


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CUBA

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A HISTORICAL STUDY IN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

BY

JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN, PH.D.

*Albert Shaw Lecturer in Diplomatic History
Johns Hopkins University*

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TO MY FATHER
THE INSTRUCTOR OF MY YOUTH

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PREFACE.

There are hundreds of books concerning Cuba, but none of them treats the subject from the standpoint of the part that the island has played in American history and international relations. Recent significant events in the West Indies have induced me to undertake this study. The nature of the subject has led to an extensive consideration of the American policy of expansion.

Part of Chapter V. appears in the Report of the American Historical Association for December, 1897. The substance of other chapters has been presented in a course of lectures at Johns Hopkins University, and also at Hamilton College.

In submitting this work to the public, I desire especially to acknowledge the courtesies of Mr. Pendleton King, Chief of the Bureau of Archives and Indexes; Mr. Andrew H. Allen, Chief of the Bureau of Rolls and Library, and Mr. S. M. Hamilton, Custodian of Archives, in rendering manuscript materials accessible, and in facilitating my researches at the Department of State. Such kindness and interest have increased the pleasure of work. I am under deep obligation to Professor Herbert B. Adams for valuable suggestions and assistance. My thanks are also due to Miss Elizabeth R. Daran and Dr. W. W. Willoughby, who have aided me in reading proofs, and to General Daniel E. Sickles, who has kindly examined the proofs of Chapter XII.

The principal sources of material are given on another page.

J. M. CALLAHAN.

*Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, June, 1899.*

PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF MATERIAL.

1. Manuscript "Notes," "Instructions," "Despatches," and "Miscellaneous" and "Domestic" letters. Bureau of Archives and Indexes, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
2. Manuscript Papers of Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, etc. Bureau of Library and Rolls, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
3. Manuscript Diplomatic Correspondence of the "Confederate States." Department of the Treasury, Washington.
4. Government Publications. Washington.
5. Record of Congressional Debates—*Annals, Register, Globe* and *Record*. Washington.
6. British and Foreign State Papers. London.
7. Parliamentary Debates. London.
8. Private correspondence, memoirs and diaries of public men.
9. Contemporary newspapers, magazines and pamphlets.
10. Historical and political treatises, *passim*.

The best bibliography upon Cuba was recently prepared by A. P. C. Griffin, Assistant Librarian of Congress. (Senate Doc. 161—55th Congress, 2d session.)

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CUBA AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION—CUBA'S RELATION TO AMERICAN HISTORY AND DIPLOMACY.

We stand at the close of a century teeming with significant and inspiring events, of which one of the most conspicuous is the Spanish retreat from her once extensive American possessions. Her decline has been coincident with the growth of the United States. Once she owned one-half the Western Continent, but now it has fallen from her hands, and over a large portion of it the United States has spread with her institutions of self-government. She ceded Louisiana to France in 1800, sold Florida to the United States in 1819, and, one by one, her provinces in South America, Central America and Mexico threw off the yoke of maladministration, leaving only Cuba and Porto Rico as a source of dissension for the remainder of the century. During a great portion of this time the relations between Spain and the United States have been in a large measure concerning the island of Cuba, which has often been a bone of serious contention. At three different times before the recent war of intervention, the United States has been on the verge of a collision with Spain: (1) At the period when Jefferson was compelled to devote his time to the unravelling of unsought foreign complications; (2) in 1854, when a shot ricocheted across the bows of the American steamer *Black*

Warrior, and (3) in 1873, when the *Virginus* was captured and many of those on board were executed at Santiago.

Cuba, lying athwart the Gulf of Mexico, between the arms of Florida and Yucatan, has had an important relation to the history of the region around the Gulf, from the time when the nations began their scramble for the globe until the present day; and there was a "Cuban question" even before American commerce in the Gulf fell a prey to the warring powers of Europe. It was a point of departure for Spanish expeditions for exploration and settlement in North America. Narvaez sailed from its shores to find a spring of youth among the flowers of Florida. Cortes started from the same place when he sailed on his expedition for intervention in Mexico, and De Soto tarried there awhile before beginning his march through Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi. It was long a stopping-place for the Spanish treasure ships from the mines of the continent, and for many years remained a resort for buccaneers. It was an objective point in the international wars in which Spain shook the American bush and England got the bird. Raleigh in those days suggested that the best way to abase King Philip of Spain and leave him as bare as Æsop's proud crow—a laughing-stock for the world—was to pluck his gorgeous tail-feathers in the Indies. It was a place of trade for the American colonies until it was captured by an Anglo-American expedition in 1762 and returned to Spain in the succeeding year. In the American Revolution it became a harbor for fleets by which Spain regained the Floridas from England and tried to prevent the United States from securing the region between the Appalachians and the Mississippi. In the European wars following the opening of the French Revolution its waters became a scene of privateering. It was at the time a centre of Spanish rule from Oregon's woods to Terra del Fuego's barren rocks, and from Florida's groves to the Golden Gate. It was an aid to the Spanish designs to blockade American progress, and to keep Ameri-

can commerce from the Gulf by means of Florida and Louisiana. Its destiny became a frequent subject of consideration by Jefferson when Napoleon jumped the Pyrenees and obtained a deed to Spanish America; but it had remained true to Spain when adventurous spirits were seeking to build new empires in the home of the Montezumas and on the southern shores of the Caribbean, and it still remained true when the cession of Florida, unifying the East and the Mississippi-West, brought the United States almost in sight of its shores. But when this acquisition of Florida left the American rivers, from the Mississippi to the Tombigbee, to flow unvexed to the Gulf, Cuba was supposed to be the object of British designs, and during the frequent feats which Spain was performing, it was feared that her tenure of the island was uncertain. While Spanish America, inspired by the brilliant display in the direction of the Aurora Borealis, was cutting itself loose from the Spanish carpet-baggers who had played the role of tyrants among its people for so many years, Cuba also contemplated independence. With Cuba as a base for expeditions against Mexico and Colombia, and with its shores infested by marauding pirates, its fate became doubly uncertain, and attracted the eyes of the nations. Its destiny was a subject of consideration in connection with the events which gave rise to the Monroe doctrine, and at several times there were propositions looking toward a guarantee to prevent the island from falling into the hands of any other nation than Spain. When Spain, after the contest with her American colonies, rested in order to recuperate, Cuba still clung to the mother country, and the mother rewarded her with a strict code of discipline. Soon the influence of England in the Indies, Central America, Mexico and Texas became a source of American jealousy, and her reported influence and designs in Cuba thus became a subject of anxious watchfulness. England was also jealous of the advance of the United States around the Gulf toward the borders of Mexico, and it was suggested that this would cause her to keep her eye intently fixed upon Cuba.

After 1840, American influence largely supplanted that of England in Cuba, on account of the similar interests of Southern and Cuban slaveholders. Soon Texas came as a State to the United States, and the disagreement as to the boundary led to the unrolling of the American map to the Pacific, giving rise to new discussions concerning transit routes through Mexico and Central America, and as to the controlling position of Cuba in protecting these routes. From 1848 until the sounding of the alarm-gong of the Civil War, Cuba was continually a subject of international dispute or negotiation. The irritation produced by filibustering was increased by the proposed Cuban reforms in slave labor, and by acts of Spanish officials toward American vessels, until the war clouds at one time hovered along the border.

During the Civil War, while the United States, without a single naval station in the West Indies, was endeavoring to repress the gigantic attempt to disrupt the Union, and was swiftly establishing an effective blockade of the long coast-line from the Chesapeake to the Rio Grande, the Confederacy was endeavoring to use Cuba as a fulcrum for a lever by which to lift secession to success, Spain was sending troops from Cuba to extend her dominion in San Domingo, and the Emperor of France was planting his armies in Mexico with the contemplated plan of extending his empire around the borders of the Gulf. Both secession and the foreign designs of conquest ended in failure, and the United States, reunited, even though she felt the need of a West Indian naval station, gave an example to the world of her non-aggressive policy in relations with both weak and unfriendly neighbors. Since the close of the American fraternal conflict, Cuba has been almost continuously in a state of open or suppressed insurrection, and the United States has shown a patience and forbearance which Europe has considered remarkable. It has been said that if Cuba had been as near to the mouth of the Thames or the Seine as it is to the

outlet of the Mississippi, it would long since have ceased to remain under Spanish maladministration.

**Conditions in
Cuba and Spain.**

Cuba has been exploited for four centuries. She was the *point d'appui* from which Spain once held the greater part of the New World in her hand; and when the spirit of resistance to Spanish rule travelled from the shores of the Caribbean to the valleys of the Rio de la Plata, and was flashed back again along the vertebræ of the Andes and the isthmus until it reached the innermost recesses of Mexico, Cuba patiently bore the burdens of the Spanish contest for the continuation of her rule and sovereignty. The story of Spain from the days of her greatness when she ruled Flanders, until the days of her decadence when she alienated all her American possessions "from Dan to Beersheba," from Texas and New Mexico to Terra del Fuego, and finally to Cuba and Porto Rico, has been characterized as a tragical comedy of errors. Her misfortunes are largely the fruits of her faults. Cuba herself has been governed from Spain, where the foreign office promised all things, and did nothing, and she has suffered much from the hordes of carpet-baggers sent to officiate and to tax. Her road to liberty has been through suffering. Her rulers have shown little of the milk of human kindness, save of the chalk-and-water variety. When Spain received a liberal constitution in 1812, something like a provincial legislature was established in Cuba—committees were to discuss and make recommendations, a militia was organized, the right to bear arms was recognized, something like trial by jury was provided for in certain cases, the press was to be free, and Cuba was allowed to send delegates to the Spanish Cortes—but the constitution never went into full effect. A royal order of May 29, 1825, became Cuba's only constitution. It gave the captain-general full and arbitrary power, and since that time there has been no legislative assembly in the island and no true representation in the Spanish Cortes. Cuba has had far more cause for revolution than the United

States had in 1776. She has been held under the yoke for the milk that could be extracted from her. Life, liberty, honor and property have been subject to the caprice of the captain-general. Insurrections and revolutions have been frequently agitated—in 1821-3, 1833-7, 1840, 1843-4, for several years after 1849, and in 1865-6. Finally in 1868 broke out the devastating conflagration which, after burning for ten years, was partially smothered, only to reappear in 1895.


In 1878, at the close of the bloody ten-years' insurrection, many reforms were promised by Governor-General Campos, but these were only partially carried out.

Spain has often made resolutions for reforms, but has always postponed the first step till to-morrow. The motto of Columbus was "Sail on! sail on!" but this has not been the motto of Spain in regard to politics and government. "Forward, march!" has been used only as an order to the troops of the standing army. Procrastination and delay have been the notes of Spanish diplomacy and politics. This misfortune has often been the result of political complications rather than of any determined opposition to reform. The Spanish Government has suffered from intermittent attacks of St. Vitus' dance, or of chills and fevers. While troubled with diseases, the Spanish air had always been full of jealousies and intrigues, and violent convulsions have always been impending when not already in action. The Spanish throne has frequently been suspended over the crater of a volcano. There has been every sort of alteration in Spain except the alteration of public opinion and political methods, which have endured the storms of the ages. Much of Spanish history during the present century has consisted of revolutions either of cabinets or governments, and often initiated or conducted by military generals, such as Riego, Espartero, Narvaez, O'Donnell, Serrano, Topeta, Prim, Campos and Jovellar. To reduce the number of cabinet changes, the Government has sometimes found it necessary to prohibit military persons from taking part in public meet-

ings or political manifestations. Even during a breathing spell, while standing between two revolutions, the condition in Spain has often been such that the United States has found it inconvenient, if not impossible, to carry on diplomatic negotiations to adjust or remove serious causes of irritation arising out of relations with Cuba.

**Foreign Designs
and the Danger
of a Transfer of
Cuba.**

The condition in Spain, together with the condition and situation of Cuba, has led to frequent rumors or reports that the island might become the possession of some other European power than Spain. Both England and France had frequently contemplated or made attacks on Cuba long before the present century. Napoleon also turned his eyes in that direction while he was busy disturbing the powers of Europe. England, too, was watching it, while the United States was engaged in a word-contest for Florida. England, the United States and France were each suspicious of the other's designs while Spain was in the midst of her wars with Colombia and Mexico. Canning tossed upon a sleepless bed in his fears of what France might do. In 1825, the *London Times* characterized Cuba as "the Turkey of transatlantic politics, tottering to its fall, and kept from falling only by the struggles of those who are contending for the right of catching her in her descent." Consideration of its destiny was the great object of the Panama mission. From 1836 to 1840 the United States feared that Spain, in order to replenish her depleted treasury, would sell the island to England or France. For many years it was also feared that England, through her influence in Cuba, and by her treaties to suppress the slave trade, or on account of the Spanish debt to British citizens, would obtain a hold in the island which would ripen into possession. These fears continued to be expressed until about 1860. In recent years there have been no rumors of any English designs, but once or twice the influence of Germany has attracted the attention of America.



American Guarantee Policy.

The United States has several times befriended Spain in her possession of Cuba. At the beginning of the Revolution she expressed her willingness to guarantee to Spain and France their possessions in the West Indies. At the time of Napoleon's wars in Europe she advised Cuba to adhere to Spain. When the Cubans, in 1822, asked the United States to promise them annexation to the Union in case they should make a successful strike for independence, the American Government, following the advice of John Quincy Adams, acted upon a policy of strict moral duty to Spain. The United States has also warned other nations to keep hands off of the island, at the same time disclaiming any desire for it herself. The idea of an international guarantee of Cuba against the designs of nations has several times been proposed. In February, 1822, Forsyth suggested to Spain that by the recognition of Mexico and Colombia and by a liberal system of commerce, she might be able to obtain a guarantee of Cuba from the United States, Mexico and Colombia. A plan for a guarantee was considered both at Washington and at London in 1823, but was not acted upon. Canning, in 1825, proposed a tripartite arrangement by which the United States, England and France should disclaim any intention of occupying Cuba, and should protest against such occupation by others; but France was especially opposed to it, and there were also some American objections. In 1826 the Mexican minister to London proposed a guarantee of Cuban independence by the American nations and Great Britain. In 1852 the idea of a tripartite arrangement was revived by England and France, who proposed to the United States that all three nations should sign an agreement disclaiming all designs on Cuba "both now and hereafter." Secretary Everett urged that such an agreement would be unequal; that in such a rapidly changing country as America it could only be transitory, and that to enter such a compact would be opposed to the American principle of avoiding alliances. At this time he mentioned five con-

tingencies which might press upon the United States the necessity of purchasing Cuba. The United States, however, had for many years practically guaranteed the island to Spain by the assurance that she would prevent a transfer of it "at all hazards." In 1840, when British aggression was feared, Spain was told that she could in case of necessity securely rely upon the whole naval and military resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering Cuba. This meant that the United States would go to war rather than consent to the occupation of the island by any other European power than Spain.

**Causes of
American Com-
plaints.** Many causes of complaint have arisen in the relations between Spain and the United States. Spain interfered with American commerce during the Revolution and looked only to her own interests. She tried to shut the United States out from the region west of the Appalachians. She sat on the mouth of the Mississippi and hindered the exit of western trade. She hatched intrigues along the western borders, opposed the transfer of Louisiana to the United States, allowed France to destroy American commerce in Cuban waters, and assumed an unfriendly attitude along the Florida boundary. During the period of the revolt of the Spanish colonies, Spanish pirates destroyed and harassed American commerce and found friendly shelter in Cuban ports, and inconveniences to the United States were caused by the long persistence of Spain in a hopeless attempt at re-subjugation. British influence in Cuba was long believed to be prejudicial to the system of slavery in the southern parts of the United States, and finally, at the time of the Lopez filibustering expeditions, it was feared that Great Britain and France had united in a policy of protection for Cuba which would involve the search of American vessels, and thus endanger friendly relations with those nations. In the Civil War it was said that Cuban authorities were too friendly to Confederates. After that war the United States desired to see emancipation of slaves in Cuba. The Cuban internal conditions, the revo-

lutionary feeling resulting therefrom, and the operation of Cuban refugees in the United States, have often caused American sympathy with insurrectionary efforts, and made it a severe strain upon the American Government to maintain its neutrality. In observing her international obligations during the insurrections since 1868 (while Spain has not admitted the existence of a war, and while the American Government has not recognized the Cubans as belligerents), the United States has done far more than would have been required by international law and usage, and during this time she has frequently had to protest against the confiscation of American estates and imprisonment of American citizens in Cuba, which produced new causes for claims and procrastinations.

Much irritation has grown out of the Spanish commercial policy. The trade of the English colonies with Cuba and other West Indies, though not allowed in colonial days, had been connived at, but it was stopped in 1764 by both Great Britain and Spain. Trade between the United States and Spanish colonies grew up during the Revolution, though there was no treaty till 1795. In 1793 the blockade of Cuba by France induced Spain to encourage American trade, but this suffered long from privateers and pirates. In 1829 Spain began a policy of restricting trade, which has since been a frequent source of irritation, and has sometimes led to war of retaliatory and discriminating duties. The United States expressed a desire for reciprocity, but Spain from time to time added new restrictions, and strictly enforced fines in cases of mere clerical errors where there had been no desire to defraud. This strictness was doubtless made more severe owing to the suspicions concerning filibusters.

In 1884 and 1886 agreements were made to end discrimination and retaliatory duties, but Cuban officials made an excuse to violate these agreements, and continued their policy of fines. In June, 1891, Spain made Cuba happy by

negotiating a reciprocity schedule, and the American commerce to Cuba increased considerably the next year, though the execution of the treaty was obstructed by the Spanish authorities in the island.

**Diplomatic
Delays.**

With the exception of one or two brief periods, the settlement of questions arising out of relations with Cuba has been much delayed by the necessity of a three-cornered correspondence between Washington, Madrid and Havana, the Cuban authorities having no diplomatic correspondence with the American consul-general in Cuba nor with Washington. This became a source of frequent complaint. Before 1866, when there was no telegraphic communication across the intervening waters, delays were very inconvenient, annoying and even dangerous. If, in a serious case which required prompt attention (as when a vessel was fired upon or refused a landing), the United States should send a messenger to Cuba, the captain-general would refer him to the Spanish minister at Washington, the Spanish minister would refer the case to Madrid, and the Madrid authorities would write to Havana and wait for information. Often, by the time that information was in the hands of the officials at Madrid, the Spanish Government would perform one of its semi-annual political gyrations and keep the United States waiting for months for the new officials to become acquainted with the case. Washington Irving once said that to carry on negotiations with such transient functionaries was like bargaining at the window of a moving railroad car. Before he could get a reply to his proposition the other party would be out of sight. Spanish procrastination has become proverbial. "Mañana! Mañana!" (To-morrow! To-morrow!) has been one of Spain's great faults. She has failed to speak at the moment when it was her duty to say something definite, or else she has evaded or postponed responsibility by making contentions.

**American Policy
of Expansion
and Acquisition.**

Ideas of acquisition and expansion of territory by the United States have, with few exceptions, developed from her experience or upon grounds of necessity. In the early days after the Revolution had been giving birth to a new nation, Washington would have trembled at the annexation of new territory beyond the bounds set by the treaty of 1783. While the West was pressing for the free navigation of the Mississippi river, he feared that access to the ocean by way of the Gulf would, by lessening the connection with the East, lead to the establishment of separate nations by the states between the Mississippi and the mountains. John Adams opposed the designs of Hamilton and others against Spanish America which might have led to the extension of the United States in the southwest. Jefferson, driven by necessity and accident, before he knew exactly what he was doing, began our policy of peaceful expansion by the purchase of a vast empire, setting our bounds to the Rockies. Madison, from apparent necessity, took temporary control of the Gulf shores from the Mississippi to the Mobile. Monroe, for the same reason, extended our domains to the Florida straits. The fact that Texas had been largely settled by American frontiersmen led to quarrels which resulted in an independent state, and finally enabled Polk to move the boundary stones to the fickle Rio Grande and to the Golden Gate. Then began a twelve-year period of pro-slavery land hunger in which there were schemes for getting control of more of Spain's former domains in the direction of Central America and Mexico. Some even began to dream of South America. Cuba, especially, standing warden to the Gulf of Mexico, having a close commercial and military relation to the United States, with a system of slavery which the South desired to see continued, and a system of commercial restrictions and arbitrary government which many others desired to see ended, became an object of anxious desire by a large party in the United States.

American troops had helped to seize Cuba in 1762. The

probable necessity of seizing it again in case of war with Spain had been suggested in Congress as early as 1803. Pestered by the European conflicts, Jefferson in 1805 said that the neutrality of United States territory should extend to the Gulf Stream. At the period of uncertainty when Napoleon turned to appropriate the land beyond the Pyrenees, and took a title-deed to Spanish-America, some contemplated the possible liberation of the Western Hemisphere, and Jefferson began to consider the possibility of Cuba joining the American Union. At this time, and again in 1822-23, Cuban agents made propositions looking toward annexation, but the American Government gave them no encouragement to break the tie with Spain. It was seen, however, that if Cuba should fall from her unnatural connection with Spain and gravitate toward the bosom of the North American Union without any manœuvring on our part, "we must e'en take the goods the gods provide us." Monroe considered Cape Florida and Cuba as forming the mouth of the Mississippi and other rivers flowing into the Gulf, and suggested that its acquisition might become necessary to our internal tranquillity. In 1825, A. H. Everett, the American minister at Madrid, suggested that President Adams might be able to secure Cuba by taking it as a mortgage on a loan to Spain; but, although the United States was opposed to a transfer of the island to European powers, she preferred to see it under Spanish rule. After 1840, and especially after the annexation of Texas, there was an increasing expression in some quarters that Cuba was ready to throw herself into our arms. The Mexican War gave a stimulus to the annexation of territory, causing it to extend to Yucatan as well as to Cuba. In 1848 Polk entered into "profoundly confidential" negotiations for the purchase of Cuba, but Spain refused to sell. Books soon appeared to influence public opinion in favor of acquisition, and certain wild spirits enthusiastically entered into filibustering expeditions to play the knight-errant and to determine the future of the "Queen of the

Antilles." After several failures, the ardor of these would-be knight-errants was finally cooled by a partial realization of the fact that they had been following a will-o'-the-wisp. But the annexation of the island now became a party question. "Young America," intoxicated with the progress of a hundred years, joined hands with the slavery-extensionists to preach from the text of "manifest destiny" and to pray for more land. Every addition to the territory of the American Union had given homes to European emigrants and had extended representative government, and it was now boldly proclaimed that the American nation was "not to be circumscribed by narrow isthmuses and gulf streams." Immigration to America, and the continued march of determined men and women to the West, had kept the arteries of American society injected with vigor, had breathed into its lungs freshness, and had given it an active pulse-beat. It suffered from no torpidity, but rather from flights of passion and oratory, and it soared on the wings of "manifest destiny" from mountain peaks across fertile valleys to other distant and higher peaks. Was it a wonder that the tongues of some inflation orators spun arguments which soared aloft like balloons without ballast—at the sport of the wind? While much of the Southern agitation for Cuba can be explained by the desire to bolster up the slave power in legislative halls, Southern motives must be partially explained by the natural fear that Southern economic interests were threatened by the policy of Great Britain to secure emancipation of slaves wherever possible.

The Fillmore administration had announced that the annexation of Cuba would be "fraught with serious peril;" but when the ides of March ushered Franklin Pierce into the President's chair, the purchase of Cuba became the chief aim of his foreign policy, which before the election had been lavishly prophesied as bold and defiant. Some hoped to get the island "without money and without price;" others favored getting it by the purse if possible, but if that should not be possible, then by the sword. Pierce desired to purchase it

honestly, and negotiations were entered into, but they failed. Acquisition continued to be a subject of debate and negotiations till the Civil War. When Buchanan stepped into the place of Pierce he announced expansion to be the future policy of the country. He continued to press the necessity of purchasing Cuba; suggested intervention in helpless, bleeding Mexico; recommended the temporary occupation of Sonora and Chihuahua, and proposed to send land and naval forces to Central America in order to protect the transit route to California. It was said in Congress that we should "advance our Eagles until the tread of our columns should be heard upon the whole continent." Our vessel of State rode upon a swollen and enraged tide, and many said that the only thing to do was to let her float to her manifest and legitimate destination, carrying the flag from "Greenland's icy mountains to Darien's golden strands," and even unto the end of the earth at Cape Horn. The Democratic party had accomplished much good in its long career, but it was now on the trail of false gods. The good it had done would never die; but it was only an instrument, and its new creed needed to be modified. It had to learn the lesson that a nation's glory does not consist alone in material goods and extent of territory. A higher and more liberal democracy was to be wrought out by actual experience to meet the needs of a greater nation that had been born in the generation of a rapidly developing West. National development and the establishment of closer bonds between East and West, North and South, was more important than the extension of dominion over the tropical climes whose people were disturbed by dissension and strife—so the American majority believed. The Civil War by abolishing slavery in the United States ended the agitation for the purchase of Cuba. Both North and South during the struggle had disclaimed all designs upon the island. It was prophesied that the United States at the close of the war would embark upon a policy of conquest, and for several years afterwards Mexico feared to establish a railway connection with her

American neighbor. Canada also feared American designs. About the time Alaska was purchased the United States Government contemplated the acquisition of St. Thomas and other small islands in the West Indies for naval stations. President Grant also urged the acquisition of San Domingo. But there was a strong opposition to further extension of territory at that time. During the Ten Years' War, with all its inconveniences, many Americans, who desired to see the end of slavery in Cuba, sympathized with the insurgents, but there was no American offer to purchase the island, though the Government for the sake of peace would probably have agreed to guarantee a payment by the Cubans to Spain for their independence. Secretary Fish several times stated that the United States did not desire Cuba. Blaine, in 1881, and Frelinghuysen, in 1883, said that the American policy tended to avoid possessions disconnected with this continent. In 1887, when there was a strong Cuban feeling in favor of annexation, John Sherman said that he did not desire to see Cuba as an appendage to the United States. Senator Morgan states that Cleveland favored the annexation of both Cuba and Hawaii during his first administration; but Blaine, in 1890, felt sure that the people of the United States, for a long time to come, would "be wisely content with our present area, and not launch upon any scheme of annexation." The conditions as to Hawaii, and the inevitable consequences of the recent dismemberment of the Spanish dominions, have modified the policy of previous years. The recent change in favor of annexation has been advocated by leaders in both political parties, but not with a general desire to enter upon an aggressive policy of territorial aggrandizement.

**Origin and
Development of
the Policy of
Intervention.**

The United States Government has always manifested a great interest in the future welfare of Cuba. It has opposed the intervention of other powers there and has contemplated the possibility of exigencies which might arise where intervention by the United States

would become a necessity or a duty. Jefferson, as early as 1807, suggested that, in case of a war with Spain, Cuba would probably "add itself to our confederation," but the next year, when Napoleon threatened America, the peace-loving President said he would sincerely lament to see Cuba fall into any hands but those of Spain. When a deputation from Cuba was sent to Washington to propose annexation to the United States, Jefferson thought best to decline the offer at that time, but stated that we would be very unwilling to see them pass under the dominion or ascendancy of England or France, and that the "object of both (Cuba and the United States) must be to exclude European influence from this continent." Madison, in 1810-11, confidently said that the position of Cuba would prevent the United States from being a satisfied spectator to its falling into the hands of any European nation which might use it as a fulcrum against American commerce. The Monroe administration adopted the same policy. In February, 1823, when it was feared that France was about to attack the island, and that there was some sort of agreement between Spain and England which would give the latter a chance to interfere, Forsyth asked the Spanish minister whether there was local force enough to defend the island in case of attacks. The minister replied that Spain relied for security upon her own resources and upon the United States. Cuba at this time was a focus for pirates, whose depredations on American commerce induced the United States to consider whether measures of intervention would not be necessary in case the Spanish forces should be unable to drive them from Cuban waters. In 1817-19 there was a general agreement in Europe and America upon the propriety of intervention in the contest between Spain and her American colonies, but there was a disagreement as to the method. President Monroe countenanced no interference except upon the basis of independence. The spirit of the Monroe doctrine, launched in 1823 against the introduction of oppressive government on this hemisphere, forbade European intervention on the American

continent, and even implied the possibility of intervention against Spain on behalf of Cuba, as well as against Europe in behalf of America. It claimed the right to intervene in favor of communities that were no longer contented to remain European, and that showed their wish and power to be American. The Monroe doctrine has several times been applied in justification of the American policy to prevent the acquisition of Cuba by any other European power than Spain, but it is not the real source and life of the policy. The American Government also opposed any Mexican or Colombian expedition against Cuba in case it should threaten to disturb the internal condition of the island. In 1843, when it was reported that British agents were encouraging an insurrection of slaves in the island, the Spanish minister seems to have applied to the United States for the assistance of her naval vessels. Ten years later Secretary Marcy, in his instructions to Buchanan at London, said the United States would resist any interference of foreign nations to sustain Spanish rule in Cuba or to regulate the internal affairs of the island to the injury of the United States. At the beginning of the Civil War, Spain was warned that Cuba must not be made a base for enterprises endangering the American Union.

In the ten years' struggle against Spain, there was much sympathy in the United States for the Cuban cause. In order to end the inconvenience of the desperate warfare, the American Government offered to mediate on the basis of Cuban independence, Cuba to pay Spain for the relinquishment of her sovereignty and for her property. The leaders of the Spanish Government were inclined to accede, the only apparent serious obstacle being the arrangement of the preliminaries. The Castilian Cabinet did not become offended at the suggestion of Cuban independence, but it refused to consider any armistice or plan for independence so long as the insurgents had arms in their hands. It began to pave the way for reforms, however, by the preparation of a law for the emancipation of slaves. After the stubborn

exterminating war had been in existence for four years a long catalogue of irritating affairs relating to Cuba culminated in the exciting episode of the *Virginius* which came near dragging the United States into a war with Spain. After the affair was adjusted it was suggested that, in order to remove the possibility of such irritations in the future, the time had arrived when intervention for the pacification of Cuba was justifiable and a duty. A year later Spain was notified of the possible necessity of early intervention. At the same time England and other powers were invited to consider the state of Cuba with a view to co-operation with American overtures to end the war. It soon became evident that there was little hope of European co-operation. Calderon, the new Spanish minister at Madrid, expressed to Cushing, the American minister, a desire to heal all differences between the two countries, and a willingness promptly to consider all causes of complaint with a view of properly adjusting them. He invited the advice of the American executive as to a plan of reform in Cuba. There were Spanish suspicions in regard to the American fleet which wintered at Port Royal, but the adjustment of questions at issue proceeded in a friendly manner between Cushing and Calderon.

Soon came the end of the desperate Ten Years' War, but it was followed by mutterings of Cuban discontent which presaged the renewal of the contest which began in 1895 and was ended by the intervention of the United States. When the Sagasta-Campos policy of conciliation to end the new insurrection was replaced by the Canovas-Weyler policy of "blood and iron" at the beginning of 1896, Congress soon favored intervention on the basis of Cuban independence. President Cleveland was patient; he offered the good offices of the United States for mediation, but contemplated intervention as a future contingency in case Spain should fail to put her house in order. The Spanish ministry considered mediation as impracticable, but promised to inaugurate reforms after the insurgents should lay down their arms.

At the close of Cleveland's administration, President McKinley found it necessary to continue the protests of his predecessor against the Spanish policy in Cuba. General Woodford was sent to Madrid, in the summer of 1897, on a mission of mediation for Cuban independence, and to say that the time was ripe for Spain to end the struggle. A more liberal ministry under Sagasta now replaced the Canovas ministry. While it did not accept the proffered mediation, it appreciated the friendly motives of the United States, admitted the inconveniences to the American Government and people, and declared its purpose to adopt a policy that would satisfy the American Government and secure an early pacification of Cuba. Sagasta recalled Weyler, and seemed sincere in his plan of autonomy, but Hannis Taylor, the recent American minister at Madrid, on returning to the United States, said that there was little hope of reform, that the sovereignty of Spain over Cuba was extinct, and that intervention was the proper cure for Cuba's ills. The American Government had observed its international obligations, and was still willing to abide the result of the milder methods of Blanco in Cuba, but it reserved the right to determine its future policy according to what should seem the obligations of duty—even if it should appear necessary to interfere by force. While the majority of both sides in Cuba were opposing autonomy, while the American people were sending supplies to feed the surviving Cuban reconcentrados who had lost nearly all interest in the problem of human life, and while there was no reviving indication that Spain could ever expect to re-establish her sovereignty over the blue mountains and naked hills, the telegraph flashed the news of the tragic destruction of the American war vessel, the *Maine*, while on a friendly visit in Havana harbor. After a calm, careful investigation of this affair, there was a shower of resolutions in Congress in favor of some immediate action that would clean the western seas of the medievalism which had been the source of the three years' irritation culminating in the blowing up of the *Maine*. President McKinley soon

stated that all efforts to restore peace in Cuba had been exhausted, and recommended intervention as a last resource in order that a government could be established that could be recognized and that could guarantee security to foreign vessels in Cuban ports. The Senate committee of foreign affairs, having fully considered the subject, said in its report that Spain could no more be allowed to recolonize the depopulated portions of Cuba than she could be permitted to found a new colony in the Western Hemisphere. Congress at once passed a resolution demanding Spain to relinquish her authority over Cuba, and to withdraw her forces from Cuban waters—authorizing intervention on grounds of necessity and policy as advocated by the Monroe doctrine. Spain refused to consider the American demand, negotiations ended, the blockade of Cuba began, and after nearly a century of diplomacy without war these two nations entered into a sixty days' war without diplomacy.

The Recent War. The voice of the people was heard like the rush of mighty waters demanding that the desolating, pitiless story of Spain in Cuba should end, and that the Augean stables should be cleaned. War came like a furious wind and blew away the dying leaves of Spanish rule in order to give room for a younger, healthier and more democratic growth. Weyler, at the door of the twentieth century, while writing his name in blood-red letters on Cuba's mountains, had strewn his path with the victims which he slew by his policy of "blood and iron;" but the United States sent her fleets to plough the waves in order that people might exercise their right to live, and in order that Cuba, naked, sick and hungry, might be clothed, animated with new life, and encouraged to again labor for food. Folly lies back of wars, but even the pacific state cannot always conveniently avoid becoming entangled in quarrels. There are occasions when it becomes necessary to throw aside the lectures of the "Peace Society." Merciful Heaven allows people to fight rather than be killed by inches.

The tragedy of time has been punctuated by battles; and earth's bosom is still fretted by cyclones as well as warmed by gulf streams. The modern close bonds of communication and mutual interests, together with a realization of the vast evil consequences which arise from prancing in war harness either as an occupation or as a pastime, have created a healthful spirit in favor of peace. But while the clearing of forests, the laying of railroads, the building of steamships, the erection of telegraph lines and the cabling of oceans, have brought neighbors to live nearer to each other, it has in some cases increased their duties and responsibilities. They must watch whether their actions infringe upon the rights of their neighbors. The bitter experiences of the past, in which nations have received their schooling, show the absurdity of rushing into wars, but there may yet be a time when the cannon's mouth must speak, and shouldered muskets gleam in the sunlight. Perhaps it is still true that without the shedding of blood there can be no conclusion of some sins. War proved a swift and effective remedy for the constitutional ills of Spain in the West Indies.

New Problems.

The results of the recent war are far-reaching. It has left us with several Spanish children in arms for whose future we are largely responsible. Victorious over Spain, we win our greatest victory over ourselves in taking the proper attitude toward these new children. New problems arise along the southern horizon. The loss of Cuba and Porto Rico by Spain, and the probability that sugar from these islands will enter the United States free of duty has an important significance as to the political and commercial future of other West Indian islands. There has been considerable discussion in Jamaica, and in a conference at Barbadoes, in favor of annexation to the United States in case the British Government does not take action to assist the sugar interests in those islands. The United States has not countenanced this movement. Froude, the English historian, said in 1887 that it was the opinion in Cuba that "America is the residuary legatee" of all the West Indies, and

that she will finally be forced to take charge of them even if she should desire otherwise.

Destiny of Cuba. Cuba's great interest for us lies in its future, and the principal value of a study of its past is to illumine the problems which confront those who must help to determine its future. A purely historical treatise can not indulge in a forecast of the future, nor enter into arguments or disquisitions upon questions of future policy. It cannot enter into a running veneration, apology or criticism of the past; and it can embark neither upon prophecy nor upon politics. It can simply state facts in their true relations and bearings with no particular set of ideas to sustain. In both Cuba and the United States public opinion is divided between a policy of annexation, autonomy under United States, and independence. Motives in each case are complex, influenced by sentiment, personal aims and prejudices, as well as by sound political reasons; but after investigation, deliberation and exchange of views, the best solution of the question can be reached. Great problems have confronted us in the past, and the American Government has arisen to meet them. We need not despair of the future. If mistakes are made they will but lead to correction. Newspapers may be wrong to-day, but truth appears to-morrow—though error and falsehood help to make the composite picture of history. The ultimate destiny of Cuba is not one to be settled only by the gladiators of issues in the dome-crowned capitol on the banks of the malarial Potomac. The desire of Cuba as well as of the United States must be considered; and, as in marriage, in addition to the question of desire is the question of expediency and fitness. It has been said that with Cuba's destiny in the hands of her own people she would abandon race sentiment and seek to become a part of the United States; but it would still be necessary to consider whether the Cubans are ready for American institutions—whether the character of the population is such that annexation as a territory or state would not be objectionable or

inconvenient to the United States. In 1859, Slidell and Mallory, in the Senate, said that the purchase of Louisiana led to that of Florida, and that they both pointed to the acquisition of Cuba. Whatever objection may be made to this statement, it is certainly true that the acquisition of Louisiana, Florida and Texas, and the extension of self-government over vast regions of virgin territory, pointed to the solution of the Cuban question. Self-government and a more complete life, with as little injury or inconvenience to others as possible—this is the end to which both individuals and nations have been moving—and, whether annexed or independent, Cuba will advance with the currents of the age. Some leading Cubans doubt whether the island at present has a capacity for self-government. The ultimate destiny of Cuba cannot be decided in advance by political quacks. Her entire future cannot be moulded by institutions imposed from without or from within. She has centuries of past experience which cannot be ignored, and future experience will be the best guide to future destiny. She may for awhile be discontented and play intermittent pranks in the school of self-government. The difficulties that come from a lack of experience will doubtless be augmented by the mischief-working manipulations of wily politicians, whose consciences and lack of patriotism permit them to seek to use the Government as an instrument to advance their own personal ends at the expense of the people. But Cuba will not turn her back upon progress. She will feel her way toward the light as the United States has done. She will learn and will gradually be able to realize the meaning of a "Government of the people, by the people, and for the people." Whether independent, or a part of the American Union, she will be united in the holy bonds of commerce with all nations.

CHAPTER II.

ANGLO-SPANISH RELATIONS AROUND THE GULF OF MEXICO BEFORE 1783.

Cuba, nearly 800 miles long, with an area of 43,220 square miles, narrow and crescent-shaped, had its origin in volcanic action. It is a land of hills and lowlands, unnavigable rivers, shallow and rocky coasts, no snow, and a variety of vegetation and bright coloring. It lies athwart the Gulf of Mexico, 130 miles from Florida, and 100 miles from Yucatan. Its position prevented Columbus from finding the American continent, and it preserved to the Anglo-Saxon the best part of a new world. It was discovered in 1492 by Columbus, who visited it again in 1494 and 1502, and was rewarded for his work by being returned in chains from San Domingo. In one of his letters to Ferdinand and Isabella, Columbus called Cuba the "Alpha and Omega," and said: "I shall not speak to your Highnesses of the immense advantages which will one day be derived from it; such a country must afford great resources."

The island was circumnavigated in 1508, and won by Spanish conquest in 1511. The Indian population was extinct by 1553. The method of causing the natives to disappear may be inferred from the statement of a native chief who said: "I prefer hell to Heaven if there are Spaniards in Heaven." The disappearance of native races beneath the burdens of the Spaniards led to a new social necessity—the importation of slaves. In 1534, when the people were excited over the reported riches of Peru, a Spanish officer wrote to the emperor as follows: "Send us

at once the 7000 negroes that they may become inured to labor before the Indians cease to exist; otherwise the inhabitants cannot sustain themselves nor the Government detain anyone here, for, with the new tidings from Peru, all desire to leave."

Taking Cuba as a starting point for explorations and expeditions of conquest, Spain could finally claim all the extensive domain from Cape Horn to the Dakotas and Oregon.

Like Grecian waters, the restless sea around Cuba, with its beautiful islands and deep blue waters, became the scene of great adventures and brave struggles between races—but also one of pain and disaster. It was long a place for pirates and buccaneers, who toyed with danger quite as fearlessly as with a maiden's ringlets, and watched for the Spanish ships that were ever sailing to carry to Spain the gold gotten by the sweat of Indians in American mines. The Caribbean was in those days a great training school for seamen. Froude said that it was the cradle of the naval empire of Great Britain. It was there that Drake, Hawkins and others stopped the Spanish ships from Panama. It was there that the men who spoiled the Spanish Armada were trained.

There was a scramble for the globe after the discovery of America and the doubling of the Cape of Good Hope. The nations were on the hunt for booty. Spain and Portugal at first got the big share. When the treasures of the Indies, the Incas, and the Aztecs made Spain the greatest power in the earth and the sovereign of the seas, England, Holland and France began to dispute her supremacy. When Spain declared war against England, the English sea-dogs persistently worried her treasure fleets. So, other nations finally obtained islands in the Caribbean Sea. Cuba was often threatened by both France and England. In 1538, a French privateer attacked Havana, fired it and burned it to the ground. Spain rebuilt the city, erected defences, and made De Soto governor. In 1554 the city was again par-

tially destroyed by the French, and the next year it was plundered by pirates. It became more and more an object and Philip II.

The reign of that confirmed coquette, Elizabeth, fell in of attack by the enemies of Spain in the wars of Charles V. an age of intrigue and double-dealing in which she had no superior representative. Fraud and dissimulation had partly taken the place of force. It was an age of adventure and daring. When Frobisher sailed along the coast of Greenland and Drake circumnavigated the globe the world had grown large suddenly, and the "West" had arisen to dazzle the vision of man and to produce Utopian dreams. Men looked across the Atlantic with extravagant hopes of the material gain which they might obtain. Englishmen first sailed the Spanish main to sell slaves or to appropriate gold from Spanish vessels. In October, 1567, Sir John Hawkins started to the coast of Guinea in Africa to get negroes for the Spanish settlement in America. After getting over 400 of Africa's natives he sailed to the West Indies in 1568, where he had a reasonable trade in some places—though the king had commanded the governor not to allow it. In other places, the towns were entered by force and the trading was done secretly.

America had become a field for Spanish exploitation; but while Spain was beating the bush, England was catching the bird. On November 15, 1577, Sir Francis Drake with 164 men left Plymouth, England, ostensibly for Alexandria, but he sailed by the northern coast of Africa and went from the Cape Verde Islands to Brazil, then through the Straits of Magellan to the Pacific. Sailing up the western coast of America as far as San Francisco, he rifled Spaniards who had fallen asleep by the seaside, the llama trains laden with silver from the mines, the chapels of their silver chalice and altar cloth, the Spanish captains of their jewels, and about a score of Spanish ships of their gold, silver, precious stones, dry-goods and china dishes. A clean sweep was made of everything which could be carried off. Where

men were asleep beside their treasure, however, the treasure alone was appropriated, the men being left undisturbed to enjoy their seance with Morpheus. When ships in port were rifled, their cables were cut and they were allowed to drift where they would. The last ship Drake took was bound for the Philippines, and, in this case, he relieved her of only a part of her merchandise. By this time Drake, "thinking himself both in respect of his private injuries received from the Spaniards and also of their contempts and indignities offered to our country [England] and Prince in general, sufficiently satisfied and revenged," decided to return to England with his treasure. Avoiding the danger of meeting angry Spaniards by the Magellan route, he rounded the Cape of Good Hope and reached home November 3, 1580. The drama of Drake on the Pacific coast was soon frequently enacted in the waters around Cuba.

In 1584, Richard Hakluyt, at the request of Raleigh, wrote a tract, to be read before the Queen, in which he suggested how King Philip of Spain might be abased by beginning at the West Indies where the people were kept in subjection and desired freedom. The tract said that Philip was in debt many millions, had no credit, and that if the proper plans be "executed duelye and with spede and effect no doubt but the Spanish empire falls to the ground and the Spanish king shall be left as bare as Æsop's proud crow," and that with his gorgeous feathers gone he would "become a laughing-stock for the worlde." "If you touch him in the Indies," said Hakluyt, "you touch the apple of his eye."

About 1585, Havana was seriously menaced by the English under Drake, and a few years later (1589-97) two fortresses were built for protection. The fact that the Spanish treasure ships from Mexico and Honduras stopped at Havana made it the more liable to attack by English buccaneers. It also favored the development of Cuba, but the Spanish wars of the seventeenth century reacted on the progress and prosperity of the island.

When Henry VII. was chief constable of England the Cabots had made explorations in North America, but it was not until the days of enigmatical Elizabeth that an attempt at settlement was made. Before the time of Gilbert, men sought the Indies and the treasure ships, not colonization. It is no wonder that Spain feared that English colonies in America would prove a den of pirates. The desire to debase Spain was one of the earliest causes of English colonization in the New World. At first Spain had claimed all America, but other nations of Europe had not acquiesced in such a chimerical claim. Even after the days of Philip II. when the empire began to moulder, and after England had made permanent settlements in America, Spain did not give up her original claim, and hostilities seldom ceased in the West Indies, even in time of peace.

From the beginning of colonization in Virginia, there were Spanish intrigues to prevent it. Spain instructed her ambassador, Zuñiga, to try to influence the King of England to discountenance the Jamestown colony. James I. was conciliatory but he would not prohibit the settlement. Zuñiga, on January 24, 1607, wrote Philip III. concerning the proposed settlement, and suggested that its design was to establish a base for pirates to capture Spanish merchant ships. His fears were not entirely groundless, for a few of the Jamestown settlers did at one time escape from the hand of colonial authority and embark on a piratical expedition. Zuñiga, on April 12, 1609, wrote his king that the Jamestown people ought to be "quickly annihilated." Spain sent spies to Virginia, but made no open attack upon the colony. The desire of James to please Spain was one of the influences which finally led to the annulling of the Virginia charter in June, 1624.

The capture of the Spanish treasure fleet, worth three million dollars, in 1628, and the subsequent destruction of the Spanish naval fleet, left the West Indies almost unprotected. The restriction of colonial commerce to the Spanish flag, by the action of the Spanish Government under Philip

IV. and Charles II. led to the growth of the smuggling trade in the Caribbean. The smugglers, or buccaneers, grew to be freebooters preying mainly on Spanish commerce, and in many cases aiding France and England in their designs against Spanish colonies.

During the time of Cromwell several plans were proposed for striking at the power of Spain in America. The first of these was probably originated by Thomas Gage, who had been educated in the Catholic religion, and had been a priest in Mexico for twelve years. Returning to England, he offered to his countrymen "a new world to be subject of their future pains, valor and piety * * * wherein the English nation may see what wealth and honor they have lost by the oversight of Henry VII. who * * did * * reject the offer of being the first discoverer of America, and left it to Ferdinando." Gage went on to say: "And yet, if time were closely followed at the heels, we are not so far behind but that we might take him by the foretop * * * The Barbadoes, St. Christophers, Mives, and the rest of the Caribbe Islands have not only advanced our journey the better part of the way, but so inured our people to the clime of the Indies as they are the more enabled thereby to undertake any enterprise upon the firm land with greater facility * * * With the same pains and charge which they have been at in planting one of those petty islands, they might have conquered so many great cities and large territories on the main continent as very well might merit the title of a kingdom." Mr. Gage said that mere discoveries should not give the Spaniards a title to the land—that the just right or title to the countries around the Caribbean belonged to the natives, and that if they freely invited the English to come to their protection they might legally transfer the title which they held. In the plan which he submitted to Cromwell, Gage particularly advised the reduction of San Domingo and Cuba, which he said might easily pave the way for extending conquests to the continent, and for stopping Spanish treasure ships. Colonel Modiford, a planter

of the Barbadoes, preferred to force a settlement in Guiana, but, in case design against the islands was considered more advisable, he said Cuba was the most advantageous place to watch for Spanish vessels. In the council it was decided to begin the attack with Porto Rico or San Domingo. In September, 1654, the expedition sailed under Admiral Penn, and it landed at San Domingo in April, 1655. Sickness among the soldiers, and other causes, led to the abandonment of the attack at that point. Jamaica was taken by the assistance of the buccaneers, and it became a dead weight on England for many years. Filibusters were the principal supporters of the colony. For many years these buccaneers also threatened Havana; and if Spain had not cultivated influence with the British Government, the English might easily have taken Cuba as they had taken Jamaica. The Spaniards were so reduced by the assaults of the buccaneers that they were never successful in their attempts to regain Jamaica.

By an American treaty of friendship between England and Spain in 1670, peace was proclaimed in the West Indies. All letters of marque and reprisal were called in, past injuries were to be forgotten, England was to hold all that she then possessed in the West Indies, and the subjects of each Power were not to sail into the ports fortified or possessed by the other party. English merchants, however, said that it was not the duty of England to prevent trade with Spain—that she should neither countenance nor prohibit the trade, but that she should leave it to itself. Spain practically did the same for a long while. While the letter of the treaty prohibited all commerce with Spanish ports in the West Indies, English traders and vessels were allowed to put into Spanish harbors, if forced by storms or other distresses, and to continue there until they had refreshed themselves and were refitted. The result shows that the Spanish were inclined to connive at the English trade. The above provision furnished a convenient way of overcoming inconveniences to trade, and the English vessels did not wait

for the near approach of the storm in order to carry on their illicit and flourishing trade. But after the Bourbon, Philip V., established himself on the throne the Spanish policy changed and later, by the treaty of Utrecht, the English trade in Spanish America was much restricted. The coast guards began to watch closely and the letter of the treaty was enforced, except when Spain had trouble with France.

About 1710, there were British plans for capturing Havana whose advantages to Great Britain were carefully considered. The treaty of Utrecht in 1713 did not bring a finality to the Anglo-Spanish quarrels, and the friction in the Caribbean and along the American coast did not cease. Cuba had grown rapidly since the decline of the buccaneers in 1689-97. In 1717, the establishment of a royal tobacco monopoly produced friction between the colonists and the mother-country. Smuggling was soon revived, mainly by British traders. Relations became more and more tangled until, in 1726, the English Government issued instructions to Vice-Admiral Hosier to search for Spanish galleons. General Hunter the same year wrote to Lord Townsend favoring an attack upon Cuba. A few days later the Duke of Newcastle instructed Vice-Admiral Hosier to intercept the Spanish galleons at Havana. In 1732, the Governor of Santiago de Cuba in a letter to Hon. Charles Stewart expressed a desire to aid in suppressing privateers. At the beginning of 1737 there were fears that Spanish privateers from Havana would invade Georgia and South Carolina, and the British Government considered plans for protection. The next year it was urged in Parliament that Spain should disavow any right to either of these colonies.

Walpole managed to keep peace until 1738, but the nation was then plunged into war with Spain by the clamor of merchants, the dreams of heroic grandeur, and the violence of party. By the Treaty of 1713 one English vessel of 600 tons burden was to make one trading voyage a year to the Spanish colonies of America. But Englishmen wanted a larger share of American commerce and the treaty restric-

tions were a source of ill-feeling. English merchants had begun to look upon the trade as a right, and had persistently traded as they had been allowed to do before 1713. Other vessels followed the one of 600 tons and resupplied her as fast as she sold her first cargo—so the Spanish said. This led to a great falling off in the business of the Spanish-American fair at Panama. The merchants smuggled, the guards acted, the merchants complained, petitions were sent to Parliament, and war was insisted upon. In some cases where the vessels were captured the Governor of Cuba had agreed to pay a money indemnity, thus recognizing the capture as unjust. But merchants complained that the pay was not enough; and, in some cases they had an opportunity to continue their complaints for nine years after they had lost their goods.

On March 3, 1738, the Spanish depredations were the subject of long debates in the House of Commons, and continued to be under discussion for over a month. Various seamen were examined at the bar of the House, many of whom probably exaggerated their injuries—but their tales, no matter how incredulous, were implicitly believed, and soon the dogs of war were unchained. The real occasion of the war was the episode of Jenkins' ear. Captain Robert Jenkins had been seized while cruising (or smuggling) in the West Indies on the *Rebecca* in 1731. The Spaniards searched his vessels for goods which they did not succeed in finding, then hung him to the yard-arm till nearly dead, once with the cabin-boy at his feet, and finally cut off one of his ears and told him to take it to the King of England with their compliments. Jenkins wrapped up his ear and carried it home, hoping to use it advantageously in making a request for justice. The story of Robert Jenkins' ear when first reported made no great impression, but when Jenkins now appeared at the bar of the Commons and told his story, displaying the ear which he had been carrying around in cotton for seven years, the ridiculous affair filled the House with indignation, and inflamed the public mind.

Walpole—who had been able to select the Commons with a purse and rule it with a nod; who had kept his power by contriving to set his enemies to fighting each other; who had been able to save his unreformed craft of State by throwing tubs and barrels overboard to satisfy the immediate hunger of the too-credulous critics that followed in the wake of his vessel—was now forced to favor war in order to satisfy the clamor for vengeance.

During the war which followed, Cuba was considered important, and various plans were submitted for an attack upon it. In 1738, Spain had about a dozen ships-of-war at Havana. The English also had forces in the West Indies, and the movements of the Spanish vessels were closely watched. Vice-Admiral Vernon at Jamaica on January 31, 1739, gave orders to capture any Spanish vessel which should attempt to enter Havana. Plans for taking Cuba were considered the same year—the English were to be assisted by American colonial forces. The nature of various plans, and the importance which the British attached to Cuba at this time, will be fairly indicated by the following endorsed proposal which was contained in a letter of Mr. Hamilton under date of May 14, 1739:

“A Proposal to take the Island of Cuba with very little expense to England by a Force raised in the American Colonies.

“If the Crown of England could become possessed of the Island of Cuba, that Key of all America, no man of knowledge can deny but that Great Britain, in that case must become possessed of the whole Trade of the Spanish Empire there; and if the simple Privilege of trading with those People, upon very high Terms, is now become one of the greatest Prizes contended for by all the Powers in Europe, sure England will not neglect any opportunity which is offer'd of acquiring such a possession as must Infallibly Secure that whole Invaliable trade to its Subjects alone, especially since Great Britain is now in a fair way of loosing

all the Trade She has hitherto had with those parts. It is propos'd, therefore, to take Cuba without puting England to any Material Expence, or trouble, in ye following manner (viz:)

“For a person of conduct and experiance to be Commission'd from hence, for the Chief Command in this Expedition, to take Cuba, &cd. That as soon as such person is so Commiss'd and properly instructed, He is to repair, with all Expedition, to America, and at the same time another proper person should be Commission'd & sent to America, with Instructions, to begin at the most Northren Colony, and proceed from one Province to another, and apply to ye several Governments for each of them, according to their Respective Capacitys, to furnish their Quota of proper Transports with 6 months provisions in each for as many men as they will severally carry; and that each Province, according to the number of Transports they severally furnish, shall raise a suffitient number of men to fill them, compleately arm'd with amunition, &cd. That the number of men thus rais'd and arm'd shall consist of 10,000; and at the same time yt such persons are commission'd and sent away it will be necessary to send Instructions, of the same Import, to the several Governors in America to Issue orders, and give their best assistance, to fitt out, with all Expedition, such Transports, &cd, and men so equip'd.

“That when each Province has furnish'd their Quota of Transports and Men, according to their abilitys, these shall imediately repair to one Place appointed, which may be at South Carolina, and from thence proceed, under the command and direction of the person to be Commission'd from hence. They may (if it shall appear advisable) in their passage make a faint to take St. Augustine, and having manag'd that stratigem properly, they are to proceed to the Island of Cuba, and Land in the Bay of Matances, that being a good Harbour and not Guarded, yet lying the nearest of any other proper one to ye Havana. Here they shall land 7 or 8000 men, more or less, as necessity shall require,

and with that Force to March down and pich at a proper distance to surround the Havana and cutt of all manner of provisions—going thereto by land, at the same time that some ships shall lye before the town to prevent any provisions or relief coming to it by sea; in which situation that Important Place must surrender in a very short time. In order to render this Conquest both sure and Expeditious, it will be necessary to send 6 or 8 60-guns Ships and 2 Bomb Keches, with about 2,000 Troops on Board them, which, if necessary, may be joyn'd by some of ye station ships now in America. These Ships of Warr are intended, some to lye before the Havana to play against ye town and cutt off all relief and provisions by sea, while the American Forces Besieges it by Land; and the rest of the Ships are to take care of the Gard da Coaste.

“These 10,000 men being furnish'd & maintain'd by ye several Colonies in America will render ye Conq^t. of this Important Place not only secretly secure, but very cheap to England; for that number of Forces being rais'd there will, with greater certainty, Conqr. that Place than 40,000 men would to be sent from Britain, because they are Inur'd to the American Climate, and will live soberer than Britains can be prevail'd to do. By these Forces, and by them only, every man of judgment, who knows ye situation of that place, and will speake with truth and candour, will lay it down as a Fact that it is to be gain'd, with great certainty, in ye way propos'd; and if it can be thus gained, upon such easy terms to England, it would be offering an affront to ye understanding of every man of sense to pretend to recount the unlimited advantages which must accrue to Great Britain from its being posses'd of the Island of Cuba alone.

“If the Conquest of Cuba is effected, a small part of the Forces which does that, may, with very little trouble, take Porto Rico, & St. Augustine if it will appear advisable so to do. The British Colonys in America lying so near the object in view, before ye knowledge of ye propos'd attempt can reach to Europe ye whole designe will be executed.

“It may be asked, how is it possible to go upon ye proposed Expedition without its being known by Inquisitive diligent foreign spies, since ships of Warr are to be sent from England? In answer to that, ’tis to be hop’d England can be as Politic as Her Neighbours, (vizt:) look one way and steer ye contrary. It may, for this purpose, be given out by some that England is going to reinforce some of its Colonys, by others that she is going to resume the settlement of Darien, &c. In short ther’s no human appearance of this attempts miscarrying if the knowledge of it is confin’d to a Cabinet Council, & a fitt person appointed for ye Chief Command. The proposer is so well assur’d, of his own knowledge, that the American People, can be brought, by proper managm’t, to fitt out the Transports, and raise the men proposed, that he will undertake to accomplish it by his own personal application without either view or inclination of Cuting out or accepting of any Place or Command of profit in ye whole Transaction.

“If there be an inclination to attempt this Greatest of Acquisitions it is presum’d no material objection can be made to the nature of the Proposall. It may be urged, indeed, yt it will be Dishonorable to make such an attempt while there’s a Treaty on Foot with Spain; but such an objection must stand or fall by the Wisdom and at ye Discretion of His Majestys Ministers; tho’ ’tis humbly presum’d if the word Politick be not an empty sound, that objection, nor none like it, can hold. It is to be observ’d that if ye preparation of ye Transports and men propos’d is not to be set on Foot ’till it is seen that nothing can be done with ye Court of Spain, by Treaty, for the advantage of ye British nation, it will then be too late to begin to prepair and colect them: It is presum’d they should be prepair’d as soon as possible, in order to be colected, and ready to go upon the Attack when necessity may make it proper; and if it shall appear that there will be no occasion to make such an attempt, after they are got in readiness, the design may be laid aside without inconveniency to England in either case.

It may be ask'd, were Cuba taken, how it would be Garrison'd without Forces from England? for 'tis to be understood that ye American People who are propos'd to be rais'd must not be compell'd to stay in ye Garrison against their own inclination. In answer to yt 'tis suffi't now to say that ye propos'r has also conceived a pretty certain method to Garrison, not only that, but all ye Places mention'd, if they are taken, without much expence to England, but wch he begs leave to reserve to himself, it being too long to incert here, 'till he sees how this proposall will be approved off."

In 1740, the Governor of Cuba expected an attack upon the island. English merchants complained of privateers who molested their trade, and English naval officers proposed to take Cuba by attacking Havana. In a letter of August 27, 1740, the bold adventurer, Sir William Poultney, told Admiral Vernon that "To take and hold" Cuba was the cry, and he boasted that "when we (the British) are possessed of it, the whole world will not be able to dispossess us again." In 1741 the British fleet under Admiral Vernon, reinforced by 600 men from the New England and Middle colonies, threatened Cuba; but the expedition was inactive, until many of the force died. The Governor of Havana fully expected an attack, and was making preparations for defense. In a letter to the French governor of Hispaniola, he spoke of the failure of the French fleet to co-operate with the Spanish for the protection of Cuba. According to the family compact of 1733 between France and Spain these two nations had agreed to assist in guarding each other's possessions. Vernon and other officers held a council of war at Jamaica, but the plan of attacking Cuba was given up. Governor Trelaway advised an attack upon Panama instead of the contemplated advance against Cuba. The next year Cuba fitted out an armament of over 2000 troops and invaded Georgia. Vernon had still hoped for a chance to proceed against Cuba, but the plan was finally abandoned.

Cuban troubles did not end with the close of the war of 1748. The period of 1748-1761 was one of rapid growth for the smuggling trade. The tobacco monopoly was changed to a system of farming out the revenues to private monopoly, but this did not stop the troubles. France and Spain were jealous of English commercial influence in America, and in 1759 they made a compact to stop its expansion. This led Pitt in 1760 to favor immediate measures against Spain. But George III. came to the throne and was anxious to make peace with France. Pitt resigned. Spain waited until her treasure ship had arrived from America and then she prepared to wage war against England. One of Pitt's plans had been to send a force to seize Havana. Lord Bute now adopted the same plan, and prepared an expedition which surprised Spain by its successful attack against the fortifications of Havana. The war began in 1762, and before the year was ended the Spanish were driven from Portugal, the Philippines had fallen from the hands of Spain, and Havana with an enormous booty of over three and a half million dollars was in the hands of the English.

The fleet of 15,000 men which took Havana received its supplies from the American colonies, and was aided by colonial troops. The army landed on June 7, 1762, without opposition near Coxemar Castle—about a league from Morro Castle, which commands the entrance to the harbor on one side. Colonel Howe with two battalions of American Grenadiers assisted in the siege of Morro. The troops had to drink brackish water while making the batteries, and had to bring it from a distance of three miles. The report of the siege states that Colonel Grant who superintended the work "gave grogg liberally which had its effect." There were many reverses and many cases of fever and ague among the soldiers. But mines were finally dug to Morro, after several failures and a considerable loss of men, and, on August 11 the Spanish governor

expressed to Lord Albemarle his desire to capitulate. On August 14, the Anglo-American forces took possession.

The capture of Havana produced a sensation in both America and England. New York knew it by September 11, and Boston by September 13. There was great rejoicing in Boston on the 16th. Governor Bernard and the two Houses of the colonial legislature attended divine worship, cannons were discharged, bells rang, and there was a general display of fireworks. There were similar demonstrations all over the colonies. The conquest of Canada had exalted the American heart, and now they rejoiced at the conquest of Cuba. England was still "Home" to the colonists, and they were ready to fight to extend English possessions. In England, Horace Walpole wrote to Conway that Great Britain was now more in favor of conquering the rest of the world. The general opinion was that Havana should not be re-ceded to Spain without ample satisfaction on other questions. On October 4, the Mayor of London congratulated His Majesty on the reduction of the key to the West Indies—characterizing it as "an irreparable blow to the trade and naval power of Spain." The king, on the opening of Parliament, November 25, announced in his speech that Havana, the bulwark of the Spanish colonies, was in his possession.

Albemarle did not rule at Havana with a mild hand. It was the sunset time of the age of plunder, but Albemarle made himself rich with spoils. He "ruled Havana with a bundle of fasces, the rods being of iron and the axe sharp, and which did not become rusty for want of use." Many suspected persons were sent to the scaffold, and, contrary to the terms of capitulation, some were denied religious consolation. But by the English occupation Cuba was aroused from the stupor of near three hundred years. She was animated with new life. Havana was opened to free commerce, and, after the English disorged it and Spain owned it again, the latter found herself in 1765 compelled to reduce the commercial restrictions.

In the treaty of 1763, Lord Bute would have returned Cuba without a word, but his colleagues decided to ask for Florida or Porto Rico in return for it. Florida was of little use to England; Cuba would probably have been much more useful to her, especially during the American Revolution. But by the treaty England secured Florida for Havana, and France gave Louisiana to Spain to compensate her for the loss of Florida. Both Spain and France declared that a peace would be of no use unless Cuba was returned to Spain.

On November 29, 1762, the preliminary articles of peace were presented to the Commons. In December they were taken up in the House of Lords for consideration, and considerable opposition was shown. The Earl of Hardwicke spoke of Havana as the key and barrier of the Spanish West Indies, which had been thought to have been impregnable. Many objections were made to the surrender of it. In the Commons, on December 9, Pitt suffering with pain, so that he had to sit while speaking, made a speech nearly four hours in length against the treaty. He said Florida was no compensation for Havana, which he himself had planned to take in 1760. He thought that too much was allowed to Spain and France in the West Indies, and said: "From the moment that Havana was taken, all the Spanish riches and treasures in America lay at our mercy. Spain had purchased the security of all these, and the restoration of Cuba also, with the cession of Florida only. It was no equivalent."

But for the Seven Years' War, the American Revolution would not have occurred when it did. It has been said that George III. forced peace upon his unwilling subjects in 1763, and that this was one reason why England was unable to conquer America in the Revolution. The surrender of Cuba to Spain in 1763 probably had a great influence on the course of events in American history. If England had held it during the American Revolution it would doubtless have delayed the success of the American colonies. It was

there that many of the fleets which harmed England found a harbor. If England had held Cuba after 1783, the United States boundary might have been limited to the Mississippi.

With the close of the Seven Years' War England resolved to enforce the trade restrictions. Foreign goods had been imported contrary to the laws of Charles II. and William III. The Molasses Act had never been duly executed. In a letter of November 10, 1764, Bernard, the royal governor of Massachusetts, said that it had long been admitted that the American trade with Spanish West Indies ought to be encouraged by all means. He thought that the duty should be lowered; but in 1764 England resolved to enforce the high duties, and to stop the smuggling of goods from the French and Spanish colonies in the West Indies. The commanders of English ships were commanded to act as revenue officers. They made many illegal seizures, and it was inconvenient for America to get redress from distant England. The trade between the British and the Spanish colonies, which, though it had not been strictly according to law, had been connived at, was now almost suddenly destroyed. Spain co-operated with England to prevent the trade. England laid heavy duties on all articles imported from the West Indies to her American colonies. The Americans complained much. A letter from Pensacola, West Florida, December 13, 1764, said: "Every thing here is put into a dull state, by the men-of-war obstructing the Spaniards from trading with us. We had four vessels here lately, but they were not permitted to trade." The colonists looked upon the trade restrictions as a loss, not only to the colonies, but to England as well. The British policy induced the American colonies to consume as few British manufactures as possible. Mourning articles and the giving of gloves at funerals were dispensed with, as were many other superfluous articles. The colonies also began to manufacture articles for themselves. The stamp duties imposed by England met with such strong opposition that they were

repealed. The Americans became elated over their triumph in defeating the attempt of Great Britain to impose heavy trade restrictions and taxes.

The relation between the colonies and Great Britain had never been settled, and it now became a subject of discussion on both sides of the water. In America it was said that although England had locked the door against absolute monarchy the monarch still had access to the key. The constitution of England was unhealthy, and even the political physicians at home could not agree on the medicine.

The breach between England and her colonies grew wider with discussion and the colonies gradually favored separation. When the imperious breath of Parliament and king was closing up the commerce of American towns, the pulse of the people ceased to beat calmly. The people of America now urged the theory that the king is the servant, and not the proprietor of the people. They urged that government was not founded on grace, nor on force, nor on property alone, but upon the necessities of human nature—and that the people might alter constitutions and replace old prescriptions. They said that liberty was older than Magna Charta; and that rights came from the law of nature and from the necessities of society, and not from the edicts of kings. Through the wise and salutary neglect of England, her trans-Atlantic children had been allowed to take care of themselves, and to develop firm bones from yielding gristle. Not only had they felled the mighty monarchs of the forest; not only had they successfully occupied the land and carried civilization from the valleys by the sea to the foot of the mountain, but, as Burke said, there was no climate that was not witness to their toil, and no sea but what was vexed by their fisheries “among the tumbling mountains of ice * * beneath the Arctic circle, into the opposite region of the polar cold, on the coast of Africa, and along the coasts of Brazil.” Such men were not children. There was a tendency to independence which could not

have been overcome so long as there existed between England and her colonies a relation which they felt to be radically wrong. The width of the Atlantic was a great factor in leading the colonies to follow their own destiny, and to blossom into self-governing communities that should become a shining example for the Spanish colonies to the southward.

One of the first steps of the English colonies, when they decided to make themselves independent of the mother country, was to apply for aid to France and Spain, the recent enemies of England. During the Seven Years' War the expeditions against the French and Spanish islands were supplied from England's American colonies; but these colonies were now ready to furnish supplies for expeditions to seize the English islands. In a letter of Franklin, Deane and Lee, to Vergennes, in January, 1777, they applied for manned ships to protect American coasts, and suggested that France might furnish troops. They stated that if England made it a cause of war, the united forces of France, Spain and America could take from her most of her possessions in the West Indies, and most of her commerce. They said: "North America now offers to France and Spain her amity and commerce. She is also ready to guarantee in the firmest manner to those nations all her present possessions in the West Indies, as well as those they shall acquire from the enemy in a war that may be consequential of such a system as she requests." In 1776, the English West India trade suffered much from captures made by small American cruisers. By the beginning of the next year England began to send armed cutters to prevent these depredations. It was seen by the Americans that this would make it necessary for the United States to send only the larger privateers to the Gulf. Some of the Gulf vessels were probably fitted out by Spaniards under commissions from the American Government. At the beginning of 1777 France and Spain indicated to Arthur Lee that they would arrange their American forces so that

the United States would not need to send their cutters to the Gulf of Mexico.

The French soon decided to ally themselves with the Americans, but the attitude of Spain remained uncertain. Some Spaniards, who were friendly to the American cause, furnished money which was vested in war supplies; but the Spanish Government was uncertain whether it would be convenient for it to form an American alliance. Arthur Lee was impressed with the ambiguity of the conduct of Spain. It was clear that she did not intend to embark upon any war which did not contribute amply to her own benefit. She saw a chance to obtain the Floridas. Arthur Lee wrote home that she desired to have her former territory returned, and he asked the instructions of Congress on that subject. Izard wrote to the President of Congress from Paris on September 12, 1778, saying: "If Spain is allowed to get Florida, perpetual causes of quarrel may be expected, and I hope Congress will guard against it." He said that the Southern states should be consulted separately in regard to this subject.

English statesmen had tried to prevent France from declaring in favor of America, and some still hoped to keep Spain from taking any part against England. Early in the war, Lord Rochford had proposed a treaty of confederation between England, France, Spain and Portugal. It was to provide for: (1) a guarantee of each other's possessions in the Americas and the Indies, in case of war in Europe; (2) participation by France in the commerce of the English possessions; (3) adjustment of contested privileges with America. At the beginning of 1780, Sir John Dalrymple, who was at Madrid, favored a similar plan to bring the war to a close. He said such a confederation would be of especial advantage to Spain, because, by preventing the independence of the American colonies, the Spanish colonies would not be in danger of the contraband trade which the Americans would not feel bound to prevent. He declared that necessity would compel the Americans to carry on a

trade with the South American colonies, or to carry on war against the Spanish and Portuguese possessions in order to get the gold and silver which (he said) was necessary to enable them to carry on agriculture. He held out to Spain that America with her low-priced commodities would fly with her sails to Cape Horn, Chili, Peru, Mexico, New Zealand, and the islands of the South Sea, and that Spain would find it difficult to stop her vessels.

Spain, carefully watching the course of events, declared war against England in the summer of 1779, and decided to co-operate with France and the American colonies, though she did not enter into any formal alliance with the United States. Her first step was to regain her former possessions by means of American aid. In 1777, Cuba had been given independent colonial administration under a captain-general, who now took command of the Spanish forces in that vicinity and conducted the plans of campaign; he asked the American Congress to lay siege to St. Augustine, in order to divert the English while Spanish troops attacked Pensacola. He also invited Congress to undertake the conquest of the territory northeast of Louisiana, and asked what kind of productions the United States could furnish for the assistance of Havana and Cuba. While the English held New York, Washington did not consider it wise to weaken his army by sending troops to aid Spain; but Congress decided to send 4000 men and three frigates to Charleston, and to give power to the commander of the Southern army to act in concert with the Governor of Havana in regard to plans for taking East Florida. The Charleston troops were expected to create the diversion which the Governor of Cuba desired.

Jay was sent as minister to Spain in September, 1779; and he arrived at Cadiz the following December, and sent his credentials to the Spanish Government. He vainly sought recognition in an official capacity until May, 1782, when he left in disgust for Paris. But he had several communications which gave him the impression of the policy

of Spain. He saw from the first that Spain would have fears of the rapid extension of the new American nation toward the West. In sending Mr. Carmichael to sound the Spanish Government, Jay instructed him that while he should do justice to Virginia and to the Western achievements against the savages, he should, nevertheless, try to leave the impression that it would require ages to settle those extensive regions. Mr. Jay was especially anxious to know whether Spain was likely to carry on any serious operations for possessing herself of the Floridas and the banks of the Mississippi. It seemed to him that the islands of the West Indies would be the principal objects of contention.

On February 2, 1780, a committee of Congress reported a conference with the French minister at Philadelphia in which the Spanish policy was discussed. The minister said that Spain was ready for alliance, but that she desired to know the intentions of the United States in regard to boundaries, the Floridas, and the navigation of the Mississippi. He stated that the Government at Madrid thought that the United States should make settlements no farther West than was allowed by the royal proclamation of 1763, and that since she had no territory on the Mississippi, she should not desire the privilege of navigating that river. As to the Floridas, he said that Spain would probably conquer them, and that she hoped to remove all causes of dispute between herself and the United States concerning that territory. Spain desired that the United States should restrain the Southern states from making settlements or conquests in the land northeast of Louisiana. She said that the United States had no claim to these lands, and that Spain claimed the right to take them from England during the war. She was especially anxious to keep the United States from the Mississippi. In May, 1780, while a treaty with America was in contemplation, Count Florida Blanca, in a conference with Jay, said that Congress having once relinquished pretensions to the navigation of the Mississippi, should not now insist upon it. He desired to exclude the Americans from

the Mississippi, and, if possible, to keep the English from the Gulf of Mexico. When Jay stated that some of the American states were bounded by the Mississippi, Blanca said that he did not think the King of Spain would be willing to admit it.

In order to avoid the bar to alliance with Spain which the question of the navigation of the Mississippi seemed to offer, the Georgia delegates in the Continental Congress, in November, 1780, proposed that Jay be instructed, if necessary, to cede to Spain the navigation of the Mississippi and the tract of land on the east bank and extending along the southern boundary of Georgia to the Mobile—provided Spain would make a suitable treaty, grant an annual subsidy of £5,000,000 for five years (or make an annual loan of double that sum during the war), and agree not to accede to proposals of peace without the concurrence of the United States commissioners. On February 1, 1781, the Virginia delegates moved that Jay be privately instructed to recede, if necessary, from the claim of free navigation of the Mississippi below 31°—provided Spain would grant the free ports, which had also been desired, near the mouth of the river. These propositions were called forth by the pressing exigencies of immediate aid.

The American colonies did not receive the assistance which they had expected from Spain. It appears that some little aid had been sent "from Spain, Havana and Louisiana" in 1779; but in the spring of 1780, Blanca informed Jay that the Spanish expenses had been so heavy that they could not give hope of rendering as much aid as they might have been able to do the year before. Spain was watching her own interests. In America there were many reasons for distrust of her. Delays and slights had a bad effect on the mutual harmony and confidence which should have existed. There were many causes for complaint. When Pensacola was captured by Spain it served to strengthen the British garrison of New York and Charleston by the addition of the troops from the former place. The Havana trade was advan-

tageous to Spain, but she seriously interrupted it by the detention of American vessels for months at a time, to aid in her expeditions. She made use of these American trading vessels without rendering proper compensation, and often sent them away without a convoy to prevent their capture by the enemy. The trade with Havana was in this way much discouraged.

From what has been said it will be seen that Spain evidently allied herself with America with the intention of restricting the limits of the young republic to the narrowest bounds possible. She desired to confine the United States behind the Appalachians, but to this the Americans would never have consented. In August, 1779, and in October, 1780, the instructions of Congress had proposed that the southern boundary of the United States should be the parallel of 31° from the Mississippi to the middle of the Appalachicola, the middle of the Appalachicola to the Flint river, then a straight line to the head of St. Mary's river, and the middle of St. Mary's to the Atlantic. The instructions of June 15, 1781, left the commissioners to use their own judgment in securing the interests of the United States. The above boundary was agreed to by British and American commissioners in October and November, 1782.

In the negotiations between the British and American commissioners, Oswald, probably expecting England to keep Florida, desired to annex as much territory to it as possible. He even proposed that it should extend to the Ohio in order to make it worth keeping and to furnish a retreat for the tories. The King of England had already authorized the Governor of Florida to extend the boundary to the Yazoo, and Oswald finally agreed to that line. The American commissioners felt that the United States should extend the boundary as near to the mouth of the Mississippi as possible. At the same time they saw that it would be to their advantage for England not to give up the navigation of the Mississippi; it was important that the views of England and America should agree upon that subject. So, the American

commissioners finally agreed that, in case England should have the Floridas at the end of the war, the mouth of the Yazoo should be the northern boundary; and under any circumstances England should have the right to navigate the Mississippi. To the provisional articles of peace signed by Oswald and the American commissioners, November 30, 1782, was attached a separate secret article which agreed that, in case England at the close of the war should obtain possession of Florida, the line of boundary between it and the United States should be a line from the mouth of the Yazoo river where it unites with the Mississippi due east to the Appalachicola. Livingston did not think the separate article should have been concealed from the French, and he feared it might carry seeds of enmity to Spain by showing such a marked preference for England. He said there should have been no preference shown, and that it would have no advantage, in any case, for Florida, if ceded to Spain, would have the same boundary as when held by England.

A short time after this secret article was added, the condition of England enabled Spain to get Florida. Lafayette saw that this might in the future lead to boundary disputes with the United States. He told Livingston that Spain would always be extravagant in her territorial notions, and that she would insist on holding all the territory on the left bank of the Mississippi, not because she wished to occupy it, but because she feared neighbors who had the spirit of liberty. He hoped that the people of the Floridas would move over into Georgia. Lafayette thought, too, that Lord Shelburne desired to arrange the boundary in such a manner that future disputes between Spain and the United States would be hard to avoid, and he said: "A day will come, I hope, when Europeans will have little to do on the northern continent, and God grant it may ever be for the happiness of mankind and the propagation of liberty."

Spain hoped to induce the American Government to guarantee her future possession of all the territory that she held

in America at the close of the war. Such a guarantee would have made it the duty of the United States to fight for Spain. The proposal of Franklin, Deane and Lee to Vergennes on January 5, 1777, may have been the source of the Spanish expectations on this subject. Jay, at a later date, in order to induce the Spanish minister to negotiate for a treaty, had also offered a guarantee of territory, but in a letter to Livingston in April, 1783, he declared that the United States, when she proposed the guarantee, did not intend to fight for Spain. He said: "That we should so guarantee the Spanish possessions as to fight for them was as far distant from my design as it could be from that of Congress. A common guarantee means nothing more than a quit-claim, to which we certainly could have no objection."

At the close of the war the consideration of possible future alliances was a subject of concern. In April, 1783, Jay was afraid that Spain and England might form an alliance looking to the security of their possessions in America. A short time before, when it was feared that England would make reprisals on Cuba, Spain had sent reinforcements to Havana. Tory refugees in New York, during the Revolution, while favoring a submission to England instead of a treaty, said: "Will not the perfidy of France and Spain justify Great Britain in entering into an alliance with Russia, Prussia and other powers, against France and Spain, the common disturbers of public tranquillity, to take and divide among them all their islands in the West Indies?"

The subject of an Anglo-Saxon alliance and common citizenship was suggested during the discussions for peace. David Hartley feared that the Americans might form some alliance with Spain which would be detrimental to England, and he seemed sincerely anxious to secure the friendliest relations between England and her former colonies. In a letter to the American commissioners in June, 1783, in urging a policy of reciprocity of intercourse, he evidently desired to dissuade the United States from making any permanent alliance with Spain. He said that the only activity of Spain in the

war had been to secure a barrier against the American States by securing Florida and the mouth of the Mississippi, by which she could restrict American progress. He said that the differences of language, custom and position would prevent permanent peace between the United States and Spain, and urged that England was America's best ally.

Notwithstanding the friendly advances of David Hartley, the policy of England after 1783 was to prevent trade between the United States and the British West Indies in order to encourage the trade with Nova Scotia, Canada and St. John's Island. Spain was disposed to be more liberal. About 1783, Havana and Santiago were open to free commerce with foreign nations, except as to the slave trade. Havana as the centre of this trade grew rapidly. In 1790 the restrictions on it were removed. Internal development as well as commerce was encouraged.

In 1783 Spain governed all the territory from Oregon to Cape Horn. When France had once claimed all the Mississippi system and the region from Mobile to the Rio Grande, Spain had objected and had claimed that the Gulf of Mexico was a closed sea. She now owned all the shores of the Gulf of Mexico. With Cuba as a centre of a vast empire, she still hoped to add more territory to Florida and Louisiana, her dominions on the continent. She had tried to hold the United States behind the Appalachians, and had failed. She now hoped to blockade her from the Gulf, but the American settlers were passing over the crest of the Alleghenies and on to the Mississippi. Spain was only dreaming, for fate, driven on by strong human hands, was against her. She played a losing game. Her policy in Louisiana led to its purchase by the United States. The Ohio led the Americans to the Mississippi, the Mississippi to the Gulf. The trans-Appalachian West gave them a trans-Mississippi West, and both of these led them to see their manifest destiny and largely determined the course of American history.

CHAPTER III.

LOUISIANA AND THE MISSISSIPPI QUESTION.

The Struggle of a Growing West against the Spanish Attempt to Blockade the Mississippi.

Spain hoped to sit on the mouth of the Mississippi and make the Gulf of Mexico a closed sea, all of whose benefits she desired to appropriate to herself. But nature and the logic of events were against her. The Gulf, fed by ocean currents, as well as by mighty rivers, was a great reservoir from which sun-pump and cloud-bucket, in spite of Spain, ever carried water to quench the thirst of the interior of the continent. The inland waters in their return to the sea formed a great commercial highway, to the use of which none had a better right than those who dwelt in its valley and were led to the Gulf by its beckoning call. In 1778-82, Spain had desired to limit our borders to the Appalachians, but the passes of the mountains had become the arteries of a growing nation. We were not to be shut out from the land of promise where the young Adams and Eves of that generation could turn the wilderness into gardens, earn bread by the sweat of their face, and kindle fires of democracy never to be extinguished. Adventurous spirits breathing the air of freedom had already passed from the valleys of the Atlantic to the "poor man's country" until they stood upon the ridges and looked over into other valleys and plains where the races of the world were to settle and weld themselves into a great national democracy. Even by 1750 they had passed over the mountain barrier which hemmed them in from the West, and soon the blue smoke curled upward from many cabin homes. The cold sentences of mere treaties could not have prevented the logic of history.

It was useless to ignore facts. The perpetual ring of the settler's axe was the music of the advancing hosts who were ready to conquer by the full price of sweat and blood. The people were slowly but surely, inch by inch, with Anglo-Saxon grit, subduing and possessing the vast stretch of savage wilderness, and neither treaties, constitutions nor creeds could stand in the way of the triumphal national march which had set in toward the great central valley that France had unsuccessfully striven to hold from occupation. The incessant wave of pale-faced frontiersmen with pack-horses, ox-carts and covered wagons flowed ever on through Cumberland's Gap to Kentucky and Tennessee, and from the Alleghenies toward the Father of Waters until, even before the Revolution was ended, the democracy of the rude and boisterous West began to feel its strength, and while the question of the cession of Western land was yet unsettled, petitions were sent to the mother states of the Atlantic coast, asking that new states be formed beyond the mountains. When told that they could not yet conduct their own affairs these men replied with confidence that "A fool can sometimes put on his own clothes better than a wise man can do it for him."

After the fires of revolution, kindled in Massachusetts and Virginia, had gotten rid of some of our traditional burdens, and the young republic had been baptized in the blood of hard-fought battles, there was a renewed impulse to wrestle and experiment with the opportunities of the wilderness. The active sought to employ energy; the man in debt sought to escape the tax-collector and creditor; the wild and reckless desired a wider field for exploit; even the idle might escape to a new life which would awaken their sleeping powers into action. There were heroes of a thousand humble tragedies who contributed their share to the winning of the West. In many waving fields of grain, where once stood primeval forests, could be seen the result of the labors and struggles of these plain, brave men and

women who laid the foundation of a great and enduring republic.

The rivers had been valuable as a means of transporting settlers to their new home, and now they became valuable as highways for trade. The Mississippi became the great outlet for the products of the West. Rafts or flat-boats of grain and pork were floated down the Ohio and other streams, and carried to New Orleans where they were disposed of. Washington hoped that the Potomac could be connected with the Ohio by canals, as a means of binding the West to the East. Could this have been done, the navigation of the Mississippi would not have been a matter of so great importance to the West, but the West could not wait for the realization of such schemes. The West was the child of the East, and had not been blind to the environment of opportunity. She saw that the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico in that early day were her natural outlets to the world.

In 1783, Spain, with all the shores of the Gulf in her possession, intended to use her opportunities to restrict the growth of the American West. Perhaps she expected eventually to include in her bounds part of the country between the Appalachians and the Mississippi. In 1783, she stopped several American boats that were trading on the Mississippi. About the same time, Kentucky began to think of autonomy from Virginia, and Patrick Henry saw the finger of the Spanish Devil in this. Did Spain intend to use her control of the Mississippi as a means of inducing the West to secede from the United States in order to get better commercial advantages? A struggle with Spain seemed imminent. Madison saw that it might be necessary for France and England to intervene for the United States in order that they themselves might secure the free navigation of the Mississippi. In 1784, he met Lafayette in Baltimore and tried to make him see that France should persuade Spain to give up her exclusive pretensions to the Mississippi. Lafayette replied: "Spain is such a fool that allowances

must be made." In 1786, the East was willing to sacrifice the interests of the West in regard to commerce. In that year Spain demanded, as the price of the treaty of commerce, an agreement that the United States should not navigate the Mississippi for twenty-five years. John Jay consented; but Virginia and Kentucky protested vigorously, and as a result Spain did not enter into a commercial treaty with the United States until 1795. During this time the Spanish minister taking advantage of the Western disgust, was trying to alienate that section and secure the dismemberment of the Union. In a letter to Jay in 1786 Lafayette spoke of the strong prejudices which Spain had in regard to the Mississippi and said: "But we know in a little time we must have navigation one way or another, which I hope Spain now understands."

The administration of Washington received from the old Continental Congress the perplexing legacy in regard to the relations with Spain on the Mississippi and the southern boundary. In 1789, Spain and England were about to go to war. The United States urged Spain to accede to her claims for the free navigation of the Mississippi, and also to cede New Orleans and Florida to the United States. Jefferson, Secretary of State, in 1790 demanded the free navigation of the Mississippi, but Spain resisted the claims of the United States on this question as well as upon the question of boundary. In the same year, having failed to secure an alliance with France against England, Spain yielded to England in the settlement of disputes with that nation. In the same year Kentucky separated from Virginia in order to form a new state, and she even thought of separation from the rest of the Union, and of alliance with England on account of the lack of free navigation of the Mississippi. At the same time Tennessee was emphatically knocking at the door for admission into the Union. The increase of population increased the discontent in the West, and the prohibition of the navigation of the Mississippi became more galling. The French Revolution opened the markets of the

West Indies to neutrals and produced a demand for flour, pork and other staples of the West. The spirit of revolution grew until it seemed that the West would unite with Spain, or drive her out and set up a new republic. In 1793, when Genet formed a project against Florida and Louisiana, there were many restless spirits in Kentucky who would have been glad to follow George Rogers Clarke in an expedition against New Orleans. Blount of Tennessee was expelled from the Senate of the United States for trying to get England to send a fleet to close the Mississippi while he led an army from Canada to attack Louisiana. Wilkinson was also accused of intrigues. These dangers, and especially the fear of English conquest, finally induced Spain to make a treaty with the United States.

In 1794, the United States was still trying to secure an adjustment with Spain as to the Mississippi navigation dispute. The French Revolution had broken the family compact with Spain and France and had taken French support away from Spain. France now declared war on Spain, who allied herself with England, and was in great fear that she would lose her American possessions in case France and the United States should join hands. In 1794, Spain had to give up her part of San Domingo to France. There were civil commotions in San Domingo and other French islands at this time, and the national convention in France decided to emancipate the negroes. This step discontented the slave-owners in those islands, and they asked England to make an invasion. England, with the aid of Spain, prepared an expedition for conquest, but it was only partially successful. By 1795, England was planning to attack Spain, and the Spanish ministry suddenly became more favorable to the United States and notified her that the King of Spain was ready to fix boundaries, to consider the navigation of the Mississippi, and to make a treaty of alliance and reciprocal guarantee of the possessions of both countries. After some delay Pinkney, negotiated the treaty in which Spain agreed to the southern boundary of the United States as defined

in the treaty of 1783, together with the free navigation of the Mississippi and the right of deposit at New Orleans. While negotiating the treaty Jefferson said that "We should have nothing to do with conquest," and that the United States had been sincere in its disposition to court and cultivate the friendship with Spain. What the United States desired was not conquest, but friendship and commerce with all the Spanish dominions in America.

No sooner was the treaty with Spain completed than quarrels arose in regard to it. In 1796, Yrujo, the Spanish minister at Washington, said that the United States had no right to accord England the navigation of the Mississippi as had been done by the Jay treaty. Spain feared invasion from Canada and did not withdraw her troops as she had promised. In 1797, Senator William Blount urged the Cherokee interpreter to stir up the Cherokee Indians. His purpose probably was to aid a scheme for the invasion of the Spanish dominions, in which he expected English help. Yrujo had feared hostile designs, and consequently the Louisiana authorities resisted the survey of the boundary. Liston, the British minister, said that persons had proposed to him that, if England would invade Florida by sea, she could depend upon co-operation of American citizens. Liston mentioned the scheme to his Government but claimed that he discouraged it. Yrujo claimed that the British still had designs, and he freely ventilated his opinions and charges in the newspapers. Spain and France had now become allies. Pickering was expecting war against France, and the chance to march American armies against Spanish domains. In his correspondence with Spain he made no attempt to avoid a quarrel. In 1796, Spain and France had guaranteed to each other their dominions in both the Old and New World—so that a war against France would have led to a war with Spain. Blount's letter showed that there was a plot by citizens of the United States to invade Louisiana, with the assistance of Great Britain. Several Federalist officials at this time hoped to secure some arrangement by

which the United States Government could be induced to join with them in assisting the Spanish-American colonies to shake themselves free from Spanish rule. Hamilton hoped for a chance to lead an American army, and to make himself the liberator of the South American people.

The struggle of the British colonies in America had given a stimulus to the cause of liberty. The zeal and enthusiasm by which the United States was established as an infant republic deeply impressed the minds of spirited men in the Spanish-American dominions. These men now began to borrow fire from the North, and to dream of kindling a new one in the land where native Spaniards held all the offices and where the seeds of deep resentment had already been sown among the people. The example of North America became a grand object of imitation, and secret combinations began to be formed among the Spanish provincials. Miranda, a native of Carácas, Venezuela, who had fought in the Spanish army during the American Revolution, aspired to the glory of being the deliverer of his country. In 1785, he went to England, then to Prussia, Austria, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Russia. His schemes were strongly favored by the Queen of Russia, but after five years of travel he still saw no chance of forming a combination against Spain. About 1790 he returned to England. During the wars with Spain, England had undertaken plans for the conquest of her American dominions. In 1790, General Miranda had proposed to Pitt a general scheme for emancipation, which was cordially received. At that time the dispute respecting Nootka Sound threatened to lead to hostilities between England and Spain. Spain early navigated the Mississippi and sent exploration parties along the western coast. She claimed, by discovery in 1774, Nootka Sound on the west shore of Vancouvers Island, and in 1789 she seized several British vessels there. England demanded reparation. Pitt informed Miranda that if Spain did not submit he would adopt the plan of revolutionizing the Spanish colonies in America, and he invited several of

the order of Jesuits, who had been banished from the Spanish territories, to use their influence in preparing the minds of the people for the meditated changes by which they were to take the management of their own affairs into their own hands for their own benefit. Spain and England settled their difficulties October 28, 1790, and peace was decreed, but Pitt still assured Miranda that the English Government would not lose sight of his scheme for the emancipation of the Spanish colonies in America.

Miranda went to France to endeavor to obtain the same friendship which she had shown to America. In 1792, the Republican leaders in Paris considered the advisability of placing him at the head of the French army to revolutionize the Spanish colonies, but Miranda did not encourage the plan as it was made, and the pressure of other affairs caused it to be relinquished.

While all Europe was agitated by the Reign of Terror, Miranda was buried in a dungeon; but he escaped the guillotine, and soon after 1795 he was again encouraged to take up his scheme for the freedom of Spanish America. Deputies and commissioners from Mexico, and other Spanish-American provinces, were sent to consult with him concerning the proper steps to be taken to secure their independence. They decided to send Miranda to London to secure assistance from the British Government similar to that which Spain had given the English colonists in America during the Revolution. It was stated that an alliance with England was the only means of holding in check the destructive ambition of the audacious French who had now allied themselves with Spain. In a document dated at Paris December 22, 1797, it was agreed to pay England thirty million pounds for the assistance required of her, to enter into a treaty of commerce with her, and to guarantee to her the freedom of any canal which should be opened between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by the Isthmus of Panama or Lake Nicaragua. It was also proposed to form an alliance with the United States, allowing her to have all Florida

in return for military aid, and proposing the Mississippi as the most advisable western boundary for her. The last article of the document refers to the Spanish islands, and speaks especially of Cuba, the possession of which was considered to be necessary on account of the "situation of Havana commanding the passage from the Gulf of Mexico." In January, 1798, Pitt had a conference with Miranda, acceded to his plan, and soon began to carry it out. It was considered to be a favorable time for such an expedition, for Napoleon was secretly preparing to invade Egypt, and, judging from surface appearances, everything denoted that his mind would be taken up with Eastern conquest—but, in reality, secret negotiations were soon under way in preparation for one of the most terrible military struggles in the nineteenth century—and it was in Central Europe and not in the East that the events of the next seventeen years were to occur.

Miranda was confident that the United States would lend assistance in carrying out his scheme. He at once began negotiations with Mr. King, the American minister at London, who was favorable to his schemes. He was soon in correspondence with the President of the United States and Hamilton. For many years he had known the sentiments of Hamilton in regard to Spanish America, and he felt confident that he would encourage the administration to take part in the project which he had in view. On April 6, 1798, he wrote Hamilton that he had sent dispatches of the highest importance to the President of the United States, and that he felt that the establishment of liberty upon the new continent was fast approaching consummation. The letter to Hamilton was sent by a special messenger who was instructed to inform him confidentially of all he desired to know in regard to the plan. In his letter Miranda said: "The only danger that I foresee is the introduction of French principles which would poison our liberty in its cradle, and would finish by destroying yours."

While Miranda was negotiating to obtain Anglo-American co-operation to assist him in carrying out his plans,

Hamilton, Knox and Pinkney were made major-generals in the standing army which was being raised in America "to repel French invasion." It was hoped that this army would be a step toward the consummation of the plans against Spanish America. Hamilton was warmly favorable to the plot which Miranda was advocating, but he did not desire to take part in an expedition unless it was under the authority of the United States. On August 22, 1788, in replying to several letters of Mr. King, he said that he would be glad to see an expedition organized in which the United States should furnish all the land force with himself as leader. He said that "Independence of the separate territory under a moderate government with the joint guarantee of the co-operating powers, stipulating equal privileges in commerce, would be the sum of the result to be accomplished" by the proposed expedition into the Spanish dominions. He did not think that the United States Government was entirely ready to act, but added: "I have sometime since advised certain preliminary steps to prepare the way consistently with national character and justice." Under the same date, Hamilton wrote to Miranda that the United States was raising an army of twelve thousand men with Washington at its head; and he stated that the project for the co-operation of the United States in the expedition against Spanish America might mature the following winter. He desired that it might be arranged for England to furnish the fleet and the United States the land forces.

On October 19, 1798, Miranda wrote to Hamilton that the plans had been arranged according to his wishes—England to supply the naval force and the United States to conduct the land operations—and that the only thing that kept them from departing "like lightning" was the *fiat* of the American executive. On the same day he wrote to General Knox, expressing his delight to hear of his nomination for general in the army. He said that circumstances were working in their favor, and that it appeared that their wishes were at last to be accomplished. President Adams,

however, did not deem it advisable to furnish the ten thousand troops which were wanted to supplement the money and ships which the British Government agreed to find, and the project was necessarily postponed.

Hamilton and Pickering were not able to draw President Adams into the Miranda scheme. Like Washington, he did not favor forcible conquest or foreign alliances. Affairs with France caused him to "cool off" in the war preparations which had been started. He saw no need of a large army without an enemy, and wrote: "At present, there is no more prospect of seeing a French army here than there is in Heaven." The peace with France, and the subsequent peace of Amiens, lessened the probability of the success of Miranda's schemes. In 1799, the men who favored Miranda still hoped for something to happen that would favor their cause. King showed great anxiety to have an American army raised lest France should secure a peaceable settlement of her difficulty, and was surprised that the President said nothing in reply to his dispatches. Hamilton still hoped for the invasion as late as June 27, 1799, and he endeavored to get Secretary McHenry to urge Adams to complete the land forces. He said: "Besides the eventual security against invasion, we ought certainly to look to the possession of the Floridas and Louisiana, and we ought to squint at South America." But Adams silently discountenanced the suggestions that were so freely given.

At the turn of the centuries when Napoleon shook up the nations of Europe like dice, Cuba was faithful to Spain, but was several times in danger. The French Revolution had broken the family compact between Spain and France and had taken French support away from Spain. In 1794, when Spain had to give up her part of San Domingo to France, the rigorous blockade of Cuba by the French squadron reduced the inhabitants to great want and misery. In 1796, the same era in which the venerated relics of Columbus were removed from San Domingo to the Cathedral at Havana, Cuba was threatened by an attack from the British

fleet, and fortifications were made to guard it from possible attempts in the future. In 1796, by the treaty of San Ildefonso, a new alliance was formed between France and Spain, but it was to the advantage of France and was not intended to secure any advantage to Spain in the West Indies. In 1797 the naval power of Spain was broken at Cape St. Vincent and the communication with Cuba was almost cut off. In 1800 the Spanish Government was at the feet of Napoleon. When it gave up Louisiana to France, the Spanish colonies were left to defend themselves as best they could against England, who attacked Porto Rico, threatened Cuba, and took Trinidad. The treaty of Amiens in 1802 was the salvation of Cuba, but its tranquillity was threatened by a race war in San Domingo, between the French and the negroes, in which England aided the Dominicans to free themselves in 1803. In 1804 Spain was again induced to join Napoleon against England. Soon her naval forces were ruined and England seized Buenos Ayres. Cuba was again in danger. From 1802 to 1805 the Cuban commerce with Spain was revived and the Spanish treasury was greatly replenished. There were large importations of negroes during this period, but the white population had also increased largely by emigration from San Domingo after 1798 and from Louisiana after 1800.

American commerce in the Gulf was much disturbed by French privateers in the vicinity of Cuba. In November, 1799, four American vessels were ordered to cruise in Cuban waters in search of these privateers, and to convoy American trading vessels out of port. At one time they chased a French privateer ashore and destroyed it. The *Norfolk*, one of the American cruisers, learning that another French privateer was being fitted out at Havana, blockaded the city in spite of the protest of the Spanish Governor, compelling the commander to dismantle his vessel and discharge his crew. The United States Government hoped to restrict the influence of the French in the West Indies. In 1799 a consul-general was appointed to represent the United States

at San Domingo, where Toussaint held the French part of the island, and was still extending his conquests over the Spanish part, while the mixed and black races were fighting each other. Spain and England had given up all hope of conquering the island. Hamilton hoped that our consul-general would be able silently to encourage the independence of the Toussaint government, but it acknowledged the nominal authority of the French.

The French at this time thought that the United States should have been shut up from the Gulf of Mexico. By 1800 Napoleon resolved to revive the ancient dreams of a new France in America, and to hem the United States between the Mississippi and the Atlantic. He secretly induced Spain to cede Louisiana to France, and sent an army to subdue San Domingo so that he might have a base in the West Indies from which to extend his operations into the Mississippi valley. But L'Ouverture led the blacks of Domingo against the French troops, and the fever came to his aid to prevent the subjugation of the island. Many of the French army perished, and the expedition which was intended for Louisiana never reached New Orleans. Napoleon was too busy in Europe to carry out any American scheme.

Even before the cession of Louisiana to France there were rumors that it had already been ceded. Soon after Jefferson's inauguration, Mr. King, minister at London, told him of these rumors, and appeared to be much alarmed. He thought that the American Government should object to any European power making new acquisitions on the American continent and should insist that if Louisiana did not fall into the hands of the United States it should remain in the hands of Spain. Quoting Montesquieu, Mr. King said: "It is happy for the trading powers that God has permitted Turks and Spaniards to be in this world, since, of all nations, they are the most proper to possess a great empire with insignificance." Mr. Livingston, the American minister in France, was as restless as Mr. King. He was ener-

getically spending his time in seeking definite information in regard to the flying rumors, and, in view of the conduct of the Spanish officials at New Orleans, he unceremoniously expressed the hope that the American Government might take advantage of the occasion to possess itself of Louisiana. In April, 1802, when considering the recent cession of Louisiana to France, Jefferson wrote: "The day France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low-water mark; it seals the union of two nations who, in conjunction, can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry the British fleet and nation." It will be seen that the Americans were opposed to France as a western neighbor. The United States had already offered to purchase Louisiana in order to frustrate Napoleon's scheme, and other events soon arose to show that such a policy was the only means by which the progress of the West could be assured.

In October, 1802, the Spanish Intendant at New Orleans, acting without orders from Spain, proclaimed that New Orleans was closed as a place of deposit for merchandise. This meant a blockade for all western commerce, and when the people of the West heard that they were not allowed to float their products to the Spanish metropolis they began to talk of a war to prevent the closing of the fair Mississippi. They also proposed that the United States should obtain control of New Orleans and the east bank of the Mississippi to the mouth in order to secure the free navigation to the Gulf of Mexico.

In December, 1802, the Federalists and many Westerners urged war. Hamilton advised prompt annexation of all the territory east of the Mississippi. He would have seized Florida and New Orleans, and would have negotiated for them afterwards. In February, 1803, Jefferson, in order to guard against international complications, had letters sent to the governors of Kentucky, Tennessee and Pennsylvania, asking them to restrain the expedition against Louisiana

which was being instigated. The opposition in Congress at this time strongly favored the expedition, rather than an attempt at negotiations. On February 14, Senator Ross, of Pennsylvania, favored immediate action, and proposed that the militia should be called out. Mr. White, of Delaware, also favored action, and said: "We can never have permanent peace until we possess ourselves of New Orleans and such other positions as may be necessary to give us the complete and absolute command of the navigation of the Mississippi." Gouverneur Morris was in favor of launching out upon a policy of war and territorial extension. These views were discussed and answered by Senators Mason, Cocke, Jackson, Breckinridge, Clinton and Nicholas. Mason, of Virginia, favored deliberation rather than a policy of conquest. He said we had enough territory. Mr. Cocke opposed the Morris view of "going to war for fear we may be compelled to go to war." Jackson, of Georgia, said that the people were not unanimous for war, but that in case negotiations failed he believed all would be ready to help take New Orleans—for, that it was bound to come to the United States in the course of human events. He stated that if New Orleans must fall into the American hands by force, so must Florida, and he added: "God and Nature have destined both New Orleans and the Floridas to belong to this great and rising empire. Natural bounds to the south are the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi, and the world at some future day cannot hold them from us." To those who favored immediate seizure of New Orleans and withdrawal from the Union rather than to wait for negotiations, Mr. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, pointed to the situation of Havana; which, he said, possessed every advantage in annoying their commerce. Mr. Clinton, of New York, in speaking against the inflammatory appeals of Mr. Ross and Mr. White gave a brief review of American relations, and said it was the policy of the United States to avoid heavy taxes, standing armies, wars, the spirit of conquest, and the threats of lawless expeditions.

He saw that even if the West should seize New Orleans, Spain could cripple American commerce by her superior naval force and her controlling position in Cuba. In discussing this subject he stated: "The seizure of New Orleans would vest us with a place of deposit, but * * so long as the enemy holds the country below New Orleans and possesses a superior naval force, so long will we be excluded from the Mississippi. Suppose, however, this obstacle be removed; suppose we are enabled to pass in to the Gulf without molestation; is it not necessary for vessels to hug the island of Cuba on their passage to the Atlantic states? and will not this expose them to certain capture as long as Spain retains that important possession? To secure the great object said to be aimed at by this resolution, and to establish, beyond the reach of annoyance, a free communication between the Atlantic and the Western states, we must seize not only New Orleans but the Floridas and Cuba; and we must immediately create a formidable navy." Mr. Nicholas, of Virginia, said that if New Orleans was necessary for the security of the West, it would also be necessary to take Cuba; and he declared that without a navy to take Cuba, in case of war the navigation of the Mississippi would be hindered. Under these circumstances, he urged, the Government should not precipitate itself into a condition which would make alliance with some strong naval power necessary.

There were other causes of misunderstanding with Spain at this time. Spanish subjects complained that American vessels interfered with the fishery of sea-dogs off the coast of South America. The President did not countenance any acts against the rights of Spain, but he insisted on the right to use the seas. Greater sources of irritation were the claims of the United States to Mobile, and the damages to American commerce in the Gulf by French vessels which found protection in the Spanish harbors. Several American citizens complained before Mr. Norton, the American consul at Havana, that their vessel had been captured by

Spanish vessels near Campeachy. They claimed to live near Pittsburg and said that they had purchased flour on credit; that they had shipped it down the Ohio to New Orleans, and, finding no market there, had decided to reship it on the American vessel which was captured. They complained that Spanish authorities had sold their flour, restrained them from their liberty, and made it impossible to pay their debts at home, and that there was no excuse for the capture. There were other cases similar to this. It is probable that in some instances the American vessels that were captured were engaged in illegal transactions. An attempt had been made to adjust these difficulties in 1802 by a claims treaty. In April, 1803, the King of Spain decided to offer some other place of deposit instead of New Orleans; but he would not ratify the treaty of 1802, on account of the claims of the United States to Mobile and the claims for damages done by French vessels in Spanish waters.

The Mississippi entanglement was wisely left to the Executive to settle. Jefferson's policy was not to strike prematurely, but to resort to diplomacy and to pull the chair from under the offenders. Monroe had already been sent in January, 1803, to join Livingston and Pinkney in diplomatic service upon which was to "depend the future destinies of this Republic." They were expected to secure West Florida and New Orleans. Napoleon needed money, and under these circumstances Louisiana was purchased for fifteen million dollars. Forced to surrender his plans in America, Napoleon decided to put Louisiana out of the hands of England and at the same time get money to carry on his plans in Europe. In May, 1803, the treaty was signed and the United States started on a great career. Jefferson by one stroke of the pen and without shedding a single drop of blood set our stakes to the Rocky Mountains, and broke the barriers which prevented us from having a free outlet to the Gulf of Mexico, and the dominating influence in the North American continent. England and France were kept

out and the interests of the American people were subverted. Soon we crossed the Mississippi and scaled the bluffs lately guarded by the Spanish—and the panorama of a great West began to unroll. The Mississippi and its branches were ours, and the tide of emigration was free to sweep onward to the Cordilleras, and perhaps to roll southward to the Rio Grande and to the Pacific. Could all this vast region be kept together under one federal government, or would a new and great nation be formed beyond the Mississippi? Jefferson contemplated the future with enthusiastic hope, but he saw the remote danger of dismemberment.

Spain remonstrated against the cession of Louisiana, on the ground that France had promised not to cede it to any other nation than Spain, but by January, 1804, the United States authorities were in full possession.

The settlement of the Mississippi question did not end the danger of tangled relations with Spain. The Mississippi led to the Gulf and the Florida coast, and its waters had to pass the shores of Cuba before they mingled with the free Atlantic. It was seen that in case of war with Spain the control which Cuba gave her over the rapidly increasing western commerce would prove of great disadvantage to the United States. In 1859 Mr. Slidell in the Senate report said: "The purchase and annexation of Louisiana led as a necessary corollary to that of Florida, and both point with unerring certainty to the acquisition of Cuba * * * From the day we acquired Louisiana the attention of our able statesmen was fixed on Cuba. What the possession of the mouth of the Mississippi had been to the people of the West that of Cuba became to the nation. To cast the eye upon the map was enough to predict its destiny." Mr. Mallory, in a speech in the Senate in 1859, said that both the friends and enemies of the Mississippi question in 1803 looked to the acquisition of Cuba as the necessary consequence of the acquisition of Louisiana. We have seen that Clinton, of New York, said the seizure of New Orleans alone would not prevent the exclusion of American vessels from the Missis-

issippi, so long as Spain held the Floridas and Cuba, and owned a superior naval force. This was used as an argument by those who opposed the seizure of New Orleans and favored an attempt to secure it by negotiation instead. But, while it was seen that, if the seizure of territory should lead to a war, the navigation of the Mississippi would be hindered without a navy to take Cuba, yet there was no direct expression to indicate that the acquisition of Cuba would be necessary in consequence of a peaceful acquisition of Louisiana by purchase. It was seen, however, that the Gulf of Mexico would eventually be our southern boundary and that Florida naturally should form a part of the United States. Expansion had become our destiny. In 1804 Pinckney, the United States minister in Spain, was joined by Monroe, and they offered to pay two million dollars for the Floridas. After considerable discussion the offer failed. Monroe and Livingston claimed that West Florida to the Perdido was included in the Louisiana purchase; but Spain disputed this, and the danger of a conflict in that quarter became evident. In September, 1804, the President proposed that neither Spain nor the United States should augment the force east of the Mississippi in the territory claimed by the two nations; nevertheless, the Spanish began to strengthen and advance their military posts. Was it on account of fears of England? Madison said not, and he thought it was not favorable to that tranquillity and friendship between the two nations, which it was to the interest of Spain, as well as of the United States, to maintain.

What the United States Government desired with Cuba and all the Spanish possessions was friendship and commerce. It had been the general rule of all the European nations to keep a monopoly of the colonial trade, but this rule had been broken in 1756, when France was ruined on the sea. We have seen that in 1783 Havana and Santiago were opened to the free commerce with foreign nations—except as to the slave trade, which was restricted until 1790.

The United States had no treaty of commerce with Spain until 1795, but her citizens managed to get a share of the West India trade. The blockade of Cuba by the French in 1793 reduced the inhabitants to such great want and misery that Spain had to throw open the ports to neutral bottoms carrying breadstuffs. This gave a great impetus to the United States trade in flour. Owing to the wars raging in Europe, the period from 1789-1812 was one of great commercial enterprise for the United States. We carried many of the colonial productions to the parent states. But there were many difficulties which American commerce had to meet. By 1803-4 British, French and Spanish privateers were doing much damage by attacking the American vessels in the West Indies.

The French who protested against the United States trade with San Domingo until Congress passed the bill to suspend it, were also unlawfully capturing United States vessels in Cuban waters, and it was found necessary to use armed vessels for the protection of the Cuban trade. Spain and Cuba were both asked to interpose, but without success. Madison decided that the United States should hold Spain responsible for the French injuries to our commerce in the vicinity of Cuba, but there seems to have been no idea of making reprisals on Cuba. Jefferson was hoping to get the Floridas, and it was seen that in securing an adjustment of the injuries to American commerce in Spanish waters there would be an opportunity to obtain a cession of Florida. Madison wrote Monroe that we needed West Florida, and that since Spain would be compelled sooner or later to swallow the claim for French injuries all she could expect was "to have the pill wrapt up in the least nauseous disguise."

CHAPTER IV.

FLORIDA AND CUBA.

Jefferson's troubles had not ended when he had purchased Louisiana. He desired peace with all foreign nations, but there could be no peace so long as Napoleon was restlessly warring with Europe, dethroning kings, afflicting statesmen with nightmares, and playing shuttlecock with the map of Europe. It seemed that while the people of America were learning self-government, the people of Europe were "standing on their heads." Jefferson desired to keep his eye fixed upon the cold polar star of neutrality, and to guide the great ship of state safely through dangerous seas, but he found many complicated difficulties.

The European conflict soon assumed larger proportions, and, until the close of the War of 1812, increased the inconveniences to American commerce and threatened the security of the Louisiana territory. England had tried in vain to get Spain to renounce the treaty of Ildefonso by which she and France guaranteed each other's territories and agreed to assist each other upon demand. As early as October, 1802, England tried to detach Spain from the compact—or at least to get her to remain neutral as long as possible. In June, 1803, instructions were given to ask the Spanish Government to renounce the treaty. Spain was at that time disposed to break with France; but she delayed, and finally tried to prove that the treaty intended nothing hostile to England. In September, Spain was asked by France to furnish money according to the terms of the treaty. Spain obeyed, and soon began to fit out an armament, while her foreign secretary constantly told the English ambassador, evasively, that she was doing nothing to

hurt England. The jargon of the Spanish ministry at Madrid continued until England thought that war had become inevitable and justifiable—and to this the Commons agreed by a large majority, in 1805.

In 1805 Great Britain desired to restrict the commercial rights of neutral nations. The British West India Government in order to nourish Nova Scotia, issued proclamations excluding the United States trade with the West Indies, but it found it hard to enforce its orders. By the rule of war recognized by the British since 1776, the Americans were allowed to trade with the colonies of belligerents in produce of every description. The United States, Sweden and Denmark were becoming rich by this trade; and it was for this reason that the British Court of Admiralty now suggested that the vessels trading with the belligerents really belonged to or were engaged by them, and should be seized and condemned. It was under this rule that the American trade soon began to suffer.

Nevertheless, by August, 1805, Jefferson felt that England was more friendly than either Spain or France. In 1804 he had desired to keep on good terms with Napoleon, but he could not endure the dictating tone in which the French had recently addressed us through her minister, and he was for awhile strongly in favor of an alliance with England. He said: "I am strongly impressed with the belief of hostile and treacherous contentions against us on the part of France, and that we should lose no time in securing something more than a neutral friendship from England." At that time a treaty was being negotiated to take the place of the Jay treaty, which would expire the next year. Concerning the proposed treaty, Jefferson thought that there should be a provisional clause, providing that in case the United States had war with Spain or France during the European struggles, she should make common cause with England, and that England should stipulate not to make peace until Spain had acknowledged the rightful boundary of Louisiana and the "indemnification for spoliations, for which purpose

we should be allowed to make reprisals on the Floridas and retain them." The battle of Cape Trafalgar, October 21, 1805, made England mistress of the ocean. In May, 1806, Jefferson still hoped for a settlement of the difficulties with England and preferred a policy of peace and neutrality. He thought that it was probably better to have English than French supremacy upon the ocean. At this time Jefferson had begun to suggest the idea that we considered the Gulf Stream "our waters," in which hostilities and cruising were to be "frowned on for the present and prohibited as soon as either consent or force will permit." As early as November, 1805, Jefferson suggested the principle that the neutrality of American territories should extend to the Gulf Stream, which he said was the natural boundary within which the United States should allow no hostility. When John Quincy Adams suggested that we did not have force enough to maintain it, Jefferson said that it was as well to begin "to squint at it" and to accustom Europe to the idea that we should claim it in the future.

In 1804-5, many difficulties existed in the relations of the United States and Spain. Madison and Jefferson claimed that Louisiana extended to the Perdido, and that we thus had a good title to West Florida. But Spain was in an attitude of hostility, unwilling to settle the bounds of Louisiana or to allow compensation for past outrages, and she continued to give more causes for provocation. The carrying trade of the United States had expanded greatly during the war, and our vessels were constantly seized, so that it was necessary to protect the trade with armed ships. Besides the piratical vessels which annoyed the trade along the southern coast of the United States, Spain also endeavored to obstruct the trade of the American settlements on the Tombigbee by a pretended right to exact a duty from American commerce descending the Mobile river. Jefferson asked the opinion of his Cabinet as to a war with Spain. West Florida seemed to be necessary for the United States,

on account of Mobile bay, but the President decided to make one more attempt at negotiation.

It occurred to Jefferson that the best way to settle the difficulties with Spain would be to offer to purchase Florida. He felt that France would favor the cession, and he proposed to negotiate at once. But the Cabinet thought that the sanction of Congress should be obtained before attempting the acquisition of any large territory. When Congress met in December, John Randolph was appointed chairman of the committee to consider the relations with Spain. Jefferson's confidential message of December 6, 1805, on the relations with Spain was referred to this committee. On January 3, 1806, the committee reported that a just cause of war existed, but recommended forbearance and troops to protect the southern frontier. As a substitute for the report, Bidwell, of Massachusetts, offered a resolution to appropriate two million dollars to defray any extraordinary expenses which might arise in the foreign relations, and to be applied under the direction of the President. The Federalists tried to make Bidwell's resolution read: "Expense which may be incurred in the purchase of the Spanish territory lying on the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico and eastward of the Mississippi," but they failed. The Bidwell resolution was passed after much debate. The debates on Spanish relations continued for over a month.

New causes of friction arose to increase the peril of a war with Spain. Yrujo had been dismissed from his position as Spanish minister, but he insisted upon his right to remain at Washington as an individual as long as it suited him, and he took advantage of his influence in the United States to speak and write articles against the administration. Still another event occurred which disturbed our relations with Spain and interfered with our commerce in the Caribbean Sea. Miranda, encouraged by Pitt, who was at the head of the British ministry, came to America to secure funds and men to aid him in his designs against Spanish America. He arrived in New York in November,

1805, under the name of George Martin. About the beginning of 1806 he went to Washington under the name of Molini and was received in the best society under the name of General Miranda. He had several private interviews with Jefferson and Madison, who, though they probably did not encourage his expedition, were ready to listen to his plans. He returned to New York on January 18, obtained assistance from Col. W. S. Smith, the surveyor of the port of New York, and from Ogden, a shipowner, and sailed from that place on the *Leander*, on February 2, with a number of men, who, though they did not know the exact purpose and destination of the expedition, believed that it was to enlarge freedom somewhere in the Spanish colonies. In a few weeks there were rumors of the character of the expedition, and it was believed in New York that its purpose was to attack the Spanish possessions in the West Indies or on the continent. The *Leander* was the property of Ogden, who already had his vessel armed for protection in the West India trade, in which he had been engaged, so that the character of the vessel had created no suspicion at the time of its sailing. When Yrujo heard the rumors in regard to Miranda's intentions, he wrote an article for the *Philadelphia Gazette* which accused the administration of encouraging or conniving in the preparations of the expedition. The expedition proved a failure, but Yrujo continued his clamor. The President removed Smith from his office of surveyor of the port of New York. The authorities at Washington had both Smith and Ogden arrested and taken before Judge Tallmadge, of the United States District Court. All the Federal papers accused Jefferson of conniving. Two New York papers quarrelled over some revelations which Rufus King made in regard to the plans of Miranda which had been previously sent to Washington city from London. The Democratic papers spoke of the accusations against the administration as a Federal trick with the British at the bottom of it.

On April 7, the jury found a bill against Smith and Ogden, and their trial was set for July 14. At the trial the verdict of the jury was "not guilty." Before the trial Smith and Ogden sent two memorials to Congress, in which they explained the part which they had taken with Miranda. They said that the condition of affairs with Spain had made them believe Miranda's representations that the administration would encourage the expedition. Miranda had told them that the administration agreed that a private individual could act if he did not violate the laws, and that merchants would advance money if it was to their advantage. Miranda had been in Washington two weeks, and evidently felt that the Government silently approved his expedition. He claimed that Madison had recommended that he should use discretion. Eleven days before sailing he wrote a letter to Madison and one to Jefferson, both of which he read to Ogden and Smith. In the letter to Jefferson he hoped that Jefferson's predictions as to Colombia would be accomplished under Jefferson's auspices. In the letter to Madison (January 22), he said: "I am on the point of leaving America. I thank you for the attentions shown me while in Washington. The important things which I then communicated will remain, I do not doubt, in the deepest mystery until the final issue of this delicate business. I have acted here in this supposition, conforming myself in everything to the intentions of the Government, which I hope to have understood and observed with exactness and discretion." The above letter to Madison, as written in French by Miranda, is still to be found in the archives of the Department of State, and two foot-notes are appended in Madison's handwriting. One explains that the "important things" alluded to in the letter referred to "what passed with the British Government." The other characterizes as "not true" the suggestion that the United States had expressed any intentions in regard to the expedition.

Jefferson and Madison always denied that they favored Miranda's plan. Madison, in the letter to the American minister in Paris, Mr. Armstrong, said that Miranda disclosed in general terms his purpose to instigate rebellion in the Spanish dominions, and that the United States Government listened, but at the same time stated its open, neutral policy. On March 22, 1806, Mr. Jefferson, in a letter to Duane, wrote: "That the expedition of Miranda was countenanced by me, is an absolute falsehood, let it have gone from whom it might, and I am satisfied it is equally so as to Mr. Madison. To know as much of it as we could was our duty, but not to encourage it." In a letter to the Secretary of State, August 16, 1807, Jefferson expressed his surprise that Foronda, the Spanish minister, had demanded satisfaction for the injuries resulting from the expedition, but he told Madison to give him a decent answer as to how far the Government had knowledge of Miranda's object, and as to the negligence of the Spanish agents in not giving earlier notice of the expedition. Madison carefully vindicated the conduct of the Government against the charges of not taking preventive measures. Jefferson himself wrote to Foronda in October, 1809, after his term as President had expired, assuring him that the Government was never committed to any of Miranda's schemes.

There were ambitious and unscrupulous spirits in the United States in 1805-6, who hoped the tangled relations with Spain would give them an opportunity to lead a military expedition against the Spanish possessions in the Southwest. Burr hoped to work upon the self-confident sons of the Mississippi Valley, plunder New Orleans, make himself the ruler of Mexico, and perhaps detach the West from the Union. He had expected that a war with Spain would insure the success of the expedition, but, no war coming, he resolved to take advantage of the turbulent element which was ever ready to make a raid upon the Spanish territory, without considering the inconvenience which would result to the nation. During the latter part of 1806 he had his con-

federate, Blannerhassett, to organize a flotilla on the Ohio, but the Government heard of his plans and took vigorous measures to prevent them. The authorities in Ohio seized the flotilla the latter part of 1806, and by the spring of 1807 the enterprise was entirely suppressed. Jefferson said that it was the most extravagant and extraordinary enterprise since the days of Don Quixote, and he thought that Burr aimed at nothing less than to place himself on the throne of the Montezumas and to extend his empire to the Alleghenies by seizing New Orleans. Burr was captured and taken to Richmond for trial, and Jefferson was very anxious to have him convicted, but the jury acquitted him.

General Wilkinson, in command of the United States forces at New Orleans, was believed to have had an intention of aiding Burr. On September 28, 1806, he wrote, "in haste freely and confidentially," to John Smith, of Ohio, stating that on his arrival in Louisiana he found a deficiency in everything essential to a military movement, but that he expected men and provisions from the interior of the provinces. He went on to say: "I shall push troops over the Sabine. You must speedily send me a force to support our pretensions, or we must yield them up, together with the territory of New Orleans. * * 5000 mounted infantry * * may suffice to carry us forward as far as the Grande river; there we shall require 5000 more to conduct us to Mount el Ray * * after which 20,000 or 30,000 will be necessary to carry our conquest to California and the Isthmus of Darien." It was reported that Burr expected an English fleet from Jamaica to co-operate with him at New Orleans, and that an expedition against Florida was to be effected if he was successful at the Creole City. There was an impression in some quarters in 1807 that England had designs on the Floridas, for the advantage they would give her in relation to the West Indies and in annoying the United States in case of war with her, and it was said that the disappointed

adherents of Burr would not object to England occupying St. Augustine and Pensacola.

In July, 1807, when it seemed that a war with England was possible, Wm. Duane, of Philadelphia, wrote Jefferson that there should be an early expedition against the English possessions in America, especially a menace against Jamaica, which in case of war could best be attacked from Cuba and Porto Rico with the aid of the Spanish and French navies. But Spanish relations were too much tangled to hope for an alliance with Spain in case of a war with England. Jefferson did not like the Spanish demand for satisfaction in the case of the Miranda expedition, and he began to cast his eyes from the Everglades of Florida to the tropical fruits of Cuba. In August, 1807, while instructing the Secretary of State to prepare an answer to Foronda, with a view of laying it before Congress and publishing it to the world, he said that we should "demand satisfaction" whenever we had sufficient proof of the Western intrigues of the Spanish, and that if Congress approved, we should make reprisals on the Floridas until full satisfaction was obtained, and until Spain would be willing to agree upon a boundary. The spoilation claims were still unsettled, and Jefferson said he would rather have a war against Spain than not to have it, in case we went to war with England. Looking forward to that possible event, he said: "Our southern defensive force can take the Floridas, volunteers from the Mexican army will flock to our standard, rich pabulum will be offered to our privateers in the plunder of their commerce and coast, and probably Cuba will add itself to our confederation."

At this time there was a belief at Havana that England intended to make a descent upon the island. There was a scarcity of funds and supplies, but the militia and troops were drilled, and preparations were made to give the Angli-cans a warm reception. A descent was actually made by the French, chiefly refugees from San Domingo, who intended to take possession with a view to the colonization and cultivation of a portion of the unoccupied land along

the southern border. The captain-general induced many of them to leave peaceably in vessels which he furnished them.

Affairs in Cuba now became a subject of frequent consideration. At the close of 1807, Foronda enclosed to Secretary Madison a letter from the Captain-General of Cuba, complaining that the collector of New Orleans had refused to allow a Spanish vessel to reload a part of her cargo, consisting of spars for the royal navy, which, as a consequence of the war with England, had been placed on the banks of the Mississippi several years before the embargo act. The captain-general's letter intimated that in case satisfaction was not given, retaliation would be made upon the property of United States citizens of Havana.

After the peace of Tilsit (July, 1807), when Napoleon and Alexander of Russia met on a raft to discuss the spoliation of Prussia, there was a brief breathing spell in Europe. But Napoleon soon turned to swallow Spain and Portugal in order to shut out English commerce, and soon Spain was in his hands. On March 4, 1808, Charles ceded to him both Spain and the Indies, and the destiny of the Spanish-American possessions thus became a matter of much concern until after the victories of Trafalgar and Wellington. The British Government had been interested in the emancipation of the Spanish colonies in America since 1790, but when the extraordinary revolution broke out in Spain in 1808, England became the ally of Spain, so that the idea of using force to detach the Spanish colonies could not be harbored so long as both England and Spain were struggling together to expel the insatiable French invader whose unrelaxing grasp had fastened upon European Spain, and whose ambitious mind had already laid plans to conquer for himself the Spanish-American possessions. English ships no longer threatened Cuba, but they aided her commerce. It was apparent that if France could not have been driven from Spain, the English Government would have enabled the Spanish-American colonies to constitute themselves into free and independent

communities whose affairs would have been uninfluenced by the nod of Napoleon's fertile head.

The result of the Spanish affairs in 1808 was watched with much interest in America. The nearness of the United States to the Spanish West Indies, and the effects which were liable at an early period to spring out of that vicinity, gave to the American people a far greater anxiety than there was any necessity for England to have had. In March, 1808, General Wilkinson wrote to Hassara, the Spanish Governor of Mexico, that Bonaparte's recent act showed that his aim was universal dominion, but that he had enough in Europe to keep him busy for several years yet, and that the people of the Western Hemisphere should have an eye to their own safety and independence. In stating the policy of the United States to prevent the Spanish possessions from passing into the hands of either France or England, he said: "Mexico, Peru and Cuba, formed into independent states under a government of such natives as would be best adapted to the genius and talent of the people, and united by a strong alliance to the United States of America, would in a short time be able to defy the world." Gallatin, in a letter to Jefferson, mentioned the danger of Napoleon losing all the Spanish colonies in America, and of England taking Cuba. He said: "The occupation of Cuba by either France or England, and the transfer of our quarrel about the Louisiana boundary to France, would be the only drawback to result to us if Bonaparte takes the throne of Spain." Jefferson replied: "I shall sincerely lament Cuba falling into any hands but those of its present owners. Spanish America is at present in the best hands for us."

Napoleon desired to obtain the good-will of the United States, and he hinted that she might have Florida. He gave Armstrong, the United States minister at Paris, the impression that he would interpose with Spain to induce her to give Florida to the United States, and that he would approve the seizure of Florida by the United States in case the English attempted an attack upon it. Napoleon had hoped

to enlist the sympathies of the American Government in favor of his cause. Madison wrote that it was the policy of the United States to remain neutral, but he added: "It may be intimated at the same time that in the event of such a crisis as will demand from the United States a precautionary occupation of Florida against the hostile designs of Great Britain, it will be recollected with satisfaction that the measure had been contemplated with approbation by His Imperial Majesty."

Jefferson found many difficulties in carrying out his policy of peaceful neutrality. His embargo upon the American ships to prevent their capture by the powers of war met with much opposition. It did not harm the belligerents as he hoped it would. Queer old John Randolph said that it was "an attempt to wound the invulnerable like shooting Gibraltar with a pocket pistol"—that we had hanged ourselves for spite, hoping for the belligerents to cut us down, but that they had disappointed us by showing their preference to "let us dangle in our garters." It seemed that war with England could not be avoided, and Jefferson carefully kept Napoleon's suggestion in his mind. He was determined that neither France nor England should possess themselves of West Florida and menace the control of the Mississippi by the United States. In a note to the Secretary of War, he said that, in case England should make war on the United States while Napoleon was fighting Spain, a favorable opportunity might present itself "to seize our own limits of Louisiana and the residue of the Floridas as reprisal for spoiliations." He instructed the secretary to keep this in mind while stationing troops and vessels, so that we might be prepared to strike in case Congress authorized it. The embargo of March 12, 1808, had considered Florida from Baton Rouge to the Perdido, and all the rest of the Floridas, as foreign territory, and no exports of the United States were allowed to go to it. This was found very inconvenient and necessity of owning Florida became more and more manifest.

In July, Cuba heard the news of Napoleon's entry into Spain. The demands of the French intruders from San Domingo for recognition were disregarded. Cuba remained true to the Spanish Junta of Seville, even when that Junta placed restrictions on commerce under foreign flags which later led to the South American revolt. While Spain was bowed beneath the strong yoke of France, however, a deputation was sent from Cuba to Washington to propose annexation to the United States. Jefferson declined the offer—it has been said that his devotion to French influence led him to this policy, but it is not certain that he had a chance to gain Cuba without costly complications. The explosion in Spain gave some enthusiastic and restless spirits in the United States an opportunity to hope for the liberation of the entire American continent from the "shackles of European government." Wilkinson, who had been connected with many enterprises, intrigues, researches and enquiries in relation to Spanish America, wrote a letter to Jefferson, on October 1, 1808, in which he suggested that it was a great opportunity to make America entirely independent of Europe. He said that connection with Europe had been gradually depraving our tastes, multiplying our wants, infecting our manners and corrupting our principles since 1776, and that it would be possible, by separating ourselves from the fashions of Europe, to eradicate all our bad habits within a period of two years. He believed that the ordinary habits of rational beings could be changed in one month, and that all that was necessary to make people good was to legislate for them and have the rich and wise to set examples for them. As a justification for his proposed policy of isolation he said that it would exempt us from the bickerings and bloody contests of Europe, prevent the sacrifice of liberty to fashion, and make fleets and armies useless. As the acquaintance of America with Europe should gradually subside, he felt that there would be less danger of the success of any attempt of the British to interfere with the feeble Spaniards along the

shores of the American seas. Mr. Wilkinson said that he had been much slandered in America, and he desired an appointment which would raise him in the estimation of the people. He feared the insidious encroachments of Great Britain in Mexico and other Spanish colonies, and he suggested that the United States should demonstrate her sympathy with the Spanish colonies, and send an agent to lead public opinion and to alarm their jealousy as to the intentions of the British. "I fear," said he, "that without some seasonable counter action on our part, the British may cajole and frighten the Marquis Semeruilos, the Captain-General of Cuba and the Floridas, out of these possessions, which I should consider a calamitous event to the United States. Semeruilos, personally known to me, is extremely feminine in his exterior, and of feeble intellect * * * I fear the British have a fair chance to mislead him."

After the flight of Joseph from Madrid and the outburst of English enthusiasm for Spain, it was agreed at a Cabinet meeting at Washington, on October 22, that the United States agents in Cuba and Mexico should unauthoritatively say to influential persons there: "If you remain under the kingdom and family of Spain, we are contented; but we should be extremely unwilling to see you pass under the dominion or ascendancy of France or England. In the latter case, should you choose to declare independence, we cannot now commit ourselves by saying we would make a common cause with you, but must reserve ourselves to act according to the then existing circumstances." At the same time the agents were to state that the interests of the United States and of the Spanish colony were intimately connected. About this time there was published at Havana an article from a Spanish paper which stated that the United States were not friendly to the patriots of Spain who were trying to drive out Napoleon. Jefferson denied the charge, and in stating that it was our duty to remain neutral, said: "If they succeed we shall be well satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in the present dependence,

but very unwilling to see them in that of either France or England, politically or commercially. We consider their interests and ours as the same, and that the object of both must be to exclude all European influence from this hemisphere."

At the beginning of 1809 the West India Islands were suffering greatly for want of provisions, Cuba, however, not suffering so much as many others, for besides the occasional supplies of flour from Vera Cruz, she had a large amount of vegetables. The political situation being uncertain, the people were looking towards the United States for protection in case of invasion. Morris Rogers, a United States commercial agent at St. Jago, Cuba, informed the Secretary of State that while the people were unanimously in favor of Ferdinand II. of Spain, and desired to retain their former connection, their attention had "lately been directed to the United States with a peculiar degree of anxiety arising probably more from interest than from any peculiar affection." But he believed they would prefer to place themselves under the protection of the United States rather than that of Great Britain, in case the island should fall into the hands of the French Government. On March 21, a serious disturbance arose, the object of which was to invite the return of the French to Cuba. After a considerable loss of property tranquillity was restored at the end of two days. Many of the industrious French settlers continued to be driven away from the island.

It was uncertain what would be the best course for the United States to pursue in regard to its relations with the Bonapartes. Jefferson seemed to think that the success of Napoleon in Spain might, after all, prove for the best interests of the United States, by preventing a war which seemed to be impending. In a letter to Monroe, Jefferson said that, however much liberal sentiment might revolt at Napoleon's success, it might result in making England and France more accommodating with the United States. He thought that Napoleon, having Spain at his feet and desir-

ing to get the Spanish colonies, might be willing to purchase the neutrality of the United States by a repeal of his decrees, and perhaps "with Florida thrown in." If things should keep on as they had been, it appeared to Jefferson that the United States would be compelled to take the tented field, and he wished to avoid war for a few years longer until the revenues of the country were sufficient to carry it on. On March 4, the "drudgery" of Jefferson ended, and Madison, who had been Secretary of State, became President of the United States. But Jefferson's influence with the Executive Department had not ended. He frequently wrote to Mr. Madison and often consulted him. On March 31, he wrote Mr. Madison that Mr. Erving, the Minister of the United States at Madrid, had probably made a mistake by recognizing the Government of Spain *de facto*, for, it was understood that Joseph Bonaparte was well disposed toward the United States. Mr. Madison decided to admit a minister from neither the Spanish Junta, nor from the Bonaparte Government, until the dispute was settled in Spain. Onís, who was sent to America to represent the Spanish Junta, complained of the decision of the President in thus failing to recognize the patriots who were fighting for their liberty against the usurper; he said that the Junta and Ferdinand had the obedience of the people in both Spain and the colonies, and had the control of the squadron, while Napoleon had not a single Spanish soldier in his armies.

At the close of the year 1808 there were rumors of English designs against America. Burr, in London, stated to his friends that the English Government would give him two million dollars whenever he could raise an ensign of rebellion. Wilkinson had thought that the United States should send informal agents to alarm the jealousy of the Spanish colonies as to the views of England. He declared that he "knew more of Spanish America than any other American" and he desired the appointment. He did not receive the appointment that he probably had in view, but

on December 2, 1808, he was ordered back to New Orleans, being requested, however, to stop at Havana and Pensacola under a special mission from the Executive of the United States, and later, he was given the opportunity to sound the Spanish governor of Florida as to his probable policy. Turreau, the French minister, was suspicious because General Wilkinson touched at Havana. Jefferson said that he went there simply to remove the impression, caused by the embargo, that the United States were in hostile co-operation with the revolutionary designs in the Spanish colonies. The Executive had heard that an English force from Halifax was held ready for service in the West Indies or New Orleans, in case of war. The mission of Wilkinson may also have had some connection with this subject. On reaching New Orleans in April, Wilkinson urged that the critical condition of Spanish America made the strengthening of New Orleans defenses necessary. He reported that England had a disposable force of 6000 men in the West Indies, and that she could take West Florida at her will. "Give me leave and I will anticipate her," said he, though he saw that there was danger of such a step affecting Cuba and Mexico to the injury of the United States. Wilkinson soon began to sound Governor Falch, of West Florida, as to the course he would pursue in case Spain was subdued by Bonaparte. Falch hoped that the Junta government of Spain would not be overthrown, but, in case it should be, he hoped to have an order from it for the delivery of West Florida to the United States. When Wilkinson suggested that the Junta might already have been driven from Spain, Falch said in that case he would recommend to the Mexican authorities that his province be ceded to the United States, and, that if they did not listen to him, he would make a direct application to President Madison. When Wilkinson mentioned that the British probably had designs upon Florida, Falch said: "That grows out of the corruption of their understanding. What do they want it for? To go to war with you? They shall

not have it, for it is as necessary to the United States as the drawer is to the case."

A month after Jefferson left the presidential chair, he wrote to President Madison that the conquest of Spain would probably force a delicate question upon the administration in regard to the Floridas and Cuba, which he thought would probably offer themselves to the United States. Jefferson did not have any too high an opinion of the good faith of Bonaparte in carrying out his obligations, but he still thought that the French Emperor would give his consent for the annexation of Florida and perhaps of Cuba also.

There was a rumor that troops were collecting at New Orleans to support a movement for independence in Florida, and that Jefferson, just before leaving the presidency, had been heard to say: "We must have the Floridas and Cuba." Turreau, the French minister was troubled over these rumors, and he had been suspicious of the mission of Wilkinson to Havana. Madison, at this time, was anxious to have the French decrees repealed, and he sent Gallatin to make explanations to Turreau as he passed through Baltimore about the middle of April. Gallatin said to Turreau: "We are and wish to be strangers to all that passes in the Floridas, in Mexico, and also in Cuba." He said that Madison had no such policy as had been attributed to Jefferson, and that "If Cuba were offered to us as a gift we would not accept it." Turreau agreed to make efforts to have the decrees repealed, saying that Napoleon would revoke his orders if the report was true that England had repealed hers. A vessel was sent to France to obtain definite information from the Emperor. With the probabilities that the decrees would be repealed, Madison felt that the only difficulties which were likely to threaten our relations with France in the future would be in connection with the Spanish-American colonies. He saw that France might attempt to make the United States in some way subservient to the reduction of Spanish America, especially by restricting American commerce.

Considering Turreau's jealousy, Madison said: "Cuba will, without doubt, be a cardinal object with Napoleon."

Jefferson did not want any more Spanish territory than we would be able to manage; but he was willing to take Cuba, and his willingness increased. He saw that Florida would be ours whether Napoleon favored it or not; and he believed that, in case Napoleon extended his conquest to America, he would be willing to give us Cuba, as well as Florida, to prevent us from aiding Mexico and South America. In a letter to the President on April 27, 1809, Jefferson said: "It will be objected to our receiving Cuba that no limit can then be drawn to our future acquisitions. Cuba can be defended by us without a navy, and this develops the principle which ought to limit our views. Nothing should ever be accepted which would require a navy to defend it." Jefferson believed that Cuba as well as Florida would probably be offered to us by the inhabitants. In case the vessel despatched to France brought back a reply unfavorable to the revocation of the Napoleonic decrees, he expected Congress to consider the question of war—for, he said, Napoleon had all the war that he wanted, in Europe, and we might as well receive the offers of the Floridas and Cuba.

Napoleon was probably more anxious for Cuba than for Florida. The French from Domingo who had settled in the island, submitted to the French Government a plan for the cession of that part of Cuba to the windward of Baracoa as far as Trinidad. The course of affairs frustrated the plan, but Joseph Bonaparte, in 1809, sent an agent on a secret mission to Cuba. On July 18, he arrived from Norfolk, United States. Being suspected, he was searched, and thirty-three letters signed by Joseph Bonaparte, and directed to persons in Cuba, Mexico and Yucatan, were found in the bottom of his trunk. On July 30, he was executed at Havana, for treason. A number of French settlers were driven out of Cuba at this time—some with their slaves, were compelled to take passage on the American vessels bound for the United States. By the law of

1807, captains and owners of vessels had been forbidden to bring slaves into the country, but the United States extended the hand of relief to these unfortunates until they were able to get passage for the French possessions.

Since the beginning of its career, the American republic had tried to avoid complications with Europe. Washington, Adams and Jefferson had all favored peace. The young nation had preferred patiently to endure vexatious inconveniences than to rush into dangers that it knew not of—hoping the inconveniences would cease with time. But time went on and so did the inconveniences. When the second year of Madison's administration began there were many threatening clouds rising at different points in the horizon. The outlook was certainly not encouraging. But Jefferson was still hopeful—from his Virginia home he looked out upon a world of conflict and turmoil, but he had confidence in his watchmen and slept soundly. When others were fearing that Napoleon would soon be walking the American main, he replied with confidence that Napoleon had enough work to do with the rulers of Europe and Asia to keep him busy for some time to come, and he thought it would be his policy to leave America for the last item in his chapter of accidents. He said: "If he finishes Spain and Portugal, he still has Russia and England to subdue * * he can't leave them in his rear; and then he has Greece and Macedonia, the cradle of Alexander * *; then Egypt and Syria, and the territory to the Ganges." With an optimism that never failed him, Jefferson said that our difficulties were "joys of Paradise" compared to those of Europe, where a conqueror was roaming over the land with havoc and destruction and the pirate was spreading misery and ruin over the ocean; and that America should feel thankful that "the mammoth cannot swim nor the leviathan move on dry land."

In 1810, European affairs were in such a tangle that the United States Government had good reason to fear that some European nation would get a foothold in Florida.

It looked as though Spain would become dependent upon either England or France, and the United States especially desired that neither of these powers should obtain West Florida and menace the American control of the Mississippi. The United States had no claim to East Florida, but she claimed West Florida, as a part of the Louisiana purchase. Spain had objected to this, and Talleyrand, the French Minister of State, had agreed with the Spanish interpretation. But the United States now found an opportunity to take possession of the east bank of the Mississippi provisionally, and later to annex it to Louisiana. Many of the people of West Florida favored revolution. The governor would concede nothing without consulting higher authorities. Many Englishmen held offices in the province and were an obstacle to the plan of independence. Under these conditions there was shown a disposition to propose an alliance with England in case the United States showed no disposition to favor the cause of independence. The insurgents, following the example of Miranda at Carácas, seized Baton Rouge in 1810, proclaimed independence, adopted the flag of one star, and applied to the United States for aid and recognition. But President Madison sent Claiborne to take possession under claim of title by the Louisiana purchase. The Spanish commander at Mobile was not disturbed, but he was ready to transfer the whole province to the United States if Spain should send no reinforcements from Havana. In January, 1811, Congress passed an Act in secret session authorizing Madison to take possession of East Florida, if the local authorities agreed to it, or if the foreign governments should try to take it. On March 8, 1811, there were some fears that the Percival Ministry would take the province if the United States did not hurry and get it.

Bernebue, the Spanish representative in the United States, protested against the taking of West Florida. Before the revolutionary movement occurred, the Captain-General of Cuba had informed him of a society organized for hos-

tilities against Mobile. On October 1, he mentioned the report to Mr. Smith, who was then Secretary of State, and he hoped that no revolution would occur in Florida while the Spanish nation was "contending to preserve that liberty which Bonaparte wished to deprive them of." In regard to the seizure of West Florida, he said (December 10) that the act showed a spirit of hostility where the two countries (Spain and the United States) by geographical and commercial relations ought to be strictly united. Bornebue continued to complain of the conduct of the United States in Florida, in favoring the French, and in sending war supplies to the insurgents at Carácas and Buenos Ayres. Finally, in June, 1811, Mr. Monroe was induced to deny every charge which Bernebue brought against the United States, and to bring counter charges against the hostile attitude of the Spanish Government since the beginning of the American nation. He said the United States Government had no authority in the revolutionary movement of the inhabitants of West Florida, though he admitted that deserters from the United States Army had gone there. He said the people were too strong in their movement, and that Governor Falch had thus been induced to offer to surrender the province to the United States. In denying the charges that the United States had been sending war supplies to South America, Monroe justified the sending of commercial agents to the revolting colony on the ground that there was no law to forbid it. The conduct of previous Spanish ministers in the United States furnished plenty of material for Monroe in preparing his diplomatic reply for the Spanish representative.

English designs in Cuba were still a source of anxiety in 1810-11. Gallatin said that an agent should be sent to Havana to watch the course of affairs, to guard the commercial and political interests of the United States, and to prevent undue British ascendancy. He thought there was reason to believe that England would try to govern the Spanish colonies through a nominal Spanish regency;

and for that purpose she would keep up hostilities in some quarter of Spain, and oppose revolutionary movements in the colony. He expected her to attempt to take possession of Cuba. Madison hoped that England would not seize Florida, and said that the position of Cuba would prevent the United States from being a satisfied spectator to its falling into the hands of any European nation which might use it as a fulcrum against the commerce of the United States. While the game which England might play in Cuba was conjectured, it was felt that it would be a losing one in the end.

At the beginning of the war with England in 1812, the United States Government feared that Great Britain would make the Spanish ports a base for offensive operations, but even with this danger it would not have been considered wise to annex Spanish possessions forcibly at that time. The War of 1812 caused much friction between the American and Spanish Governments, and Cuba gathered a naval force. Wilkinson with American troops seized the fort at Mobile in 1813. The English used the harbor of Pensacola while preparing for their southern campaign of 1814, and they rested at Havana after the battle of New Orleans. It has often been said that if Cuba had belonged to the United States in 1814-15, no British fleet would ever have landed on the Gulf coast.

In 1815, after the Bonapartes had fled and Napoleon was safely enclosed by the broad ocean at St. Helena, the rainbow of peace promised Europe a "breathing spell." But the insolent Napoleon had been replaced by a swarm of swaggering pigmies and Europe was uneasy from the Urals to the Atlantic. Metternich and the allied sovereigns found it no easy work to "sit on" the smouldering fires of revolution. By the plans which they had hatched at summer resorts, they made themselves believe that the old order of things had returned. A Bourbon ruled the shrunken French domains, and excitable Paris shouted itself hoarse. The policy of the European congresses and the conditions

of Europe greatly influenced the development of America. While Metternich was chief cook, liberalists could get no dinner. Debts, standing armies, political prescription, and hungry stomachs induced a large emigration from Europe to the land of promise, which, though it held the slave code in one hand, held the Declaration of Independence in the other. When the down-trodden and almost suffocated democracy, which had toiled to give luxury to others, threw off its heavy burdens, and came to America, it indicated the rise of a new democracy and the development of a self-governing West.

The dull times in the East after 1814, the cheapness of land in the West, the desire for broader opportunities, and the natural spirit of adventure caused a continual stream of emigration to the valleys of the Mississippi where solitude and privation were founding a great West. Washington sat upon the swampy banks of the Potomac and saw the jostling of all peoples in the nation-making settlements of the interior. The West advanced with certain, buoyant step. Soon the work of a national road was moving westward over ravines and hills toward that future debating ground where people "took to politics like a duck takes to water." Within a few years the Ohio and Mississippi swarmed with steamboats and the goods which had formerly been carried over the mountains, to the western settlers, were now purchased at New Orleans, which had already become the emporium for western pork, flour and lumber. With the increase of American commerce on the waters of the Mississippi and of the Gulf of Mexico, and with ripe Spanish fruit falling from the old Spanish tree the destiny of Florida and Cuba became more and more a subject of interest to the United States.

Spain shook off the yoke of Napoleon in 1812, and an assembly was called to make a new constitution. Three Cuban deputies were present and took part at the convention. In proposing various reforms, some of the Spanish leaders favored the emancipation of slaves in Cuba, but the

Cuban deputies prevented the measure. The new constitution was proclaimed, but the convulsions of Spanish political life soon made it null and void. Ferdinand VII. returned to Spain in March, 1814. In May, he repealed the constitution and dissolved the Cortes. There was a return to the ancient régime in both Spain and Cuba. The reactionary government and the rule of caprice in Spain lasted for six years, in which industries ebbed, the treasury was emptied, and beggary and robbery thrived. South America was in revolt. Expeditions were planned against these revolts, but the once great monarchy now had no fleet, and had to purchase two rotten ships from Russia. In Spain there were nine attempts at revolution from 1816-19. All were suppressed; but in January, 1820, Riego proclaimed the Constitution of 1812, and violent commotion followed until the revolution was victorious and the king consented to open the Cortes in July.

Spain's influence was rapidly declining in the New World. She had long been preparing her bed, and now it seemed she would have to lie in it. The United States, where Spain had once planned a revolt, had not been a light under a bushel. Her progress had been watched by the people of South America. The provinces bound to Spain for three centuries began to break the bonds. They were tired of Jesuitic influence, crippled trade, corrupt officers, captain-generals, sub-officials and extortion. When they refused to recognize a Napoleonic government, they began to realize the possibilities of a self-government, and they were never under the yoke again as completely as they had been before. They demanded equal rights with the mother-country, equal representation in the Cortes, and freedom of trade; but these reforms were favored by neither Ferdinand nor the liberal Cortes. They presented a long catalogue of grievances, and soon began to tear away from the mother-country. The spirit of revolution spread from province to province until Spanish supremacy was shaken from Patagonia to Venezuela.

What should be the attitude of the United States to the colonies in revolt, soon became an important question. Her people naturally had a hearty sympathy for young republics, but it was necessary to keep that sympathy in proper check and balance. In February, 1816, General Scott and others favored joining in the war with South America, but this was not the policy of Madison. Jefferson said that on the whole the independence of the Spanish colonies would be to our interests, though he feared they might undersell us in the market. He favored alliance with South America whenever open rupture with Spain could no longer be deferred, and he felt that war with Spain was brewing. Clay and others in Congress desired to recognize the independence of the South American provinces. Monroe sent three commissioners in a war vessel to the South American ports to gather information of the conditions which existed there, and their report did not make it appear advisable to offer recognition at that time. The United States had declared its neutrality in the struggle, but Spain complained that vessels fitted out in the United States were cruising under insurgents' flags and injuring her commerce. The Spanish Minister, D'Onis, complained of two privateers being fitted out in the Chesapeake, and stated that the neutrality laws were not enforced by the marshal of Baltimore.

There were many depredations on the United States commerce by privateers sailing under Spanish commissions. Some were seized. The character of the Caribbean had always favored piracy, and during the European wars a horde of pirates had developed, some of whom now received commissions as privateers. The anarchy along the Spanish main, and the military dictatorships which were set up, favored their existence. Finally, in 1819, the United States undertook to sweep them from the sea. The American West India trade was very lucrative after 1815, but many vessels sailed and never returned, and there were many races for life. In some cases United States citizens took advantage of the conditions in order to carry on illegal

transactions against Spain. In 1816, fourteen Americans, who had been captured by a Spanish vessel near Cuba, and who were probably sailing to aid South America, were placed in prison at St. Jago de Cuba, where they complained of being cut, bound back to back, and allowed only "one-half pint of rice and beans half cooked to content the sons of Columbia for twenty-four hours." They stated that they had no clothes and were allowed no chance to see their friends, and they begged for the mercy of a free country, for which they said they had fought.

In 1818 there were many unsettled questions between the United States and Spain. The Spanish ministers had been sitting on some of them for years, hoping that they might be consigned to everlasting sleep in the files of the Spanish Legation. The Spanish spoliation claims were still unpaid, and unrecognized. In January, 1818, D'Onis informed the Secretary of State that America should apply to the tribunals of France, and not to those of Spain; that Spain had endeavored to protect American vessels in her jurisdiction around Cuba, but that she could not prevent French privateers from entering her ports while France was her ally against England, and that she could not foresee what these vessels might do with American vessels. Florida and Texas had at this time become a base for pirates, the boundaries were still unsettled and it was hard for the United States to prevent her citizens from giving aid to the South American insurgents. Texas, which lawless Americans had attempted to wrest from Spain in 1812, now showed symptoms of insurrection. There were rumors that Mexico would also throw off the Spanish rule and that Jerome Bonaparte might be called to the throne of the Montezumas. In 1817, Gregor McGregor had led a body of lawless men from Charleston, South Carolina, with which he sailed to Amelia Island and took possession in the name of Venezuela and Buenos Ayres, making it a centre for free-booting enterprises, smuggling, and the introduction of African slaves. Another band of pirates gathered at Gal-

veston. By January, 1818, American naval forces broke up both of these nests of outlaws; and the Spanish authority being too weak to occupy them, the United States kept temporary possession, but she assured Spain that her claims would be respected.

The influence of Spain was rapidly declining in America, and it became more and more evident that a full cession of the Floridas to the United States was essential to the future peace of the two countries. That they could not much longer remain in the hands of Spain, was evident from the circumstances which led to the Jackson invasion in 1818. The Creek Indians of Georgia and Louisiana who had been the allies of England in 1814, had been driven, by United States forces under General Jackson, into Florida, where they took refuge with the Seminoles. In 1817, both these tribes began to harass the inhabitants along the Florida border. Jackson having been sent to stop them pursued them into Spanish territory. In April, 1818, he seized St. Marks, and executed Arbuthnot and Ambrister, two British citizens who had exerted a bad influence over the Indians. In May he seized Pensacola—and the Spanish governor sailed to Havana.

When the news of Jackson's invasion reached Washington, Adams, Secretary of State, was already endeavoring to negotiate a treaty for the cession of the Floridas. In 1815 the United States had proposed to Spain: (1) That she cede all territory east of the Mississippi, (2) That her eastern boundary be the Colorado river, (3) That a commission be appointed to settle the claims for losses by the abrogation of the right of deposit at New Orleans, and for the spoliation by French or Spanish vessels in Spanish waters, (4) That the lands from East Florida to Louisiana be held as security for the payment of these claims, and that no grants by Spain in this territory since 1802 were to be considered valid, (5) That in consideration of the transfer of the above territory Spain was to be released from the claims made by the United States. In 1817, Spain tried to secure the Mis-

issippi as her eastern boundary, in return for West Florida. In December, 1817, negotiations between Adams and D'Onis began at Washington, but the discussions ended in no agreement. England offered to mediate; but, because she had already taken the part of Spain on several points, the United States refused. On July 9, 1818, the Spanish king ratified the convention of 1802, admitting the claims against Spain for injuries to American commerce in Cuban waters. The following October, D'Onis proposed to cede the Floridas and to fix the western boundary of Louisiana. The terms were not satisfactory to Adams at first; but, after some changes, they were accepted in February, 1819, and Forsythe was sent to Spain to get the king to ratify the treaty. The Cortes delayed action on the treaty and the news came that England was trying to get Cuba.

The Peace of Utrecht had provided that Spain should not cede any of her colonies to another power. The treaty of Seville in 1729, confirmed this provision. In the House of Lords, the Marquis of Lansdowne, in calling for papers concerning the conduct of Jackson in Florida, took occasion to say that the English ministers should have guarded against the cession of Florida. He was inclined to think that such a security should have been asked of Spain at Vienna in 1814. He said that the cession of the Floridas would place a great part of the commerce of the West Indies at the mercy of the United States, and that in the case of hostilities the British homeward-bound fleet would be in danger while passing the Gulf of Florida. He also feared that the possession of the Floridas would give the United States a commanding influence over the black governments which were already established, or might thereafter be established, in the West Indies. Lord Bathurst said that interference as to the cession of Florida was unjustifiable. The Earl of Liverpool stated that if by faith of treaties Spain was bound to make no cession of the Floridas it would nevertheless be inconsistent in the existing state of Spain to call upon her to exercise such a guarantee, unless Eng-

land was prepared to make a common cause with her. In May, Mr. Tierney in the Commons moved for the appointment of a committee on the state of the nation, in order to see that English rights were defended against America and France. He was surprised that the Ministry was not troubled over the cession of Florida. In reply, Canning said that it would be more to the interests of England if Florida had remained in the hands of Spain, but he did not see how England could interfere to prevent a transfer of territory between two independent nations, unless she were prepared to make common cause with the nation of whom the cession was required.

On June 30, 1819, Mr. Rush, the American minister at London, in a letter to Gallatin said that it was surmised that the English Government was trying to influence Spain not to accept the Florida treaty, but the Duke of San Carlos declared that it would be ratified. Castlereagh stated that the English Cabinet, by simply holding up a finger, could have produced a war over Florida matters, but that the Government was conciliatory. England, at this time, desired to keep friendship with the United States while the South American revolution was unsettled. Dr. Phillimore, in a speech on the foreign enlistment bill, referred to the momentous events in South America where the people, so long depressed, were emerging from beneath the galling yoke which had held them for centuries, and he thought that England should hold herself in readiness to secure advantageous trade relations. The table of the Commons was strewn with petitions, all breathing the same spirit. At such a time it was especially desirable that England should be on good terms with the United States.

It appears that England, France, and Russia were trying to get Ferdinand to sign the Florida treaty; but the latter feared that the United States would recognize the independence of the South American states as soon as the treaty was ratified—and he also heard of the Texan invasion by American citizens. Monroe's message of 1819, was cau-

tious. He was ready to avow an inclination to recognize the South American republics, but Adams advised him to avoid any expression that would deepen the hostile feeling of Spain at that time, and to leave the republics to the kind future.

In April, 1820, General Vives arrived in Washington from Cuba to extort new pledges from the United States, and to gain time. The *Norfolk Herald* was "informed" that the reason Ferdinand had not signed the Florida treaty "was because it had already been ceded to England." When Vives came to Washington, however, he said that Spain would ratify the treaty if the United States would agree (1) to prevent piratical excursions from the ports of the United States, (2) to stop the aid that had been given to South America, and (3) to have no relations with the revolted colonies. Mr. Monroe at once wrote Jefferson of the Spanish demand. Jefferson replied that we had shown our friendly desire, and that he was not sorry for the non-ratification by Spain. He saw the opportunity which America would soon have to extend herself, not only to Florida, but also to Texas, which he said would prove to be one of the richest states of the Union. He believed that the nations of Europe would agree that Florida should be ours, and he saw the possibility of Cuba joining us on the acknowledgment of their independence. At this time Jefferson expected the new Spanish Government to voluntarily accede Cuban independence.

The hour of retribution for Spain was arriving. The trumpet of civil war had been blown; the blast of revolution had gone forth into all her trans-Atlantic colonies, from the extremity of Cape Horn to the banks of the Orinoco, and from the banks of the Orinoco to the innermost recesses of Mexico. Spain's empire was crumbling, and Monroe felt that she would soon be expelled from the continent, and that the United States could arrange the boundary with Mexico to include more territory than would probably be safe for our internal peace. The earlier desires of certain politicians,

to bring about dismemberment of the Union by the establishment of a nation west of the Alleghenies, had not passed from Monroe's mind. Jefferson was confident that the United States would obtain Texas and Florida, and he expected to get Cuba also by the voluntary action of the people of that island. He did not fear Spain. So far as foreign relations were concerned he had no fears, but he was uncertain as to the results which might follow to disturb internal affairs. The French-Creole population of Louisiana had been a source of some uneasiness for several years after the purchase of Louisiana. Might there not be danger from too rapid expansion? This danger presented itself to Monroe more than to Jefferson. In a letter to Jefferson in May, 1820, he said: "If occurrences involved in it nothing more than a question between the United States and Spain or between them and the colonies I should entirely concur in your view of the subject. I am satisfied that we might regulate it in every circumstance as we thought just; and, without war, that we might take Florida as an indemnity and Texas for some trifle as an equivalent. Spain must soon be expelled from this continent, and with any new boundary which might be formed in Mexico it would be easy to arrange the boundaries in the wilderness so as to include as much territory on our side as we might desire. No European power could prevent this if so disposed. But it is altogether internal and of the most distressing nature and dangerous tendency."

Soon came the news of revolution in Spain, and that the Spanish Government had again made a change in policy. General Vives at once sent a messenger to Madrid to get the final decision in regard to the Florida treaty. Upon the adoption of the new Spanish constitution the treaty was finally ratified after having been delayed two years. By its terms East and West Florida were sold to the United States for five million dollars, and the United States gave up all claims to the territory west of the Sabine. Thus Louisiana lost her claim to Texas. The five million dollars

were not paid to Spain, but were used by the United States in settling the spoliation claims of her citizens against Cuba.

Florida has been called the "Land of Disappointments." Many of the inhabitants after the purchase by the United States moved to Cuba. But even in that early day Florida was valuable for its harbors and for the command which it gave to the United States over the Gulf of Mexico. By its position the United States were better able to counteract the schemes of Europe in the West Indies, and to make the Gulf safer. It also carried our boundaries very near the shores of Cuba, and it mysteriously pointed like some index finger to another zone whose political destiny was still uncertain. The hopes of restless spirits to carry our banners beyond the Gulf were increased. General Wilkinson, who was in Mexico, wrote to the President that Mexico desired annexation to the United States, and he offered his services in case the Government desired negotiations looking to that end.

The Florida treaty left Spain free to look after her revolted colonies, whose destiny now became of greater interest to the United States. The burdens which Cuba had to bear upon her patient shoulders were somewhat reduced. The Florida provinces had formed a part of the captain-generalship of Cuba, and Cuba had remitted about \$470,000 for the annual support of those provinces. In addition to this, she furnished \$100,000 to San Domingo and its emigrants, \$25,000 to Porto Rico, \$400,000 to the royal cause in South America and \$1,500,000 for the support of the regulars and marines.

From 1809 to 1820, the commerce of Cuba advanced, though harassed by the cruisers of South America. There was a very extensive trade in slaves during this period. In 1817, it was stated that the secret reason for permitting the importation of negroes was to secure the allegiance of Cuba by alarming the people for their own safety. The two races seemed to have been in dread of each other, the blacks

indifferent, the whites indolent, holding nothing in common but a faith which said that all would finally meet in concord in Heaven. It was felt in England that the terrific past and the frowning future of San Domingo should impress Cuba with the necessity of augmenting only its white population. In 1817, the English treaty with Spain made the importation of negro slaves to the West Indies illegal after 1820. In order to secure this treaty England gave Spain the sum of £400,000. The trading interests in Cuba were opposed to the treaty, and smuggled to avoid it. The opposition of the Cubans led Spain in 1818 to open the Cuban ports to unlimited foreign commerce and to encourage white immigration to the island. Until 1829, Cuba enjoyed limited commercial freedom. Most of her commerce was with the United States. In 1819, out of the 1250 arrivals of vessels for Havana 614 were American, 338 Spanish, and 148 British. Baltimore at that time sent far more flour than any other city. According to some letters written by an Englishman at Havana in 1820, the commerce decreased at that date. He stated that when the new constitution was established the people assumed the right to refuse to pay impost, and that the officials did not have the courage to enforce the law. The result was a dry treasury, slumbering laws, and violation of public order, as well as several financial failures.

During the delay in the ratification of the Florida treaty the American people were frequently made uneasy by reports that England had designs on Cuba. Early in 1819, it was hinted that England was likely to aim at Cuba, but D'Onis at a London diplomatic dinner by Castlereagh on June 17, said that Mr. Rush, the American minister at London, might feel easy—that Spain had not ceded Cuba to England, and did not intend to do so. Lord Liverpool in a conversation with Mr. Rush said that the newspaper rumors were often very idle, and the sentiment among ambassadors at London was that the powers would not

allow any cession of that island. The rumors were generally discredited. The Duke of San Carlos was unequivocal in his disbelief. In August, when London "society" had ended for the season, Mr. Rush was cut off from his previous sources of information, but he learned that in case of an attempt of Spain to transfer Cuba the inhabitants of the island would oppose it. It did not appear that England would desire to hold Cuba by a force of 10,000 troops. As to whether Spain desired to sell, no one could say. It was surmised, however, that the English Government would use its influence to prevent the ratification of the Florida treaty, unless England could get Cuba in return. This caused much unrest in America.

The British papers continued to count upon getting Cuba in case Florida was delivered to the United States. They said England should have it as an equivalent for the injury which the British interests had received by the cession of Florida, and to oppose the progress of aggrandizement in the United States, as well as to command the Gulf coast. In October, a Brussels paper said that the British Government continued to press the King of Spain for a cession. The negotiations between London and Madrid were at this time involved in mystery, but the newspapers intermittently announced that the English had revived the proposal to obtain Cuba. It was a common subject of conversation at Madrid. The British papers urged that the British trade in the Gulf would be exposed in case of war with the United States, and that the English dominion on the ocean was threatened. J. Freeman Rattenbury, in the *Morning Chronicle* for July and August, 1820, had a series of articles which stated that Florida strengthened the American Union by uniting the West and the Atlantic States, and that it would lead to further attempts at conquest; that the West was no longer rendered independent by the Appalachians—that its interests and policy, by the cession of Florida, had become inseparable from those of the East, and that the possession of Florida gave the East control of the

Gulf Stream, and indisputable ascendancy over the Western people whose complaints she could always silence by means of the naval control which she had over the channels of Western exports. He said the American Union with Florida might now remain unshaken by internal convulsions—at least until the back settlements should be populated enough to drive agriculturalists to become renters and dependents upon the great landed proprietors. He declared that in case the Florida treaty was ratified English interests would be much injured; and that Cuba was the only adequate indemnity which Spain had to offer, and the only security which England could acquire to counteract the effect of the Florida cession—for, that the United States were striding toward empire faster than any European nation, and that in case of war she would have all of England's Gulf trade at her mercy. Whether Spain in ceding Cuba could give *possession* to England, Mr. Rattenbury was not certain. He said the Cubans were not oppressed at that time, and, their ports being open to the world, they might not desire to pass under the colonial policy of England, against which they had been prejudiced by the United States. He suggested that Cuba might have been in the United States except for the Cuban contempt for American vanity. He also said that the United States watched with a quick and inquiring eye every movement of their opponents, and were ready to seize a favorable moment to appropriate nourishment "to the hungry appetite of their ambition," and that England must have Havana for a depot of naval thunder to awe her enterprising competitor. He considered that the possession of Cuba by England would be a security to Canada for many years, and he urged that, if Spain did not favor the cession of this precious possession, coercion as a matter of self-defense for England would be the proper remedy. "The apologists for the seizure of the fleet at Copenhagen," said he, "could not want an excuse for this equally necessary violence." The *London Times* concluded an article on the cession of Florida by the statement: "If

the United States will not submit to be temporized with on the subject of Florida, this country ought not in respect of Cuba. The two transactions are necessary parts of the same whole, and must be, if possible, put out of hand together. *Niles' Register* did not agree with the remedy by which the English papers proposed to keep the United States from ruining herself with too much territory. In regard to their desire to receive Cuba from the decaying Spanish empire the *Register* said: "Spain will resist, Cuba will resist, and, if necessary, another power will resist." The Mississippi Valley at that time had more inhabitants than all of the British colonies. It was necessary for the commerce of that valley to go by the channel of which Havana was the key, and Mr. Niles said: "We do not wish to have anything to do with Cuba; but as it has pleased Providence to locate this island in such a commanding position it is impossible that we should be indifferent to its fate."

What Cuba needed in 1820 to make her secure in the possession of the Spanish Government was peace, good economic government, and communication with the peoples of the earth. An Englishman, in his letters from Havana, said, that with peace in America to stop the drain of Cuban resources, and with a wider intercourse with nations who had passed the stage of infancy, to clear away the burdens which had been inherited from the fifteenth century, Cuba might in half a century have an orderly and progressive government, and "the grave of its aboriginal possessors be covered by an atoning monument, raised by improving descendants of their destroyers."

CHAPTER V.

CUBA AND THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT.

During the decade after the negotiations which resulted in the cession of Florida to the United States, the political destiny of Cuba was a subject of great international interest. During that time Cuba was the point of departure for expeditions of Spain to reconquer her revolted colonies, and to regain her power in the land of the mighty Cordilleras where she had caused the stars of Aztec and Peruvian dynasties to set in blood. The empire of Spain was falling to pieces. She had played a losing game in two hemispheres. When the vital spirit ceases to animate the central organ of the body politic, the connection with the extremities begins to lose its force. When all Spain's other possessions were falling away from her, it was not certain whether in the course of events Cuba would find it convenient to refrain from breaking the bonds which had held her loyal to the mother country for 300 years. Her large slave population made the question of her independence different from that of the South American states and Mexico, where the new governments found it necessary to emancipate the slaves. It was doubtful whether she would have been able to maintain her independence, unless under the protectorate of some other strong power. If she remained in possession of Spain she was open to attack by Mexico and Colombia so long as Spain persevered in the attempt to conquer those colonies. If she had been conquered by Mexico or Colombia her final destiny would still have been uncertain. Her position was such that her fate was a subject of special concern to the United States and England, neither of whom desired to see her fall into the hands of the other.

Neither England nor the United States had hastened to recognize the revolted colonies in America, but both countries sympathized with the movement for independence. General Scott had early desired to join in the war, but it was not the policy of the country. Jefferson said that Madison did right in extending friendship to South America, but that he was equally right in remaining neutral. Jefferson saw that the separation of the Spanish colonies from Spain would bring an everlasting peace between Spain and the United States, but he did not desire to become an ally of South America until the rupture with Spain was inevitable. He saw that the independence of the South American colonies might give rise to new difficulties in that direction. Clay desired to recognize the independence of South America in 1817, but after investigation President Monroe decided that it was too early.

By January, 1819, Monroe felt that recognition must soon be given to the Spanish colonies, but he desired to watch the course of Europe. Mr. Adams, the Secretary of State, frequently intimated to Bagot, the British minister at Washington, that the United States should act in some kind of concert with the British Government in regard to the revolutionary provinces. Shortly after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had declined to interfere in questions between Spain and her colonies, Mr. Adams told Bagot that although the United States had been waiting to learn the course of Europe it was evident that independence must soon be recognized. By the beginning of 1819 the American Government was in constant communication with the South American colonies by means of agents and deputies. Monroe was ready to recognize them in his message of 1819, but Adams advised him to use no expression hostile to Spain, and to leave the republics to the care of the future. The Florida treaty had not yet been ratified, and perhaps this fact to some extent influenced the Government. The ratification of this treaty, the Greek revolt, and the military successes of Bolivar and Iturbide in America finally gave

Monroe an opportunity to send a message to Congress March 8, 1822, recommending the independence of Mexico, Colombia, Chili, and Buenos Ayres. Anduaga, the Spanish minister, remonstrated, but Adams gave him reasons for his policy—and the sovereignty of the people had won another victory. The United States desired these new states to prosper, but not by conquest. In May, 1823, Adams, while instructing the minister to Colombia, said that she should look to commerce and navigation and not to empire as her means of communication with the rest of the human family.

Long before Clay reached forth the hand of welcome to the South American colonies, they had been looking to the great northern light, and now at last they had become pupils in the school of self-government. But their inheritance from the despotic government from which they were just escaping made it necessary for them to remain in school a long while after they had reached independence. They had entered the freshman class with many conditions to absolve; they had broken the chains worn by the friction of years, but they stood dazed before the noonday sun of freedom which had so suddenly emerged from the dark clouds of the past, and it was necessary for them to be born again by struggle and experience in order to adjust themselves to their new condition.

It was evident that these new-born nations could not long survive if the nations of Europe should combine against them. American statesmen began to see the necessity of a policy of intervention to protect the new states that expressed a desire to be American. Jefferson now hoped to see a realization of his wishes to be able to avoid the inconveniences which we had long been compelled to suffer on account of the European policy of strife and struggle. He ventured to predict that the day was not far distant when we might "formally require a meridian of partition through the ocean which separates the two hemispheres, on the hither side of which no European gun should ever be heard" to threaten the peace which in thinly-populated America

was necessary for producing men. He hoped that while the eternal wars of Europe were raging to keep down the excess of population in that long-settled country, that the lion and the lamb might be allowed to lie down in peace in America.

England desired the friendship of the United States at this time and hoped for the emancipation of South America in order to stop the odious Spanish trading monopoly. Dr. Phillimore, however, said that England should not assist the South American colonies until she recognized them as states. While England favored the cause of liberty in the Spanish dominions she did not find it convenient to give them recognition until January, 1825. Though English people were ready to rejoice at the final success of the Spanish colonies, the Government was not agreed as to a policy of early recognition. In 1820, there was a report of negotiations between France and Buenos Ayres to establish a Bourbon dynasty in America, but even at that early date it is likely that England would have interfered.

With the ratification of the Florida treaty the destiny of Cuba became more and more a subject of diplomatic correspondence. When it appeared that Spain was being expelled from all her former strongholds in South and Central America, it was not certain that Cuba would not apply for separation. The interest which was felt in the United States expressed itself in various ways. There was always a fear of British designs. In February, 1822, Forsyth expressed his conviction to one of the members of the political commission of the Cortes, that Spain could, by the recognition of Colombia and Mexico and a liberal system of commerce, procure a guarantee of Cuba from the United States, Colombia and Mexico—since each of these powers preferred that it might be held by Spain and kept out of the hands of any other power. News of English overtures reached the Government from various sources. In April Senator De Wolfe, of Rhode Island, was alarmed because he expected England to take possession of Cuba within a

month, and Adams found it hard to laugh him out of his apprehensions. In June, the French minister at Washington told Crawford that England had been negotiating for Cuba for two years and had offered Gibraltar and a large sum of money. For over a year later the attitude of England to Cuba was a subject of much concern.

The future political condition of Cuba was also a subject of deliberation among the Cubans. In 1820, when the discord in Spain had resulted in the re-establishment of the constitution of 1812, a liberal government was also proclaimed in Cuba, but the captains-general soon adopted the policy of restricting freedom there. In May, 1823, an attempt was made to reunite military and civil power in the hands of a captain-general. Secret societies arose and two bitter opposing parties were formed. The "Sociedad de Bolívar" resisted the attacks on liberalism, but the Spanish constitution was abrogated and despotism was renewed under Vives, the captain-general, who arrived that year. The Sociedad de Bolívar planned a rising for August 16, 1822, but it failed. It was now proposed to make Cuba an arsenal for the resubjugation of South America. Various risings were attempted in the island in 1824, and many troops were kept there, especially while watching the possible result of the Panama Congress two years later. In May, 1825, extraordinary powers were given to the captain-general for extraordinary cases. Under these he could send suspicious persons to Spain and could suspend the regular laws and regulations if it became necessary, but it was recommended that his power be used with prudence and discretion. The Cubans had been talking of independence as early as 1808, and there was a revived feeling for it in 1821. In September, 1822, a number of the inhabitants in Havana sent a secret agent to notify the United States Government that plans had been long contemplated and were now matured for Cuban independence; and that they only wanted the assurance that they would be seconded by the United States, in case they declared independence without the co-opera-

tion of the United States and then asked admission to the confederation as one of the states of the Union. In the discussion which arose at a meeting of the Cabinet at Washington, Calhoun expressed great anxiety to get Cuba as a part of the United States in order to avert the danger of its revolution by negroes, and its possession by the English—but as we were not then ready to risk a war with England, which the annexation of Cuba might have occasioned, he advised that the Havana overtures should be answered by persuading them for the present to adhere to Spain. He thought, however, that there could be no more objection to the acquisition of Cuba than to the purchase of Louisiana, and suggested that the matter should be made the subject of communication to Congress; and he said that we should not emphasize our relations to Spain as preventing our acceptance of the Cuban offer, for fear that it be interpreted as a direct hint to the Cubans in favor of a declaration of independence. Adams opposed Calhoun's policy. He said that there was an ocean between Florida and Cuba, and that this made the question of Cuba different from that of Louisiana, which was adjacent to our possessions. He stated that if taking Cuba led to a war with England, it would for a long while yet result in British possession of Cuba. He favored a policy of strict moral duty to Spain, and thought it best to advise nothing, but simply to say that the Executive was not competent to promise the Cubans admission into the Union, and that our relations to Spain would not allow us to encourage such a proposal—at the same time mentioning our friendly sentiments to Cuba, and the "common interests which point to intimate connections between Cuba and the United States." He opposed the presentation of the subject for discussion in secret session of Congress; for, he said, secret sessions "leaked," and that Spain might become alarmed. The policy of Adams was adopted, but Mr. Mason, through whom the Cuban agent made his offer to the government, was asked to secure fuller information.

Forsyth, who represented the United States at Madrid, felt that the uncertainty of affairs concerning Cuba would give England an opportunity to get a foothold in that quarter by which she might command the Gulf of Mexico, obtain the communication between the ocean over the Isthmus of Darien, and become mediator between Spain and her colonies. Spain felt the need of reinforcements in the Gulf of Mexico to protect Cuba from Mexico and Colombia, and may also have had some fears that Cuba would declare independence and place itself under United States protection. It was reported that the free-masons in Philadelphia and Havana had this object in view, and other events made the report appear not improbable. In December, 1822, the Spanish minister at Washington complained of an expedition from the ports of the United States which went to Porto Rico the previous August, and he said it had "fixed the attention of all Europe." He believed, however, that the tone of the American newspapers reflected the indignation felt by the mass of the people at such lawless conduct. At such a time England might have been able to secure Cuba as a lien on loans to Spain or by agreeing to guarantee Cuba against the designs of the United States. In December, 1822, there was considerable English popular expression in favor of attacking Cuba, but there is no evidence that this represented the views of the Cabinet. Though Canning did not see reason to disavow it in his conversation with Gallatin, it seems that he had been willing to make an agreement with the United States against designs on Cuba. Forsyth had informed the Government that as there was no prospect of the United States getting Cuba it should belong to Spain, for as English property it would be injurious to the United States on account of interests connected with the slavery question. It was believed in Europe that the United States Government would not consent to a cession, and Chateaubriand, in a speech in the French Chamber, said "England could not take Cuba without making war on the United States." There was a pos-

sibility of a change of conditions in Cuba which would have induced Spain not to resist an English offer for cession. Both England and France had political agents there watching the course of events and perhaps giving directions to them. Adams suggested to Forsyth that Spain might find it easier to resist any English offer "if for a limited time she might obtain a joint guarantee of the United States and France securing the island to herself." In January, 1823, it was reported that Great Britain had agreed to supply Spain with money, in case of war with France, and receive Cuba as a mortgage. But Mr. Canning, the British minister at Washington, called on Secretary Adams and *read* a letter from his cousin, George Canning, in which he denied that England desired Cuba, and stated that it would be dishonorable to take advantage of the Spanish weakness, to obtain it. Adams, therefore, stated publicly that England had no designs on Cuba. She had sent troops to Jamaica early in 1823, but they were probably for the purpose of guarding British interests in Hayti where British slaves had found an asylum. It was explained that if any English force went to Cuba it would be for the purpose of protecting it from the French who might attempt to take it in case of a war with Spain. Paris papers stated that some such kind of treaty had been made between England and Spain. But in February, 1823, when Forsyth asked whether there was local force enough to defend Cuba, in case of an attack by France, the Spanish minister replied that Spain relied, for security, upon her own resources and upon the United States.

It was no easy problem, in 1823, for the United States Government to determine what its policy towards Cuba should be. Some of the English papers said that the United States had long wanted the island, and that England should occupy it if she desired to save her West India trade; but it does not appear that there was any general desire to acquire the island, unless it should become inconvenient to do otherwise. There was a growing feeling that it should not

pass into the hands of Great Britain. Clay told Adams that we would fight for it, should England attempt to take possession. Other congressmen favored the same policy. Though this sentiment appears to have been general, Adams was not certain that we could, by war, prevent England from any designs which she might have on Cuba; and when some of the Cabinet spoke of calling Congress to consider the subject, he said the best policy was to keep cool. It was agreed that the United States should not offer to Great Britain any mutual promise not to take Cuba. Jefferson suggested the advantage of a mutual guarantee, but Adams had already seen the difficulty which might arise from such a guarantee, and Monroe replied to Jefferson that a difficulty had presented itself—"shall it be of a character to prevent the island from following the example of Colombia, Buenos Ayres, etc., and would Spain accept it if it did not extend to that object, or would England unite in it?" If Cuba had declared itself independent, recognition would have been easier on the part of the United States, than for England who had colonies in the West Indies—but the United States was not ready to say she preferred it to be independent. The South did not want to see Cuba independent *without* slavery, while the North did not desire to annex it *with* slavery.

In the early part of 1823 the Cuban liberalists sent an agent (Morales) to Washington to sound the United States Government as to the course it would pursue in case Cuba declared her independence. Poinsett, who had been in Mexico and Cuba on public service, and had communicated with many of the most influential characters in Cuba, said the Cubans did not favor any change unless there was some radical alteration in the Spanish constitution, but, that if Spain was forced to make any radical constitutional change they would ask for the protection of the United States and for admission into the Union; and that in case the United States rejected them they would then apply to England. Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, who was afterwards a member

of the committee of foreign affairs in Congress, was in Washington for a while during the winter of 1822-3, and he wrote Rush that the Cuban question was a momentous one for the decision of the United States, and while much might be said against its incorporation, he had long thought "that whenever Cuba presents herself without any forcing or manœuvring on our part "we must e'en take the good the gods provide us." He said that the Western states would favor it, for that the possession of Cuba by England would be intolerable to them; that the Southern states would not object, while the Middle states, and even the East, would consent.

In April, European affairs caused Adams much anxiety as to the fate of Cuba. On March 15, 1823, Thompson, in the Cabinet, had been in favor of urging the Cubans to declare independence if they could maintain it; but Adams was sure they could not maintain it. At the same time he felt that the United States was not yet prepared for the adoption of a policy of annexing territory beyond the sea, though he was satisfied that when Cuba should fall to the United States by the law of political gravitation, we should not cast her from our arms. Looking to the future he saw that the annexation of Cuba might become indispensable to the integrity of the Union. On April 28, in his instructions to Mr. Nelson, the American minister at Madrid, he said: "Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations, has become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas, the character of its population, its situation midway between our Southern coast and the Island of Santo Domingo, its safe and capacious harbor of the Habana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same advantages, the nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial, give it an importance in the sum of

our national interests with which that of no other foreign territory can be compared and little inferior to that which binds the different members of this Union together.

"Such, indeed, are, between the interests of that island and of this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations formed by nature, gathering in the process of time, and even now verging to maturity, that, in looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. It is obvious, however, that for this event we are not yet prepared. Numerous and formidable objections to the extension of our territorial dominions beyond sea present themselves to the first contemplation of the subject; obstacles to the system of policy by which alone that result can be compassed and maintained are to be foreseen and surmounted both from at home and abroad; but there are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom."

The probability of interference by France to overthrow the liberal government of Spain was almost certain, and Adams saw increasing danger of England taking possession of Cuba. *Niles' Register* in April said that England could have no desire for Cuba except for command of the Gulf. A revolution in the island was expected at that time and the feelings of the United States were still excited as to what England intended to do. It was reported that the British minister had said that orders had been sent to British troops to take possession of Cuba by force if pacific means should not be sufficient, and that Spain had consented. Adams saw that Spain could no longer hope to hold the island if the

Spanish constitution was overthrown by the armies of the Holy Alliance, and, that since it was incapable of self-government, its dependence would be upon either England or the United States. If England should assist Spain and thereby get any kind of a hold upon Cuba, he was convinced that it would be unpropitious to the Union, and universally opposed by the American people. In his letter to Nelson he said significantly: "The question both of our right and of our power to prevent it if necessary by force, already obtrudes itself upon our councils, and the administration is called upon, in performance of its duties to the nation, at least to use all the means within its competency to guard against and forefend it." In June Mr. Miralla, a native of Buenos Ayres, who had lived in Cuba eight or ten years, visited Jefferson and said that the public sentiment in Cuba was opposed to their country falling into the hands of England and that they would resist it. He said that Cuba was content to remain as she was, but that in case events led to her independence she would probably need the protection of Mexico or the United States—opinion was divided as to which the people would prefer.

As Jefferson sat beneath the shade trees of Monticello reading Horace and Tacitus, he was persuaded that the "nations of eternal war" were losing their foothold in America and he was not sorry to be rid of their neighborhood. On June 11, he wrote Monroe that "Cuba alone seems at present to hold a spec of war to us." He thought its possession by England would be a calamity and he suggested that if the United States could get England to join us in a guarantee of Cuba's independence against all the world except Spain it would be nearly as valuable to the United States as if she owned it. In case England should take Cuba he said that the United States should not immediately go to war for it—because it would belong to her later anyhow. While Jefferson was fearing the increasing power of the Supreme Court, he had not stopped growing in his belief that Congress had power to acquire territory, but he had

no disposition to hasten events by war or by force. In this President Monroe agreed with him, and on June 30, in reply to Jefferson he said: "I have always concurred with you in the sentiment that too much importance could not be attached to that island, and that we ought if possible to incorporate it into our Union, availing ourselves of the most favorable moment for it, hoping also that one would arise when it might be done without a rupture with Spain or any other power. I consider Cape Florida and Cuba as forming the mouth of the Mississippi and other rivers emptying into the Gulf of Mexico, within our limits, as of the Gulf itself, and in consequence that the acquisition of it to our cession was of the highest importance to our internal tranquillity as well as to our prosperity and aggrandizement."

Through authentic channels Mr. Monroe learned that the Cubans felt that they could not maintain their independence by themselves, for, besides the danger of being molested by foreign powers, they feared that in case of separation from Spain the black population would attempt to secure control of the government. To England they could become only a colony, for connection with Colombia could hardly be of use to them owing to the distance, and connection with Mexico was less desirable than incorporation into the United States, to which they were more adjacent. Through organs in which Monroe had confidence the Cubans were advised to cling to Spain as long as possible, and to resist by force any attempt of England to take possession. In the latter case they were assured that the United States would consider any preference which they might express. While it appears that there was a general feeling in the United States that the cession of Cuba to England would certainly have produced an attempt at independence, and that the conflict which would result by the insurrection might create a second Hayti, it was uncertain whether the Cubans were generally inclined toward the United States. Some French merchants from Havana who were fellow-passengers with Erving, the American minister, *en route* to Paris, said that there were

three causes in Cuba which led to dislike of the United States and to encouragement of piracy: (1) Our conduct in Florida before 1819; (2) Our early recognition of the Spanish colonies and our permission for insurgent privateers to fit out at American ports; (3) Our modes of traffic, which led them to look upon us as a "nation of cheats."

About July 10, Mr. Appleton, the United States commercial agent at Cadiz, was told by Mr. Gener, a deputy of the Cortes from Havana, who had opportunity to know something of Cabinet secrets, that England had in 1820 made some sort of an overture to obtain a cession of East Florida, but that Spain treated the offer with coldness. Appleton thought that if Nelson should reach Spain with adequate instructions, he would arrive at the best possible moment to fix the fate of Cuba to suit the interests of the United States. What he meant is probably indicated in a letter of August 6, in which he states that he had been approached on August 5 by a member of the Cortes, who asked whether the United States would be willing to negotiate a loan to Spain, with a mortgage on the proceeds of the Havana customs. Appleton thought that England had probably refused such a loan. Erving, in September, wrote from Paris that if England had any designs upon Cuba, it was evident by her course in Spanish affairs that she did not intend to purchase it by her good offices, though he suspected this might be the French policy.

The invasion of Spain by French troops after the Congress of Verona influenced the consideration of the Cuban question. The Spanish constitution did not satisfy the ultra-conservative diplomats of Europe. Through the influence of the Duke of Montmorency, the French Prime Minister, France sent M. Chateaubriand to procure the consent of the allied holy gentlemen at the Congress of Verona to occupy Spain by French forces. Both Wellington and Canning of England offered mediation between France and Spain and tried to prevent the war of intervention, but Montmorency refused all idea of intervention, and presented the

Spanish question as an European one. When Louis XVIII. made his speech to the French Chambers on January 28, 1823, all England, where public opinion and institutions were the mother of what was fictitiously called the monarch, was excited against the idea that institutions must trickle down from the throne. It offended the national ear, and Canning said it prevented him from sleeping. He did not like the idea of a Bourbon going to the help of a Bourbon who had endeavored to resist the progressive wishes of a nation.

But the withdrawal of England from the European councils for the repression of public opinion did not prevent France from executing the decrees of Verona. Louis XVIII. collected an army along the Spanish border to carry out the policy of the Holy Alliance, to release Ferdinand VII. from the constitutional limitations which the Spanish people had placed upon him. In May, 1823, this army crossed over into Spain, and on May 23 it occupied Madrid. The Cortes disbanded, and Ferdinand was restored to absolute and anarchic rule.

The United States at this time was endeavoring to get France to settle the American claims for spoliation, but Gallatin returned in June unsuccessful and much dissatisfied with the conduct of the French Government. In view of the probable arrogant presumption of France to dictate the internal policy of the Spanish Government, Monroe had been considering whether the United States should take up a bolder attitude for liberty, and requested Mr. Jefferson to submit his ideas upon this subject. On June 11 Jefferson replied: "You will do what is right, leaving the people of Europe to act their follies and crimes among themselves while we pursue in good faith the paths of peace and prosperity." He thought that the United States should be peaceful and neutral, but as partial to Spain as justifiable without giving France a cause for war, and he said that we should take occasion to cement cordial reconciliations with Spain by showing her that we would not intermeddle in her

colonial troubles. He believed that England was only flirting with Spain, looking one way and rowing another, and that she could not be trusted. The European nations, he considered, were all "nations of eternal war," whose jealousies, alliances and forms of government were foreign to us, and that we should keep ourselves clear from the affairs of Europe. Judging from conditions in Spain, it appeared that liberty was suffering from retrogression. It arose only to fall and be crushed again. But Jefferson still looked forward to the future, with a hopeful eye. He concurred with John Adams as to the difficulty of revolution from despotism to freedom, but he said that printing was changing things and that there was hope for the future—that success followed failure, that rivers of blood must flow, but that he believed a temperate representative government would eventually come in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Prussia, Germany and Greece. "You and I shall look from another world upon these glorious achievements of man which will add even to the joys of heaven."

England was still reluctant to recognize the South American insurgents but realized that she could not remain an impartial spectator, for Canning saw that France now aimed at the establishment of French rule over the rivers, mountains and plains of the Spanish-American colonies. He corresponded with Rush in August and September as to the feasibility of taking a joint stand against the designs of France, and suggested that the United States might wish to be represented in any European congress which should affect the Spanish colonies. Canning's proposals were: (1) That the recovery of the colonies by Spain was hopeless. (2) That the question of recognizing the independence of these colonies was only one of time and circumstance. (3) That we had no desire to impede any arrangement between the colonies and the mother country by amicable negotiations. (4) That we had no aim at possession of them for ourselves. (5) That we would not with indifference see them transferred to any other power. Rush

showed Canning that without any joint action they would already stand on common ground, if England would recognize the South American republics as the United States had already done. But this Canning could not yet do—possibly because he feared the result upon the English colonies. Erving, at Paris, feared we would have to act in unison with England, and yet he was not certain that it would not be better to abandon the colonies than to form any alliance with that country.

When President Monroe received the Canning-Rush correspondence in October, he was inclined to think that “we ought to meet the proposal of Great Britain and make it known that we would view interference on the part of European powers, and especially an attack upon the colonies by them, as an attack upon ourselves.” He felt the difficulty of the question, however, and consulted Jefferson and Madison for their opinions. While Jefferson was opposed to entangling ourselves with the broils of Europe, or of allowing Europe to meddle in cis-Atlantic affairs, he said it was fortunate that England had suggested co-operation and he thought that we should accede to her proposition to prevent interposition and cession, or even to join in the declaration that we did not aim at the acquisition of any of the Spanish possessions—though he still thought Cuba, partially controlling the Gulf, would be a valuable acquisition to our Union, if it could be gotten without a war. Jefferson saw a chance to make the western hemisphere one of freedom and peace, and successfully to declare against interference in the internal affairs of nations. In his enthusiasm over the thought that England was to be on the American side of these questions, he suggested that the United States might also get her to avow her disapproval of intervention by France in Spain, and by the other powers in Greece. Madison was more cautious. In the cabinet meeting November 7, Calhoun was inclined to think that the joint declaration against the interference of the Holy Allies would be to our advantage, even if it should pledge the United

States not to take Cuba or Texas—since England's power to seize was greater than ours. Adams, without discussing the expediency of annexing Cuba and Texas, thought we should be free to act as emergencies arose. He said that the proposed joint declaration would be a pledge against ourselves, for, that while we had no intention of playing a game of "grab," the inhabitants of Cuba and Texas might "exercise their primitive rights" and seek incorporation into the United States and that it was certain they would *not* seek annexation to England. It occurred to Adams that the main object of Canning at this time was to get a pledge from the United States that she would not acquire any of the Spanish-American possessions.

Secretary Adams in a letter to Rush on November 29, gave the views of the United States Government. He substantially concurred in Canning's proposals "tending to concert of principles." He had already recognized the revolted colonies, but did not object to any amicable arrangement which they might make with the mother country, so long as the United States received equal favor with the most favored nation. He agreed that the United States could not with indifference see the Spanish colonies transferred to any other nation, and added: "We cannot see any power attempt to restore them to Spain."

The conditions which have been stated will indicate the principal causes which called forth Monroe's noted message of December 2, 1823. Following the policy of Washington, it expressed in a few plain sentences the policy which had been developed from American experience and which was opposed to future intervention in American affairs by European powers. "In the wars of European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immedi-

ately connected and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the Allied Powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America * * * we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

Before Monroe's message reached Europe, Spain had issued a formal address to Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France, proposing a conference at Paris to aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of her revolting colonies. The King of Spain quoted the doctrines of Laybach, and reminded the sovereigns of the success which attended the French intervention in Spain. It was clear that there was a need for the principles which had been sent to the world by the message of Monroe. That message was not sanctioned by Congress, though Clay in 1824 endeavored to get the House of Representatives to pass a resolution favoring it; but England applauded it, and the Alliance did not interfere with affairs in the New World.

There were in 1823 and thereafter several causes of friction with the Spanish authorities in Cuba. The Spanish Government had not thought it politic to admit a consul from a nation that encouraged the separation of the Spanish colonies. The governor of Cuba had refused to admit a consul or commercial agent from the United States, and the necessity for one was daily becoming more urgent. United States commerce was receiving great injuries from the pirates which the Spanish authorities in Cuba had not

been able to suppress. Some persons in America dreamed of a conquest of Cuba in order that our ships might navigate the Gulf in safety. About the beginning of 1823 the United States sent an agent to Cuba to receive the Florida archives, and he was also instructed to urge the authorities to co-operate with the United States naval forces for the suppression of piracy, and to remain until the armaments had restored security to commerce. But the piracies continued to annoy American commerce in the vicinity of Cuba, and the pirates found sympathy among the Cuban people and the authorities. In January, 1824, the House committee on foreign relations considered the advisability of an act of Congress authorizing the President to blockade Porto Rico and Cuba as a measure of defense or retaliation, but it was finally decided to give time for the Government to call upon Spain for a remedy. The next December, Randall, an agent of the Government, returned from Havana and urged the absolute necessity of some measure for protection. In January, 1825, Congress again considered the subject of suppressing the piracy around Cuba. A bill was reported in favor of building new vessels, landing forces in fresh pursuit of pirates, authorizing a blockade under certain circumstances, making limited reprisals on offending vessels, and permitting merchant vessels to arm in defense. Barbour refreshed his memory as to Jenkins' ear, and said that the hundreds of dead invoked action and not delay. Many opposed the idea of blockade, but favored landing in Cuba to repress the pirates and to make reprisals on persons and places. No two members on the committee on foreign relations could agree upon a policy. Forsyth, the leading member, did not want to invade Cuba, or take any step which we could not allow England to take. He favored this policy not because he loved Spanish neighbors more but because he desired English neighbors less. Both England and the United States, at various subsequent dates, claimed and exercised the right of hot pursuit of pirates who had taken refuge on the coast of Cuba.

In the early part of 1825 the United States was very anxious to have consuls in Cuba and Porto Rico. Mr. Nelson in June, while urging Spain to allow them, disclaimed any policy of aggrandizement. He said the United States did not countenance any internal dissension or expeditions, but that she expected Spain not to conceal any expected transfer of Cuba. Zea Bermudez, the Spanish minister, replied that Spain had never thought of ceding Cuba, that she was pleased with the attitude expressed by Mr. Nelson, and that when the minds of the Cubans had become tranquillized by the refusal of the United States to allow rebels to fit out vessels in American ports and use such ports as places of refuge, the King of Spain would consider a proposition for the admission of the United States consul. Two months later, Bermudez told Everett, the successor of Nelson at Madrid, that Spain overlooked the recognition of independence of South America by the United States, but that she did not think it well to admit a public agent from a power whose policy was to encourage independence in the colonies of Spain. He desired pledges from the United States.

In 1825 the London *Courier* described Cuba as the "Turkey of trans-Atlantic politics, tottering to its fall, and kept from falling only by the struggles of those who contend for the right of catching her in her descent." Spain, England and the United States were all uneasy as to its fate. France seemed ready to marshal her forces to the succor of Spain if occasion demanded it. The fate of the American continent seemed decided. Peru had "gone the way of all flesh." Only Cuba and Porto Rico remained to Spain, and Metternich, the Austrian diplomat, said that insurrections were feared there. In April, Clay, who had become Secretary of State at Washington, saw that Spain could not reconquer her American colonies; and fearing that the new republics in order to strike Spain might direct their forces to reduce Cuba and Porto Rico, and having apprehension of the evil effect of any expeditions that might be

sent against Cuba, he wrote to Mr. Everett that it was to the advantage of Spain to stop the war in order to keep what she had left. He saw that Cuba was not capable of self-government, that Mexico and Colombia were not adequate to protection, and he stated that in case the theatre of war was transferred to Cuba the fortunes of that colony were so closely connected with American prosperity that it "might bring duties and obligations to the United States which she could not decline." It was seen, also, that peace would tend to stop the piracies which had been injuring American commerce. In the Cabinet meeting on May 7, the condition of Cuba was considered critical. On May 10, Clay instructed Mr. Middleton, the American minister to Russia, to urge the Russian Government to immediately recognize the independence of the Spanish-American republics, and to prevail upon Spain to do the same. He said that the march of events would ultimately end all colonial relations to Europe, and that it was useless for Spain to persist in a vain attempt to reconquer colonies that were larger than herself. "Cuba is in the mouth of the sack held by Colombia and the United States," and Colombia and Mexico in their relations with Cuba might easily annoy American commerce. He urged that the United States could not be indifferent to any political change in Cuba which was liable to arise as a result of the war and on account of the interest which other nations had in that quarter. He stated that the new states would hardly attempt acquisition unless in defense, and that the United States could not willingly see any transfer to a European power. He desired Spain to understand that the United States would have been justified in seizing both Cuba and Porto Rico, but that they had displayed moderation by respecting the sovereignty of Spain, to whom they preferred that the island should belong.

About this time Santa Anna, who had command of the Mexican troops, issued a proclamation at Guatemala to the negroes of Cuba. Baron Tuyl, the Russian minister,

on May 14, hoped that the United States would use its influence to suspend any such expeditions as were indicated by this proclamation. President Adams informed him that Colombia and Mexico did not desire to annex Cuba, for that would only prove a burden to them. The United States did not desire it, but since it was at her doors she could not allow Spain to transfer it to any European nation, nor willingly see it conquered by Mexico or Colombia. He informed Tuyl that the Mexican expedition had been discouraged by the United States, but that she could not demand that independent nations should abstain from hostile expeditions in case Spain continued to make Cuba a base against them.

Metternich, in the spring of 1825, still favored giving aid to Spain in her American contests. France also seemed ready to assist her. Metternich mourned over the loss of the Spanish colonies, and the unhappy influence which it would have upon the fate of civilization. He blamed Canning with leading the English policy astray. He thought, however, that Canning would fear an insurrection in Cuba, on account of the inevitable result which it would bring to the English colonies in the West Indies. Metternich had taken his wife to Paris for her health, and on March 17 he wrote to the Emperor Francis that in several conversations with Villele and Demas he found that the attention of the French policy was especially centered on Greek affairs, and on the course of England toward the Spanish colonies. The people of Paris looking upon him as a kind of lantern which they approached to get light on a dark night, he decided that he had arrived at Paris at an opportune moment to accomplish something by making public one of his "schemes," and he decided that the most necessary thing was to provide Spain with money—and to make sure that it would be put to the right use. On April 10, he took dinner with the King of France, and seems to have encouraged him to inquire whether Spain was ready to let Cuba "go the way of all flesh" as Peru and the other colonies had done. Met-

ternich's enlightening conversations doubtless encouraged France to be ready to assist Spain. During the summer a part of the French fleet was in the West Indies, and a French convoy was sent from Martinique to Cuba with Spanish ships and troops. England objected, and the French Government at Paris admitted that orders had been given to send French troops to succor Cuba if conditions required it. When Mexico heard of the French in the West Indies it caused her some alarm. Believing that they intended to invade Cuba, during the latter part of the summer the Mexican minister asked the United States to fulfil Monroe's pledge of December 2, 1823, and prevent any French invasion which might be preparing. In the summer it was once reported in Washington that the French had actually taken Cuba. Clay thought there should be some understanding why the French fleet visited the American seas, and that the United States should not have been kept in doubt as to its purpose. He instructed Brown, the United States minister at Paris, to say to the French Government that while the United States had no design on Cuba, she found it necessary to keep a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, and on the coast of Cuba and Porto Rico, to prevent depredations of pirates. If France thought the American Government suspected her passion for aggrandizement, Mr. Brown was to disavow it and say that the United States could not suppose that any European power would occupy Cuba "without the concurrence or at least the knowledge of the United States." Baron De Demas, the French minister, appeared to concur in the American policy. He said that the French naval force was sent to protect commerce in the West Indies, and that the United States, in the future, would be apprised of their naval movements in that direction.

Colombia and Mexico, believing that Cuba, the Spanish stronghold and base of supplies, was weakly garrisoned, planned to strike a blow in order to reduce the power of Spain. Troops were collected at various times for the

expedition, but both England and the United States objected to the invasion, and by their interposition probably preserved Cuba to Spain. On October 13, 1824, when the Mexican agent at London, in a conference with Canning, stated that Mexico considered it necessary to wrest Cuba from Spain, Canning mentioned the danger of a slave insurrection which might result from an invasion by those powers. When this reply was reported to Mexico, an expedition was being organized at Campeachy, and Santa Anna had prepared a proclamation to the negroes of Cuba, but the expedition was abandoned at once. In June, when the Mexican agent returned to America, Canning (having heard of Santa Anna's proclamation) told him that the British Government would not only oppose possession of Cuba by France or the United States, but that it could not see, without displeasure, any attack upon it by Mexico or Colombia. On November 24, 1825, Canning also signified to Hurtado, the representative of Colombia at London, who was urging the British Government to renew its efforts for peace, that an invasion of Cuba would receive the displeasure of the English Government. On December 24, Señor Hurtado informed the British Government that Colombia "could not continue to see with indifference the enemy retain a possession at which it might continually collect armament and thence direct expeditions against Colombia and her allies," and he spoke of the necessity of joining Mexico in an attack against Cuba. Canning admitted that as belligerents they had a right to attack their enemies and to capture their possessions, but that "they ought to remember that this warfare might be very prejudicial to England by causing an insurrection of the blacks and by the pretexts which it offered to other nations to interfere in the affairs of Cuba and perhaps to forcibly occupy the island." Colombia was dissuaded from an expedition which it was afterwards declared in the British Parliament might have been advantageous to her at that time. Hurtado had asserted that the the naval force of Colombia and Mexico was sufficient to

enable them to occupy the island, and that the state of the population was such that they might have taken their own time to attack the fortifications of Havana. Mr. Madden, an English official in Cuba in 1836-7, said that Mr. Canning's interference with Mexico and Colombia in 1825 proved to be a great calamity to the British West Indies.

The United States also at various times used her influence to prevent a change in the political condition of Cuba. She was satisfied with liberal commercial relations while that island was in the possession of Spain, and was not disposed to interfere with Cuba's "present actual state." Its ports were open and its cannon silent and harmless under these conditions. There was no desire to see it pass to Mexico or Colombia, for, as Clay said, they did not have a navy sufficient to protect it. Therefore, it was desired that Spain should close the war in order to prevent the results which might follow from an attack upon Cuba by either Colombia or Mexico. The United States had been among the first to hasten to acknowledge the independence of the new republics, and had served the cause of their independence by her neutrality; but she did not desire their power to become too great, and she was anxious that the immediate fate of Cuba should not be left to uncertainty. Clay instructed Poinsett, the American minister in Mexico, in 1825, to keep a vigilant attention on every movement toward Cuba. He told him that it would perhaps be best for Cuba to be independent if she could maintain it, even though perhaps it might be necessary for the United States to consider whether she should guarantee it against European attacks, but he saw it would be impossible for either Mexico or Colombia to hold the island in case they should attack it. Colombia and Mexico in May, and again in December, 1825, were advised to abstain for the present from any hostile expeditions which they might have in view against Cuba.

American relations with Mexico were growing less friendly, and this fact probably contributed to Clay's deter-

mination to discourage the expeditions against Cuba. He seemed to fear that in commercial treaties Mexico would favor England more than the United States, and also regretted to hear that British influence in Mexico was inimical to the interests of the United States, making her reluctant to agree to the opening of a road from Missouri towards Santa Fe, which Clay said was purely for commercial purposes, but which Mexico probably feared was projected with a view to territorial acquisition. Mexico also favored South America in her treaties, claiming that fraternal ties bound her closer to her southern neighbors, but Clay, in view of the friendship shown by the United States, did not think that Mexico should grant special privileges or make exceptions in favor of South America. He desired equality and reciprocity as a basis of commercial treaty.

The idea of co-operation between the United States and other nations, in a policy concerning Cuba, was suggested as early as 1823 and it became a subject of correspondence with England several times thereafter. On March 15, 1823, when the Cabinet was considering the possibility of Cuba falling into the hands of England, the question arose as to whether it would not be wise to propose to the British Government to join the United States in a mutual guarantee of Cuba to Spain. A difficult question arose as to whether the guarantee should be of such a character as to prevent the island from becoming independent, as to whether Spain would agree to it if it did not contain this provision, and as to whether England would favor it. It was agreed, however, that the United States should not make Great Britain any mutual promise not to take Cuba. A short time after this, Jefferson also suggested the idea of mutual guarantee of Cuba to Spain. Monroe wrote him concerning the difficulty which stood in the way of such a policy. In June, Jefferson again suggested the idea of an Anglo-American guarantee of Cuban independence against all the powers except Spain; but after receiving a

visit from Mr. Miralla, who had lived in Cuba several years, he wrote Mr. Monroe that England's interests in Cuba did not seem to be as strong as those of the United States, and that we need not join that power in any guarantee. In August and September, 1823, Mr. Canning proposed to Mr. Rush that England and the United States should arrange to act together in a policy towards the Spanish-American colonies, but after the matter was discussed at Washington the American Government decided that it was better to avoid any plan that resembled an alliance. Both England and the United States agreed that Spain should recognize the independence of Mexico and Colombia and that neither of these new states should obtain control of Cuba. In 1824, before England recognized the independence of Mexico and Colombia, Canning offered Spain to guarantee to her the possession of Cuba if she would recognize the independence of the two new republics, but Spain declined. In April, 1825, Rush was informed by a person in high diplomatic station at London that England had several months before made an offer to guarantee Cuba to Spain, and to send British troops there for that purpose. Spain probably saw that this might ultimately result in British possession of Cuba. Clay in a conversation with Addington, the British minister at Washington, had agreed that it could hardly accord with the views of either England or the United States to allow Cuba to fall to Mexico or Colombia. It was suggested that if Spain continued the war it might be necessary to establish an independent government in Cuba, under the joint guarantee of the United States and Great Britain, and perhaps of some of the Spanish-American states. This encouraged Canning to believe that the United States would enter into some sort of an arrangement to guarantee Cuba to Spain.

When Rufus King, now old in the service of his country, went as minister to London in the summer of 1825, the United States was anxious that Russia, England and France might be induced to influence Spain to make peace with her

revolted American colonies by acknowledging their independence. Russia had been asked to use her influence for peace, but on August 2 Mr. Canning told King that there was no hope of anything from that source—that Russia was inflexible in her policy of subduing the Spanish colonies. He said that some action should be taken without waiting for Russia, and he thought that the first steps should be to remove Spanish suspicions as to the great powers. During the summer, when the French Government had given orders to the Governor of Martinique to send troops to Cuba if they were necessary to put down internal disturbance, Canning had given France to understand that such action would be taking part in the war. Afterwards, the fear that French soldiers would misconstrue orders and take possession of Cuba had weighed heavily upon Canning's mind. He told King that when he went to bed at night he could feel no assurance that morning might not bring news that a French force had landed at Havana "in consequence of some order hastily given for contingencies ill-defined," and that the United States and England should take prompt steps to guard against this danger; that while Spain feared that the United States or England would take Cuba from her, she did not have the same fear as to France, and that she was thus liable to call France to aid her in keeping the island in case a panic arose concerning the intentions of England or the United States. France, as well as England and the United States, had already disclaimed any desire to get possession of Cuba, and Canning thought she would hardly refuse to concur with the other two powers in a written disavowal. He, therefore, proposed either the signature of three joint ministerial notes, or of one tripartite note in which all of the three powers should disclaim any intention of occupying Cuba, and protest against such occupation by the others. After this was done he thought Spain would be willing to consent to a suspension of hostilities, and this would prevent any remaining danger to Cuba from Mexico and

Colombia. Mr. King suggested that the omission of any mention of Mexico and Colombia in Canning's plan might cause an immediate invasion of Cuba by them, giving rise to questions which would throw the West Indies into disorder and perhaps excite much anxiety in the Southern states. Canning, in reply to this, said that it would be wise not to mention anything in the tripartite note that might be construed by Spain as a threat to induce her to make peace with her colonies, or as a menace to Cuba; and he asked whether the tripartite note should say that Mexico and Colombia "shall not do what we will not do?" The draft which Canning sent to King provided that the landing of small parties from friendly ships of war was to take place in aid of, or with the consent of, the local authorities in Cuba, unless it was inconvenient to operate in this way.

In proposing the tripartite arrangement to France, Canning expressed the determination of the British Government not to take Cuba nor suffer its appropriation by the other two great powers. Though France gave some encouragement at first she finally refused to sign. Canning would have been willing to sign with Mr. King alone; but King referred Canning's correspondence to Washington, causing the latter some uneasiness lest the United States Government should publish it.

Spain at this time may have been urging England for a pledge as to Cuba. She had not yet thought it politic to admit United States consuls to Cuba, fearing they might use language favorable to the insurgents. This policy inconvenienced both Spain and the United States. In September a member of the Spanish Government at Madrid suggested to Mr. Everett that the United States might obtain a consul or a public agent in Cuba, if she would by treaty guarantee the Spanish possession of that island. Mr. Everett replied that such a guarantee would be inconsistent with the American policy to avoid entangling alliances—that the United States could not run the risk of a war by

insuring Cuba to Spain merely in order to have a consul in Cuba.

When the draft of the tripartite arrangement reached Washington in October, Clay decided that Canning's policy of soothing Spain and making her unsuspecting of "our united counsels" would not contribute to the object of stopping the war—for, if Spain felt that Cuba was safe, she might be the more resolved to continue the war. Clay thought it would be better to let Spain speculate upon possible dangers to Cuba, or to let her feel that if Cuba declared independence the powers would guarantee it, rather than to lull her apprehensions as to any possible contingencies that might threaten her West Indies in case the war was continued. It seemed to Clay that Canning's real object was not to induce Spain to end the war, but to quiet the suspicions of the powers as to each other. At first he informed Mr. King that the President saw no objection to acceding to one or the other of Canning's propositions—the three separate ministerial notes, or the one tripartite note—but he would give no instruction until he heard from the Emperor of Russia. He said, however, that the pacific policy of the United States really made her declaration unnecessary; and that it was not apprehended that Great Britain would "entertain views of aggrandizement in regard to Cuba which could not fail to lead to a rupture with the United States." As to France, he hoped that she, knowing the views of England and the United States, "would equally abstain from a measure fraught with such serious consequences"—though he realized that there was some danger of France getting into Cuba by pretext of assisting distracted Spain to quell some of her disturbances. When Clay received King's letter, stating that France had declined to accede to the tripartite arrangement, he decided that it was no longer necessary or proper to consider the subject, but he stated that after the friendly communication between England and the United States on this subject, "each must now be considered as much bound to a course of forbear-

ance and abstinence in regard to Cuba and Porto Rico as if they had pledged themselves to it by a solemn act." With the hope that France would abandon her designs on Cuba, if she had any, Clay wrote Brown at Paris requesting him to say to the French Government that he could not suppose that any European power would occupy the island without the concurrence or knowledge of the United States.

The effort to get Spain to agree to stop the war in America was unsuccessful, though the United States continued to urge Russia to prevail upon Spain to make peace at once if she desired to retain Cuba and Porto Rico. While the United States did not desire any change in the possession of Cuba and had recommended that Colombia and Mexico suspend their proposed military expedition, she informed Russia in December, 1825, that she did not see any justifiable grounds on which to interfere with another expedition, in case Spain obstinately continued the war—and that she could interfere only in case the excesses of a race war should threaten her own shores. Spain was not ready to change her policy as to her former colonies, though she stated that she did not blame the United States for trying to stop the inconvenience of it. The Spanish minister was not so sure that the recognition of Mexico and Colombia would have an influence in enabling Spain to retain Cuba, even though the latter was satisfied with the flourishing trade which she then had. In January, 1826, Niles's *Register* states that it was reported that Cuba would welcome an invasion.

Everett, still minister at Madrid, though as yet he saw no symptoms of Cuba's desire to separate while she virtually assumed sovereignty over her foreign trade, nevertheless contemplated the uncertainty of the immediate future, and decided that the surest plan to stop the inconvenience which the United States had been experiencing at her doors would be to obtain Cuba peaceably, at once obviating the risk of creating broils with Europe by getting it later. On November 30, 1825, he wrote to President Adams that an informal conversation which he had with the Spanish minister gave

him some hope that the pecuniary needs of Spain would induce her to give Cuba as security on a loan from the United States. He did not think Great Britain would take umbrage at this, or that she could offer any reasonable objection, and he suggested that in case Spain did not repay the loan after a reasonable time the complete sovereignty of Cuba might be vested in the United States. It does not appear that President Adams favored this plan of his enthusiastic pupil.

While Mr. Everett told the Duke de Infantado that he saw no symptoms of a desire of Cuba to separate from Spain, he informed him that the expenses which the war was bringing upon the West Indies would bring later burdens, and he suggested that peace would make the Cubans still better satisfied by relieving them of the expense for the support of expeditions and for defense. He stated that the adjustment of internal troubles in the Spanish-American states, and the end of hostilities on the continent, would give an opportunity for an expedition against Cuba and Porto Rico whose loss could be averted only by peace between Spain and her former colonies. Hurtado, the Colombian minister at London, a few days before this, had received instructions from his government to have Canning renew his efforts for peace, else Cuba would probably be attacked—and that the conditions were favorable to success.

Although the United States Government had not accepted the tripartite proposal, it was anxious to secure some guarantee against foreign intervention in Cuba. At the beginning of 1826, Mr. King by instructions from Washington was endeavoring to have Mr. Canning formally communicate to the French Government that Great Britain would "not consent to the occupation of Cuba or Porto Rico by any other European power than Spain under any circumstance whatever." But Canning replied that the British Government had in the previous July, before the tripartite proposal, communicated with France precisely to this effect, and that by repeating it he would appear to be acting at

the suggestion of a third power, and subsidiary to it, in a step which he had already taken alone.

The feeling that a change in the political condition of Cuba was imminent was shown in the debates in Congress in the spring of 1826. A bill was introduced to provide for the survey of a canal across Florida. Randolph opposed the bill as unconstitutional, but it was urged that such a canal would protect Southern interests in case Cuba should pass into the possession of a first-class naval power. In reply to this Randolph said: "If all constitutional restraints are to be pushed aside, let us take Cuba and done with it." There was considerable discussion out of Congress in regard to the Florida canal question. It was seen that a friendly understanding with the government which should direct the policy of Cuba would always be important to the United States; but it was hoped that with the canal across Florida, Cuba would be less regarded as a military station and as an asylum for pirates.

The American policy toward the proposed Panama congress was largely connected with the Cuban question. Forsyth said that the destiny of Cuba was the great object of the Panama mission. Although the new Spanish-American states had abolished slavery, the United States Government had not hesitated to recognize their independence; but there was no desire to see any extension of their principles which might injure the slave-holding interests in the United States. It was especially desired that no negro republics should be created in the Caribbean Sea. The political constitution of Hayti had kept the United States from acknowledging the independence of that island. An invasion of Cuba and Porto Rico was stated as an object of the Panama congress. It was seen that such an invasion might lead to internal convulsion, and to a servile war which would endanger the institutions of the Southern states. President Adams, who favored sending delegates to the congress, urged the point that by so doing we might discourage any project that might threaten to disturb or change

the existing condition of Cuba. The subject was discussed in Congress in March and April, 1826. In the debates Buchanan said that we should have warned the new South American states, as well as England and France, against the occupation of Cuba. Its commerce was more valuable to the United States than that of all South America. Mexico was destined to become our commercial rival. If we could not get Cuba ourselves, we should not allow it to pass to any nation that might seal the mouth of the Mississippi, and therefore he favored the mission to Panama as a step in averting an attack upon Cuba. In case of a war which should endanger the Southern slave interests, he would have defended the Southern cause—though he said slavery was evil. Mr. Brent, of Louisiana, feared that it was too late to stop the blow from Campeachy. He would have favored the independence of Cuba except for the danger which might result to Southern planters. Those who opposed the mission did not all act from the same motive. Webster said it was unconstitutional. He thought, however, that we should not be cold toward the new American states. As to the meaning of the Monroe doctrine, he did not think it committed us to take up arms on every indication of European hostility to South America. He thought that in case an army of the allied powers had landed on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico to begin a war at our doors it might call for immediate interference; but in case Buenos Ayres or Chili had been threatened, it might be sufficient to remonstrate only. He said that we had given no pledge which others could call upon us to redeem—that the Monroe doctrine had resulted in no alliance or co-operation between the United States and Mexico—but that we desired the new republics to allow no colonization in their territories. He considered that the United States had a right to interfere in any case for self-defense. It was necessary to consider position. Cuba being nearer than South America, its destiny was more intimately connected with the Monroe policy. Mr. Webster appears to have had

greater fear of a transfer of Cuba to England, in which case he held that we had a right to interfere as a matter of self-defense. He said that England or France could not rightfully complain of the transfer of Florida to the United States, but that it by no means followed that we could not complain of the cession of Cuba to one of them. Forsyth favored a strictly neutral policy. He stated that self-preservation compelled us to watch over Cuba with anxiety. He desired to see Spain hold Cuba, but he opposed any interference against the rights of Mexico and Colombia to conquer it in order to end the contest with Spain; Cuba was "the jungle in which Royal Tiger hides himself," and they had a right to drive the tiger out. He said that we should avoid any political connections which might result in wars and burdens on our people, and should not interfere on either side except for self-preservation. Hamilton, of South Carolina, feared a Mexican invasion of Cuba more than any European possession of it. He thought that a cession of the island to England could not be nearly so dangerous to the United States as the erection of a second Carthage or another Hayti "to shadow our shores," and he was not willing to spend gallons of American blood in order to keep England out. He believed that Spain might cede Cuba under circumstances where it would be folly for us to interfere—and he did not think it a wise policy for Clay to change Monroe's mere *declaration* as to the continent, into a *pledge* as to Cuba which we might be called upon to carry out. He thought it better not to go to Panama to read homilies on religion. Mr. Bartlett said it was best for Cuba to be owned by a weak nation, but in case of transfer he considered it rash to seize it ourselves; and he was not so sure that the West, as much as it wanted Southern commerce to prosper, "could be easily persuaded to buckle on their knapsacks and shoulder their rifles to fight Cuba under a vertical sun." Mr. Floyd agreed that England had an interest in the West Indies and he opposed any "moonstruck project which would lead us from a neutral

policy." Mr. F. Johnson did not favor any alliance with the new Spanish-American states, nor did he agree that it would be better for Cuba to pass to England than to Mexico. He said it was against our own policy, interests and principles, to possess Cuba, Canada or any other colony; but that we should deny the right of either England or France to take territory not contiguous to them, and so near to our own shores.

It was not until the next May or June that news reached Washington that Mexico had decided to suspend the expedition against Cuba. In the meantime the United States was urging both Spain and Russia to end the war, and the Spanish Government was endeavoring to get the United States to guarantee Cuba to Spain. The American Government continued to decline to agree to any proposal for a guarantee, and stated that the condition of the United States, Great Britain and France was almost equivalent to an actual guarantee—even if Cuba was desired by the United States; England and France knew that the American Government would not consent to their possession of Cuba, and Spain was assured that the forbearance of the United States could be relied upon. In May, before it was certain what immediate course Colombia and Mexico would pursue, Clay instructed the delegates to the Panama Congress, stating that neither Colombia nor Mexico had the supplies necessary for a conquest of Cuba, that the United States could not see a desolating war there, and that they should at least suspend action until news arrived from Europe. At this time Spain was described as the land of "monks and locusts, the police, ports without ships, troops without breeches, a brilliant priesthood, banditti and an exhausted treasury." Many talked as though they expected Spain to lose Cuba at no distant day. Jefferson, a few days before his death, said: "All eyes are open or opening to the rights of man [and to the] truth that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few, booted and spurred, ready to ride them legiti-

mately by the Grace of God." Clay doubtless had other reasons than those mentioned which prompted him to discourage the plans of Mexico and Colombia. Might there be danger of Cuba becoming a bone of contention between these two new states? When the Mexican minister at London in conversation with Mr. Gallatin, in December, 1826, intimated a desire that Cuba should be united to Mexico, Gallatin suggested the danger of a war between Mexico and Colombia during which Great Britain might claim the right to conquer Cuba "as well as either of them." He also stated that the United States would be decidedly opposed to Cuba becoming a British colony, and might find it difficult to maintain the opposition to England, and at the same time acquiesce in an attack by one of the American states.

In his conversation with Gallatin, the Mexican minister was led to speak of the propriety of making Cuba independent under the just guarantee of all the American states and of Great Britain. Mr. Gallatin favored the plan, and wrote Clay that it was "the only one which could give a permanent security to the United States." Mr. Gallatin could not speak with authority as to the intentions of the United States; but he suggested to the Mexican minister that "if his Government thought this to be a practicable object, that Cuba was ripe for it, and that it could be done without disturbing the state of society in reference to the black population, they might make an overture to the Government of the United States and get its views." Gallatin at once resolved to get Mr. Canning's ideas concerning the ultimate destination of Cuba. At this time it was not certain that there would not soon be a war between England and Spain, and there had been a recent report, probably unfounded, that England intended to occupy Cuba. Gallatin informed Canning that complications in Anglo-American relations might result from an Anglo-Spanish war—especially as to Cuba, which it was understood should not fall into the hands of either England or the United States. He also stated that the United States and Mexico could

not submit to a transfer of the island, and asked whether it would probably go to Mexico or Colombia, or whether the whites were strong enough to maintain its independence in case it should not be practicable to keep it under Spanish rule as had been heretofore desired. Canning was cautious and reluctant to speak. He said England had already too much territory, but he gave no positive assurance that his government had no designs on Cuba. Canning's reserve may have been partially due to the failure of his proposed tripartite agreement of the year before, concerning the details of which Gallatin was not at this time informed. It appears that the suggestion of the Mexican minister to Gallatin received no further consideration.

In 1827 Cuban exiles in Mexico and Colombia formed the society of "The Black Eagle" to start another revolution in Cuba. Slave-holding interests in the United States opposed it. There was also a report that British emissaries were preparing the way for the independence of Cuba under English protection. In June, the Spanish minister at London informed his Government that England had recently sent a frigate to the Canaries with commissioners to investigate what preparations were being made for an expedition against the new American states; that they also went to Havana where they found many disposed to revolt; and that emissaries were left in Cuba "to guide public opinion" so that the people would ask for British protection, thus lessening the chances of objection by the United States. The Spanish ambassador stated that he had his information from the Duke of Wellington, who had himself advised a British officer to give immediate information of any signs of disaffection which he should see in Cuba. In August, Mr. Everett, the United States minister at Madrid, notified Mr. Clay of this intimation that the English ministry were planning a revolution in the Canaries and in Cuba. The news gave Clay some uneasiness. In December, Mr. Everett called the attention of the Spanish Government to the report, and was informed that everything had been secure

in Cuba. Everett thought Spain should keep the United States better informed as to matters relating to Cuba, and he stated England could not cover her operations by disguises. England still appeared anxious to prevent any attack on Cuba or Porto Rico by the Spanish-American states. Bolivar had ships and forces at Carácas for a contemplated invasion of Porto Rico. Mr. Cockburn, the British minister to Colombia, energetically discouraged such an attempt against any of the Spanish islands, and frustrated the plans of Bolivar. Soon after, Colombia was on the eve of civil war and her coasts were menaced by a squadron fitted out from Cuba.

The indemnity treaty, which Spain made with England and France, lessened the possibility of interference in Spanish affairs by those countries, but the United States felt that it did not entirely obviate the danger of occupation of Cuba by them. In 1829, Secretary Van Buren instructed Van Ness, the newly appointed United States minister at Madrid, to watch for any events which might lead to a change in the condition of Cuba; and stated that, while it was not the American policy to give a direct promise to guarantee Cuba to Spain, he believed the Government would be ready to prevent any threatened blow, and that the naval force and influence of the United States would render her consent an essential preliminary to any project which might affect the affairs of nations engaged in American commerce. The American Government did not feel like interposing further to preserve Cuba to Spain. The unsuccessful Spanish expedition against Mexico in the summer of 1829 was the cause of some solicitude. Mr. Van Buren stated that, while the Government had preserved Cuba to Spain when Mexico and Colombia were ready to strike a blow, and although the possession by these two new states might give England or France a chance to get it, yet the United States could hardly interfere with a defensive attack which either Mexico or Colombia might think it to their interest to make—unless such attack should threaten to disturb the internal

conditions of the island. Any measures which tended to excite the slaves to revolt would not have been permitted by the American Government, and Van Buren felt that in such a case all nations of Europe would probably have made common cause with the United States.

There had been many delays in getting a treaty with Mexico, and there had been other causes of friction. Just after the great excitement produced in Mexico by the Spanish invasion, Mr. Poinsett, the United States minister there, informed Secretary Van Buren that the Mexican Government had resolved to send a secret mission to Hayti in order to concert measures with Boyer to excite the Cuban slaves to revolt. Van Buren considered this an unnatural, wicked, and aggravating project, which could not be justified as an act of political and national hostility. Mr. Poinsett was soon recalled from Mexico on account of the public clamor against him there, and Mr. Butler was sent to take his place. In Van Buren's instructions to Butler on November 30, he stated that it was the duty of the United States to guard its peaceful and prosperous settlers on the southern and southwestern borders, and to oppose any attempt which might be made to excite an uprising of slaves in Cuba. He told Butler to remonstrate if the agents of Mexico persisted, and added: "If remonstrance is not effectual, inform the United States at once so it may have it in its power to adopt such measures as it may deem proper and necessary to avert the apprehended evil." Mexico solemnly assured the Government at Washington that the measures to excite slaves would in no event be resorted to; and, that in case Spain forced war upon them, they would strictly observe the rules of civilized warfare. In the autumn of 1830 the former jealousies of Mexico had been largely removed, and the President desired to make himself useful to her by urging Spain to recognize her independence. After the fall of Charles X. in France, Van Buren asked Van Ness to suggest to the Spanish Government that the Spanish king might escape a similar fate by abandoning

a hopeless claim over the former colonies whose independence he should now recognize. It was still the desire of the United States that Cuba should remain subject to Spain. There were serious objections to its being possessed even by the South American states, but Van Buren informed Spain that the President did not see how he would be justified in interfering with the attempts of Mexico or Colombia in any acts against the island which should be necessary in carrying on a defensive war.

England was also taking measures to get Spain by friendly advice and remonstrance to consent to the recognition of the South American states. Cuba had recently sent a proposition asking Spain to raise 25,000 troops, and declaring that Mexico could be conquered. Spain threatened to accede to the proposal. Under these conditions the Earl of Aberdeen informed the Mexican minister that the English Government no longer offered any objection to a Mexican expedition against Cuba. In May, 1830, Mr. Huskisson presented a petition from the merchants of Liverpool asking the Commons to adopt measures to protect their interests in the Mexican trade, and to induce Spain to desist from the Cuban expeditions against Mexico which had exposed the rapidly increasing commerce with Mexico to serious danger. Mr. Huskisson said that the contest was hopeless, and that neutral nations had a right to interpose as in the case of Greece in 1827. War was too great an evil to be prolonged simply to gratify spite or animosity. He said that Cuba should remain in the hands of Spain, but that there would be danger in making it a place to collect troops and to secure supplies for their support, and that in case such troops should act in opposition to the government it would give a neighboring power a pretext to interfere. Under these circumstances he said: "As we protected Cuba from the republics, we feel bound not to allow Cuba to be made the rendezvous of expeditions intended to attack those states." Sir Joseph York declared that "Every one knew that had the invasion of Cuba not

been prevented, the island would at that hour have been in the possession of the United States of America." England had no desire for Mexico to be returned to Spain, but she was especially anxious that the United States should not be given a chance to interfere in Cuba. Palmerston said that if Mexico was to be prevented from invading Cuba, Spain should also be prevented from collecting forces in Cuba against Mexico. Huskisson believed that the best interests of all parties should induce England to end the warfare, or to agree that Cuba be excepted from its operations. Peel stated that interference was not the general policy of England, but that there might be peculiar and important circumstances in the relations of England to Cuba that would justify a departure from the regular rules of policy.

A long memoir presented to the king by the Chamber of Commerce at Cadiz in 1828 will show the feeling which the Spanish people had toward the determined policy of the Spanish Government to reconquer South America and Mexico even at the risk of ruining Spain and losing Cuba. The memoir started with reflections upon the great good which Spain had done by her conquest in the New World since 1492. Spain had been "more like a mother than a conqueror," it said, but the rise and extension of the United States caused ingratitude toward Spain in her South American colonies until the fatal event came when twenty million people, "encouraged by foreign powers" hostile to Spanish prosperity, had detached themselves and left Spain in such a deplorable condition that she could not restrain the insurrection and counteract the projects of her enemies abroad. Trade had almost ceased, and the results were extending to other branches of industry as well as to the population and the revenues. Cadiz had suffered poverty and distress; its population had decreased from 71,000 to 46,000 in thirty years. "This heroic town," the memoir adds, "this firm pillar of the state, Sire, is making a rapid progress toward complete annihilation." The Chamber of Commerce was

convinced that it was useless to make further attempts to extinguish the flames of insurrection. There was no money to fit out expeditions. It exhausted all the resources to employ 20,000 men and 15 ships in Cuba where the inhabitants were faithful. How much, then, would it require for the colonies which were in revolt? It was vain to hope that civil troubles or exhaustion of the mines would help to bring the colonies back—for rather would they “shed their last drop of blood” than once more become dependent upon Spain. Under these conditions the memoir advocated that Spain should acknowledge her former colonies, in order to secure trade with them. If some of the other nations secured all of this trade and the American ports should be closed to Spain, her commerce would be at an end. Could the deficiencies of revenue then be cured by loans? No! palliations could “have no other effect than to hasten the approach of death.” Cadiz, it is stated, had been loyal in making great sacrifices; and as a true friend of Spain she advised a change of policy. She thought it a wise plan and a proper time to renounce old maxims and adapt ourselves to the spirit of the times”—sacrificing what had been considered the principles of justice, and doing what would contribute to the welfare of the people.

The advice here given was not followed at once, but by the autumn of 1830 it appeared impossible for Spain to undertake any more expeditions. She was forced by her weakened condition, and by popular sentiment at home, to discontinue her attempts for reconquest—though she did not recognize the independence of the new republics until several years later. She had already contracted vast debts which were a source of trouble to her semi-annual ministries, as well as the source of international suspicion in regard to Cuba, for many years afterwards. The proud nation which had extended her conquests over the greater part of a new world, and wasted her riches in a vain attempt to fight the natural course of events in her European and American dominions, had at last felt the hand of defeat.

The wrongs of two hemispheres had been avenged by the march of historical events—the land where the Aztec and Peruvian dynasties had gone down before the European invaders had now given birth to the new nations which had resolved to keep from under the shadow of Castilian wings. The example of the United States had inspired such men as Miranda and Bolivar to strive for independence, and the favorable opportunity, which came while Napoleon was shaking up the sovereigns of Europe and rearranging their map, had finally resulted in limiting the Spanish power in the West to Cuba and Porto Rico.

The international complications which might have arisen if Spain had been able to continue the war in America were luckily avoided, though the continuance of Cuba as a colony has led to many vexatious international questions. Both England and the United States were satisfied at that time to see the "Queen of the Antilles" remain in the hands of the nation that had depleted her treasure in the vain attempt to retain half of the American continent. An article in one of the London magazines in 1831 refers to the United States as having designs on Cuba, but there is no evidence that she did not at that time prefer to see the island under the rule of Spain with unrestricted commercial intercourse between it and the United States. A writer in the *Quarterly Review* said: "Popular opinion would be as strongly excited against the suggestion of either a voluntary or forcible acquisition beyond our territorial limits, as it would be if the Executive were to recommend a league with the Pope for the conquest of the Holy Land."

CHAPTER VI.

INTERNATIONAL JEALOUSIES CONCERNING TEXAS AND CUBA.

When the voice of the people sent General Jackson to Washington at the head of a western army of triumphant and hungry democracy, the new President looked forward to a "peaceable and honorable competition" with all nations. It soon became evident that France would peaceably settle the long-standing indemnity for spoliations, and England showed a disposition to remove the interdict on her West India trade. Spain had not yet settled the indemnity for spoliation upon American commerce, and her recent commercial restrictions were a source of friction. The minister to Madrid was authorized to endeavor to remove these sources of irritation. The South American republics were feeling their way through difficulties, but Jackson in his first message hoped that the conditions there would soon result in permanent governments and enable the United States "to salute them as friendly rivals." Civil dissension had ended in Mexico and it was hoped that this would have a salutary effect in inducing Spain to adopt a pacific policy toward her former colony. The Mexican Government and people had been prejudiced against Poinsett, the American minister, and this had an unfortunate influence on the two countries, but there was hope that Mexico would soon become more friendly toward the United States.

With England, after 1830, there remained no serious difficulty requiring an immediate adjustment, but the rapid growth of the American republic was a source of jealousy. Every breeze seemed to blow the ship of manifest destiny

forward, and some English statesmen, looking at the territorial changes since 1803, feared that the United States might own the Gulf as Turkey once owned the Black Sea. This fear was increased by the evident intention of southern men to seek new territory for the extension of slavery. In the Congress of Verona, Chateaubriand had said, "When she [England] shall have seen the United States support or subjugate the Mexican democracy, Great Britain will regret;" and when England heard that the United States Government was preparing to erect a new naval station at Dry Tortugas, off the coast of Florida, and that it had an eye on Texas and California, it seemed to her but the opening act of a play upon Mexico. The Texas squatters had declared that they would not obey the Mexican law against slavery. These squatters had kept spreading, and it was feared that they would get all Texas. Sir R. Wilson said in the English Parliament that the American Government had been unable to control the 5600 subjects who had squatted on Mexican soil; and he declared that the United States was slowly getting both sides of the Gulf of Mexico, so that by and by English ships could not enter it without passing under the guns of the United States. He feared that, after extending themselves upon the Gulf, the Americans would then look beyond the St. Lawrence. William Huskisson in a speech in the Commons on the political and commercial relations of England and Mexico said: "If the United States have declared that they cannot allow the island of Cuba to belong to any maritime power in Europe, Spain excepted, neither can England * * * suffer the United States to bring under their dominion a greater portion of the shores of the Gulf of Mexico than that which they now possess." He declared that the independence of Mexico would only be a name, if the United States should get New California and the ports of Mexico on the Pacific; and that in order to give Mexico a chance to grow, so that she would not fall a prey to the American republic, and to put Cuba into a position to make it unlikely to fall

into the American hands, it should be the policy of England to relieve Mexico of the necessity of keeping a military force to act against the hostile expeditions of Spain. Many in Parliament were strongly in favor of a policy of intervention in case Spain renewed her expeditions from Cuba to attempt the resubjugation of Mexico.

In 1819 the United States had given up all claims to Texas, but in a few years there was a growing appetite for its return. In 1825, Clay instructed Poinsett to purchase it, but Mexico declined. The proposition was renewed in 1827, but was again rejected. J. Q. Adams once said that when Jackson became President he put his double engines at work to negotiate for Texas with one hand and to favor revolt with the other. In 1829, 1833 and 1835, unsuccessful attempts were made to secure it, but it was not until 1845 that it was finally included in the lands of the republic. The first propositions to secure Texas were probably due to the unsettled boundary, to stop Mexican suspicions, and to cure the delay in getting treaties with Mexico—but later it was desired for slavery. After the invention of the cotton gin, negro slavery had become more valuable—for, the South had become the cotton-field of the world. But cotton exhausted the soil, and there was need of virgin land. Slavery also needed more states in order to retain its influence in Congress. So the desire grew to absorb new lands to the southwest, and finally to look to Cuba. There was also a desire to check the influence of England around the Gulf. In 1830 Mexico began to enforce laws against slavery and to make her rule more severe in other particulars. In 1833 the Texans rebelled. The United States was neutral, but by 1835 it was thought that the only sure cure for the trouble was to purchase Texas. Butler, a Texan land-jobber, was sent as minister to Mexico. In June, 1835, he wrote Secretary Forsyth that he had a plan for securing Texas. He proposed to purchase the cession of it by bribing Hernandez, the confessor of Santa Anna's sister. This proposition was too gross for Jackson to accept, and he forbade

bribery. Jackson was anxious to secure all the territory north of 37° north latitude to the Pacific. In August, 1835, Forsyth instructed Butler to endeavor to obtain a boundary of the Rio del Norte to 37° thence west to the Pacific. If he could not get this line he was to settle on any other line that would include the Bay of San Francisco. While these negotiations were being carried on the United States made Mexico uneasy by the measures which she took to protect commerce in the Gulf of Mexico. The President's message, and occurrences in Congress in the latter part of 1835 also became a subject of inquiry by the Mexican minister. The United States had many claims which the new Spanish-American republics, owing to their distracted condition, had been unable to settle. The patience of the administration was severely tried, and in his message President Jackson said: "Unfortunately many nations of this hemisphere are still self-tormented by domestic dissensions. Revolution succeeds revolution; injuries are committed upon foreigners engaged in lawful pursuits; much time elapses before a government sufficiently stable is erected to justify expectation of redress; ministers are sent and received and before the discussion of past injuries is fairly begun, fresh troubles arise; but too frequently new injuries are added to the old, to be discussed together with the existing government, after it has proved its ability to sustain the assaults made upon it, or with its successor if overthrown. If this unhappy condition of things continues much longer, other nations will be under the painful necessity of deciding whether justice to their suffering citizens does not require a prompt redress of injury by their own power, without waiting for the establishment of a government efficient and enduring enough to make satisfaction for them." When the Mexican minister drew the attention of the Secretary of State to this message the latter informed him that it was not a subject of discussion with a foreign power. Mexico also became very uneasy as to the policy of the United States in recognizing Texas. It was the desire of the American Gov-

ernment to disperse the suspicions and apprehensions of Mexico which had been aggravated by recent events in Texas. In his instructions to Ellis in January, 1836, Forsyth said that the Mexican suspicions were unfounded, and that he should use his exertions to undeceive the Mexican Government and people in regard to the intentions of the United States. In the spring of 1836, the Mexican minister feared that the American Government, on account of the inability of Mexico to fulfil her part of the treaty with the United States, would send troops into the Mexican territory to repel the Indians. Forsyth replied that General Gaines would not be sent across the boundary, though he might justly have been sent into the heart of Mexico.

The United States was at this time negotiating at Madrid for the recognition of the new American republics, and Spain finally acquiesced in this policy. This removed another source of diplomatic correspondence with Spain. The spoliation claims for depredations on American commerce during the Spanish-American revolt, by privateers sailing under Spanish commission, had after much discussion been acknowledged by Spain in 1834, she agreeing to pay twelve million dollars with five per cent. interest. Spanish internal conflicts made it impossible for her to pay the full claims at that time and this was the source of subsequent failure to keep up the interest, but at first she paid the interest promptly. Jackson's message of December, 1836, said that our relations with Spain were "on the best footing with the exception of burdens still imposed upon our commerce with her possessions out of Europe." In violation of the decree of 1818, which had opened up an extensive trade with the United States, Spain in 1829 imposed heavy tonnage dues on foreign vessels in the port of Cuba. She also placed the duty of \$5.18 per barrel on flour imported from Spain to Cuba in foreign vessels. Mr. Van Buren asked Everett to remonstrate. In November, 1829,

Van Buren, referring to the wisdom which had induced Spain in 1818, to relax its colonial system and adopt the liberal policy which had resulted in opening colonial ports to general commerce, said that it had been so far "satisfactory in the view of the United States as in addition to other considerations to induce this government to desire that their possession should not be transferred from the Spanish crown to any other power." But Spain continued to adopt a policy of placing heavy duties. In April, 1831, there were memorials to Congress against the Cuban duties on rice and flour. The United States wanted reciprocity; she had paid two million dollars duty since the trade with Cuba was open, and it was felt to be necessary for her to retaliate. In April, 1833, the Cuban trade was declining, and Spain was asked to put an end to her discriminating duties, but in 1834 the Spanish Cortes imposed a duty of nearly ten dollars per barrel on flour imported to Cuba. This was ruinous to the merchant marine of Cuba; ship-building soon ceased, and reprisals in the American Congress also followed. New tonnage duties were laid upon Cuban vessels, and in 1843 on sugars and tobaccos from the Spanish islands. In his message of December, 1835, Jackson said that the pressure of affairs in Spain could give us no immediate hope for a change in regard to commercial intercourse with Cuba. The Spanish commercial policy continues to be a source of complaint. Those who hoped for change, hoped in vain. In July, 1840, Secretary Forsyth complained of the commercial exactions and heavy duties at Havana, and urged reciprocity. In November, 1842, the American trade with peninsular Spain was declining, and there was no benefit to the Spanish shipping by the commercial regulations with foreign nations. The United States desired a treaty securing more liberal commercial regulations. In Tyler's message of December, 1842, he hoped that the agitation which internal convulsions had produced in Spain would soon end, and that Spain would shortly adopt a more liberal policy, but in August,

1846, the American minister at Madrid, was instructed to protest against the additional tonnage duty on American vessels in Cuba.

For many years after 1833, Spain was in a condition of almost continual disturbance. On September 29, 1833, Ferdinand VII. died, and by the abolition of the Salic law, his daughter Isabella took the throne. The Apostolic party, the priesthood and absolutism, proclaimed Ferdinand's brother, Don Carlos, king, under the title of Charles V. The regent, Maria Christina, threw herself into the arms of the liberal party. Scenes of savage bloodshed and destruction followed until the Carlist war finally wore itself out. The Carlists had the advantage at first, but in 1834, a quadruple alliance was concluded between Spain, Portugal, France and England to drive out the pretenders, Don Carlos and Don Miguel. In 1835 England interfered to propose measures calculated to conciliate rather than to destroy the pretenders. After Espartero was given command of Christina's army in 1836, the Carlists were defeated, and after the treaty of August, 1839, their cause was lost. but the private and political conduct of Christina had alienated the respect and affection of her people. Her liberal moods were not serious. Her constitution of 1834 pleased nobody. The Cortes met, but parties were hostile and its policy wavered. Ministers changed rapidly. The finances were low. The crown may be the fountain of honor, but the treasury is the spring of business; and when the treasure is low business languishes. In 1836, the progressives forced their way into Christina's summer palace and compelled her to accept the constitution of 1812, which was revised by the constitutional assembly in 1837, and was sworn to by the Queen. But she afterwards succeeded in displeasing the popular party. Revolts again arose and in 1840, in order to check revolution, she had to choose Espartero as minister-president. He favored the progressive movement. This, together with the reputation which her private life had given her, caused the Queen to

abdicate the regency in October, 1840. Spain thus experienced another political revolution.

It was said that while Spain was torn by convulsions Cuba presented a spectacle of peace and prosperity which was almost unparalleled. The Spanish principle with Cuba, from the time the Castilian foot was set upon its soil, was to sacrifice its well-being to what was meant to be Spain's prosperity. Stagnation and corruption had been the result. Don Miguel Tacon, who became governor in 1832, made an effort to sweep corruption from the Augean stables. Under his predecessor the safest place for an honest man after seven o'clock at night was in his bed. Judges were corruptible, and malefactors were safe if they had bribe money. Tacon suppressed the robbers and closed the gambling houses—and such criminals as were not dealt with by severer measures he put to work upon public buildings and roads—but he was arbitrary, fearless and severe. While he lessened corruption he did not prevent the Spanish policy of making Cuba a feeding-ground for Spanish politicians. Madden, an English official, in Cuba in 1837, said that Tacon left the colony a kind of civilization of stone and mortar, and he added that "from Augustus to Napoleon, all despots have made themselves architects to fool the people." It was General Tacon who once said "I am here, not to promote the interests of the people of Cuba, but to serve my master, the king."

In 1834 Cuba was placed in enjoyment of the same rights as Spain, and sent deputies to the Spanish Cortes. In 1837, these rights were denied, the Cuban deputies were refused admittance and it was decreed that the colonies should be governed by special laws. This was the beginning of a period of conspiracies. From that time until the time of the ten years' war Cuba had no representation, and did not receive the promised special laws, but she was at all times subject to the will of the governor-general. In 1830 and 1833, there had been some discontent, but it gave way to epicurean

pleasures and business. From 1836 to 1839 there was a general feeling of disaffection among the white creole population, and it is said they had an intense desire for independence. In order to get more money, Spain was giving Cuba less liberty, and, in 1836, was just about to recognize the independence of the states which had been her former colonies in America. This, together with the new democratic constitution at Madrid, it was feared would have a bad result on Cuba. Van Ness, the American minister at Madrid, wrote that he was informed that the disorders in Spain were promoted by Cuban agents in order to give Cuba a chance to declare her independence, but he furnished no proof of this. Spain was draining Cuba, and Van Ness thought it would be difficult to keep the island down, for he said that no force could be sent from Spain to oppose any attempt which might be made in Cuba. Calatrava, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, declared that the fear of the negroes would be worth an army of one hundred thousand to prevent the whites from making revolutionary attempts. Spain seems to have thought that the voice of independence was shouting across the Gulf of Mexico. In November, 1836, the *Revista Nacional* referred to the President of the United States as saying that Cuba could not possibly remain united to Spain. Van Ness pronounced this an infamous calumny, and in a letter to the editor he said the United States had a peculiar interest in preserving the existing condition of Cuba, and that she had once intervened to prevent a blow against it.

Under the Queen Regent, Christina, the Spanish treasure had become depleted. Spain needed money to close the Carlist war, and it was seen that this might give England or France an opportunity to secure Cuba. In January, 1836, there was a secret scheme to sell the island to France in order to get money, and to get rid of future turbulence in that quarter. Christina had sent Señor Campuzano to interview Prince Talleyrand, and to propose the sale of Cuba to Louis Philippe for thirty million reals—the Philippines

and Porto Rico for ten millions more. Only Aguado, a Spanish banker in Paris, and Talleyrand's secretary were present at this interview. Lord Palmerston was feared and the subject was to be kept secret if not carried out. It was proposed that the loan to pay for the cession, should be issued by Aguado; that Talleyrand should be offered one million francs, and that others should receive three hundred thousand francs as bribes or commissions. Shortly after the interview with Talleyrand the parties met in the King's Cabinet to sign the contract. The Cuban clause was agreed to with little discussion. But Louis Philippe said that the cession of the Philippines to France would be strongly opposed by England, and, seeing the ghost of Palmerston rise up, he asked a reduction of three million reals on the price of the Philippines. He pushed the contract across the table, and said the reduction of price must be made or else the contract must be thrown into the fire. Campuzano, who had not personally favored the cession, theatrically arose, looked the higgling citizen-king in the face, agreed that the contract should be burned, and proceeded to crumble and burn it in the blazing fire before them. The king was thunderstruck, but he had recourse to his snuff-box, his faithful ally and comforter—taking a large quantity this time to enable him to comprehend the extraordinary circumstance which he had witnessed. The matter was kept secret, lest it should arouse Europe, for it might have been considered a conspiracy against the Spanish people.

For some time there had been rumors of the British Government receiving Cuba as a pledge for a loan to Spain. Great jealousy was indicated in the American papers concerning the supposed interference of England in Cuban affairs. The condition of the English colonies, and the influence of England on Spain at this time, made the rumors appear not improbable. Cuban sugar had been replacing that of the English colonies, and the British Government saw the necessity of duties, encouragement to the immigration of free labor, and more capital and machinery, to enable

her colonies to compete with the slave colonies. The necessity of extinguishing the slave-trade in the Spanish colonies and Brazil was also evident. In 1833, England had emancipated her slaves, and in 1834 twenty million pounds of compensation money was given to the West India merchants, but none of this compensation money was used to purchase free labor and machinery, and the conditions in the English colonies were not very encouraging. By the treaty of 1817, Spain had agreed to relinquish the slave-trade. By a later treaty of 1835, she authorized British armed vessels to capture Spanish ships engaged in the trade, and allowed England to establish a mixed commission to sit in Havana to take cognizance of such cases. In the United States it was feared that England would take advantage of her influence and endeavor to secure the emancipation of slaves in Cuba. Agents of British anti-slavery societies, in 1838, actually proposed to the Government at Madrid to emancipate the Cuban slaves, but the suggestion did not secure favor.

When Eaton, the United States minister at Madrid, heard the floating rumors of the proposal to pawn Cuba to Great Britain as security for a loan, he presented an energetic protest to Queen Isabella's Government, and stated that the United States could not permit England to hold Cuba under any circumstances. The *New York Courier* said that the Cubans themselves would probably be opposed to such an arrangement. Madden, who was an English official in Cuba in 1837, said that if England in that year could have been induced to guarantee Cuba from the intervention of any foreign power, the white inhabitants were prepared to throw off the Spanish yoke and to undertake the abolition of the slave-trade. It was supposed that the 16,000 Spaniards and the 20,000 soldiers could have been won over by allotments of land. A great source of apprehension was the slave, who it was seen might be a serious source of trouble unless England should make a guarantee against foreign intervention. Besides the objection of the United States,

there would have been other serious difficulties in the way of a transfer of Cuba to England. The soil, and the harbor of Havana made the island valuable; but the English policy was against slavery, and emancipation would have necessitated the compensation of the owners of four hundred thousand slaves. This would have required eight or ten million pounds and would have made Cuba a costly acquisition. In June, 1837, Niles's *Register* stated that any attempt to secure Cuba as a pledge was not apparently probable, and that in case it were it would be unpopular in England. The *Madrid Gazette* gave assurance that no new treaty was to give England possession of Cuba—that the Spanish Government could not have conceived such a project. It said that the *Espanol* in March had probably copied the reports from foreign journals only in order to discredit the Spanish Government. On April 1, 1837, Deputy Sancho, speaking in the Spanish Cortes on a proposition to give Cuba representation in the Cortes, said: "If, gentlemen, the island of Cuba should cease to be Spanish it must belong to the negro. It cannot come under the power of any other nation, because, (1) there is no nation powerful enough to subjugate four hundred thousand negroes who under the tropics would say 'We will not be governed by you.' (2) Because, if another nation should attempt to take possession of it, some rival power would oppose the design. In strict truth, and without any figure of speech, the island of Cuba is the key of the Gulf of Mexico, and no other than a great maritime power could take possession of it And what power would consent to such possession?" He said that neither England nor the United States could allow the other to hold Cuba without effusion of blood. Referring to the products of the mountain-fed rivers in the United States, whose valleys were being filled with a growing population, he said that for the United States to consent to England holding Cuba would be like one person handing to another the key to his money chest"—and, on the other hand, England, the mistress of Gibraltar, the Ionian Isles, and the

Cape of Good Hope, would not allow Cuba to be held by the United States.

The United States after half a century teeming with extraordinary events now enjoyed the respect of all nations and she still desired to cultivate the friendship of all. When Mr. Van Buren became President, he said in his inaugural address: "We have no disposition, and disclaim all right to meddle in disputes, whether internal or foreign, that may molest other countries, regarding them in their actual states as social communities, and preserving a strict neutrality in all other controversies." But this was not intended to preclude the right under certain circumstances to interfere in Cuba. In June, 1837, Mr. Stevenson, the American minister, had an informal and unofficial conversation with Palmerston, at London, concerning the newspaper reports that England and France had been asked for a loan and to guarantee Cuba. Mr. Stevenson referred to the geographical position of the island, its commercial importance to the United States, the policy of the American Government, and he stated that the right of the United States to interfere could be little doubted when a question of self-preservation and defense was concerned. Palmerston was conciliatory in language and manner. He said that Great Britain had declined the proposition of Spain, and that there was very little probability that Parliament would give its consent for the fulfilment of such a pledge as Spain desired. Mr. Eaton, the American minister at Madrid, hearing so many rumors concerning the supposed treaty between England and Spain, giving England a lien upon Cuba, spoke, in August, to the English ambassador at Madrid concerning it. The ambassador replied that England did not desire the possession of Cuba.

The execution of the slave-trade treaty by Great Britain was a source of several disagreements with the United State authorities. The *Venus*, a vessel of 460 tons, sailing from Baltimore in 1838, reached Havana on August 4. It soon left under the American flag, returned four months

later under the Portuguese colors, and landed 860 negroes, upon which the owners of the vessel were supposed to have cleared \$200,000. On the coast of Africa the *Venus* had been watched by English cruisers, but she eluded their chase. The British commissioners in Cuba informed Mr. Trist, the United States consul in Havana, of the character of the *Venus*. Trist considered this an insult to the American Government. He stated that no official relation existed between the British commissioners and the United States consul, and that he could not recognize the right of any agent of a foreign government to interfere in any possible mode or degree in the discharge of his duty. Concerning the "peculiar relationship" of England and the United States, he said: "Since July 4, 1776, the only relation in which they stand to each other is that of two independent nations—'enemies in war and in peace friends.'" A heated correspondence followed.

By the tenth article of the Treaty of Ghent in 1814, the United States and England had agreed to endeavor to secure the entire abolition of the slave trade. England had for many years kept a squadron on the coast of Africa to suppress the slaves. Other nations also consented to keep vessels there. The United States refused to be a party to such an agreement, and slavers soon found that they could avoid the inconvenience and consequences of search by hoisting the American flag which they could purchase for a few cents. England felt that the United States was feeble in checking this abuse of the flag, and this caused the British officers to invent a new doctrine—the right of visit to see whether vessels were really American. The Americans protested. Palmerston maintained the position taken by the British officers, and a warm correspondence ensued.

In 1840 it was suspected that agents of England who were determined to end the slave traffic were intriguing with the discontented to arouse a rebellion against the authorities of Cuba. David Turnbull, the British consul at Havana, and other anti-slavery agents were accused of fomenting

an insurrection. The opinions and conduct of Turnbull had made the truth of this implication probable. Conspirators afterwards confessed it. The British Government was probably not directly implicated however. The President of the United States made an effort to ascertain the truth of the matter; and the American minister at Madrid was asked to say to Spain that the United States would never allow Cuba to be occupied by British agents under any pretext whatever, and would lend the whole naval and military resource of the United States to keep Europe out. Spain knew that the United States had long looked with solicitude at the political condition of Cuba, but the American minister was asked again to make our views clearly known. Mr. Forsyth, in his letter to Vail in July, 1840, stated that the Anglo-Spanish alliance against the slave trade, together with loans to Spain by England, might furnish a pretext for English designs, and he instructed Vail to protest against any act which might lead to a transfer of Cuba. In the early part of 1842, Mr. Walsh, in one of his letters to the *National Intelligencer*, said that the Madrid politicians did not entertain the idea that England would ever acquire Cuba by cession. Mr. Walsh believed that English statesmen did not seek Cuba, but thought that the abolition of slavery there had been somehow semi-officially undertaken.

At this time, Spain was not even able to pay the interest upon her debt to the United States. The President suggested that she might make it chargeable upon the revenues of Cuba, either by draft upon the colonial government or by treasury notes receivable at the Cuban custom house. The next year Spain proposed that the entire claim of the United States might be settled by a sum paid to her semi-annually by the authorities of Cuba. It was arranged that the interest should be forwarded from Havana each year by the captain-general. In 1842, there was a disagreement over *L'Amistad*, which caused a delay in the payment of the interest by Spain. The schooner *L'Amistad* sailed from Havana June 27, 1839, for La Guanaja, on the northern

coast of Puerto Principe, Cuba, with a cargo of negroes recently brought from Africa, which the Havana passports described as slaves of José Ruiz and Pedro Montez. Before reaching their destination the negroes revolted, killed the captain and three other whites, and commanded Ruiz and Montez to take them back to Africa, but the latter changed the course of the vessel toward the North, and on August 26 it was taken possession of, as a prize, by Lieutenant Gedney, of the United States brig *Washington*, near the coast of Long Island. The case was brought before the federal court in Connecticut in September, and was very complicated. Gedney claimed salvage money, the two Spaniards asked for the negroes which they claimed to have purchased, and the negroes claimed their freedom. The Spanish ambassador demanded the return of the negroes and the vessel, and the United States attorney-general determined that they should be surrendered without an examination before the federal court, though they both looked upon the negroes as "pirates" as well as property. The case was already before the circuit court, from which it was carried to the district court and then to the Supreme Court, all of which decided against Ruiz and Montez, and the negroes became free, though the administration at Washington had apparently favored the Spanish view of the case. Spain continued to ask for the \$47,000 damages, and in August, 1842, the failure of the United States to pay these claims resulted in a delay in the payment of the interest due the United States from Spain. The United States made complaint at Madrid, and, in December, Almodovar informed Irving, the American minister, that Argaiz, the Spanish minister in the United States, had not been authorized to withhold the interest. The Governor-General of Cuba was expected to pay it promptly. The *Amistad* claim was never paid. In 1844, Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, chairman of the committee on foreign affairs in the House, introduced a bill to give Ruiz and Montez \$70,000 compensation, but Giddings boldly opposed it, and the bill was laid on the table.

The rapid changes of government in Spain made it almost impossible to carry on diplomatic negotiations. On May 8, 1841, Espartero became regent, and guardian of Queen Isabella and her sister. Christina and Louis Philippe used both gold and influence to work against him. He sought to establish order and to rule fairly, but he was accused of selling Spanish commercial interests to England, and of tyranny in quieting rebellions. Conspiracies soon arose against him. England and France were rivals for the ascendancy on the Peninsula, and there was much feeling against the apprehended cotton treaty with England, who was thought to be intriguing to ruin the Spanish manufacturers. In the early part of 1842, when Mr. Washington Irving went to the Spanish Court, our relations with Spain were peaceful. Spain herself was standing between two revolutions, her finances exhausted, her government subsisting without money, a deficit that was constantly increasing, with a powerful standing army that had to be punctually paid to keep it loyal and in good humor, seditious marauders robbing villages and placing contributions upon travelers, and her political affairs surrounded by solemn mystery and petty legerdemain. The rapid changes which had been made in the cabinet led Irving to say that, "To carry on negotiations with such transient functionaries is like bargaining at the window of a railroad car—before you can get a reply to a proposition, the other party is out of sight." In eight years there had been forty-two changes in the department of war, twenty-five in that of the marines, and nineteen in the department of state. After a brief breathing spell the public tranquillity was once more threatened by a coalition of discontented elements to create a tempest against the administration of Espartero whom the absolutists accused of designing to make himself sovereign. With every threatened outbreak the influence of England was increased. By May, 1843, an intermittent revolution formed a provisional government at Barcelona, issuing decrees in the name of the Queen and declaring all of Espar-

tero's acts null and void. All parties appealed to the constitution, but rather as a weapon of defense against their adversaries than as a rule of conduct for themselves. Anarchy was the picture which the future seemed to present, but by the last of July the political existence of the regent was ended by the success of the conspiracy of both parties against him. On July 27, Irving wrote: "The question is decided. The armies met yesterday morning. A few shots were exchanged, when a general embracing took place among the soldiers—and the troops of the regency joined the insurgents." Two days later the insurgents under General Narvaez concentrated upon Madrid and took possession. Espartero embarked for England the next day, remaining away from Spain until 1848. There was a lull between political convulsions and governmental disturbances, but there was nothing to indicate that another violent paroxysm might not come soon to break the tranquillity which existed under martial law—for the air was full of jealousies and intrigues. In November, 1843, Isabella, at the age of thirteen, amid tumultuous cheers and the joyous waving of hats, was declared of age by the Cortes, assumed the government, made Narvaez president, and recalled her mother—thereby bringing in French influence. In 1845 the constitution was made less liberal. On October 16, 1846, Isabella married her kinsman, Francis of Assiz, and her sister married the Duke de Montpensier, the young son of Louis Philippe—and thus Louis lost the friendship of the English Cabinet. Isabella following her mother's failings, found Francis too tedious, and soon amused herself with General Serrano and other officers until the legitimacy of her children became a matter of doubt. Mystery is the life of ornamental royalty, and when its magic was pierced by daylight that found virtue in doubt, the queen fell in the estimation of the people.

Cuba was free from the revolutions which were drinking up the life blood of Spain, but the influence of British abolitionists there was considered inimical to the interests of

slavery in the United States. It was feared that there were plots to establish a black republic. The population in 1841 consisted of 571,129 free persons and 436,497 slaves. Of the free inhabitants, 418,291 were whites, over 88,000 were colored and 64,000 were negroes. Of the slaves, 425,521 were negroes, and nearly 11,000 were colored. It will be seen that the whole free population was greater than the slave population, but in many places the slaves far outnumbered their masters. Reports of crises in Cuba were not new, but the American Government appears to have been more alarmed than usual by a report which reached Washington in January, 1843, stating that the condition of Cuba was critical, that England had resolved upon its ruin, and that the authorities could not meet the crisis. The report stated that agents were offering independence to the creoles, if they would unite with the blacks in favor of emancipation and a black military republic under British protection, and that the abolitionists expected the assistance of the British naval force. Webster, Secretary of State, on January 14, wrote to Mr. Campbell, the consul in Cuba, asking him to verify these speculations, and stating that the United States Government would not permit England to use any force nor allow Cuba to be occupied by the agents of England—for it was seen that England could thus strike a death blow at slavery in the United States, and close both entrances to the Gulf of Mexico, thus interfering with the commerce of the rivers which had their *debouche* at New Orleans. The information which Webster had received from Cuba was found to be extravagant, but there was need for vigilance. Campbell entirely discredited the tale of the secret informer as to the British Government taking possession of Cuba, but he joined in holy horror of the abolitionists. The mass of whites in Cuba who were in easy circumstances would probably have preferred annexation to the United States rather than cession to England. In addition to the letter to Campbell, Webster, on January 17,

instructed Irving to sound the Spanish Government as to the recent reports, in order that we might know its sentiments. It appears that Webster also offered, through the Spanish minister at Washington, the assistance of the United States Government. Mr. Irving's secretary, Alexander Hamilton, Jr., interviewed Almodovar, at Madrid, concerning the English plot in Cuba, and stated that the United States would investigate the matter in order that steps might be taken to prevent it. Almodovar, through the Spanish minister at Washington, had already heard of the reports, and had taken steps to put down any plot that might exist. He had no serious apprehension, but he stated that the Spanish Government was "grateful for the kind offers of assistance * * * and in case of need would avail itself of the aid of the United States to defeat the attempts which the two nations were alike interested in suppressing." The annexation of Texas to the United States was being urged at Washington at this time, and it was suggested to President Tyler that such an act might provoke England to seize Cuba. Tyler said he would strike at once if such a case should arise.

John Quincy Adams, who in 1843 made a careful study of the correspondence at the Department of State, while preparing his speech on Texas, was satisfied that the supposed design of England to take possession of Cuba was a hoax, and that the subject was a matter for inquiry and deep meditation. He thought that there might be a "real design at Havana" to hold up the English scarecrow in order to urge the United States herself to hasten to take Cuba. He supposed that the real fact in regard to the British Government was that they were "turning the screws upon the importation of slaves," and preventing the gorging of the Cuban market with 25,000 negroes each year. On April 7, Adams told Mr. Childs, who was publishing a pamphlet on the Texan revolution and the recent "outrage in California," to keep his eye steadily fixed on the occurring events in the island of Cuba. In June, another report

of an insurrection of slaves in the island reached the United States. During the summer there were pamphlets published in France whose purpose seemed to be to prepare the public mind for French intervention in Hayti and the resumption of the government there to prevent its relapse into barbarism. In the United States it was supposed that England would probably allow France to hold Hayti if France would allow England to take Cuba.

In the spring and summer of 1843, Mr. P. A. de Argaiz, the Spanish minister at Washington, had a number of conversations with Secretary Upshur upon affairs in Cuba, and when rumors reached Washington concerning the probable policy of England, he seems to have made application to the United States Government for armed assistance to frustrate any attempt which England might make in case of a crisis. The United States was ready in a friendly manner to accede to his request, and it appears that the secretary of the navy actually ordered ships to Cuba. The negotiations of Argaiz were fruitful of much doubt and jealousy. The fact that he did not communicate with the highest authority in Cuba concerning this matter caused contradictory rumors to arise, some speaking of the grasping policy of England, and others of the possible designs of the United States. The action of Argaiz in regard to Cuban affairs led to his recall at the close of the year 1843. Minister Bravo at Madrid stated to Irving, the next spring, that Argaiz had been precipitate and indiscreet, causing rumors of armed intervention in Cuba, and awakening the jealousy of the British consul there. He acknowledged the patriotism of Argaiz, however, and his recall does not seem to have been due to British influence, but the affair and the circumstances connected with it caused some uneasiness at Washington. Upshur in a letter to Irving on January 9, 1844, thought that sleepless vigilance was necessary in watching over the interests of Spain in Cuba. He desired that Irving should impress the Spanish Government with the apprehension which the American Government had of a

crisis near at hand in the island, and to furnish the American Government with the views of Spain and with such information as he could obtain. Mr. Irving was asked to get accurate information of every move that England made in regard to Cuba. The mode of securing it was not defined, but it was suggested that it might be well for him to confer with some of the friends of Argaiz.

Irving had no fear that Spain would concede the control of Cuba to England. Minister Bravo seemed gratified at the apparent disposition of the United States to maintain Spain in possession there. On March 2, 1844, Irving wrote Secretary Upshur as follows: "I had taken occasion to have that frank and full conversation with Mr. Gonsalez Bravo, the present minister of foreign affairs, which the legation is instructed to hold with each succeeding Spanish Government. I was quickened to this by fresh reports of plots and insurrections in the island and by some surprise expressed in a ministerial paper at the avowal of Mr. Ingersoll in the United States House of Representatives of a readiness to go to war with England on the subject of Cuba.

* * * I am satisfied, however, from all that I can judge of the present tone of feeling of the actual cabinet and of the people at large, in respect to England, there is no danger of any views she may have in regard to the island of Cuba meeting with encouragement in this quarter. I do not apprehend any pecuniary pressure that would induce this government to concede to her a control over that island, indeed, any measure of the kind would be one of the most unpopular expedients the government could adopt, both from the jealousy of the public with regard to English interference of all kind, and from the sensitive pride of the Spaniards respecting the few, but precious relics, left of their once splendid American domain. This war talk, however, though furious for a time, has rather cooled for some days past, there being doubts of the safety of detaching a large military force to a distance under the command of ambi-

tious officers, lest it might produce another military revolution."

On April 23, Irving notified the Secretary of State that he had information of alarming affairs in Cuba. Valdes, under whom the slave trade had declined, was relieved of command, and in September, 1843, General Tavier de Ullox, commander-in-chief, had taken supreme authority until the coming of General O'Donnell. On November 12, 1843, O'Donnell arrived to take command, and contrary to all precedent, wore his hat while landing. This was considered a bad omen. He took prompt and energetic measures to put down insurrection, but under his *regime* slaves were admitted in great numbers. He received \$17 for each negro landed by the slavers. It was argued that there were not enough slaves born in Cuba to keep up the plantations, few women being imported. Under the excited condition the admission of so many males appeared hazardous, but Irving said that the rich capitalists expected to make a fortune and then desert the ship. Spain seemed to close her eyes to all danger. The recent partial insurrection left an impression of the general plan to strike a blow. Spain at that time had twenty thousand troops and a half dozen small vessels to protect Cuba. Spain herself was under martial law, and by May another ministerial crisis was apparent. In April, A. Calderon de la Barca was sent to the United States to represent the Spanish Government. He was told to inform himself of occurrences in Cuba by vessels from that island to Washington. The Spanish Government apparently imagined that Washington was a seaport town in frequent intercourse with Cuba. On May 24, Irving wrote to Washington that the minister of the Spanish treasury considered that the negro insurrection had been suffocated. He added: "It is almost useless, however, to agitate topics of the kind with these transient occupants of office who seldom have time or inclination to make themselves acquainted with the details of the department momentarily confided to their superintendency."

In 1844, the Cuban slave and poet, Concepcion Valdes, known also under the name of Placido, the illegitimate offspring of a negro and a rich creole lady, organized a general uprising of the blacks to occur at "bloody vespers" in April, 1845, but his plan was betrayed and before the end of 1844 he and his accomplices were tried and sentenced to be shot. O'Donnell, during the summer of 1844, made a careful investigation to learn the causes of the recent attempts to form a conspiracy against the Government. Turnbull, the recent English consul, and other Englishmen, were accused of having encouraged the abolitionists and of having instigated slaves to insurrection, with a design to overthrow the white government and open the way for England to "divide and conquer" the island. In the examination of negroes, testimony was extorted by lashes. O'Donnell was bitterly assailed by the newspapers, especially in England. Lord Aberdeen had informed Spain that England must use force, if necessary, to require the execution of the treaty of 1835 against the slave traders; that O'Donnell must continue the repression begun by his predecessors—and, that the horrible traffic should not be carried on by Spanish ships under the Spanish flag. The *Morning Advertiser* spoke of Cuba as an immense slaughter house (abattoir) flowing with human blood, which demanded mercy and vengeance from the entire world, and especially from England; and added, "It shall not be said that General O'Donnell will be able to continue to trample with impunity upon the negroes of Cuba with his bloody feet. If Spain cannot compel O'Donnell to do that which she hypocritically acknowledges that she desires, *we will do it for her*. Cuba shall no longer be a cursed Jehoshaphat in the midst of the civilized world." In the United States the feeling was not so strong against O'Donnell. Calhoun, Secretary of State, seems to have had a good opinion of him. The *Madisonian* said that while putting down the plot in Cuba he had been courteous and impartial toward the Americans. Niles's *Register* stated that he had tried to cultivate

relations of amity with the United States. Americans, who had been arrested for conniving in the plot for an insurrection, received a speedy trial and were set free after the guilt of some had been disproved.

Dr. F. Wurdiman, in a book entitled "Notes on Cuba," published in Boston in 1844, stated that it was evidently the policy of England to form around the southern shores of the United States a cordon of free negroes—and that her refusal to acknowledge the independence of Texas, so long as slaves were held there, was not guided by philanthropy alone. "But," said Wurdiman, "the nation whose grasping ambition and blood-stained conquests clearly demonstrate that the end ever justifies the means should not prate about freedom to the Southern slaveholder whose black subjects fare better than her own oppressed white laborers at home." He said that if all the slave population of Cuba was suddenly emancipated there could be no concord; that even if all the whites should be expelled, the mulatto would not submit to be ruled by the blacks; that the southern seas would swarm with pirates; that the final effect would be the subjugation of the island, and that the white man would again become the master of the negro. Spain felt the danger, and after the conspiracy trials she declined to admit foreign consuls in any but four of the Cuban ports—probably on account of the previous meddling of consuls in the internal affairs of Cuba. Cuban slaveholders looked to the United States for help in case England persisted in any policy to secure the emancipation of the slaves. Wurdiman said that the Anglo-Saxon emigrant with his restless spirit was taking up his abode in the island; that there was a constant and secret tide of liberal views flowing into Cuba's rising generation, and that the separation from Spain would result by the slow work of time. He thought that the condition of South America was a warning against any sudden change in the local government of Cuba.

The question of the annexation of Texas to the United States was an important one to England. It involved the question of disturbed relations with Mexico and Cuba, and an extended influence of slavery which tended to bear prejudicially on the English West Indies. Texas had prospered since the exciting administration of Andrew Jackson. After a romantic career, Sam Houston, starting to Texas with a bobtail pony and an old razor, had created a state in the wilderness, and had become its governor. In 1842, Mexico still vainly hoped to recover the land which had made itself independent in 1836. Houston and Santa Anna were carrying on a documentary war. Santa Anna said that Mexico would never surrender her right to Texas and would never desist from war until she "had planted her eagle standard on the banks of the Sabine." Houston's vigorous and emphatic reply was: "Ere the banner of Mexico shall triumphantly float on the banks of the Sabine, the Texan standard of the single star, borne by the Anglo-Saxon race, shall display its bright folds in liberty's triumph on the Isthmus of Darien." The Mexican navy had been destroyed by the French at Vera Cruz in 1838, but the Texan vessels were also out of repair, and the warfare between Mexico and Texas consisted principally in Mexican raids across the border and counter expeditions to prevent them. In October, 1842, Houston appealed to the United States, Great Britain and France to ask Mexico to stop the raids or to declare war properly. Lord Aberdeen offered to mediate with Mexico, but he refused to act jointly with the United States. A new source of jealousy had arisen with reference to the policy of England around the borders of the Gulf. The President, in his message of December, 1842, hoped for the non-interference of Europe in what related to the states of America. Three weeks later a resolution of the Senate asked the President for information as to whether the Quintuple treaty for the suppression of the slave trade had been communicated to the United States in any form, whether the attitude of the United States Govern-

ment had excited attention in Europe, and whether the "great political excitement in Europe," which was then being discussed, had reference to the United States—and also whether there was any danger that the obligations of the United States would be executed by others if our flag was allowed to be violated by slavers. Efforts for the annexation of Texas were revived in 1843 by the reports of friendly offers made by European powers. The attempt of the South to keep control of the Senate by the extension of the slave territory was inevitable. This meant the absorption of territory toward the south. The census of 1840 showed that the South was falling behind in the increase of population. The annexation of Texas was urged by some for the purpose of perpetuating slavery. It was expected that several states would be made out of it, and that the price of slaves would be increased. England saw that this would offer an advantage for the evasion of the African slave trade laws. Dr. Channing, of Boston, in a "Letter on the Annexation of Texas" to Henry Clay, said this gave England a moral interest in the question of Texas—and also a political interest, when the United States was girding the Gulf with slavery—that the jealousy of England was sanctioned by our own people, and that the annexation of Texas would be only the beginning of conquests which would never stop short of the isthmus unless arrested by Providence.

A letter of Congressman Gilmer, dated January 10, 1843, and published in a Baltimore newspaper, urged the immediate annexation of Texas as a preservation against England's ambitious designs, as well as for strengthening the Union. The slaveholders claimed to fear that the English Government was in league with the abolitionists of Mexico and Texas to secure the abolition of slavery in Texas. During the summer of 1843 a citizen of Maryland wrote from London that Mr. Andrews, the agent of the abolitionists of Texas, was in London negotiating with the British Government, and he considered it as a part of a general plan to

secure abolition in all the American continent, and islands, in order to advance English interests. With Texas as a refuge for fugitive slaves, the dangers of collision, invasion and war along the border were seen; and, whether the English ever had any such designs as were reported, the sentiment for annexation was increased by the report. At the same time, it was suggested that the occupation of Texas by the United States might provoke England to occupy Cuba. In 1842, United States citizens had joined a Texan expedition to Santa Fé. In the beginning of 1843, when the annexation of Texas was being urged, Murphy, the American chargé d'affaires, exceeded his instructions, in promising that United States troops would be stationed to ward off Mexican hostilities during the pending negotiations. Tyler disavowed it, and it was feared by some that this act would break off negotiations, as Jones, the Texan secretary of state, was a New Yorker, who had no feeling for annexation. Eliot, the English minister in Texas, was at this time (March) located at New Orleans, where he could communicate freely with Packenham, the British minister at Washington. It was seen by the leaders in Congress that in case Texas did not come to the United States she might place herself under the protection of England. President Tyler was advised, by Mr. Ingersoll, the chairman of the committee on foreign affairs in the House, to treat Mexico with every possible forbearance, but not to consider English wishes in the Texan matter—to treat it as an American affair, and to promptly repel England if she offered to interfere. Tyler agreed with Ingersoll and said that if the American policy as to Texas should provoke England to take Cuba he would strike her at once without even waiting for Congress. On March 25, 1843, ex-President Adams, had a long conversation of three hours' duration with Webster, in which the latter admitted that Lord Ashburton, in reply to a question of his, had thought that England would make no objection to a Mexican cession to the United States, which would include San Francisco. Adams said that England,

if allowed to take the line of the Columbia river for her southern boundary, would allow us to stretch southward at the expense of Mexico; and he was inclined to think that there was too much encroachment on Mexico because she was weak—too much insolence in the notes of the Secretary of State. He said in his diary: "When I contemplate the prospect before us my heart sinks within me for the cause of human freedom and for our own." Houston favored annexation and he wrote Jackson on February 16: "Texas is presented to the United States as a bride adorned for her espousals." He said that she had been sought by the United States, that she had three times consented, and that she could not postpone the desired union. Houston had an extravagant vision of Texas establishing another union, embracing Oregon and a part of Mexico, in case the nuptials with the United States were not soon celebrated.

In April, 1844, Tyler surprised the Senate of the United States by submitting a treaty of annexation. He said that Texas had asked it without any intrigues of the United States, and that, if we refused her, she might look elsewhere for alliance and trade, and that the circle of European possessions which surround us—including Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and the islands of the southern seas—might be completed by the addition of Texas to a foreign power. He saw no danger that might arise from the extension of the American system into other territories, and especially in the case of Texas, which was at our door, and was more important than territory along the far-off Columbia. During the negotiations, the attitude of Mexico caused the American Government, as a precautionary measure, to concentrate a considerable naval force in the Gulf of Mexico. This was a cause of inquiry by the Senate. The treaty was rejected June 5, 1844. Lord Aberdeen soon proposed to the Texas minister at London, that England, France, the United States, Texas and Mexico join in a diplomatic act to secure peace between Mexico and Texas, and to insure the permanent independence of Texas. France

agreed to join England in the offer and Houston asked his secretary of state to agree to it, but the secretary disobeyed. An armistice was soon agreed upon, however, through the mediation of the British minister—though war was liable to be renewed at any time. Public sentiment in the United States became more favorable to annexation. In August, 1844, during the presidential campaign, Calhoun, in a letter to the American minister in France, declared it to be the American policy to spread into unoccupied territory, increasing by accretion and assimilation and not by conquest. As he saw the population rolling to the West, he felt that it was the destiny of the Americans to occupy the land when it could be done without disturbing our neighbors. The election of Polk assured the annexation of Texas. In December, 1844, Tyler urged Congress to a policy of annexation and before his term closed a joint resolution was passed providing terms that Texas accepted. Many who had favored the annexation now became emboldened by their success in this bloodless achievement, and Cuba became an object of desire as a theatre of new exploits and as a means of further extending the slave territory.

CHAPTER VII.

PRESIDENT POLK'S POLICY—PROPOSALS FOR PURCHASE.

The right wing of Texas pointed to the Golden Gate and to the Pacific waves, and its rivers flowed towards Cuba and Yucatan. In 1845 the annexation of Cuba was widely discussed in the United States. A. H. Everett, in his "Miscellaneous Essays," published in that year, said: "The subject of Cuba will be brought, we fear, by the irresistible power of circumstances, but too frequently to the notice of the people of the United States." Vice-President Dallas at a public dinner in the same year toasted "the annexation of Cuba." In 1846 a popular movement for annexation began in the South. The slaveholders saw that by the acquisition of Cuba they might get control of the government and change the condition for the admission of new states. On December 22, 1845, Mr. Levy (alias Yulee) submitted to the Senate a resolution that it was advisable for the President to open negotiations with Spain for the cession of Cuba to the United States, the inhabitants of Cuba consenting. The project was strangled, and on December 27, Levy withdrew his resolution in deference to the desire of his associates—though he did not concur in the reasons which they urged against it. In February, 1846, Smith, of Illinois, offered a resolution that the committee on foreign affairs be instructed to inquire into the expediency of reporting a joint resolution directing the President to negotiate with Spain for the purchase of Cuba upon principles recommended in the proceedings of a meeting at Springfield, Illinois. Ex-President Adams wrote in his diary that these were "merely explosive effusions of the

spirit of aggrandizement" which had taken possession of the people, and he thought that it indicated that the North American continent and the West Indian Islands would, in no great distance of time, be only parts of a great confederated Anglo-Saxon republic.

No sword nor arm of force had yet been used to extend American territory when Polk began to weave the web of the Mexican war, but the rapid advance of American institutions had not failed to elicit the jealousy of Europe. The rapid extension of American settlement over unoccupied territory, the addition of new states to the Union, the spread of free principles, and the rising greatness of America as a nation, were attracting the attention of European powers. Guizot, who was at the head of the French ministry, in June, 1845, broached the doctrine of a "balance of power" on the American continent in order to preserve the American equilibrium. Polk, in his message of December, 1845, complained of the principle announced by the French historian and statesman. He said that the United States was sincerely desirous of preserving relations of good understanding with all nations, but he declared that she could "not in silence permit any European interference on the American continent," and that if such interference was attempted she would be ready to resist it at all hazards. Stating that the United States had not sought to enter into foreign alliances, to secure territory by conquest, nor to propagate her own ideas, he claimed that America should have exemption from European interference, and from the jealousies which had caused the doctrine of "balance of power." "The people of this continent," said he, "alone have the right to decide their own destiny," and he declared that if any independent state proposed annexation to the United States, we could not consent to any European interference. He reannounced the Monroe doctrine in the statement that "No future European colony or dominion shall, with our consent, be established on any part of the North American continent." When the echo of the President's

thunder reached Europe some thought that he was suffering from the delirium of national greatness, but M. Thiers, the French statesman, said that Polk had a right to complain of Guizot's recent enunciation, for that it was the true policy of France to favor the aggrandizement of the United States in America.

After the birth of Texas, while the South hoped for other fair daughters to smile beneath southern skies from the restless Caribbean to the gentle Pacific, the West desired a hardy son to stand warden along the banks of the far-off Columbia in Oregon's groves, where the energetic settlers from empire-making England threatened to plant their standards upon the lands already trodden by the large and certain foot of the American-institution extensionist. The theatre of conflict was soon open. Polk put on his gloves, adjusted the stage machinery and set the footlights burning. He excited the "eagle to flap his wings powerfully in the face of the British lion." He shook his mighty clenched fist towards England, but it was in the Southwest that he was preparing to strike a blow that would wrest fair daughters from the embrace of Mexico. Negotiations soon promised to settle difficulties with England by diplomatic means, but heavy war clouds, more and more, hung over the quicksands of the fickle Rio Grande. On May 14, 1846, Mr. Buchanan, President Polk's Secretary of State, in a letter to Mr. Irving, at Madrid, informing him of the proposed blockade of Mexican ports, said: "We go to war with Mexico solely for the purpose of conquering an honorable and permanent peace. While we intend to prosecute the war with vigor, both by land and sea, we shall bear the olive branch in one hand and the sword in the other, and whenever she will accept the former we will sheathe the latter." The olive branch which Slidell had borne to the Mexicans looked to them more like a highwayman's club than an emblem of peace, and the American sword was not sheathed. The storm began, which though it may have given rein to American vanity, resulted in

strengthening American unity and defense, in giving the United States connection with Asia by the harbor of San Francisco, and preventing the possibility of California falling out of the hands of weak Mexico and becoming a prey to other nations.

For several months Spain offered to mediate between the United States and Mexico. She saw that the war might produce some inconvenience to her in the Gulf of Mexico. The American Government had early instructed Campbell, the American consul in Cuba, to request, in accordance with the fourteenth article in the treaty of 1795, that no privateers be allowed to fit out from the ports of Cuba. Buchanan also asked Irving to see that the treaty obligations were enforced. On July 18, Irving replied that Isturiz would issue orders to prevent the fitting of privateers against the United States. In his conversation with the Spanish minister, Irving took occasion to disclaim "the unprincipled avidity of empire charged upon us by the British press."

The annexation of Texas, the war with Mexico, and the Spanish debts, might have given England a pretext to seize Cuba. England had been fighting or diplomatizing about Spain almost without intermission since the beginning of the century. Her people continually had their attention invited toward that country by its internal broils and frequent political changes, and the moneyed and commercial classes had their attention directed to it by the fluctuations and speculations in what had been facetiously called Spanish "securities." While the energetic knocks of England upon the front door of the hungry Spanish treasury brought only an uncertain hollow response, and while Mexican affairs were engaging the attention of the United States, was there not danger of England grasping an opportunity to seize Cuba, the source of Spanish revenue? In the latter part of 1846 Senator Yulee received information, from a person whom he considered to be well informed, that Spain was in danger of exchanging Cuba

for Gibraltar. Yulee brought the letter of his correspondent to the attention of Secretary Buchanan. On December 7, Buchanan sent the views of the correspondent to Saunders, the new United States minister at Madrid. He thought that the views might prove useful to him, but it seemed to Buchanan that Spain could hardly offer any inducement to Great Britain to relinquish Gibraltar. Shortly after this, there were newspaper articles concerning the rumor of a project to revolutionize Cuba, and annex it to the United States. In February, 1847, Buchanan was considering the question of Cuba while preparing his instructions to Saunders.

The attention of the American Government was further called to the Anglo-Spanish relations by the discussion of the Spanish debt in the British Parliament. The foreign debt of Spain in 1842 was sixty-five million pounds. Since that time her expenditures had exceeded her income, and she had not paid the interest on her foreign debt. Forty-six millions of the debt were due to England, and there had been no interest paid for a long time. Lord George Bentwick, on July 7, 1847, in the British House of Commons, intimated that Spain should be forced to pay by war. He significantly referred to the revenues of Cuba, and said that Spain was amply able to pay. Palmerston, in replying for the Government, said that war was not expedient at that time, but that Parliament would not be patient forever. He also referred to the debts of South America and the United States. He hoped that South America would cease settling her disputes by the cartridge-box and that she might be able to pay her debts. He thought that the United States ought to be in a condition to pay. A few days after his speech Bentwick wrote a letter to his constituency (July 13) in which he said that if Lord Palmerston failed or procrastinated in procuring redress for the holders of Spanish bonds, he would again bring the matter before the House of Commons, but he thought that Lord Palmerston's heart was with "the British creditors of foreign repudiating and

non-paying states." In case Palmerston should fail, Bentwick, his political opponent, was ready to "neither flatter, flinch, deceive, desert or betray." He said: "Will the people of England be content any longer to look quietly on Cuba and Porto Rico producing in value upwards of ten million sterling of produce annually, on the one side, and on the unpaid debt of forty-six millions due by Spain to British subjects, on the other side; Cuba and Porto Rico, once so rich and so easy a prize, and forbear longer to restrain on the goods of their wealthy, their faithless, their unprincipled Spanish debtors?" Something must be allowed for the fact that Bentwick was endeavoring to secure a victory on the hustings.

The speeches of Palmerston and Bentwick aroused considerable comment in the United States. The Philadelphia *North American Gazette* thought that England wanted to appropriate some more territory. It stated that the doctrine of the Spanish debts being a *casus belli* did not appear so extraordinary after the Chinese war, which England had waged in advocacy of the right to compel 200,000,000 Asiatics to eat poison. Niles's *Register* in discussing the subject said that for England to take Cuba would no doubt produce war with the United States. It stated that the slaveholders of Cuba had signified their preference for annexation to the United States, and that the annexation of Texas had increased the necessity of protecting the slave interests from the example and policy of England. It also mentioned the increased love for acquisition and military renown in the United States, which, in case of war with England, would cause Americans to occupy Cuba on the earliest pretexts, but was willing that both nations should keep their hands off.

Since 1840 many Americans had settled in Cuba, and after 1845 there were various expressions of the possibility of American influence replacing British influence there. In 1779 the Spanish Government had authorized American merchants, in times of scarcity in Cuba, to receive specie

for produce. The ancient laws against the establishment of foreigners in Cuba were not enforced. The fact that Americans were exempt from taxes which Spanish subjects had to pay drew many settlers from the United States, and the advantage to Cuba was seen in agriculture, railways and other improvements. In 1849, Mr. Madden, in a book which was afterwards published in London, stated that Cuba had been slowly but steadily becoming Americanized, and that the feeling in favor of independence had recently been changed into a desire for connection with the United States. He said: "It is to America that they now turn their eyes, and America takes good care to respond to the wishes that are secretly expressed." But he admitted that the American Government took no official steps in hastening the incorporation into the United States. It seems to have been the policy of Southern congressmen who favored the purchase of Cuba to secure it by quiet negotiations, and not to agitate the question by spirited debates beforehand. Senator Yulee was not so discreet, and his proposals had been met with derision. In Louisiana there would have been much opposition to annexation, upon the ground that Cuban sugar would ruin the sugar interests of that state. Several Northern papers advertised the Cuban sentiment in favor of annexation, and *Nile's Register* was led to say that the "appetite for new territory would seem but to increase with its indulgence." The *New York Sun* of the latter part of July, 1847, in an editorial on "Cuba under the Flag of the United States" said that Mexico, to all intents and purposes, being now in possession of the United States we would soon have a chance to take Cuba. He had recently been travelling in Cuba and claimed to have discovered while at Havana, that the Cubans were in love with the United States, that Spain would sell, and that Cuba would pay us the price in a week after the purchase. The editorial said: "When in Havana last winter we had a consultation with a meeting of the most influential and wealthy of that city upon the union of Cuba to the United States,

and promised to lay the matter before the people of this country as soon as the Mexican question had been disposed of. * * * Cuba by geographical position, necessity, and right belongs to the United States; it may and must be ours. * * * Cuba is in the market for sale, and we are authorized, by parties eminently able to fulfil what they propose, to say that if the United States will offer Spain 100 million dollars Cuba is ours, and that with one week's notice the whole amount will be raised and paid over by the inhabitants of the island * * * this is no vision, but a fixed fact, of which we have * * * proofs. The possession of Cuba will complete our chain of territory, and give us the North American continent." The *Sun*, after darting its rays upon Cuba, also illumined with a flood of light the mountains and valleys of Mexico, and stated that the Mexicans were dying with unrequited love for the United States. The New Orleans *Bee* took occasion to buzz around the *Sun* in a way to make its editor feel uncomfortable. In commenting upon the illuminating editorial, it suggested that it seemed curious that the "blissful revelation as to Cuba" had not been made to other travellers in that island, and to the Americans living there. The *Bee* prefaced its remarks by stating that the *Sun* had recently shown a disposition to gull the people, by publishing the statement that the Falls of Niagara had given away, and now, that it was trying to warm the inanimate nursling of Mr. Yulee into existence.

The *Pennsylvanian*, a paper which was supposed to speak with almost as much authority as the Washington *Union*, in referring to the hints that the Cubans were disposed to have their island attached to the United States, said: "We ourselves conversed last winter with a rich planter at St. Jago who declared to us that the reports of the feeling on the part of his countrymen were well founded; that in the vicinity of his home, a majority of the planters favored such a disposition of the island as should speedily bring it

within the control and under the protection of our institutions."

During the closing hours of the Mexican war, Yucatan with its degenerate white population was reaching out its hand to the United States. Its position, extending toward Cuba, and lying on the route from the Gulf of Mexico to Central America, made its destiny more a matter of concern in the United States, and its annexation a subject of discussion. It had had a checkered career, playing fast and loose with Mexico, and trying to lead a double life. It had been an integral part of Mexico from 1821. It was a province until 1825, and then a part of the Federal Government. It separated from the Federal Government, however, in 1829-32. In 1834 Santa Anna commenced the ruin of the federal system, which he accomplished in 1836. His odious conscription in 1839, produced an uprising in that year and another one in 1841 which resulted in the separation of Yucatan. In 1843, Yucatan was overcome, but on January 1, 1846, she again resumed her sovereignty, on account of the violation by Santa Anna of the convention of 1843. Mexico tried to induce Yucatan to assist her in the war against the United States, but she deemed it to her interest not to do so. A part of Laguna, however, was occupied by United States naval forces during the war, and heavy duties were imposed upon trade. Yucatan complained and said that she had been neutral. In December, 1847, Secretary Buchanan replied that Yucatan was still considered a part of Mexico, and had, therefore, been at war with the United States. Laguna was not surrendered until the close of the war, but a disposition was shown to stop the imposts. In February, 1848, Yucatan complained to the United States of the establishment of the British colony of Belise upon its territory, and stated that some of the Yucanese wanted to submit to Great Britain. In March and April following, internal troubles in Yucatan caused the Government to ask help of the United States, England and France. On April 3, the Government appealed to the United States for inter-

vention. Under these circumstances President Polk sent a message to Congress in which he told of the offer of Yucatan to transfer its sovereignty to the United States. While he did not recommend the acceptance of the offer, he said it was our policy not to consent to the transfer of Yucatan to any other power. He advised such measures as would seem expedient to prevent Yucatan from becoming a colony of any European power. After quoting the Monroe doctrine, he proceeded to show that Yucatan was a territory to which the doctrine should be applied. "It is situate in the Gulf of Mexico," said he, "on the North American continent; and from its vicinity to Cuba, the Capes of Florida, to New Orleans, and indeed to our whole southwestern coast, it would be dangerous to our peace and security if it should become the colony of any foreign nation." Mr. Polk's message stirred up considerable talk in Congress, and the discussion was closely connected with the Cuban question. Mr. Stevens, of Georgia, and others doubted the constitutional powers of the United States Government to render assistance such as Yucatan asked. Stevens said: "Suppose the Spanish whites of Yucatan should offer to sell out their country for protection. Could the United States accept? Mr. Ingersoll was in sympathy with the Yucanese offer. Mr. Root said that Ingersoll's sympathy might prove to be for the aristocracy of Yucatan, and not for the democracy. Root favored letting Yucatan take care of itself—unless we were ready to take up the cause of the weaker party in all countries—and he thought that the administration was not going on a crusade of pure humanity to save the Yucanese from slaughter, unless it had hopes of grabbing up the country. Mr. Hannegan, of Indiana, favored a bill to enable Polk to take military occupation of Yucatan, and he spoke of England "hastening with race-horse speed to seize the Isthmus, Honduras, and Yucatan * * " "Let her get Yucatan and what would be the effect on Southern interests? Look to the map and see that Yucatan shakes hands almost with Cuba; let her then obtain Yucatan, and

he had no more doubt that she would get possession of Cuba than that the trees would sprout and the flowers blossom in the spring; indeed, at this very hour they had possession of information that England was endeavoring to obtain that fertile island, and that once effected, the Gulf of Mexico would become a *mare clausum*. Cuba was said to be the key, and with Yucatan she would have both lock and key, and control the whole outlet of the vast Mississippi; and were they to fold their arms quietly and see Yucatan and Cuba fall into the arms of England." Mr. Clayton asked Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, if, in case of a rise of the negroes against the whites in Cuba, in which England, at the invitation of the whites to aid them, should give assistance and take military possession of Cuba, whether he would be ready to make war on England. Davis said "Yes," and he thought that the President could take possession of Yucatan on the ground of our war with Mexico. Senator Houston favored aiding Yucatan against the Indians; and he cited, as a precedent, the views of the United States, in 1825, on the supposed intention of Mexico to make an attack on Cuba. Concerning England, Cass said: "If she lays the Lion's paw on Yucatan it will be difficult to displace her." He thought that the Gulf of Mexico would become a *mare clausum*, but that it should be under American control in order to protect the great artery "of a boundless and extending West," and so we could close it in case of war. He said that we could not allow England to have Cuba; that we would resist it to the last, and he hoped that Spain would see it to her interest to dispose of the island by purchase. He stated, however, that since Bentwick's speech in the Commons, there had been a change in the opinion of British statesmen as to the abolition of slavery, and that nothing was to be feared from the interference of England in our institutions. Miller said that political capital had been made out of the cry about English interference in Texas and California. He saw no evidence of danger in that direction, Calhoun saw no evidence of English interference in Yuca-

tan, and said that Polk had stretched the Monroe doctrine beyond what Monroe intended. He declared that Yucatan was worthless, and had no ports—and that he would not resist England if she attempted to relieve the Government there. In the case of Cuba, however, he said that he would be willing to interfere—that it, like Texas, must pass to us if Spain should let loose. By May 17, the internal disputes in Yucatan had been settled and the senators under the dome of the Capitol were not sorry. But the Southern senators, and some others, were not ready to give up hope of getting Cuba.

As soon as the struggle with Mexico was closed, Polk, ready to accept more land, undertook to annex Cuba. On May 30, 1848, at the beginning of a new presidential canvass, and even before the ratification of peace with Mexico, he brought the subject before the Cabinet, and favored a "fair purchase." Walker and Mason of the Cabinet favored the plan, but Buchanan objected on the ground that it would be a fire-brand in the presidential canvass. It was understood, however, that Cass was willing to risk his chances on the issue. On June 6, Polk brought the subject before the Cabinet again. A day or so later, news of the peace with Mexico arrived. The Cubans at this time were said to be ready for an insurrection, and it was uncertain when war on the island might begin. Anglo-Spanish relations were in a serious tangle. On May 17, Bulwer, the English minister, was ordered to quit Spain in forty-eight hours. General Quitman wanted to sail from Mexico with a force of United States volunteers on a filibustering expedition. President Polk would not grant permission for such an expedition. He used means to prevent the violation of neutrality and stated that an unsuccessful uprising could only delay, and perhaps defeat annexation. He proposed to let Spain know that we were willing to buy Cuba, and the Cabinet unanimously agreed. Spanish commercial restrictions were strongly felt at this time. The Spanish Government had recently decreed that articles shipped to Cuba in

foreign vessels, and then from Cuba to Spain in Spanish vessels would be subject to the same duties as if imported from the place of production direct to Spain in foreign vessels. This decree prevented the carrying of cotton to Cuba in American vessels. The duty on American flour imported into Cuba was \$9.50 per barrel if sent in American vessels, and only \$2.00 per barrel if sent in Spanish vessels. The Cubans themselves desired a reduction on this duty, and in June Buchanan instructed Saunders at Madrid to use his efforts to secure the reduction.

While the annexation of Cuba would probably have given some beneficial results, particularly to the South, there would have been disadvantages to the Union, from the fact that it was a Spanish island with a Spanish and colored population. Polk was a man of oral confidence. He and Buchanan preferred to wrap the negotiations with Spain, as to Cuba, in secrecy and mystery, and take the people unawares—in order that success might be more certain. They preferred to keep their cards to themselves until the game was played. Polk's instructions to Saunders were "profoundly confidential." They were written June 17, 1848, but they were held back from the clerks, and not received for record until February 25, 1849. In his instructions, Polk told Saunders to begin his negotiations by a confidential conversation concerning the distractions in Cuba, the good faith of the United States, and the danger from Great Britain. He told him to avoid any absolute refusal in writing which might embarrass the United States hereafter in acquiring Cuba, and also suggested that on account of the situation in the Spanish Cabinet, and of relations with foreign governments it was probably better to avoid record in the Cuban negotiations.

The advance of England into Central America was mentioned as a reason why the United States should be anxious as to the fate of Cuba. If this was a cold, unfeeling, unfriendly world, and a vale of tears, it was no reason why it should all be handed over to the corporations and the Eng-

lish. England, tempted by the weakness of the Central American States, was trying to get the Caribbean coast south of Cape Honduras. She was doing this while claiming the right to protect the Mosquito Indians. Polk declared it was in opposition to her treaty of 1786 with Spain, in which she had agreed to evacuate the Mosquito country. In 1783-6, Spain had given England the privilege of getting logwood within certain limits, and under this permission she had established Balise. Polk stated that she desired to get control over the communication between the Atlantic and Pacific by the Lake Nicaragua route. Balise was only 200 miles from Cuba, and Polk suggested that England's next step might be to place at her mercy the American commerce on the Caribbean. He also called the attention of Saunders to the recent speeches in the English Parliament which indicated that England might soon take advantage of her relations with Spain, and seize upon Cuba. It seemed to him that a rupture between England and Spain was already impending. Spain had sent Sir Henry Bulwer, the British ambassador at Madrid, his passports to leave in forty-eight hours. If hostilities should result Polk feared that England would seize Cuba at once, and he thought that she would anyhow take the first opportunity to obtain possession. He said that England knew that the value of her West Indies would decrease if the United States should get Cuba. In his instructions to Mr. Saunders, Buchanan took pains to state that the United States had used proper means to preserve neutrality in regard to Cuba, and that she was still willing that Spain should keep the colony; but he restated the policy of the United States to allow it to pass under the dominion of no other European power. He urged that in the hands of England it would ruin the American domestic and foreign commerce, and endanger the union of the states. By its possession England would be able to control the Gulf, thus injuring not only the commerce of the West, but also the coast trade to New Orleans. He thought that it was the British policy to get every com-

mercial point by which she should control the advance of her competitors in commerce, and this was a reason for the acquisition of Cuba by the United States. Buchanan said that the cession of the island would be beneficial to the United States in various ways: (1) It would relieve her of apprehensions concerning England. (2) It would command the outlet between Florida and Cuba. (3) It would furnish a large revenue, which would increase with the advance of the population and the development of the country. (4) It would furnish a field for strengthening the Union by the extension of the federal system of government. He also declared that it would pay Spain to sell. He claimed that the United States had never had any agency in exciting this question among the Cubans, but, that the Creoles hated Spanish dominion and were liable to start an insurrection at any time, and the Cubans appreciating the advantages of trade, which would follow annexation, were ready to rush into our arms.

When Saunders received Buchanan's instructions he realized that there were many difficulties at the threshold of his undertaking. The Queen-Mother had interests in Cuba and a great influence over her daughter. It seemed that she would have to be paid for any loss which she might sustain by cession of Cuba. Saunders arranged for a conference with General Narvaez, President of the Council. In the conversation, he gradually led up to the subject of cession by mentioning (1) the threatened insurrection at Havana and the American instructions to the consul to avoid any conduct which would favor the insurgents; (2) Buchanan's order to Major-General Butler to prevent volunteers from stopping at Cuba on their road home from Mexico; (3) the American interests in Cuba on account of questions connected with slavery, and the American alarm on account of the probable English policy. He then stated that he had a special commission to treat on the subject of Cuba. He did not use the word "cession," and perhaps Narvaez, who seemed pleased with the conference, thought

that he referred to the "security" of Cuba. After this first interview Saunders thought it was better to let the subject rest awhile. He was convinced that nothing but the fear of a successful revolution, or of the seizure of Cuba by England, would induce Spain to part with it. In writing Buchanan an account of his conference, he suggested that the American guarantee of 1840, to aid Spain in case Cuba was threatened, had made Spain feel too secure in that quarter; and that it might be well for the United States to say that England had been neutral in the Mexican War, and that the United States would not feel like being otherwise than neutral in case of a war between Spain and England. He said that whatever might be our secret resolutions—not to allow England to have Cuba—indefinite language to Spain might have a good effect. In August, Saunders decided to renew his efforts to sound the Spanish Government. On August 15, he had an interview with the minister of foreign affairs. The minister asked him whether he proposed to treat for the cession of Cuba, or for its security to Spain; and, in case of difficulty with England whether Spain could rely upon the United States for aid. Saunders replied that it was the fear that the Spanish difficulty with England might result in the British seizure of Cuba, which had caused the President to give him special authority to negotiate concerning Cuba. He intimated that the United States Government did not desire to adopt any policy which would embarrass it as a neutral, and he said that the United States would prefer to purchase Cuba rather than to involve herself in war with England. The Spanish minister could assure him of no prospect for a cession of Cuba at that time, but he promised to inform him in case anything occurred to change the situation.

Notwithstanding the intended secrecy of the negotiations at Madrid, there was a leak somewhere. A Madrid letter in the *New York Herald* of October 20, referred to negotiations which were probably pending for the cession of Cuba to the United States. The letter was copied in European

papers, and a number of articles in Spanish papers gave Saunders a knowledge of the state of the Spanish popular pulse as to Cuba. He was satisfied that the Government could not venture upon the policy of ceding it. He informed the Spanish minister that he had not been the source of the leak. The minister replied that he supposed that it was a trick of the newspaper editors; but he was annoyed, and said that the publication was calculated to produce a bad effect on the colonies. To the public he denied that there had been any negotiations.

In December, Saunders was persuaded to try again. He was not satisfied with certain articles which had been published in the New York *Herald* accusing him of not pressing the negotiations with sufficient energy. In order to vindicate himself he had another conference with the Spanish minister and informed him that recent publications produced the impression in the United States that Spain might be induced to sell Cuba. The Spanish minister, desiring to have it publicly understood that the United States had made no direct offer, told Saunders that he did not understand that the latter had any instructions to make a direct proposal for cession, and that he wished the matter to stand in that condition. Saunders replied that he simply desired to know whether liberal terms would induce Spain to part with Cuba. The minister did not dare take the proposal, though Saunders said he appreciated the motive. He believed that the Spanish people felt that "sooner than see the island transferred to any power they would prefer to see it sunk in the ocean." On December 14, Saunders wrote Buchanan that he thought a direct proposal would have met with a flat refusal, and that he was anxious to close his mission and return home.

At this time there were new sources of friction with Cuba. During the year 1848, it seems that many letters, newspapers and even caricatures reflecting upon Spanish rule had been introduced into Cuba by the captains and passengers of American vessels. Spain was violently opposed

to having herself thus photographed and sketched; and the Spanish consuls in the United States, in 1848, were asked to warn the captains of vessels against the free distribution which had been practiced. Mr. Bush, the steward of the American vessel *Childe Harold*, was imprisoned in Cuba charged with the delivery of packages of papers calculated to create an insurrectionary spirit. The United States consul, R. B. Campbell, could not obtain his release, and he protested to the Count of Alcoy, the governor and captain-general, stating that he would have to leave the affair to the discretion of the United States Government. Bush had been imprisoned under the charge of *infidencia* (treason), and it was objected that this charge could not be sustained against any except Spanish citizens. The captain-general allowed the United States consul to see Bush, and he also gave official answers to his letters—but he reminded him that he went beyond his powers in thus having official communication with the commercial agent of the United States. The imprisonment of Bush became a subject of inquiry in the American Senate.

The newspaper despatches from Madrid attracted the attention of the people of the United States, and there was a feeling that they should know what thoughts had been harbored in the White House and carried under lock and key to the American legation at Madrid. In December, Miller, of New Jersey, in the Senate, offered a resolution that the President be instructed to inform that body whether any negotiations or correspondence had taken place between the United States and Spain as to the purchase of Cuba, and to request that he communicate copies of any correspondence on the subject. Berrien, of Georgia, suggested that the resolution should be transferred to executive session, and said that he did not believe such negotiations were pending. Miller replied that he merely desired to satisfy the public mind which had been excited by the rumor that the President had opened negotiations without giving any intimation to the country. On January 5, 1849,

Miller's resolution was called up, and it immediately met opposition. Rusk, who tried to shut out debate by moving to lay the motion on the table, said that he did not think that any negotiations or correspondence had been entered into—that the newspaper reports were only vague rumors. Miller replied that if there had been negotiations the country should know it before the object was consummated, and he announced his purpose to oppose the consummation. Senator Foote, of Mississippi, informed Miller that he would find himself in an awkward position within less than four months if he intended to oppose the annexation of Cuba, for, that the President-elect had declared himself in favor of it. The Miller resolution was tabled by a vote of 23 to 19. If any of the administration senators knew the secrets of the White House, they had no desire to divulge them. The instructions of Buchanan to Saunders were not even handed to the clerks at the State Department to place on the records for over a month after this debate, and none of the correspondence was divulged to the public until nearly four years thereafter.

The *Washington Union*, the official organ of Polk's administration, stated that if there had been no effort to discover the Spanish views upon the cession of Cuba there should be an attempt at once. The disclaimer of the Spanish minister, which stated that he had never considered that any negotiations had taken place, led the *Union* to say that in case there was danger of England pouncing upon Cuba and closing the mighty artery of the West we would be willing to sound Spain and know on what terms we could obtain the island. The secretary of the British legation at Washington (Reynolds) did not deny that England had thoughts of getting Cuba. He had even said that after having examined the Fortress of Gibraltar, and having obtained other rare and valuable information, he thought that the rumors of an exchange of Gibraltar for Cuba should receive particular attention. The *Union* said that the United States claimed the right to guard its own destiny, and that it

could not allow foreigners to place their watch towers in a commanding position by which they could shape according to their own pleasure the future history of America. In June, 1849, Clayton, Secretary of State, wrote to Bancroft, the American minister at London, that the American Government had received information that British commissioners had been sent to the Dominican republic to get a cession of the Bay of Samana. Bancroft was asked to obtain information concerning this report, and instructed that even if it was only contemplated, to inquire of Lord Palmerston concerning the intentions of the British Government in making the acquisition. It was evident at this time that the United States desired to keep England from St. Domingo and Hawaii as well as from Cuba.

Events were occurring to increase the watch which the United States kept over Cuba and the Caribbean shores. In 1827, Goethe, while he was hoping that the Danube and the Rhine might be joined, and that England might some day control a canal through the Isthmus of Suez, said that he also longed to see the United States people the Rockies and effect a passage from the Mexican Gulf to the Pacific. The stern hand of historic necessity pointed to the realization of the poet's dream. Fresh breezes were blowing from Western states to fan the institutions of the East. The bonds of commerce were more and more binding the West to the East. At the corner of Lake Michigan was growing up a great city to feel the pulse and minister to the needs of an advancing West—as well as of an older East, that still contributed many sons of toil to swell the throng of pioneers beyond the Mississippi. Emigration never stopped. The moving stream of life flowed on, propelled by an everlasting desire to get bread and to get married. The majestic tread of civilization was advancing toward the Pacific. Learning and labor walked together arm in arm. During the hot days of August, 1847, while Scott was pushing his way toward the Mexican capital, the stream of people was

flowing from the East to Wisconsin, and to the valleys of the Mississippi system. Many were also still leaving Europe to seek homes in a new land. The newspapers announced that day after day the train of the Buffalo and Niagara Falls Railway, stretching to the length of a monstrous serpent and filled so full of German emigrants that it seemed like cruelty to compel a single engine to drag such enormous loads in hot weather, came into Buffalo and unloaded its passengers, who were soon on their way across Lake Erie to the still farther West. Population was rolling so restlessly and so swiftly toward the West that McDuffie, of South Carolina, feared that the unbridled rush into the wilderness would lead to semi-barbarism. He thought it ludicrous that Oregon should ever become a state of the Union. A bridge over the difficulty was suggested, however, in 1845, when A. C. Whitney laid before Congress the project of a railroad to Oregon.

After the Mexican war, when the blue Pacific became our boundary, and when gold was discovered in California, a mighty flood of the world's adventurers, seeking new homes, found their way to the western slopes of the Rockies and gave an impulse towards seeking a better communication. Soon, four thousand persons were at Sacramento, and the silent valley had been transformed into a small city with the discordant music and wild rioting of a mining camp. The people came from Mexico, the Sandwich islands, Australia, and Europe as well as from America. When the potato crop failed in Ireland many of the sons and daughters of Erin came to New England shops to take the places of those who had gone to dig among California rocks. The crusaders' blood was wild with delirium for the golden fleece. There was a mad rush to Panama and to San Francisco. Boats were crowded. Many went by a seven months' voyage around Cape Horn. Across the great plain others pursued their way, sometimes subsisting upon the flesh of mules and rattlesnakes. The new republic of California rose as though from the ocean foam.

The events which followed the discovery of gold in California revived the dreams of the early explorers to find a shorter route across the continent. Plans for a canal across some part of Central America had been considered by Spain several times between 1528 and 1550, and also at subsequent dates. In 1698, an English company with 1200 men sailed to the isthmus to begin the construction of a canal, but Spain sent an expedition to prevent the enterprise. The Spanish Cortes in 1814 decreed that the canal should be built, but the revolt and liberation of the Spanish colonies prevented any attempt at its execution. Between 1825 and 1850, the attention of the Government of the United States had been called to consider the feasibility of constructing a canal through Central America. A railway was finally built, but the canal project was not abandoned. From 1850 to the opening of the Civil War several surveys were made under the direction of the United States Government and several canal companies were organized, but no further steps were taken until Grant became President of the United States.

From the days of the English buccaneers the English had been befriended by the Mosquito Indians who held the land along the north coast of Nicaragua. Many English adventurers had taken residence there and selected wives among the natives. In 1848, shortly after the United States had obtained California, Great Britain established a protectorate over the Mosquitos and forced Nicaragua to recognize their independence. At the same time by seizing San Juan (Greytown) and Tigre Island she held the keys of the isthmus in her hands. In making his protest, Buchanan, on June 3, 1848, in a letter to Mr. Hise, the chargé d'affaires to Central America, said: "The independence as well as the interests of the nations on this continent require that they should maintain an American system of policy entirely distinct from that which prevails in Europe. To suffer any interference on the part of the European governments with the domestic concerns of the American republic, or to per-

mit them to establish new colonies upon this continent, would be to jeopardize their independence and ruin their interests." But this matter was finally adjusted by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of April 19, 1850, which provided that neither England nor the United States should ever have exclusive control over a canal in Central America, nor have fortifications there, nor attempt to colonize or exercise dominion over any part of Central America, nor use any influence to secure for one nation any commercial rights which were not also offered to the other nation. The treaty also guaranteed the neutrality of the canal.

The plans for a route across Central America made Cuba of still greater importance to the United States. The rapid development of California and its admission as a free state caused slavery to seek acquisition in which to perpetuate itself. Some men like Governor Quitman, who had been angry at President Polk because he did not end the Mexican War by incorporating all of that republic with the United States, now kept their mind on Cuba and dreamed of a future Southern Confederacy. A book, entitled "Cuba and the Cubans," which was published in 1850, said that Cuba would soon be free, and, if without the influence or aid of the United States, she should fall to England. The author spoke of the unmatched position of Cuba "as the warder of the Mexican Gulf and the guardian of the communication of the Pacific;" and he said that whenever she should break the chains, the United States could no more say to her that she was naught to us, than Cuba could detach herself from her anchorage in her portals of the American sea or her guardianship over against the entrance of the thousand-armed Mississippi. In speaking of the necessity of preventing England from getting Cuba with its mighty fortress, he said that its position overawed all the other islands, watched the isthmus routes to the Pacific, guarded the portals of the Gulf, was the reservoir of the Mexican and the Mississippi trade, the rendezvous of the California traffic and the outlet of a new-born mineral wealth which would

control the mineral market of Christendom. In referring to the threats of the captain-general to emancipate and arm the slaves in case of an insurrection by the Cubans the author stated that the best way out of the difficulty was for the United States to buy Cuba of Spain.

At the close of Polk's administration there appears to have been a widespread feeling that fair Cuba would soon be willingly nestling in the strong arms of her ambitious and energetic American admirer. An article in *Blackwood's Magazine* said that England had set some bad precedents for the United States, and that she herself was now threatened with the loss of her West Indian possessions. Mr. Madden, an Englishman, who had been well acquainted with the affairs of Cuba, said in 1849, that there was a desire in Cuba to link the fortunes of the island to the United States in order to protect slavery interests, and that the annexation of Cuba would follow unless slavery should be broken down there, and the renewal of the Texan game by the United States be prevented. The United States did not have the *casus belli* that England had, in case she had desired to take Cuba by war. She had no broken treaty with Spain on the slave trade. Robert Baird, an Englishman, who wrote his impressions of the West Indies in 1849, said that he was undecided whether the American Government would act wisely in possessing herself of Cuba, and whether the Spanish debt to England would entitle England to prevent it; but he said that a cession of Cuba to England could not be expected, and that its possession by a nation which was nearer in blood than any other nation on earth might not prove to be objectionable. The American Government had stopped the slave trade, and the acquisition of Cuba by the United States might accelerate the abolition of slavery. He was at least satisfied that the loss of Cuba would be a just retribution to Spain, and that its possession by the enterprising Americans would make it a "better customer of England." Those in the United States who still favored the acquisition of Cuba suggested many advantages which

would follow. It would give neighbors facility for changing climate; it would give us the military key to the Gulf; it would add to the security of slavery in the Southern states. The commercial advantages were also strongly urged. Cuba was spoken of as a "point of intersection for all the most important lines of trade and travel on the continent," and it was said that we only required this one link in order to belt five thousand miles of seaboard in close commercial unity. The high duties on flour at Cuban ports were a source of much irritation. A writer in *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine* for November, 1849, in speaking of Cuba, declared that Spain's policy "to inhospitably bar her gates with a chain of duties and formalities, put serious delays and expenses in the way of a rapid and profitable exchange of benefits between opposite sections of the Union and between the Union and her neighbors." The writer said: "Whenever the trembling, restless seal of the Gulf drops from the nerveless finger of Spain, there will be some envy in Europe, but little open resistance to its passing into the grasp of our Eagle; and, if he assumes the charge, Europe will retire from this continent, and thenceforth, on all our coasts we will ask nothing but our steam marine, and the splendor of our flag to command the respect of the world for our commerce."

Notwithstanding the agitation in favor of the annexation of Cuba, the administration which followed that of Polk did not desire to renew the proposition for purchase. It desired to secure an abolition of discriminating duties on American commerce, and hoped that Spain could pay the debt of \$600,000, concerning which there had been so much trouble and inconvenience as to the interest, but it considered that any proposition as to cession of Cuba should come from Spain instead of from the United States. It was seen, however, that other questions might lead to a discussion or reference as to the Cuban question. Secretary Clayton in his instructions of August 2, 1849, to Barringer, the new minister to Spain, in regard to Cuba, said: "On this exciting subject the President does not think that any *particular*

instructions are proper or necessary, and he would therefore avoid them. * * * The President cannot comprehend or appreciate the motives or expediency of openly declaring to Spain that the whole power of the United States would be employed to prevent the occupation in whole or in part of Cuba, from passing into other hands; because he has reason to believe that this declaration on our part has led to *counter declarations* being made to Spain against us, of a similar character, by other interested powers." The new government was still resolutely determined in the traditional policy, and believed that the news of a cession of Cuba to a foreign power would be an instant signal for war, but it did not desire to utter threats or to enter into any guarantees with Spain on this subject.

CHAPTER VIII.

FILIBUSTERING, THE PROPOSED TRIPARTITE TREATY, AND "MANIFEST DESTINY."

After the failure of Polk to purchase Cuba, there were some Americans who, losing sight of the principle of American institutions, were ready to enter upon a career of propagandism and territorial acquisition—to give length of line and plenty of play to the passion for more land. These men were found especially in the South where the interests of slavery and the accompanying extensive system of cultivation constantly needed new areas. In 1850, Senator Hale asked a Southern friend of his what the South would be satisfied with. He replied, "If we can have California for slave territory, with all the rest of it and then take Cuba, we would be satisfied for a little while, but not long." Concession to the slave interests only created new demands for more concession. Many in the West with a passion for notoriety looked upon Cuba as an arena where they could gratify their appetite for excitement. Still others, seeing Cuba drifting from Spain, and contemplating that they were born under lucky stars and lived under the law of territorial extension, were impatient with the laws of nature, and sought to precipitate events. It was by no means sure that Cuba would fare better as a democracy, but there was a vague impression that she desired independence. Books and magazine articles were written to promote a democratic revolution there, and to persuade American citizens to aid in wresting this possession from Spain in order to prepare

the way for annexation to the United States. Jack-o'-lantern insurrections followed.

Narcisso Lopez was the leader of the filibusters. Like Miranda he was a native of Venezuela. He was born in Carácas in 1799, and had served for some time as an officer in the Spanish service. In 1822 he retired from the Spanish army with the rank of colonel and emigrated to Cuba. From there he went to Spain and became adjutant of General Valdes, governor of Madrid. Afterward he was senator for Seville, but when the Cortes refused to admit the representative from Cuba he resigned his office. When General Valdes became governor-general of Cuba, Lopez returned to the island and was loaded with honors. He was employed by Valdes in various capacities connected with the government there. When O'Donnell succeeded Valdes, he did not continue the vice-regal favors to Lopez. Lopez then retired to private life, and soon began to conspire against the government. He claimed to have sympathy with the oppressed and distressed, and he encouraged them to seek independence. In 1849 he went to the United States, where he found many adventurous spirits ready to assist him in his designs. The Mexican War had closed, and many of the volunteers who were thus relieved from exciting conflicts were ready to join him. In August it was reported that an expedition was preparing to embark for Cuba, and the Spanish minister at Washington showed great anxiety. On August 11, President Taylor issued a proclamation against armed expeditions from the United States, and the Lopez party was captured as it was leaving the harbor of New York. There was at this time, according to reports sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, no general desire for a revolutionary movement in Cuba—unless there may have been a possible exception in the case of the region around Santiago. Men of property and consideration were said to be content with their condition, and not in favor of any movement for the overthrow of the Spanish crown. Campbell, the consul

at Havana, on August 28, in a letter to Secretary Clayton, said that many of the wealthy Creoles would oppose Lopez; that there was a bitter feeling against the Americans, and that if the Lopez vessel had sailed it would be advisable to send a naval force to protect the interests of Americans. The English consul, in view of the disturbance which might be created by the expedition of Lopez, asked the British admiral for a squadron of vessels to ensure the safety of Englishmen at Havana. That the Americans were not invited to Cuba is evident, and there was no excuse for their expedition. The United States, however, was faithful in the discharge of its obligation.

William Cullen Bryant, who visited Cuba in 1850, said that many Europeans there stated that the Creoles would be glad to see the island annexed to the United States. He said, however, that the people would not emancipate themselves by taking up arms—that there was distrust between the planters and the peasantry, and that it was not safe for Cuban planters to speak publicly of annexation to the United States. Some disaffection had existed among the slaves, but there was said to be no great danger of a political revolution except in case of foreign invasion. The slaves were often treated better than in the United States. Prejudice of color was not so strong in Cuba. People of mixed blood were, by legal forms, smuggled into the white race; and, if they were rich, even if their hair was frizzled, they could get into good society. The Cuban Government sanctioned making slaves of the free-born Indians of Yucatan, yet, under the laws of Cuba, any slave could purchase his own freedom by three persons, two of whom were selected by a magistrate. The annexation of Cuba to the United States and the suppression of the slave trade would, without new importations from the United States, have resulted in the decline of Cuban slavery.

The brief political calm after the threats of disunion and the compromise of 1850, was followed by clouds which

showed that new storms were coming. Preparations for a new expedition against Cuba were made openly and in the streets. Reckless adventurers were persuaded to risk their lives by leaders who were careful to risk only their money. A Cuban Junta was formed in Washington. Calderon de la Barca complained in January, 1850, and Clayton, on January 22, authorized the United States attorney to take steps to prevent unlawful acts. But the agitators had not yet been guilty of an indictable offence, though preparations still went on. The crowd snapped its fingers in the face of the Government, and followed the will-o'-the-wisp. In May, Calderon again complained of the threatened expedition from New Orleans, and of the hoisting of the Cuban flag by the *New York Sun*. Clayton became more energetic in endeavoring to stop the filibusters, but Lopez escaped with a hostile expedition in May; the United States sent vessels to stop him, but he was successful in landing. Two of his ships were captured by the Spanish at Contoy, a Mexican island. He himself returned to Key West, where he was arrested, but soon released by the district judge because sufficient evidence was not offered by the Spanish vice-consul. The consul could only state his belief, and S. S. Prentiss, who defended Lopez, stated before the court that the consul's belief floated "unsupported in midair with not even a clothes-line to hold it up." Prentiss intimated that if there had been a single fact as large as a hand it would have been blown up by the Spanish consul into a black cloud of muttering thunder and forked lightning. Lopez escaped only by the technicalities of the law and the sympathies of the people in the section where he was brought to trial. The United States sent a war vessel to Cuba, with a message from the President to the captain-general, to demand the release of the prisoners taken at Contoy. Secretary Clayton also objected to the Spanish use of the word "pirates" as applying to the Contoy prisoners. The Spanish Minister of State argued, with animation, the right to dislodge the enemies of her peace from a desert

island of Mexico. He claimed that if Spain did not have the right to dislodge them it would virtually make Contoy Island a sacred asylum for filibusters, where they need fear no molestation from either Spain or the United States. Barringer, the United States minister at Madrid, in urging the release of the prisoners, said that the expedition had been set on foot by a Spanish leader and Spanish money; he denied that Contoy was an abandoned desert; he said the United States had always done her duty to Spain—even when Cuba was a focus for real pirates whom the Cubans encouraged and protected, and that the squadrons which America then found necessary to protect her commerce did not violate the territory of the Spanish island nor the Spanish "desert" places. Secretary Clayton told the Spanish authorities that they should feel thankful that the United States had prevented matters from being no worse than they were. He asked the minister of Spain to send the prisoners home to the land of the Eagle, "to encounter a punishment, which, if they are honorable men, will be worse than any he can inflict, in the indignant frowns and denunciations of good men in their own country, for an attempt to violate the faith and honor of the nation which holds its character for integrity of more value and higher worth than all the Antilles together." He also warned the minister that the American Eagle must protect the prisoners, and that "if he unjustly shed one drop of American blood at this exciting period, it may cost the two countries a sanguinary war." Spain decided to pardon such prisoners as had been condemned, and the Havana courts set the others free. Soon afterwards there were a few cases of Americans living in Cuba who were banished by the authorities on account of their political opinion.

The "indignant frowns" of good Americans were not enough to prevent the agitation for a new expedition. Yulee, in the Senate, complained that the executive had overstepped its constitutional powers, by attempting to stop the Lopez expedition without the authority of Congress.

He said that the order given to the naval vessels to go to the coast of Cuba to prevent the landing of reinforcements for the insurgents was not only an act of war, but that it was also opposed to liberal progress. Public sentiment was not excited as Yulee hoped it would be, but there was considerable sympathy with the preparation for a new expedition.

After 1850 silence on the slavery question seemed impossible. Slavery extensionists increased their activity. Major Borland introduced a memorial from Kentucky asking for a peaceable acquisition of Cuba. Congressman Clingman emphatically stated that the slaveholders would annex new Mexican territory as soon as they needed it; that the region beyond the Rio Grande, with or without government aid, was destined to be revolutionized by American emigrants, and occupied by the slaveholding population; that the Government might as well try to curb the waves of the ocean as to try to prevent Southern settlers from filling up the region around the Gulf, including Yucatan and perhaps the northern coasts of South America.

The last Lopez expedition into Cuba occurred in 1851. On July 4, a few worn-out fugitives met and declared the independence of Cuba—mentioning the evils and horrible iniquities which had been perpetrated, and to which they had so long submitted. Among other reasons given for independence were the following: Deprivation of Cubans from holding public office, restriction on the free action of enterprise, exactions from officials, threats against the press, military commissions, and burdens caused by the quartering of troops in Cuba. Lopez, twice unsuccessful, had at this time joined a few speculators who had wild dreams of the wealth which the conquest of Cuba would give. The speculators gave money and Lopez issued Cuban bonds in which the people might invest. Lopez asked Jefferson Davis to lead the expedition, but he declined and at the same time recommended Robert E. Lee. Lee also refused on account of his place in the United States Army. So Lopez led the expedition himself. He got followers by assuring them that in

Cuba all the plans were set for an easy revolution—that even the Spanish soldiers would join the invaders—and he said that each soldier would get at least five thousand dollars. Some, who were not willing to risk their lives nor their money, favored the project because they hoped for the acquisition of Cuba. In April, there were rumors of the intended invasion, and the President issued a proclamation of warning. The Secretary of State and the President remembered our past assurances, and were energetic in asking the authorities to keep a watch to prevent the expedition; but on August 3, Lopez, with his four hundred ill-informed youths, escaped from New Orleans, and on August 12 landed in Cuba. The members of the expedition soon found that they were in a hostile country, though for a time the star of Lopez was in the ascendancy. A force of Spanish troops was routed and the Spanish commander was killed. Still the country did not rise. When Lopez started for the interior he left Crittenden, of Kentucky, on the coast to guard the baggage. Seeing that the Creoles did not rise, Crittenden, instead of joining Lopez, attempted to escape by taking to the sea in boats. The Spanish forces succeeded in defeating his escape, and in returning all his fifty men to Cuba as prisoners. Crittenden and his men were tried, condemned and put to death. Lopez was soon completely routed, and he himself was executed at Havana. The Cuban question had become the chief topic of conversation in street and *cafe* at New Orleans. Excitement increased when it was learned that Crittenden and his fifty men had been shot. Rioters broke into the office of the Spanish consul, destroyed the archives, defaced the portraits of the Captain-General of Cuba and the Queen of Spain, and tore the Spanish flag into tatters and shreds. The police did not intervene, but the Secretary of State, Mr. Webster, promptly acknowledged the wrong. For several days the executive was busy interceding for leniency toward the remaining prisoners in Cuba in order to allay the passions at New Orleans, and on account of the family relations of some

of the men. The President promptly said that Spain should be indemnified for the New Orleans lawlessness, and in 1852 Congress appropriated \$25,000 for the injuries to the Spanish consul and other Spanish subjects at New Orleans and Key West.

Some who joined the Lopez expedition were of good Southern families, but the Mexican War had fired them with the spirit of adventure and battle. Some who joined thought there was an understanding between Lopez and the Government of the United States that if the Cubans succeeded in organizing a *de facto* government the United States would promptly recognize it and give it such encouragement and protection as circumstances would justify. At this day it seems foolish that a few hundred men, poorly armed and badly equipped should have attempted to capture a large, wealthy and populous island and to organize a rebellion among a native population unfit for self-government and entirely unprepared for revolution. Lopez staked everything on his attempt, and had he been successful he would probably have been stamped as one of the world's heroes. The correspondence in regard to the Lopez expedition and the insults to the Spanish citizens in the United States furnished an opportunity for Mr. Webster to restate the policy of the United States as to Cuba. The Spanish Government had already been often informed that the United States desired no political change which would transfer Cuba from Spain. Webster in his letter to Barringer, the minister at Madrid, in 1851, drew the attention of Spain to the inconveniences which had occurred in the past, and which were liable to rise again on account of the contiguity of territory. He said that steam had increased the proximity between Cuba and the United States, and made them much nearer neighbors than they were many years before when American armed vessels found it necessary to suppress the pirates who then found refuge in Cuban ports; and he stated that it was the duty of the two governments to keep a closer and stricter watch to prevent treaty violations. The United

States was resolved to perform her duty faithfully, and the President thought it was wise "to suffer oblivion to cover the past." Spain was asked to be lenient with the deluded men whom Lopez had induced to go on a wild goose chase.

Schemes for the liberation of Cuba fell into disrepute, and coquetting with the Spanish maiden across the Florida straits, against the wishes of her mother, became less popular. In March and November, 1852, there were rumors of new expeditions being fitted out, but it seems that they were suspended for want of funds. People had concluded that they had no money to hang on Cuban trees. Public opinion did not loudly assert itself in favor of Cuban independence, for it was seen that Cuba did not desire freedom earnestly enough to exert herself to obtain it. If some Americans screamed for revenge and posted placards in narrow streets calling for mass-meetings, the thoughtful people did not allow themselves to respond excitedly to the call to force liberty and independence upon those who did not want it. But a new play was now put upon the political stage. Democratic politicians openly declared that the annexation of Cuba was to be a party question. Democratic papers all over the Union took up the cry. Democratic leaders in the North as well as the South spoke of the "probable annexation of more sugar-growing states to the Union." Those who in the interests of liberty favored the extension of territory over which the Eagle might soar were yoked in alliance to the dogmatists and promoters of slavery—until the anomalous combination finally collapsed in a quarrel. The desires of this combination were favored for a time by the anomalous condition of Cuba. Spain had not been prompt in paying the interest on the debt due the United States; the need of a new commercial treaty with Spain was felt—for Spain said that the treaty of 1795 did not apply to the colonies; owing to the difficulties which were liable to arise concerning Cuba, the American Government also felt that the functions of the United States consul at Havana should be extended, and that the governor-general should be given

power to act in certain cases without referring to Madrid, 2000 miles away. The policy of England also offered an excuse which furnished a semi-transparent cloak by which the Democratic combination could cover up the nakedness of their motives. There had been controversies between Great Britain and Spain over Cuba for several years, but it was said that Spain was enabled to resist England, in carrying out the slave-trade treaty, until the advent of Louis Napoleon, who united with the English Cabinet in a policy affecting their interests in two hemispheres. In order to secure the suppression of the slave trade, England claimed the right to examine the title by which slaves in Cuba were held in bondage. 1841-3 Spain had resisted the English demands. After the diplomatic relations, which had been broken in 1848, were restored in April, 1850, Spain again resisted the British demands; but at the time Lopez was threatening Cuba, the English Government informed Spain that England, in order to suppress the slave trade, might have to take matters into her own hands. Palmerston claimed to have no desire to violate the rights of Spain, but he said: "Great Britain will no longer be baffled." England was favorable to emancipation as well as to the abolition of the slave trade. In 1851 Lord Palmerston instructed the British ambassador at Madrid to say to the Spanish minister that if steps were provided for the emancipation of slaves in Cuba it would tend to content the people of the island and strengthen the connection with Spain—as well as to "create a most powerful element of resistance to any scheme for the annexation to the United States."

The report in 1851, that England and France had given orders to their fleets in the West Indies to preserve Cuba to Spain by forcibly preventing any further landing of filibusters, revived the question of search or visitation. In September, Acting Secretary Derrick objected to visitation upon the ground that it was only a belligerent right. On October 2, President Fillmore in a note to Webster, said that the protection of Cuba by English vessels involved a

right of search that would annoy and disturb friendly relations. Webster replied that we could not submit to English interference with American vessels, and he quoted John Quincy Adams as saying that we ought to make war on England, if necessary, rather than to acquiesce in her acquisition of Cuba. Acting Secretary Crittenden intimated to the ministers of Spain and England that an attempt to interfere with American vessels or to protect Cuba, might lead to serious complications—that it might give the British a chance to get possession of Cuba. After Kossuth left England in 1851 Palmerston's organ, the *London Globe*, intimated that Spain, France and England contemplated a compact to enforce the right of search in Cuban waters; but eight out of ten weekly London papers repudiated the idea and said that the temper of the English people was opposed to being involved in troubles with their trans-Atlantic brethren.

The idea of guaranteeing Cuba to Spain was revived in the correspondence of 1852. After the Lopez attempt (in 1849) to stimulate enterprises against Cuba a writer in *Frazer's Magazine* (London) said that the Americans had already set their hearts upon the possession of the isthmus, and that Cuba was to be only a stepping-stone in that direction. By the two, she could control the trade of the world which passed in that direction; and it was suggested that there should be a convention guaranteeing Cuba to Spain. In January, 1852, the Spanish Government desired that England might secure an abnegatory declaration on the part of France, the United States and England in regard to Cuba. On March 17, Turgot had received a despatch from Madrid that the Spanish Government feared that a fresh expedition against Cuba was being organized at New Orleans. It was deemed an opportune time to urge a joint agreement in favor of Spain. On April 8, Lord Malmsbury addressed Crampton, the British minister at Washington, as to the recent attacks on Cuba, said that England and France agreed with the past policy of the United States,

and proposed that an arrangement should be made to preclude all future hazard of collision between the three powers in event of aggression on Cuba. He said that since all three parties had agreed to repudiate all thought of appropriating Cuba, they might properly sign a tripartite arrangement disclaiming all designs "both now and hereafter." This idea may have been suggested to Malmsbury by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Crampton read the proposed project to Webster who concurred in the views as to Cuba and said that he would consider the proposal as to a convention. A few days later, Webster wrote to Barringer that the United States could not afford to see a combination of England and France for the protection of Cuba, and that if Spain would agree not to cede it to any European power she could rely upon the United States to assist her in its defense and preservation. At the same time he intimated to Crampton that while the United States had no designs on Cuba, it was her policy to avoid alliances. In speaking of not desiring a voluntary cession of the island by Spain, Crampton thought that Webster studiously used the word "European."

Crampton kept his government well-informed as to affairs relating to Cuba. On May 17, he wrote Malmsbury that an expedition against Cuba was doubtless meditated from the shores of the United States. On June 20, he wrote that it seemed suspended from want of funds. He thought that most of the funds for the Lopez expedition had been raised in Cuba. In a note to Webster, on July 8, Crampton spoke of the position of Cuba as to the route across the Isthmus of Panama, and said that it made it necessary for the powers to assure, so far as possible, "the present and future neutrality of the island." He said that Spain owed money to English and French subjects and to the French Government, and that by the neutrality of Cuba she would be enabled to reduce her expenses, to pay her debts, and to remove part of the high tariff at Havana, of which the United States had complained so often. In desiring the preservation of the sovereignty of Spain over Cuba, Cramp-

ton said that England and France asked no more than the United States had at previous times contemplated. On account of the sickness and death of Webster, Crampton's note was not answered until December 1. In the meantime, Crampton had information of a conspiracy for an expedition against Cuba. On November 1, he heard that 800 men had actually left New York for Cuba, but this seems to have been only a rumor. In November, in response to a call from the House of Representatives, documents showing the past policy of the United States as to Cuba were published. Crampton, in sending these documents to the London Government, stated that the publication would probably add weight and significance to the tripartite proposal, for that in all the proceedings for the acquisition of Cuba, the motive was continually put forward that it was a supposed design of Great Britain to get it. He said that those who favored the annexation to the United States would now be deprived of the argument by which they had hoped to manufacture feeling in favor of it. Seeing that the United States would probably not accede to the proposals for the tripartite agreement, M. de Isturiz said that if the United States did not adhere to the proposed declaration it was the desire of Spain that England and France should declare that they never would allow any other power, European or American, at any time to possess itself of "Cuba, either by cession, alienation, conquest or insurrection of the same."

The feeling that nature had made two continents with separate interests led the American Government to reject the tripartite proposal. The United States had only a general interest in the fate of Turkey; why should England and France watch the fate of Cuba, which lay under America's nose and right arm? In seventy-five years England, France, Spain and Portugal had lost vast colonies. The United States had become large and peaceful; it had needed territory and had purchased it. The Mississippi had long ago ceased to roll through foreign dominions. If necessary, the United States might in the future acquire more territory, and it did

not desire to bind its developing chest and growing muscle. America did not need to be propped up, and she did not see the use of joining any alliance, holy or unholy, for propping up any of the powers of Europe. In his note to Crampton, on December 1, 1852, Secretary Everett gave several reasons why the United States Government would not join in the tripartite: (1) The Senate would not favor such an arrangement. (2) Since the days of Washington it had been the policy of the United States to avoid entangling alliances. To enter a compact disclaiming all intention to get Cuba was inconsistent with our principles, policy and traditions. Our treaty with France of 1778 had nearly involved us in the wars of the French revolution when France asked us to defend the West Indies from England. There was no desire to have such another alliance. (3) It was unequal. While the President did not covet the acquisition of Cuba he considered its condition as mainly an American question. Cuba was remote from Europe, but its relations were intimately connected with the United States. France and England could take Africa without our objection, but an attempt on Cuba would indicate designs in the western hemisphere which would necessarily alarm the United States. The tripartite, it was stated, would disable the United States from making acquisitions by the natural order of events, and without disturbing foreign relations. Cuba guarded the Mississippi and not the Thames or Seine. It was territorially and commercially valuable to the United States, though its incorporation at that time was for domestic reasons considered hazardous. The United States was not seizing islands in the Mediterranean, and she would not take Cuba by force except in a just war. She had no desire to be a disgrace to civilization. There were many inconveniences growing out of her relations to Cuba; there was need of a shorter route for settling troubles; but the United States had fulfilled her international obligations and would continue to do so. (4) It would strike a death-blow to our conservatism and give an impulse to lawless expeditions instead

of lessening them as Turgot and Malmsbury had inferred. (5) It could only be transitory and could not disable the United States for all time. In twenty years England and France might not wish Spain to keep Cuba.

The tripartite was not suited for a rapidly changing new world. In one hundred years great events had occurred in America, which had completely changed the relations with Europe. She was escaping from the wilderness. Conditions had been provisional and temporary but progressive. France had disappeared from the western map in 1763; England had lost her most prosperous colonies in 1783; the United States had purchased Louisiana from France in 1803, and Florida from Spain in 1819; momentous revolutions in Europe had caused Spain to lose from California to Cape Horn, and had brought a new world into existence to redress the powers of an old one; the prosperous march of America went on, and Texas had been annexed; "the law of our political existence operated" after the Mexican War, and free dynamic institutions were extended to new regions; California completed the circuit and gave homes to people who were coming to our bosom from all the lands of the earth; could Europe be unfriendly because we were feeding her starving millions and giving gardens to European want? Everett vindicated the doctrine of manifest destiny as applied to our past, and said that the fortunes of Cuba could not be fixed by compact any more than the Gulf Stream could be dammed; but he was willing to leave Cuba and Porto Rico undisturbed so long as they could resist the mighty current of events, though he suggested that Cuba was costing Spain more than the whole navy of the United States.

Everett mentioned five contingencies which might press upon the United States the necessity of the acquisition of Cuba. (1) Change of circumstances (domestic). (2) Amicable arrangements with Spain (purchase). (3) An act in lawful war (conquest). (4) Consent of the inhabitants

(looking to independence). (5) The over-ruling necessity of self-preservation.

England's main interest in Cuba was to stop the slave trade and restrict the growth of slavery. In January, 1853, Lord John Russell wrote to Lord Howden, at Madrid: "Your Lordship may be assured that however friendly the councils of Her Majesty may be to Spain—whatever may be the interest of this country not to see Cuba in the hands of any other power than Spain, yet, in the eyes of the people of this country, the destruction of the trade which conveys natives of Africa to become slaves in Cuba, will furnish a large compensation for such a transfer. For such an exhibition of public feeling the government of Spain should be prepared." These sentiments were imparted to Conde de Alcoy by Lord Howden, and on February 9, Conde replied, regretting the hint given, and saying that such a change of opinion in England would be a triumph for the partisans of force against the law of nations, but that if the case arrived, Spain could do her duty without counting the elements of resistance.

Lord Russell, after receiving the American note of December 1, wrote Crampton that he thought Everett went into unnecessary arguments when he reminded him of the Seven Years' War, the Revolution, the growth of power, and the extension of territory which had marked the progress of the United States. He could not agree that the tripartite was unequal. He said that Spain had ceded American territory to European nations in the past—that England now owned Trinidad, once a colony of Spain, and that France had once owned Louisiana by a cession of Spain; and that England and France having possessions in American seas, were interested in the question of Cuba, and that Jamaica was nearer to Cuba than was any portion of the United States. In reply to Everett's statement, that the tripartite gave an impulse to lawless expeditions, he said that Her Majesty's Government hoped that the United States would not be insensible to the eternal laws of

right and wrong, peace and friendship, duty of neighbors, and to the rules of international relations. He significantly added that, while the right of the United States to reject the proposal was admitted, "Great Britain must at once resume her entire liberty, and upon any occasion that may call for it, be free to act either singly or in conjunction with other powers, as to her may seem fit." On March 8, 1853, Marcy became Secretary of State, but Everett, not liking the sarcasm of Russell's tone in Parliament, and in his note to Crampton, decided to reply as a private citizen. On September 17, he wrote a letter to Lord Russell stating that he had mentioned the absorption of territory by the United States merely as an illustration that the growth of the United States had been natural and in conformity with the laws of nations; he had desired to counteract the European feeling that Americans were land pirates. In reply to the statement as to the nearness of Cuba to Jamaica, he said that Jamaica did not bear the same relation to England as the American states did to the United States. He also declared that Jamaica was a burden upon the British treasury. He suggested that the United States had as good a right to obtain Cuba by voluntary cession as England had to get Trinidad by compulsory cession. He said that there was a wide feeling in the United States that the Cubans were justly disaffected, and that it was not extraordinary that misguided young men had joined in an invasion; England and France had been doing their share of annexation, and the United States did not need to be advised of the "utility of those rules for the observance of international relations"—for she had studied them as the victims of European systematic violation at the beginning of the present century. As an American citizen, Everett did not covet the acquisition of Cuba, but he declared that the United States was not done growing, and that representative government was not done extending.

Fillmore's administration did not favor any schemes for getting Cuba. In the President's message of 1852, he mentioned the trouble and alarm which grew out of the refusal

of the Captain-General of Cuba to allow the landing of mail and passengers in certain cases, but he was convinced that it would be hazardous to annex Cuba in order to avoid inconvenience to our commerce. He regarded the incorporation of Cuba into the Union at that time as "fraught with serious peril," on account of the character of the Cuban people, and the danger of affecting the industrial interests of the South and reviving the conflicting opinions which had been compromised in 1850. On December 17, a few days after the message, Everett, in writing to Rives at Paris, concerning steps taken by England, France and the United States to preserve peace in East San Domingo, said that the United States acted from disinterested motives, and that there was no desire to convert the West Indies into a theatre of national competition for exclusive advantages and territorial acquisition. Men like Giddings, in the Democratic party, agreed with the policy of the Fillmore administration; he was ready to do his own thinking and to represent the people without waiting for party instructions; he hoped that Pierce would continue to prevent the filibusters from carrying out their national crime; the only way to get Cuba was by peaceable and quiet purchase, and he thought that the influence of eleven Spanish members in the House of Representatives would not be worth the one hundred million dollars which the recent printed documents showed that Polk had offered. He said that there were suppressed volcanoes slumbering in Cuba; and that annexation would rock the Union to its centre, and devastate the South by a servile war. The 800,000 negroes would require a vast military force to hold them in subjection. Giddings concluded that Cuba would not be annexed. He said that Spain would not sell it, and that we could not get it so long as the friends of liberty called attention to the wrongs of slavery; the schemes of the filibusters would be prevented by the fear that Spain would free the slaves; slavery could only exist in peace, not in war. He prophesied that freedom would come to Cuba even under Spanish rule—the employ-

ment of Chinese had been far more profitable than slaves, and the laws of emancipation were far more favorable than in the United States.

Fillmore's administration was too conservative for the leaders of the Democratic party. It was not aggressive enough; they said it had treated the young republic as if it was still in its swaddling clothes, when it had reached the first phase of its giant manhood. Those who combined upon Pierce for President desired a bold and defiant foreign policy. Not even military glory was enough to waft the Whig craft into the presidential port; but the balloon of young America was well inflated, and it was swept on by a strong southern breeze. Scott, the Whig candidate for President, was characterized by the opposition organs as "the peacock of politics"—the "fuss, feathers and fireworks."

The platform managers of those who soared under the label of "Democracy" advertised and prophesied a brilliant foreign policy. They said the young republic had reached the tide in her affairs when she could grasp the opportunity to bury "fogyism," reform the navy, brush the cobwebs from the stars and stripes, and let her light shine from the tops of her commercial craft to diffuse knowledge and freedom unto all lands. They were intoxicated with the progress of historical events, and desired to ride like Numidian cavalry—with spurs and without bridles—unrestricted by treaties and laws. Their old men dreamed dreams and their young men saw visions.

Man was winning in the fight against physical difficulties and was making nature his servant. He had dugged great ditches for ships and had enabled the restless ocean to take to his arms the beautiful western sylvan maiden, Erie, the goddess of the crystal lakes. He had turned swamps into cities which blossomed with industry. He had annihilated time and distance; he had torn open nature's rocky breast, and swept back its mighty forests. By experience he had learned to control nature. With hand on the throttle he guided his horse of iron over bridged chasms and through

tunnelled mountains. The printing press, steam and the telegraph had entirely changed the relations of men and things. Every steamer which plowed the water, every new vessel, every mile of railway and new telegraph, brought people and nations nearer. Paris was closer to Washington than New Orleans had been twenty years before. The Atlantic had been reduced to the width of the Mediterranean. One could cross it in ten days, where it had formerly taken six weeks. Thousands of European emigrants were landing on our shores each year to escape the hard times in the land of their nativity. A great state had sprung up on the Pacific, and America was now a candle lighted at both ends. The expansion of the Union had become a theme of glory to all. There was no grander spectacle to imagine than the splendid procession which had swept across the continent since the American revolution—from bays to summits, then to rivers swollen by far-gathered floods, then across the prairies and by way of the isthmus “to the Golden Gate where California with her snow-white diadem, sits virgin empress of the seas.”

The isthmus was to become a highway, it was prophesied, with some of the West Indies as connecting stations, and we were to keep our eyes on the commercial advantages of the Sandwich Islands in the broad Pacific. Referring to the closer contact of people, a writer in the *Democratic Review* said: “That the inferior must recede or disappear before the superior races in an inevitable result sanctioned alike by reason, analogy, and the indisputable records of history.” Of absolute Russia and the free United States, both at the top of continents, he said that “limited by barriers of eternal ice to the northward, reaching from sea to sea they hang impending over the nations below them,” and that they pressed onward like glaciers toward the south. The Russian flag was being carried on to the Caucasus, and that of the United States was reflected in the sea of the Antilles, where “the rising tide beats at the base of the decadent republic of Mexico.” Another writer in the *Democratic*

Review said that Fillmore's administration was represented by a long row of ciphers—that he had violated the faith with Nicaragua, divulged to the House of Representatives all the correspondence with Spain as to Cuba, trampled down our foreign principles and had been recreant to his duty in the Bay of Honduras; Pierce, on the other hand, it was said, would run breast high with a national aspiration and be a supporter of liberal principles throughout the world—just to all nations, but, nevertheless, as jealous of the honor and glory of the United States as a woman of her virtue. He was to be a protector of Cuba and Central America, and Nicaragua was told to make no compromises with her enemies, but to wait for Pierce. The writer said "Men of the Isthmus! the people of the United States are your friends * * and will yet redeem the faith they have plighted to you. Be faithful, be firm, and you will yet reap the reward of your patriotic sacrifice, in the full and complete vindication of your rights. Trust to the future; await patiently the Ides of March." Some thought that it was the duty of America to relieve the distress of the Irish in Ireland and to give greater freedom to the European people. In July, before the election, some Utopian writer in the *Democratic Review*, who was ready and aching for the naked strife, planned an attack directly on the coast of the British Isles as a preliminary for restricting British power, for closing the purse of the Holy Alliance, and to "get a fulcrum in Europe by which to lift the mangled population of that continent to individual freedom." "We cannot shirk the issue or compress it into a codfish barrel," said he. "Sooner or later, this third Punic war must be fought—this is our Africa—the democratic administration of Franklin Pierce can alone furnish us with a victorious Africanus."

Manifest destiny with its extravagant pulse-flow like a beckoning angel bade the expansionists to hope that they would get their Cuban Paradise. Uncle Sam was lean in the picture, but everything else was big. There was a vast unoccupied territory into which the thousands of Europeans

who landed on our shores could disappear with the great flow to the West to obtain bread; there was still plenty of room in the country, and apparently no need for several years of building a fence along the ocean to keep the people from falling overboard; but "enough" was a lonesome word in the vocabulary of those who yearned to drive free in dangerous and reckless love for dominion over a rotating earth. Some men wanted to appropriate "ripe fruit" in the direction of the equator. They were anxious to seek a tropical zone for a kind of a winter resort, and the Sandwich Islands for a summer residence. They warmly desired to see new constellations arise as they pushed boldly out upon the swelling bosom of the ocean towards southern zones. Spread-eagle speeches were not limited to sophomoric statesmen, but even senior Senators indulged.

There was much bombast in the "manifest destiny" talk; it was often used as a pack-horse for the unscrupulous schemes of politicians who desired to tickle the ears of the sometimes too-credulous people; but, after all, there was something justifiable in the phrase, for the experience of years had made the self-governing people of the United States conscious of their better ability to solve the problems of civilization, even if they had to desert their former policy of extension to lands unpeopled, and to embark in a policy of naturalizing whole nations at once. After all, the whole of Mexico had not been absorbed when the chance was given by the occupation of the capital of that country by Scott.

When the course of legislation was started beneath the shelter of the Capitol, in December, after the election of Pierce, the Cuban question soon came up for debate. On December 23, Mason of Virginia called for the correspondence on the tripartite proposal. He and Cass both made speeches favoring the acquisition of Cuba. The tripartite proposal had evidently not removed their apprehensions of Great Britain and France. Mason, who was the chairman of the committee on foreign relations, said that the Anglo-

French offer showed that they had their eyes on Cuba, and that they evidently desired to intimate to the popular mind of the United States that they were in alliance to prevent attempts to take the island. He admitted that we should frown upon all forcible and unlawful attempts to take Cuba from Spain, but added: "We know that in the fulness of time the fruit will ripen and fall from the parent stem." He said that its political coalition with the United States was only a question of time, and could not be prevented by the powers of Europe. He regretted that the President had said that its present annexation would be perilous, and he thought that the correspondence in regard to Cuba should not have been divulged to the House of Representatives. Cass said that the period was one of momentous subjects relating to foreign relations; that this hemisphere had peculiar interests of its own, and that it was our manifest destiny to move on with the world of progress, declaring our rights, standing by the Monroe doctrine and refusing to be humbugged by the scarecrows of "raw-head and bloody-bones." He was willing to purchase Cuba even at an extravagant price, but he still said, as he had said five years before, that there should be no interference in the island so long as Spain owned it or in case it should become independent. He would have been glad, however, to see Cuba free herself from Spain. Acquisition presented no terrors to him. He said: "It is pretty well known that I have a capacious swallow for territory, though I can wait, if necessary, and spend the time digesting our last acquisitions. They sit lightly on the stomach and promise to promote the health of the body politic * * * beyond expectations." As to where annexation was to stop, he said it was not to be answered in his day, but he denounced any but honest acquisition. In reply to the English arraignment of our rapacity, he drew attention to the immense congregation of British subjects in India which was still increasing by the sword.

The ideas of Cass and Mason were not advanced enough for that head-light of "manifest destiny," the *Democratic*

Review, which said the recent action of foreign powers should induce the United States to throw away the musty opinions of the past and to take Cuba at once—if Spain confessed she needed help to hold Cuba, what right had a man to a wife if he could not take care of her? The *Review* hoped that the United States would aid Cuba and Canada as we had aided Texas. It thought the Senate had better examine the condition of Hayti where the French had designs and were sending settlers; and that the tripartite proposal was “burnt powder” now, but that Napoleon, who was endeavoring to get a depot for steamers at Samana, thereby exposing Cuba and Mexico to foreign invasion, was a “living lion,” who needed to be watched. The *Review* repudiated the doctrines of Cass and said: “We might as well say at once that our people want Cuba and that our people will have it.” It declared that not one of the prepared opinions of Cass and Mason were true now or could be true hereafter—for that we wanted Cuba soon; it was the gate to the Mississippi, and the turnpike bar to California. It pronounced it criminal for a Senator to talk of adhering to what he may have said five years before on relations with other nations, colonies or protectorates, for that California, which had become ours since then, would soon overcome all British America, and that the cordon of islands from Nova Scotia to Jamaica and Roatan would become our outposts.

In January, 1853, Cass again stated his views as to our foreign policy. He had introduced a joint resolution declaring the views of the United States as to colonization on the North American continent by European colonies, disclaiming designs on Cuba inconsistent with the laws of nations, and stating that efforts made against Cuba by any foreign power would be considered unfriendly acts. A consideration of this resolution, and the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, brought up a discussion of the whole question of European intervention on the Western continent. Butler, of South Carolina, did not believe in advertising what we would do

in case of some future contingency which might never happen, but he said that if American settlements continued, the islands of the Caribbean Sea would become de-Europeanized—that bayonets could not stop the innovation of opinion, and that “you might as well attempt to stop the progress of the Mississippi by a bundle of hay as to stop the progress of American opinion on this American continent.” Cass also saw the advance of American opinion, but he thought that it would be well to notify the outside world that no trespassing would be allowed on our neighbors’ territory. In his speech of January 15, 1853, he said that such progressive people as those of the United States should not be circumscribed by narrow isthmuses and gulf streams—that we needed a communication between the East and the West, and that Europe could not prevent us from getting it. He said that recent attempts of French agents to get Sonora and Chihuahua were efforts to check the growth of the United States and to prevent a railroad from the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean, and also suggested that England, after having almost converted the Mediterranean into an English lake in time of war, might now try to attempt the same plan with the Gulf of Mexico if she could encircle it with her power and influence. He objected, and said that for security the Gulf must be practically an American lake. He believed that no man should despair of the future of the nation that preferred its chief magistrate to wear a hat instead of a crown, for that old things had passed away and that there was now none to make us afraid. We had not run too fast, he said, and we did not intend to be circumscribed in our expansion, nor to have this hemisphere ruled by maxims suited neither to its position nor to its interests. He was ready to purchase Cuba, and he preferred the Cubans should favor the acquisition.

In regard to the January speech of Cass, the *Democratic Review* said that he was improving, but that he was still far behind the exigencies of the moment—that he advanced but hesitated, that his voice was strong but his knees

trembled, and that there was mystification in his speech. It thought that he was learning from the *Review*, however, and it proceeded to set other lessons. It began by stating that the colonies of England as well as those of Spain would soon become independent republics and that the citizens of the United States should aid them as they aided Texas, and as France had once aided the United States. It proceeded to say that we should interfere in weak Mexico, which owed England, was being watched by Napoleon, and had been "bristled up to" by Spain entirely too much. The *Review* favored taking possession of Cuba as soon as possible for the sake of her own and our people, and it advocated measures for preventing the designs and power of Louis Napoleon in Mexico, Central America and the West Indies. It urged that Congress should give Pierce ten million dollars for use in case there was a chance for action, and that it should stop talking "crisis." It said: "The time to deliberate is not now; now is the time to act. We must act now for all North America and the islands; charge on Africa as soon as possible; apply the Monroe doctrine to all South America, and growl and protest against all the usurpations of Europe and Asia."

Honest Mr. Venable, of North Carolina, struck a discordant note which grated harshly upon the nerves of his Southern friends who were astraddle of the "manifest destiny" horse. In a speech of January 3, he dissented from the idea of our capacity to swallow Canada, Cuba and the islands of the sea. He did not favor fostering a spirit of revolution in Cuba in order to intervene there, and said: "The desire for the acquisition of territories in general and of Cuba in particular, under the name of progress, threatens to involve our country in difficulties of a most complicated character." "It may do," said he, "for Fourth of July orations, or to hear sophomores talk about human rights, and trumpets calling to victory, but when you come down to the solemn reality of life * * every nation in the world that can take care of its liberty has received it. * * If we

set ourselves to work as crusaders to establish human liberty, we destroy everything at home." Venable expected to keep company with his conscience long after political relations had ceased, and he admitted no party ties, or allegiance to any party which should make filibustering its watchword. He said that Cuba belonged to Spain; that no power of Europe was disposed to seize it; that our country needed repose from disputes, and that we should not be propagandists of free government except by example. He declared that it was a mistake that we wanted Cuba for an outlet for our slaves, and that it would be to our advantage for Spain to remain interested in slavery by continuing her possession of Cuba. Stephens, of Georgia, did not favor filibustering, and he did not desire to acquire Cuba by any unnecessary war, but he did not agree that its acquisition would endanger the Union. Mr. Brown, of Mississippi, stated that the acquisition would stop the foreign slave trade, and said that was one reason why he favored it. In case of a revolution in Cuba, and of an emancipation of the Cuban slaves by Spain to punish the revolutionists, Brown said that such a decree of emancipation could not be legal and binding. He therefore saw no reason why the Creoles should not resist Spanish rule, and he said that the citizens of the United States as individuals had a right to go to aid them. He favored acquisition as an outlet to slavery, which he said must extend its area. Venable asked Brown if he would favor the annexation of Cuba as a free state. Brown replied: "I confess that a vast amount of my zeal and enthusiasm would ooze out very suddenly if I knew it was coming as a free state." Howard, of Texas, in the House on January 6, in discussing the state of the Union and Cuba, said that he favored the Monroe doctrine, but that he did not agree with Cass as to the necessity of abstract legislation on the subject. He saw no necessity of serving notice to the world before circumstances should arrive to require it; he said the Monroe doctrine did not mean "that every settlement upon any sand bank on this continent is an

offense which is to result in war." As to Cuba, he held that its acquisition did not rest on the Monroe doctrine, but on the question of safety, and he saw no reason to make an attempt to obtain the island until we should be justified by the attempt of some great maritime power upon it. He stated that slavery must exist in Cuba as long as it should exist in the United States. While he saw no immediate danger to Cuba, he agreed that the United States should get it as soon as Spain would cede it. Marshall, of California, offered a resolution to place at the disposal of the President five or ten million dollars "To meet the exigencies which might arise before the meeting of the next Congress, in our foreign relations." He said, however, that the danger of collision with Spain seemed to be past, and that he saw no danger that the present generation would be called upon to act in regard to Cuba. He was willing to leave the question to the wisdom of the future. While he did not desire war for conquest, he desired a stronger foreign policy, and he said: "The Eagle's wing is strong enough to bear its flight over the continent and its beak and talons sharp enough to guard its charge even though the lion of England is against it."

Some at the North tried to divert attention from Cuba by pointing to our northern borders. On January 10, Mr. Bell, of the House, said that we did not want Cuba, but that Canada was worth looking at—that over two million people, "bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh" were anxious to enjoy what we were enjoying and that it might be well to look toward measures of acquisition if it could be attained peaceably. Some persons in the South opposed the annexation of Cuba because they feared that the North would be led to desire the annexation of Canada. Hale, of New Hampshire, in the Senate on January 15, 1853, invited the Eagle to leave its beat in the air of the tropics, and for awhile to do police duty amidst the ice-fields in the North. He did not agree with Cass that there was "hardly room for us in the narrow space between the Atlantic and Pacific,

with the Gulf of Mexico for a wash-basin;" he said that we had enough territory until we had improved it, and that extension to the North was more valuable to us anyhow. He believed that our destiny was at home rather than to perform conquests abroad. He said that those who dealt most in long advertisements usually dealt less in action, but in case we were to engage in serving notices to the world he inquired whether it would not be well to intimate to Great Britain that she should not sell Canada. He opposed the Cass joint resolution in regard to colonization in North America unless Canada was also included, and he did not object if any one else desired to add an amendment to "notify all the other governments of the earth" which owned islands near the American continent that we were able to buy them out and that we would not allow them to sell in any other market.

Soule, who, in 1852, had attacked Fillmore for not taking up the cause of the Lopez expedition made a long speech on January 25, lauding Lopez, indulging in stinging sarcasms on Spain, and urging the Government not to delay too long to pluck the Cuban fruit from the Spanish tree. He admired the filibusters, said that England's conquests in the East were only marauding on a large scale, and saw no reason why senators should have fastidiousness about marauding, when they admitted that they only awaited the ripening of the fruit. "Will the plucking of it, when ripe, be less marauding than the plucking of it while still green," said he. "At common law the taking of the fruit from the tree is but trespassing, while the taking of it after it has been separated from the parent stem is larceny. Let them beware lest the fruit rot while they wait its ripening." Soule declared that England and France should not be allowed to constitute themselves the supervisors of American movements between Florida and Cuba. He urged that the Monroe doctrine extended further than the principles that gave it birth. Referring to the Anglo-French proposal as to the tripartite he said: "What is that interest

which thus prompts those haughty powers to interfere with our concerns, and to dictate to us what policy we should pursue? What are those relations now existing between those powers which interest them in the destinies of Cuba as deeply as Spain can be? I am afraid, Mr. President, there are storms in the answer. I can hardly account for the forbearance which we have of late been in the habit of exhibiting, whenever we have found ourselves in conflict with foreign pretensions, and especially whenever we have had to meet the exactions of England. The nations of the world know that we cannot be willing to disparage ourselves in their eyes, and to endanger the high position which we can so easily hold at their council-board. But we cannot expect to retain our character as one of the great powers of the earth unless we jealously watch what contingencies may endanger it. And of all the duties imposed upon government there is none whose accomplishment is more essential to its own preservation than that of providing for the exigencies of an impending future. The right of self-preservation is paramount to all other rights, and lends sanction to whatever measures necessity may impel a nation to pursue in order to vindicate and maintain it. Under what requirements our country may be placed by the late demonstrations through which England and France have manifested their restlessness with reference to our increasing strength and power, it will be for those, and those alone, to determine who, when a proper occasion arises, shall be at the head of the government. In the meantime, however, I am indisposed to yield my assent to any policy that would divorce us from those great principles and doctrines laid down by those eminent men who, under the pressure of fearful crisis, took counsel from their duty and not from their fears." Soule eulogized much of Everett's note to Crampton, but he thought that it had been remiss in not rebuking the impertinent threat, implied in the first sentences of the communication from the Cabinets of Paris and London, making the United States responsible for the

repetition of such attacks as had lately been made on Cuba by lawless bands of adventurers from the United States. He did not agree with President Fillmore nor with Cass and Mason. He expected to get Cuba without money and without price. Castilian pride would not permit us to purchase, Cuban pride would not allow them to join us by purchase—so he said we must abandon that idea. He hoped Spain would take counsel by the past, stop slumbering and indulging in dreams, and proceed to call a new nation into existence. Mallory was more radical even than Soule. Referring to the geographical advantages of Cuba and the necessity of its acquisition, he said that "Heaven helps those who help themselves."

Seward, on January 26, said that the best way to meet the Cuban question was to keep cool—and that it was a bad time to raise the issue—that the North did not fear recolonization, and did not want Cuba, while the South desired to avoid political excitement. He saw that Cuba would not be desired by England and France as a slave colony, and that without slavery it could belong to none of the European powers. He agreed that it gravitated towards the United States, and that the safety of the Southern states required our watchfulness in that direction. He was willing to vote for both the Cass resolution as to Cuba and the Hale amendment as to Canada. Senator Clements, of Alabama, also thought it best to keep cool, and said that Cuba would be ours whenever it should be right and needful to take it, and that we could afford to wait until the pear should ripen. We had always had a good foreign policy—the policy of attending to our own business without assuming to become guardian over all mankind—and he did not favor that new idea of *progress* which inculcated a sort of defiance to all mankind, a desire to rob Spain of Cuba, England of Canada, and Mexico of all she had left. Progress was not a bloody drama, and history had not been made at all times by conflict and war. France and England had made a foolish parade of their future purpose to watch Cuba, but their

threats were mere gasconade, and he did not favor meeting them with intemperate action. He said that one thousand Cubas could not induce England to declare war against the United States—that the condition of her working-classes and the “certainty of seeing 100,000 American bayonets glittering in the sunlight of Canada” would hold her back. Clements did not agree with his Southern brethren that the acquisition of Cuba was desirable, even if it could be gotten by peaceful means. If it came in as a slave state it could give no additional political advantage. The North already had a preponderance, which would continue to increase—and it would become necessary for the South to look to the good sense of the American people, to maintain their rights, rather than to the annexation of people whose population and religion were foreign. He saw not a single reason for annexation.

Douglas outdid Cass in opposing compliance with the plans of other nations. He said that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty violated the principle of the Monroe doctrine; and he denied that it was necessary and proper for the United States to disavow any intention of seizing upon Cuba. He said that we had always done our duty to other nations and that we should leave our own hands free to make such acquisitions as would not disturb foreign relations. Cuba was the gate to the Gulf, and Central America was the gate to the Pacific possessions. He did not wish to annex any more territory at that time, but he saw the necessity of it in the future, and he stated that a young and vigorous nation desired no limits fixed to her greatness and future glory—no treaties and pledges to restrict her, for, after all, written laws could not control the progress of events. So long as Cuba was loyal to Spain he said “Be it so;” but if she became independent she could do as Texas had done, and in case England should have an opportunity to buy her, he favored taking immediate possession. Underwood, of Kentucky, opposed blustering, and was not willing to act on abstractions and to say beforehand what we would do

in a given case. He remembered that in 1812, when we were weak, nobody thought of acquiring Cuba for defense, and he said that its acquisition would make it more difficult to defend ourselves from attacks. Nations that were stronger on land than on sea could embark an army on Cuba, blockade Havana, and take all the stronger fortifications. The United States would find it necessary to enlarge her armaments and to take troops to die in the tropics. If we should be strong enough to hold Cuba after we once became possessor of it he said that we certainly could defend ourselves without it.

At this time some were urging the Government of the United States to compel Mexico to give a right of way for a railroad over the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, according to the terms of a former "Garay" grant. Mexico was evidently suspicious. The grant which she had formerly made to one of her citizens had become the property of citizens of the United States. Mexico had in former treaty stipulations recognized the validity of the grant, but recently the Mexican Congress had abrogated it, and the authorities had driven away the engineers of the American company that had been sent there by special permission of Mexico. Downs, of Louisiana, in February offered a resolution in the Senate to continue negotiations with Mexico no further, and, in case she failed to reconsider her position as to the grant, to adopt such measures as would preserve the honor of the United States and the rights of its citizens. He said that the American Government should have sent the Gulf naval force to tell the company to keep its engineers at work—that the proper policy was to take possession of the territory and negotiate afterwards. He thought the United States had been too indulgent, and that there was more danger of getting into a war by waiting and doubting, than by being defiant. In defense of the route as a better one than that by Panama or Nicaragua, and as not hostile to a Pacific railway on United States territory, he said that it led to the great Mediterranean of America where none

but Mexico and the United States had a right to plant a single gun—and that this inland sea nearly shut up by Florida, Cuba and Yucatan would become more and more important. Senator Seward, of New York, opposed the Tehuantepec resolution; he said that Mexico might fall to us later, but that we were not yet ready for her twenty-two states.

Until the eve of the Civil War the cormorant appetite of some Americans, who had unbounded dreams of our manifest destiny, continued to yearn for a chance to spread our protecting wings over Central America, to “extend our claws” farther into Mexican soil, and to annex Cuba without reflecting whether we would be able to assimilate her. The slavery-extensionists had their eyes in the direction of the equator, and their ravenous appetite could not be appeased by the Kansas-Nebraska bite which they took from freedom’s soil. In June, 1854, Latham, of California, in a speech in the House said “that as a child outgrows its garments we have outgrown our ancient metes and bounds.” Looking to the East he saw England, France, Turkey and Russia exhausting their strength in armies and navies. It appeared to him that it would be a long time before any European power would again seriously contemplate circumscribing our progress. “We have a continent before us,” said he, “and the future is ours without dispute.” In May, 1854, the *Southern Standard*, of South Carolina, said that the American tropics should be won by the United States to the blessings of slavery. With fertile imagination it was convinced that “with Cuba and San Domingo we could control the productions of the tropics and with them the commerce of the world and with that the power of the world,” and that instead of courting England we should look to Brazil and the West Indies in order to preserve domestic servitude—that we should make an alliance with Brazil, and that we should open up the “African slave-emigration” in order to populate and develop the “tropical regions now slumbering in rank and wild luxuri-

ance." This was to be defended as an "enlarged system of philanthropy" for the benefit of the "poor African" and in opposition to the "whining morality of the latter-day saints and the psalm-singing school-masters from the North." It seemed that America was a youth with invincible and determined spirit, but whose dreams were often purely visionary. In 1855, a congressman said, that although he was no supporter of "Young America," yet he was persuaded that in a few years the flag of the Union would "wave over the whole continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from Cape Horn to Labrador." Some cried for the Sandwich Islands, others wanted a part of Mexico; still others looked to the Amazon; many more were bent on Cuba; others sang "From Greenland's icy mountains to Darien's golden strands;" and a few had such inordinate stomachs that they were willing to swallow up the entire continent, uniting all under one banner and one eagle, while they made the oceans and rivers, the hurricanes and blizzards, the mountains and vales, to join in one strong, harmonious, everlasting refrain of glory. In January, 1859, S. S. Cox, of Ohio, in a speech in the House said, "There is a logic in history which is as inexorable as fate * * * Weaker and disorganized nations must be absorbed by the stronger and organized nation. Nationalities of inferior grade must surrender to those of superior civilization and polity * * Central America, South America and Mexico * * must whirl in * * and become crystallized into higher forms." * * He said we must intervene for the salvation of weak nations, and that the Central American States must either come to the United States or be powdered into nothingness between the industrial movements of the surrounding states. "We have become a colossus on this continent," said he, "with the strength and stride which will and must be heeded." Reuben Davis, of Mississippi, a few days after Mr. Cox's speech, spoke to the House as follows: "Our vessel of State rides upon a tide swollen and even enraged by mighty events, and no anchor can stay

it ; and, in its course, all we can do is to guide it by prudent counsels as it floats on to its legitimate destination. * * * If we will leave all subjects in which the people are directly interested to the states, then we may expand so as to include the whole world, Mexico, Central America, South America, Cuba, the West India Islands and even England and France we might annex without inconvenience or prejudice, allowing them with their local legislators to regulate local affairs in their own way. And this, sir, is the mission of the Republic and its ultimate destiny."

CHAPTER IX.

THE FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY OF "YOUNG AMERICA" AND THE SLAVERY- EXTENSIONISTS. NEGOTIATIONS TO OBTAIN CUBA—BY THE PURSE IF POSSIBLE.

Kind-hearted Franklin Pierce was accidentally nominated for the presidency and elected—on account of the way the minority stacked the cards, Buchanan and Douglas were passed by for a man comparatively unknown. When Pierce arrived at Washington in a baggage-car, and a few days later entered the White House with his baggage, to begin the drama of four years, the momentum of affairs was so great that it was found necessary to apply the brakes and to advance with caution toward the "brilliant foreign policy" which had been lavishly prophesied and advertised by his platform managers in order to make his calling and election sure. Gadsden tried to get a large slice off Mexico from sea to sea, but in December, 1853, it was decided to be satisfied with a smaller piece of pie than the young American appetite had at first longed for. The dreams of slavery-extensionists to win Nicaragua and other tropical regions, and to lay them into the lap of the nation of "manifest destiny," were by no means stopped, but it was thought best first to concentrate all pressure upon the attempt to secure Cuba for the benefit of the slaveholding interests. It was desired to get rid of the English phantom of emancipation and to prevent England from getting control of this "golden key" to the Gulf of Mexico. The fact that Fillmore in his message of the previous December had declared

that the annexation of Cuba would be fraught with serious peril to the United States as well as to the industrial interests of the South was not heeded. In New Orleans, a secret society, The Order of the Lone Star, favored the furtherance of the revolutionary designs of the Cuban malcontents. Even in the North there were some Whig papers which regretted that Fillmore had not brilliantly closed his administration by the acquisition of Cuba, and hoped that Pierce would make the purchase in order to prevent the chances of a quarrel with Spain and other European powers. Howard, of Texas, said in the House of Representatives, that the North had too much interest in the preservation of the Union to risk the consequences of rejecting Cuba. Even before Pierce was inaugurated it had been proposed in Congress to place five or ten million dollars at his disposal to enable him to meet any unforeseen event connected with foreign affairs. Many who desired to increase the influence of slavery or to decrease the petty and serious commercial annoyances for which we had to seek redress from another hemisphere, or to extend the territory of the rising republic, were ready to believe that Cuba was an unwilling vassalage of Spain, longing for annexation to the United States; and they wished to rescue this land of starless political darkness and bring her home to the bosom of the North American confederacy.

Pierce took the oath of office at Washington, but King who was elected Vice-President took the oath in Cuba where he had gone for his health. Pierce, in his inaugural address, indicated that his policy would not fear to make extensive alterations in the map of the western continent. He did not fear territorial expansion. He said that our position and attitude might "render the acquisition of certain possessions, not within our jurisdiction, eminently important for our protection." Enthusiastic cheers and the noise of cannon showed the joy of the Democrats on inauguration day. Yet there were some antislavery Democrats who apprehended the dangers that might arise from the acquisi-

tion of more slave territory; they remembered the intrigues as to Texas and feared that Pierce would bend to the wishes of the slavery leaders. In the month following the election, Buchanan had told Pierce that he should make the purchase of Cuba the chief aim of his administration and thus render his name as illustrious as that of Jefferson who had procured Louisiana for the Union. Jefferson Davis and Caleb Cushing were chosen to support the arms of Pierce, the Moses who was to lead the people into the Canaan of which young America had dreamed. An evil star presided over the undertaking. At first John A. Dix was offered the position of Secretary of State, but the extreme Southerners and proslavery Democrats objected. Marcy was finally selected on the day after the inauguration.

The principal posts were filled with a view to the manipulation of affairs to secure the purchase of Cuba. Buchanan was sent to London, Soule to Spain and Mason to France—all were considered fit men for the scheme that was growing. Soule had freely expressed his opinions in the Senate the previous January and had spoken in the highest terms of the Lopez and Crittenden expedition to Cuba. He favored the acquisition of Cuba, but he did not favor purchase. He preferred to see the island made independent and then annexed to the United States—to prevent any English plans for the abolition of slavery there. Though not chosen for his diplomatic training, he was a man expressly fitted for the task of negotiation for Cuba, and this was the main object of his mission. The known character of Soule at first made it doubtful whether Spain would consider him a proper person to represent the United States at Madrid. At New York, before embarking for Europe, he received a deputation of Cuban exiles, who serenaded him, and hoped that when he returned a new star would shine in the celestial vault of young America. Soule responded in a speech which some American paper said was so indiscreet that the President should have sent a steamer to bring him back. He assured the Cubans that any

American minister abroad "has a right to carry with him wherever he goes the throbbings of that people that speak out such tremendous truths to the tyrants of the old continent." It was said that his policy of "Cuba without cost" might suit a Lone Star meeting, but that his "patriotism and philanthropy as to Cuba smacked too strongly of piracy." Marcy himself disapproved of Soule's appointment.

The leaders of the revolutionary party in Europe felt at this time that the government authorities were sitting on the safety-valve at the risk of bursting the boiler. They desired to secure the influence of the United States Government in support of their policy to start a revolution in Spain. After forming a republic there, they intended to extend democratic institutions across the Pyrenees to France, and then to overthrow the power of Austria in Hungary and Italy. In case the United States could have been induced to furnish material aid to the democratic project of dethroning the Queen of Spain and establishing a republic, the leaders of the project were willing to leave Cuba to chose between connection with the Spanish republic or annexation to the United States. Mr. Evans, of Texas, once said in the House of Representatives that Soule stopped at London on his way to Madrid in order to concert a plan with Mazzini, Ludro Rollin, and Kossuth, by which the United States would have been involved in a conspiracy against the peace of the world, and "would have set both hemispheres in flames and would, perhaps before the end, have covered every country on the globe with blood and ashes." According to Evans, Soule gave these European revolutionary leaders some hope of a favorable reception of their project to kindle the torch of insurrection in western Europe while the three great powers were busy with the Crimean War. The refusal of Spain to make reparation for outrages upon American commerce was to be made the excuse for the seizure of Cuba by the United States; and the probable declaration of hostilities against the United States by England, France, and Spain, it was thought, would cut

off the American supply of corn and cotton from England and France, and cause the people to arise against the Government.

Pierce took the presidential chair at a period of the world's history teeming with significant events. Foreigners were arriving from Europe by hundreds of thousands each year. Emigration was especially large in 1853-4. The bowed-down of the earth were arising. The keys to unlock the Japanese empire to the United States were nearly forged; and there were visible fears in Europe and Asia that indicated that the cry for a balance of power might resound across the Atlantic. The European nations were full of jealousy; Austria was offended, and we had been quarreling with England over the fisheries. But all Europe seemed to have enough to keep it busy at home for some time. Flags fluttered fretfully from foreign fortifications and fleets. France and England were peering across the British channel to devour each other, though they were just at this time drawn together on account of affairs in India and Africa. From the watch-towers of London they saw the Czar of Russia threatening their interests. France had recently erected an imperial throne—and some in the United States thought it was over the crater of a volcano which would keep the Emperor watching for his own safety. A continent was before us, and a bright future. Who could doubt that the Monroe doctrine would be enforced?

English and American interests had been jostling each other more and more. Since Hawaii had been threatened by a British ship-of-war in 1843 the United States had kept a jealous watch in that quarter. The annexation of the Sandwich Islands to the United States was now advocated for various reasons, one of which was that the United States should be prepared for a contest with Russia on account of the interference of Russians with American whalers. In 1853, there were political agitations in Hawaii and considerable talk of transferring the sovereignty to the United States, but the representatives of England and France on

the island used all their efforts to suppress such a rising sentiment, and their ministers at Washington seemed to desire an assurance that the American Government would not accept Hawaii if the offer was made. Marcy wrote Buchanan in December that it was inevitable that the Sandwich Islands must come to the American Government; and asked him to ascertain by indirect means what would be the probable course of Great Britain in case the United States should attempt to possess them by negotiations or by other peaceable means. Relations with Central America had become more interesting since the acquisition of California. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty had apparently increased the embarrassing question which arose between the United States and Great Britain in that quarter. The United States and England did not agree upon the interpretation of the treaty. After the dissolution of the Central American Union there were boundary disputes between Nicaragua and Costa Rica which gave England a chance to assert her claims to San Juan (Greytown). Marcy felt that there should be a re-establishment of the confederation and closer commercial relations with the United States.

Mr. Clayton and the Senate understood that England practically agreed, by the Bulwer treaty, to recede from her asserted protectorate of the Mosquito Indians, to cease to exercise dominion or control in any part of Central America, to abandon any colonial possessions if she had any there at that time, and to abstain from further acquisition in that region. It was admitted, however, that Great Britain had a qualified right over Balize from which she was not ousted by the treaty. In December, 1853, Marcy instructed Borland, the minister to Central America, to express to all the states the anxiety of the United States to prevent European nations from intermeddling with the affairs of Central America, but he insisted that Borland must get *proofs* of complaints before he asked the United States for "special instructions to take bold and decided steps." Borland was asked to use his influence to induce

Honduras to resist the encroachments of Great Britain ; but he was warned not to pledge the United States to expel Great Britain from the Bay of Islands. He was to state the American views as to the unfounded intentions of Great Britain, and then, if the latter still held the islands, it was time for the United States to determine what course to pursue. The reciprocity treaty with England in 1854, adjusted several causes of friction, but she still held her influence in Central America. Our own relations with Central America were not above reproach. In May, 1854, a captain of a United States steamer shot a negro near San Juan. The Mayor of San Juan sent on board his vessel to have him arrested. Borland and others disputed the Mayor's authority. The next day the authorities tried to arrest Borland in San Juan. A street fight ensued and Borland was struck in the face with a bottle. A United States vessel was sent to demand an apology ; receiving no reply, the vessel's guns were opened upon the town, and soon set fire to it. The Washington Government treated the affair as trifling, but others looked upon it as an injury for which there was no excuse.

The disposition of the Cuban question was the greatest foreign one that the Pierce administration had to consider. For three years the whole intercourse with Cuba had been marked by serious irritations. Restrictions on trade continued, the American Government had been inconvenienced by the attempts to filibuster from the United States ; American vessels had been seized ; the United States steamer *Falcon* had been fired upon ; sailors had been taken from the *Lucy Watts* in a Cuban port ; the mail-bags had been cut and examined ; and the *Crescent City* had been refused a landing. The American mail steamer *Ohio* was detained about the beginning of the Pierce administration under the pretext of enforcing the quarantine law. It was complained that she was ordered to move from her moorings to hazardous and unsafe anchorage under the guns of Morro Castle,

or to leave the harbor without leaving her mail. The officers complained that they were not allowed to see the American consul. Marcy instructed Barringer, the minister to Spain, that Spain should prevent these vexations which had been too often occurring in Cuba. The American Government had been unable to get Spain to allow direct negotiations between the American consul in Havana and the Captain-General of Cuba. When President Taylor had sent a messenger to Havana to adjust pressing evils the captain-general referred him to Barca, the Spanish minister at Washington, Barca referred to Madrid, and Madrid waited for information from Havana.

Under the existing form of government the possession of Cuba by Spain was supposed to be insecure. This gave rise to a whole crop of possible complications. On July 2, 1853, Marcy in a letter to Buchanan said, "It is intimated, though not authoritatively announced, that it is the design of Spain whenever she clearly perceives that she can no longer retain possession of Cuba to render the island worthless to any other power at the hazard of making it a source of hazard to this country; and that England is disposed to concur in such a measure. Though unwilling to believe * * yet the suggestion is not too idle to attract some attention." The Spanish authorities had connived at the introduction of thousands of African slaves, and there were some in America who urged that the separation of Cuba from Spain would remedy the evil. Marcy thought that if Cuba enjoyed political rights like Canada, and if the restrictions on the foreign trade were relaxed, the United States would be much less embarrassed in retaining neutral relations with Spain, and that the speculations as to the future destiny of Cuba would cease to be a matter of deep interest on both sides of the Atlantic.

Spain and other powers seemed to believe that the United States Government wanted Cuba regardless of the rights of Spain, and that it connived at the participation by United States citizens in the disturbances on the island, but Marcy

wrote Buchanan that the United States had been the victim of the violations of the law, and not the violator at any time. He declared that he would regret it if the conditions in Cuba should act on the feelings of the United States citizens to impel them to embark in unlawful enterprises against Cuba; but he said that the United States would do her duty by Spain and that there would be no fair occasion for any other nation to intervene.

It was feared that both England and France had made some sort of arrangement to sustain Spanish dominion in Cuba. They had frequently sent vessels to Cuba without giving notice to the United States. The experience of the United States with England in Central America made it the more undesirable to see her assume the duties of a protectorate over Cuba. On July 2, Marcy wrote Buchanan, who was anxious to be regularly advised of the President's policy in regard to Cuba, that the United States would regret to see foreign powers interfere to sustain Spanish rule in Cuba even if it should provoke resistance too formidable to be overcome by Spain herself. He said that in case oppression should excite such strong revolt the oppressor had no more right than the victims to call in foreign nations, and that the United States would resist. "We do not complain that Great Britain enforces her treaty stipulations in regard to *emancipados*; but if it should prove to be true that she is using her influence in furtherance of a design to fill that island with emigrants from Africa, in order that when Spanish rule over it shall cease it may become an African colony given over to barbarism she ought to be conscious that she is concurring in an act which in its consequences must be injurious to the United States. Africans thus imported and held in limited servitude, and slaves now on the island converted into apprentices, would constitute but another form of slavery, and it requires the test of experiment to [ascertain] how far such a substitute under the inevitable abuses which would attend it, would mitigate the

evil of the present system." Marcy said that, whatever might be the political condition, Cuba was a neighbor with whom intercourse was unavoidable, and that it must not be used by others as an instrument of annoyance to the United States—that Great Britain with so many reasons for maintaining friendly relations with America should not concur in any measure as to Cuba which would be adverse to the welfare and tranquillity of the Union. Marcy, in instructing Buchanan to get the views of England, said: "If you should ascertain that Great Britain had entered into * * engagements with Spain to uphold her connection with Cuba, under any modification to it which is likely to be injurious to it or to the well-being of the governments on this continent, you will have recourse to such arguments and persuasions as in your judgment will induce her to abandon them."

The administration saw that its Cuban policy must depend upon circumstances. If an attempt was to be made to obtain Cuba, the annexationists of the administration saw that it would be necessary to operate with great caution, because there were difficulties which would be hard to overcome unless the Spanish authorities should commit some indignity which would give the Government an opportunity to act with a united people behind it. The difficulties of direct purchase were discussed in an interview with Soule before he went to Madrid. On July 23, Marcy wrote him that there was no use to negotiate a purchase, for that there was at that time no hope of success. His instructions to Soule began with the usual platitudes about our attitude towards Cuba. The policy of the Government under certain contingencies was stated. Nothing was to be done to disturb Cuba's existing connection with Spain unless it changed so as to affect the security of the United States. It was stated that the American Government would regret to see Spain resort to any assistance of a foreign power which might give that power a pretext to interfere in American

affairs. Soule was asked to ascertain how far France and England would use their influence and to get any information which might be important in shaping our future policy as to Cuba. In case Spain was disposed to see the inevitable and to give birth to an independent nation of her own race, Soule was allowed to favor such a plan, but he was warned to "take special care not to excite the suspicion of sinister views on the part of this Government nor to wound the sensibilities of an ancient and proud nation." In case any of Soule's communications should require secrecy, he was requested to use the proper precautions, even if he had to employ a messenger to deliver his despatches to the American agency in London. Marcy was determined that in case Spain did not change her relations to Cuba she must keep the evils of her policy from reaching our Government. He said: "Our flag must be respected and our commerce relieved from embarrassments by Cuban authorities. He urged that discriminating duties should be removed, and that there should be a qualified diplomatic intercourse between the Governor-General of Cuba and the American consul at Havana, in order to prevent irritating occurrences, and for the more expeditious settlement of difficulties.

Soule, in his Franklin costume, was received with marked attention and courtesy by the Queen of Spain, though many had urged her to reject him. He had a disposition to take hold of the blade instead of the handle while playing with knives. He began his career at Madrid by a quarrel. On December 17 he fought a duel with Turgot, the French minister at Madrid, at whose house some criticisms had passed concerning Mrs. Soule's toilet. A few days later he wrote to Marcy that Spain was in the midst of anarchy and that it was difficult to do business. The Ministry did not have the confidence of the Cortes and Senate. The Government was not able promptly to pay the interest on the debt due the United States. There were rumors that the Queen was about to give birth to an illegitimate child, and that her hus-

band would plan to expel her from the throne; foul anecdotes were told of her unbridled passion, in which she exceeded the adventures of Catherine of Russia. Soule said that Spain was under the influence of France; that the French Emperor was opposed to our acquisition of Cuba, and nullified any influence which Soule might be able to gain with the Spanish court or the Government. It was thus plain that Soule could be of no service to America at Madrid, if the two countries desired peace. He only embroiled us in quarrels. He and Calderon, the foreign minister, had quarreled at Washington when the latter was minister at that place, and their relations were not cordial now. Soule succeeded in making himself agreeable to the Queen, but the influential officials and the press hated him. In January and February, 1854, he had no hopes of furthering the interests of this country so long as Calderon was Secretary of Foreign Affairs, but he expected and hoped for a crisis in Spain. The Government could only maintain itself by a system of terror; the treasury was empty; the Queen had wasted her income, and the price of food had doubled. Under such circumstances it was not unlikely that Cuba would rebel, and Soule was anxious to be ready to have powers to meet the crisis. In January and February he asked Marcy for greater power. On February 28 the Cuban officials played into his hands by committing an outrage on the *Black Warrior*.

The *Black Warrior* plied from Mobile to New York, stopping at Havana for mail and passengers. She had always been allowed to carry a cargo for the American port, and no detailed manifest of her load had been required, though this was contrary to the regulation of the Cuban port. But on February 28 a shot ricocheted across her bows, she was stopped, the agent was refused the privilege of correcting her manifest, the cargo was confiscated, and the captain was fined. The captain abandoned the vessel to the Spanish authorities. Spain had the letter of the law on her side, but it had not been observed in previous cases. The Cuban

authorities were neither liberal nor accommodating now. The news caused great excitement at Washington. The United States press demanded apology. "Young America" was jubilant. On March 10, Phillips, of Alabama, offered a resolution in the House of Representatives asking the President for information. The House took up the matter with passion, and strained its lungs before crowded galleries. Pierce turned on the lights in his reply of March 15 and said that Spain had often given us cause for complaint and had delayed to give satisfaction. He did not hope for peace. Conditions in Cuba were becoming more and more a matter of solicitude. There were rumors that the Indians of Mexico were to be taken to Havana to serve as apprentices. The United States Government objected to the apprentice system and said that it would make Cuba an unwholesome neighbor. The process that was used to give freedom to the *liberados* was creating discontent among the Cubans and threatened to disturb the tranquillity and prosperity of Cuba—so Marcy said. He saw that the Spanish authorities grew more regardless of our honor and rights, that annoyances increased, that our flag was insulted, and that our citizens were imprisoned. On the day following that on which the news of the *Black Warrior* arrived in Washington, he wrote to Buchanan that Spain could hardly allow such conduct unless she expected England and France to be ready to come to her aid as they had done in 1851-2; and he significantly suggested that whether they would respond might be tested before the adjustment of the *Black Warrior* affair. He also wrote Soule stating that the "offending authorities are at our doors and the authorities to which we are obliged to apply for redress are in another hemisphere." He thought those who did the wrong should have the power to redress it. Speaking of the *Black Warrior* as only one of the long list of unredressed wrongs, he said that the interference of England and France in the recent disturbances in Cuba "may have emboldened Spain" to

experiment upon the patience of the United States, but that they could not influence us to deviate from a course of justice to United States citizens and of honor to our flag. On March 17 he again wrote to Soule enclosing documents as to the *Black Warrior* affair, and said the United States would be justified in demanding immediate satisfaction of the wrong-doers at Havana, and in case of their refusal, to take redress into our own hands; but he hoped that Spain would make reparation and show her displeasure to the Cuban officials. Spain was expected either to disavow or assume responsibility for their act. Three hundred thousand dollars indemnity was asked.

The suspicious vigilance of the Cuban authorities annoyed and injured American citizens, interrupted commerce and endangered relations with Spain. It was said that Spain upheld her dominion only by arbitrary power. The change of policy in Cuba, in order to supply the demand for agricultural laborers, had increased discontent and created alarm there, and made the people more adverse to Spanish rule and more willing to come under the protection of the United States. On April 3, 1854, Marcy sent Soule confidential instructions as to the purchase of Cuba, stating that the unsettled condition of political questions in Spain and the troubles which might arise in Cuba on account of the new experiment there were circumstances which might "open the way to the accomplishment of the object so much desired by the United States." He said: "In view of the contingencies which may arise the President has deemed it proper that you should be furnished with full power to enter into a convention or treaty for the purchase of Cuba." Marcy hoped that the enlightened statesmen of Spain could see that the period for the dissolution of the connection with Cuba was fast approaching, and that the burden of sustaining her rule was fast increasing. He thought it would be to Spain's advantage to anticipate events and to secure the advantage of a cession to the United States. He referred to the natural connection of Cuba with the United States, and instructed

Soule to present the subject in such a way that the previous national prejudices as to the West Indies would be overcome. He realized that the renewal of the attempt to purchase would be a delicate negotiation. He considered \$100,000,000 a liberal price, but he stated that the President would not have the negotiation to fail even if an additional \$30,000,000 were required. In case Spain would not transfer Cuba, then Soule was to direct his attention to the next most desirable object—to detach Cuba from Spanish dominion and from dependence upon European power, for it was thought that Spain might be induced to consent to the independence of Cuba, even though her pride would not permit her to sell it. Marcy thought that if Cuba was left to dispose of herself, as her interests indicated, the anxiety of the United States as to her future condition would be relieved. He said the people of Cuba should be a party to any arrangement which might be made for her independence, though there was no political organization there at that time which could act for the people. In case that a relaxation of despotic rule should permit the organization of the people politically, he said: "The United States would readily countenance and aid its efforts to release the island from dependence on Spain." Soule was asked to get details of the new system affecting slavery in Cuba.

It was April 7 when a special messenger reached Madrid and placed the instructions of March 17 into the hands of Soule. Here was a chance for the latter to redeem himself from the place which he had held since the duel. He might make himself leader of his party at home by one fell swoop which would give us Cuba. He was furious for retaliation over the *Black Warrior* affair. Barringer, in Paris, on his road home from Madrid, said that Spain would procrastinate as usual, and that there would be no war—that Spain would set up some counter-claim. But Soule resolved to be as swift as Napoleon. He asked Calderon for an interview, and on April 8 he gave him a history of the *Black*

Warrior affair and stated that the President hoped that Spain would make reparation and show her displeasure to the Cuban officials. Calderon desired to wait for another Cuban mail. Soule would not wait; he insisted upon an immediate response. Having no reply, on April 11, though it was Holy Week, he urged that there be no delay in making reparation for the insult, and demanded \$300,000 and the dismissal of the Cuban officials within forty-eight hours. Mr. Perry, the secretary of the legation, appeared before Calderon de la Barca, and looking at his watch, said: "It is now twelve o'clock. At this hour to-morrow I am instructed to call again. If the response is not ready, His Excellency wishes his passports." "My God, young man!" said Calderon; "his passports! Does Mr. Soule mean war?" Honest, experienced Calderon sent the note, and the passports were not demanded. But Soule had exceeded his instructions.

Calderon's reply to the peremptory demands and acrid language of Soule was couched in terms of haughty dignity. It was doubtless surmised that Soule had exceeded his instructions. He said that time must be given to hear both sides of the case, and intimated that Soule's peremptory manner suggested the suspicion that the demand was a pretext for exciting estrangement and quarrel between Spain and the United States. It was a dignified reply and a severe reprimand to Soule, whose opportunity to negotiate for the purchase of Cuba had thus been checked before he received the instructions which Marcy had prepared on April 3, and which were now on their way to Madrid in the care of a special messenger, Colonel Sumner. Under the circumstances Spain would probably have had the sympathy of both England and France in case of war, but the Eastern affairs did not give Spain any hope of aid from them. In Spain, war was considered very probable, but it was believed that it would be hard for the United States to win Cuba. If Havana had been taken, Spain could have

given the slaves their freedom in order to induce them to fight the invaders.

England had long pressed her demands to secure the suppression of the slave trade by the examination of the titles by which slaves were held, and, a few days after Calderon's dignified note to Soule, the Spanish Government announced its intention of acceding to this request and providing for better regulation of the slaves in Cuba. Reinforcements were soon sent to guard Cuba from attack. On May 4, Lord Russell informed Parliament that the conditions of the Spanish agreement were agreeable to England. On May 1, Slidell, referring to the new provisions as to slaves in Cuba and as to the employment of coolies in India, offered a resolution that the committee on foreign relations should inquire into the expediency of suspending our neutrality laws in case the conditions should demand it. He thought that if the flag of revolution were once raised in Cuba, the country would be free. But the proposition to encourage the operations of filibusters was not taken up by the Senate. Public sentiment in the United States was against such a measure and was opposed to any attempt to manufacture a war out of the *Black Warrior* affair. Northern sentiment was such that the administration thought it wise to oppose a proposition which had been made to place \$10,000,000 at the disposal of the President and to authorize him to prepare the army and navy for action.

When the Calderon-Soule correspondence arrived at Washington the excitement over the *Black Warrior* had subsided. The ship and her cargo had been released and the fine remitted. Spain had settled the matter with the owners of the vessel and they were satisfied with the termination. The United States had no longer cause for complaint, for no insult had been offered to the American flag. Soule had expected that he would be ordered to demand his passports and that war would follow. The substance of the demands of Soule and their refusal leaked out through the Spanish Government, and when the people of the United States read

the newspaper reports they were not in favor of rushing into war in order to prop up the declining reputation of Soule. Davis and Cushing in the Cabinet urged that he should be sustained. Davis and other influential men from the South desired the President to demand swift satisfaction from Spain. There was talk of an early possibility of a blockade of Cuban ports and the probability of an early opportunity to pluck Cuba from the Spanish apple tree. It was held by Jefferson Davis and others that we had a right to interfere with a fire in our neighbor's house if the flames threatened to spread to our own house; that Spanish Cuba threatened our prosperity, and that the island must be taken even in face of the defiance of all Europe. They would have pounced upon Spain without regard to the opinion of the civilized world. The President and other members of the Cabinet thought it better to wait for further despatches. But for awhile the Cabinet became more and more disposed to sustain Soule.

There was much Southern sentiment in favor of a pretext that would cause a war and lead to the increase of slave territory. The difficulty of getting Cuba by purchase was realized. Many pretended to believe that the condition of the island was alarming—that England was endeavoring to control its future by inducing Spain to take steps toward the emancipation of the slaves, and that France had guaranteed Cuba to Spain on these conditions. There was no desire to have a second San Domingo under our very nose. News reached Washington of an impending revolution on account of the fear which the Creole proprietors had that the authorities were laying plans to emancipate the slaves in accordance with some Anglo-Spanish compact. On May 3 a decree was issued freeing 15,000 slaves. On May 25 there was another decree for enrolling and arming the negroes and mulattoes. These decrees, the project of importing negroes from Africa as apprentices, the institution of free schools for the instruction of the blacks, and the

legalization of marriages between blacks and whites, indicated to the slaveholders of the United States that Spain was determined to hold Cuba by the emancipation of slavery. British influence was seen in it all. A gentleman in Cuba said: "In every step taken the British finger is constantly seen." The British consul openly said that his Government had long been urging the measure. The indignation of the Creoles who had been victims of Spanish duplicity was very great. One of them wrote that confidence and credit had ceased, that the banks had suspended, that the whites trembled for their life and property, that the abolition of slavery was certain, and that the tardy intervention of the United States might render it impossible to remedy the evil. He said: "An act accomplished will shortly be the abolition of slavery in Cuba, and the tardy intervention of the United States will only have taken place when its brilliant constellation lights up the vast sepulchre which will cover the bodies of her sons, sacrificed to the black race as a reward for their sympathies with American institutions, and the vast carnage it will cost to punish the African victors. What can be done to-day without great sacrifices to help the Cubans, to-morrow cannot be achieved without the effusion of rivers of blood, and then the few surviving Cubans will curse an intervention which, deaf to their cries, will only be produced by the cold calculations of egotism. Then the struggle will not be with Spain alone." It was said that the governor-general might be expected to take a still bolder stand if the war in the East should not have required the French and English vessels.

The English Government assured Buchanan that England had no desire to throw Cuba into the hands of the negro population, but had only urged the abolition of the slave trade; that she had never tried to exercise any influence over Spain as to the condition of the slaves in Cuba; that she had "not the most remote idea in any event of ever attempting to acquire Cuba,"

for that she already had more colonies than were profitable for her. On March 11, 1854, Marcy wrote Buchanan that the feeling in the United States in regard to the rumored Anglo-French protectorate over Cuba had been recently revived by a speech of Lord Clarendon in reference to the unity of policy and action of England and France in matters affecting both hemispheres. Marcy had recently seen evidence of the "happy accord" of these two nations in the attitude of their ministers as to the American influence in Hawaii, and he wanted to know the objects of their joint policy in the western hemisphere. "This assumed guardianship," said he, "over affairs in this part of the world will not be acquiesced in by the United States," and it was more than mere curiosity that led him to ask for information. Before Buchanan received Marcy's note, he had conversed with Lord Clarendon as to the British attitude toward Cuba. Clarendon said: "Great Britain and France have not entered into any treaty or understanding, direct or indirect, of any kind whatever, concerning Cuba or in relation to the present or prospective condition of Cuba; we have never even thought of such a thing, nor have we the least intention to adopt such a course." Clarendon stated that Cuba was wretchedly governed, but that the ancient alliances with Spain caused England to feel sympathy for her. The English Government probably did not want the United States, her commercial rival, to possess Cuba, but Cobden received cheers on April 4, when he said it would be for the interest of humanity if the United States, or any other power that would stop the slave trade, should possess the island. In August the Earl of Clarendon, referring in the House of Lords to the fears in the United States that England intended to Africanize Cuba and establish a black republic there, said that the report had been frequently denied by the British Government, and that all that England asked of Spain was to observe treaties and put down the slave trade.

Notwithstanding the denials of the English Government, such men as Benjamin and Slidell continued their endeavors to stir up the people by the discussion of such reports as had once served to arouse public opinion in favor of the annexation of Texas. On May 24, Benjamin presented to the Senate a resolution from the Legislature of Louisiana concerning the English policy in Cuba. Clayton, of Delaware, did not think that Spain would attempt to blow up the powder magazine in Cuba unless there was danger of piratical attacks from the United States; he said that the United States was interested in having the slave traffic stopped if she was ever to possess Cuba, and informed Mr. Benjamin that when police officers found recently imported and non-registered slaves they were bound to declare them free according to treaties of Spain with foreign governments, and that it was necessary to apprentice them for a year to prevent them from starving. Senator Seward saw nothing to warrant apprehension. The condition of Spain and Europe would prevent England from desiring to create any tangles with the United States, and he did not favor interference with the local affairs of Cuba.

As the success of the Kansas-Nebraska bill became assured, the warlike disposition of most of the Cabinet towards Spain grew. It looked as if the administration would register all the demands of the slavery leaders, and recklessly adopt a policy which would end in the acquisition of more slave territory. It was thought that from the course of thick-coming events Cuba would necessarily be admitted. After the passage of the bill, some were determined to acquire Cuba, "utterly reckless of consequences"—even if it should be necessary violently to throw open the gates of the temple of Janus. The *Richmond Enquirer*, in the enthusiasm of the hour of victory, said that the United States should break entirely with Spain on account of the *Black Warrior* affair, and that the conservative Senators must grasp the significance of the crisis

and act—for that “while they doze in their seats and dream of obsolete conventionalities, the irreparable wrong may be consummated and Cuba lost forever.” The South would tolerate no lukewarmness in carrying out the schemes for annexation—it was the only possible way that it could indemnify itself for concession to antislavery fanaticism. The North was asked to forge new chains to hold itself in obedience to the frowns of the slaveholders who desired Spanish apples. The *Enquirer*, looking to the possibility of the disruption of the Union, said that “with Cuba as a member of a great southern confederacy, slavery might bid defiance to its enemies.”

It was not feared that France would have interfered if the United States had decided upon war, but the excitement which grew out of the Kansas-Nebraska legislation rendered it impossible to secure the annexation of Cuba by any war which the slavery extensionists might have inaugurated for that purpose. It is not likely that the people would have submitted to annexation—even with the full sanction of England and France. The Northern feeling on this subject was so strong that the moderate element of the Pierce administration did not dare to make the *Black Warrior* affair a pretext for an unjust war of conquest. In the face of the gathering storm, Marcy, backed by the almost unanimous feeling of the North, succeeded in preventing Pierce from being dragged into a war policy. The South had unwittingly lost the chance to annex Cuba, while it had manipulated to extend slavery into the free territory of Kansas. Political promenades and rambles in the fields of the West and North kept liberalism working silently against the weakening institution of slavery, and no dam could stop the advancing stream against human bondage. There was a feeling growing wider and deeper that the world had advanced since the days when the customs of Israel were codified into a book of laws; that though slavery had been beneficial in one age and place, it did not become a positive good for all time to come; that precedents do not bind the

hands and feet of all ages. On May 24, a Democratic convention in Indiana passed a resolution to support the Nebraska bill, but on the next day the free Democrats met at Indianapolis and denounced the bill as an insult and a cold-blooded conspiracy against humanity. Members of Congress who opposed the bill issued a protest. They said that the free states had lost all guarantee for freedom in the territories as provided by former compromises; that the measure was looking forward to further extension of slavery—to the annexation of Cuba and parts of Mexico without regard to the cost of money and blood, to an alliance with Brazil to extend slavery into the Amazon valley, and to secession and empire.

The filibusters still had been hoping to carry on their designs unhindered by federal interference. They were hoping to stir up sentiment enough to prevent Pierce from interfering with their actions. Quitman, the former Governor of Louisiana, and the friend of Jefferson Davis, had organized a "Cuban army" by May, 1854, and it was openly stated that Mississippi rifles in the hands of Mississippi sharp-shooters would soon "tell the tale on Spanish soldiers" if money could be obtained to support the expedition. The state of Soule's negotiation worked into the hands of these nineteenth century buccaneers, who would have enjoyed nothing more than to have involved Spain and the United States in a war over the *Black Warrior* affair. On May 31, the President warned the filibusters that the neutrality laws would be enforced. Quitman was soon arrested. Mallory and others protested against our neutrality policy. Singleton, of Mississippi, in the House of Representatives, on June 14, said there had been no parallel case in history where recruits to a country striving for liberty had been run down by the revenue cutters of their own government, and added: "I mean to record the prediction here to-day, that when Cuba shall have risen to independence as a nation, or, from force of circumstances, shall have become a part of the United States, as she most certainly

will do, the historian who records the events of this age will set down to the account of the late administration the charge of having interposed unnecessary obstacles to the progress of civil liberty and the independence of an oppressed people." Singleton favored almost any policy that would "either kill or cure," and save Cuba from being socially and politically victimized by the cupidity and corruption of the Spanish Government. He said that the only bow of promise to Cuba was the chivalry of our citizens, and he favored action. "While we have been enforcing our neutrality laws and talking of non-intervention," said he, "England has been secretly * * * moulding public opinion and controlling the affairs of that island; * * * while we have thundered from these halls and paraded in pompous ceremony in our diplomatic intercourse with England * * * she has steadily persevered in her negotiations with Spain in regard to Cuba." He thought there was danger of Cuba becoming the Constantinople of America; her rich soil, salubrious climate, her shores washed by the Gulf Stream and her vicinity to the rich treasures of the Mississippi destined her to become a "cornucopia." Nature had written on her a destiny far above that of a subjugated province, and her home was to be in the bosom of the North American confederation. Singleton favored a policy by which we would not be referred to "Madrid, where law is never vindicated and justice never administered." He said the Government should demand an apology of Spain, secure Spanish assurances that there would be no repetition of arbitrary acts by Cuban authorities, and require a Spanish tribunal to settle Cuban difficulties. If these could not be obtained, his policy was to blockade Cuba and "take it forever." Latham, of California, said that there was no desire to take forcible possession of Cuba until all peaceable means had failed. He did not desire to embark into a venture which would be opposed by foreign interference and which would require months to subdue Cuba. He favored neither

noisy diplomacy nor filibusterism as a means of getting Cuba, and said: "When we strike a blow for Cuba it must be but one, and when it is struck Cuba must be irretrievably ours. * * * This cannot be done by windy diplomacy or by resolutions in Congress, which gives the world warning of our intentions and prospects, and the pith and substance of our foreign policy. Nor can it be accomplished by long and formidable discussions in this or the other House by an attitude assumed by members or senators, or by display of patriotic eloquence whose thunder is perhaps calculated to shake the foundations of Morro Castle." He saw that England had conquered India, not by resolutions of Parliament, but by hard fighting, silent diplomacy, and skillful management.

It was not until June 22, that Marcy wrote Soule of the decision of the Government in the *Black Warrior* affair. Though the matter had been settled with the owners of the vessel, Marcy emphasized the statement that the nation had been insulted by the attempt to plunder its citizens and by the unsatisfactory manner in which Spain replied to the demand for indemnity. He expressed himself at length, devoting some seventeen pages of foolscap to his remarks. Referring to the wanton abuse of power by subordinate officials in Cuba he said that as long as Cuba was one of the Spanish dependencies Spain was responsible for the authorities which she placed over it and for the injuries to other nations by their conduct. He was urgent in his pressure for reparation, and made a solemn appeal for the adjustment of all the questions relating to Cuba.

Calderon never saw this despatch, and it was not shown to the new minister of foreign affairs until December 8. Soule did not get an opportunity to point his pistol at Spain's breast over the *Black Warrior* affair. The lightnings and artillery of rhetoric and oratory passed harmlessly by. Although Marcy had gone into a full statement of the *Black Warrior* case, and complained of the manner in which the

Spanish Government acted, he immediately proceeded to instruct Soule that he was not expected, at that time, to take any further steps as to the affair. In a note of June 24 he expressed satisfaction with the way in which Soule had performed his diplomatic duties, but he stated that weight and efficiency might be added to the negotiations by associating two other diplomats with him. There was little hope of a satisfactory adjustment of the claims against Spain, but Marcy thought it would be well to propose a commission before resorting to an extreme measure. He did not believe with the knight-errant Soule that Spain should apologize or fight at once. While he had some of the stinging characteristics of a hornet he was too much of a cool-headed nineteenth century diplomat to be bound strictly by all the menaces which his words had conveyed. While Marcy did not want to stir up a war in order to get Cuba, he still advocated its acquisition by purchase, and Soule was instructed to open negotiations if the opportunity presented itself. On June 27, he informed Buchanan confidentially that the purpose of purchasing Cuba had been revived. He enclosed a copy of his instructions of June 22 to Soule, and also his confidential note of June 24, giving the ulterior course of the United States. As to the ulterior course, he was anxious that England should have no intimation, but he informed Buchanan that there could be no harm, if the opportunity presented itself, in reading to Clarendon the American side of the *Black Warrior* affair.

Soule awaited with great anxiety for the weeks that elapsed until he heard whether his course would be sustained by the Government at Washington. Newspaper reports were not encouraging and he thought of resigning his place. Congress had not responded to the President's message of March 15. The President's proclamation against the filibusters was a disappointment to him, and he saw the doom of his designs. At last Marcy's letters of June 22, and June 24, reached him, and it seemed that they came at a favorable

time to renew negotiations. A revolution had broken out in Spain. Ferdinand's widow, Mother Christina, once the hope of Spain, was now detested by all. She was accused of a long list of abuses and neglects, and the people pronounced her guilty. Her palace was sacked and her life threatened, and Soule had to offer her the shelter of his own house. On August 27, the council decided to expel her from the country, and she left the next day. The revolution resulted in a change of ministers, greatly improved Soule's condition, and strengthened the hopes of Marcy for the purchase of Cuba. Soule himself was accused of having a hand in the outbreak. Pierce had decided not to acquiesce in the demands of the Southern extremists—that the filibusters be allowed to put their shoulders to the wheel and take the initiative in furnishing the means by which Cuba could take off her trans-Atlantic yoke, and hoist the standard of revolution. He desired to solve the Cuban problem in another way; and he was hoping that Congress would place at his disposal several million dollars, and give him power to meet any emergency that might arise, and then adjourn as soon as possible. But, on August 3, the Senate committee on foreign affairs decided not to recommend such a measure, and, on August 7, Congress adjourned *sine die*.

In June, when Marcy thought that there was no hope for a satisfactory adjustment of the claims against Spain, and believed that there were especial future difficulties, he had suggested that the Madrid negotiation might be better conducted by associating two or three other diplomats with Soule. The extraordinary commission which he suggested was intended to be preparatory to resorting to an extreme measure. On August 16, Marcy wrote Soule that this purpose was abandoned "for reasons not here stated." He said that the recent revolution in Spain and the change of ministry altered the aspect of things. He instructed Soule to press the Cuban subject as bearing on the relations to the

United States rather than to urge claims for the past, for he said, "it is far less important to settle an account with Spain as to the past than to make satisfactory arrangements for the future." President Pierce had great hopes of realizing the views that had been expressed in Soule's instructions. It was thought better to use the claims against Spain as a leverage rather than to push their settlement. There was no reason to believe that any expedition was being organized against Cuba at that time, but the unadjusted controversies rendered it more difficult for the Government to perform its duty. On August 16, Marcy wrote Soule that it would be advisable for him to meet Mason and Buchanan and to exchange views as to the acquisition of Cuba. This led to the Ostend manifesto.

While the voices of cannon were resounding on the Bosphorus around the battlements of Sebastopol to settle the Eastern question, Buchanan, Soule and Mason, with their secretaries, met at Ostend, Belgium, to settle the Western question—to prepare to perform an office of philanthropy to the Cubans by annexing them to the land where many of their sons were educated and toward which they were supposed to be manifestly destined. Public opinion was much divided upon the most decent manner to avoid or settle the Cuban puzzle. Those who agreed as to *what* should be done, often disagreed as to *how* it should be done or *why* it should be done. Some said we sought the annexation or independence of Cuba because we "sympathized with the race ruled by bayonets;" others said that annexation was desired in order to thwart the designs of England. England had one Gibraltar and she might want another. With her fleets on the Gulf and Lakes, and by taking possession of Texas, the *Southern Quarterly Review* said that with a small land force she could paralyze one-half of the Union, take Oregon, and spread insurrection. Still others stated that they desired to prevent a second Hayti from springing up at the entrance of the Gulf. Some frankly admitted that

the purpose of annexation was to extend slavery. A citizen of New Orleans, in *De Bow's Review* for November, 1854, said that the security and continuance of the Union depended upon the safety of the South, and that the safety of the South depended upon the extension of its "peculiar institutions." Governor Quitman's private letter showed his desire for slavery extension. He wrote: "The great question of our age and generation is whether the American or European policy shall prevail on this continent. Of this great question Cuba is the battle-ground for its solution. * * * Our destiny is intertwined with that of Cuba. If slave institutions perish there they will perish here. Thus interested, we must act."

A Spanish writer favored the pacific annexation of Cuba to revive industry in the island. An article in *Blackwood's Magazine* suggested annexation as a means by which Spain could get money to revive her gloomy prospects—to pay her debts, to build roads and railways, and to relieve her from the burden of fleets and armies. Some in Spain were disposed to burn the last cartridge before selling. Negroes in Cuba, it was said, would oppose attacks by American "pirates;" and it was not so certain that all in Cuba except the Spanish would cling to the neck of the American Eagle. Nevertheless, it was generally believed that with American tenacity and Spanish weakness the acquisition of Cuba was but a question of time. Some writers of the time said that its retention by Spain was more a question of pride than of profit—the force of events might take it away from her later without compensation. Of those in the United States who wanted Cuba, some wanted to buy her and some to steal her. Some said that the best way to get her was to let her free herself as Texas had done. There were rumors of expeditions being organized to hasten events, but the Government favored neutrality. In November, De Cueto, the Spanish minister at Washington, was alarmed at the rumors of a conspiracy at New Orleans for an expedition to Cuba.

He informed Secretary Marcy that some had openly boasted of having infringed the neutrality laws, and he called attention to the *Louisville Democrat* of October 16, which contained the following letter from John Allen, who, for want of money, had disbanded his "army" of filibusters: "To the public.—Twice have Americans attempted the freedom of Cuba and failed. For the third attempt I was solicited to command. * * * I organized 1500 Kentuckians eager to avenge the death of Crittenden, Logan and other brave men whose blood hallows the soil of that beautiful island. Delay has defeated the object dearest to my heart. * * * Means proffered have not been received. * * * Cuba will yet be free. The iron hoof of oppression may crush her people to the earth, her rights be desecrated by despotic rule; but the time is not long, and Kentucky will aid her people to achieve freedom."

The Ostend manifesto was the result of the Ostend conference. Soule prepared an elaborate document and submitted it to Buchanan, who wrote the original draft of the manifesto. Soule corrected it some, and softened it by a few moral paragraphs and moral reflections. Judge Mason corrected only a few verbal inaccuracies. These three diplomats agreed that the United States should make earnest efforts to purchase Cuba. The Ostend manifesto, which was dated at Aix-le-Chapelle, October 18, 1854, undertook to show that the United States must have Cuba in order to insure peace with Spain and to preserve the existence of the American Union. It said that its sale would benefit both the United States and Spain, and suggested how the latter could profitably use the money for paying debts and building railroads. In case Spain should refuse to sell, her stubbornness was to be ascribed to the malign influence of European powers; and it was intimated that the United States might then enter the list of filibusters, and be justified, by human and divine law, in wresting Cuba from Spain just as a man might for self-preservation tear down his

neighbor's burning house if it endangered his own. It was stated that it would be base treason against our posterity if we should make no effort to avert a catastrophe which might result from the Cuban policy as to African labor. In transmitting the joint report of the Ostend conference, Soule told Marcy that if Cuba was to bring upon us the calamity of war, it would be a favorable time while the great powers were engaged in the Crimean War.

Mr. Evans, of Texas, in the House of Representatives, once said that the meeting at Ostend was an opportune event by which Soule and others hoped to get the Cabinet at Washington to acquiesce in a scheme to co-operate with the revolutionists in Europe, and to seize Cuba for reparation for past injuries. He held that the subordinates of Soule, Buchanan and Mason were all men of violent revolutionary tendencies, and that "Mr. Saunders, as a stimulus to the expected insurrectionary impulse, circulated the revolutionary addresses of Mazzini and Ludro Rollin through the despatch agency of the American legation, both to France and other European countries." In December, 1854, Marcy, in a strictly confidential letter to Buchanan, said, "I am certain you have not consented to have your name connected with Saunders' political operation in Europe," and he hoped that he had not allowed the legation stamp to be used on Saunders' letters. Whatever may have been the connection of Soule and others with the European revolutionists it is safe to say that Marcy and Pierce did not encourage their schemes, and that the Ostend conference did not originate with a desire to arrange co-operation with the revolutionists of Europe.

The manifesto was received with grins by the diplomats of Europe and with ridicule in America. Such a "stand and deliver" style of diplomacy was something new in the American republic. It was something new in history to plan a burglary of such proportions and publish the prospectus in advance. Don Piatt, secretary of the American legation

at Paris, said that the Ostend conference was a trap set by Marcy to catch political aspirants—that he had no special use for either Buchanan, Soule or Mason, and that he must have chuckled over the Ostend document. Piatt said that Soule sought Cuba for manifest destiny, Mason for the Southern Confederacy, and Buchanan for the presidency. Perhaps Marcy saw in this appeal to the people his only chance to secure the suicide of obnoxious politicians. At least he drew a heavy line across the Ostend manifesto, and Pierce nodded his acquiescence in the disapproval. He did not propose to commit political suicide by swallowing the pill that had been prepared for him (and the people) at Ostend. He now invented a sugar-coated pill—using plenty of sugar—which was enclosed in his note to Soule on November 13. He stated that some might construe the Ostend report to recommend to the President “to offer Spain the alternative of cession or seizure,” but that other parts of the report repelled this inference. He held that the seizure of Cuba by the United States would assume that its acquisition was necessary to self-preservation, that Spain had refused reclamation for injuries and wrongs committed, and that she would not provide for our future security. He said that there was no imminent peril at that time, but that in case the contingency suggested in the report should arise there was no doubt but that the case would “be promptly met by the deliberate judgment and decisive action of the American people. Soule was requested not to open the question of cession of Cuba unless he found that it would meet with favor among persons of position and influence. He was to look for a favorable opportunity to enter into negotiations, but he was not to push the question in case there was any probability that it would be rejected. It was not considered that our views concerning the *Black Warrior* would injuriously affect the negotiations, but rather that they would show Spain the difficulties which a continuation of her policy in Cuba would bring upon her. Marcy stated that the American Government would want

some security against the Spanish authorities in Cuba in case the cession of that island had to be abandoned. Soule was asked to impress upon Spain the desire of the United States to have controversies speedily adjusted by negotiation, and the regret which she would feel in resorting to coercive measures.

Soule had done nothing in the *Black Warrior* case. Spain had recently offered to institute a commission to settle all existing claims, but Marcy instructed Soule to decline this offer on the ground that we could not with self-respect permit some of the claims to be submitted to arbitration.

Marcy's sugar-coated pill was bitter enough for Soule, and made him sick of life at Madrid. In December he asked to come home, and there being no sign of objection to his resignation he threw up his salary at Madrid and escaped safely across the ocean. Having beaten clamorously upon the closed doors of annexation, he now beat a safe retreat, while others laughed at the sound he had made. Shortly after his resignation Spain expressed a willingness to settle the *Black Warrior* affair as Marcy had desired. Pierce in his message of 1854 was silent upon the subject of the Ostend manifesto and the project for the purchase of Cuba; but Soule and some of the legation secretaries had been talking, and members of the House of Representatives wanted the President to give them further information. A resolution asking for information was passed but was smothered and buried in the committee-room.

In January, 1815, Boyce, of South Carolina, made the statement in the House of Representatives that the annexation of Cuba was not in the interest of the slaveholders. He was determined not to go to war for Cuba while there was so much to indicate that the South was "upon the eve of a great struggle with the hostile majority of the North," which would, for the time, require all its resources. While others were preparing their mouths to swallow Honolulu, Canada, the Amazon Valley and Cuba, Boyce said that

conservatism, not indefinite extension, was the true mission of the country. He favored a policy of commercial reciprocity with Spain, and said that we should not weaken our position by the acquisition of maritime colonies and the too rapid increase of population. He held that Cuba would be a volcano to threaten the security of slavery in the South, and that its annexation would not be a benefit. "The acquisition of Cuba," said he, "will show a new volume in our history. Former acquisitions were the necessities of location or of circumstance. This is not. By this step we are fairly launched in a career of conquest, from which there is no outlet but to storm the future, sword in hand. From this career we have nothing to hope and everything to fear; for our greatest success would be our greatest disaster."

But the voice of Boyce did not express the feeling of the slavery-extensionists, for they still panted for Cuba as the "hart panteth after the water brooks." The Southern Commercial Convention at New Orleans favored the immediate action of Congress toward the necessary acquisition of Cuba. Chastain, of Georgia, said in the House of Representatives that the only consistent and creditable course for the Government was to send a naval force to Cuba, blockade her ports, and take possession of her territory in the name of justice and freedom, relying on Providence to do the rest. The *Richmond Enquirer* in April, 1855, said that even a menace of a design to Africanize Cuba or to emancipate the slaves, "would be a grievous act of hostility and would authorize the United States to take any means of retaliation or to wage war." It appears clear that the slavery-extensionists were resolved to take the first new opportunity for annexation.

Cases of irritation with Spain still arose. American citizens were imprisoned for using firearms in Cuba, the interest on the debt due the United States was delayed, and there were unfriendly acts by Cuban authorities toward the United States consul. Most of the irritating differences were caused

by a wrong interpretation and application of general principles by irresponsible officials. Spain was opposed to American theories, for she traced the loss of her colonies to the evil example of the United States. The influence of the Anglo-Saxon was feared because it was said that he had been in the habit of driving out other people when it suited his convenience. The condition of Cuba was the sole cause which rendered our relations with Spain critical. Marcy resolved to make another attempt at purchase; and Dodge was sent to Madrid upon the mission with instructions that he was to go prepared to return home if Spain showed no sentiment to entertain cordial relations by change of policy. In his instructions to Dodge on May 1, Marcy stated that the incorporation of Cuba into the Union was essential to the welfare of both countries and was only a question of time; that self-government would come to Cuba as it had come to all other American colonies, and that she would then be inclined to seek association with the United States. He said that in a supposable contingency annexation would be a necessity—that European nations could not be allowed to influence its destiny against the United States. The past relations of Spain with her colonies was mentioned to prove that amicable intercourse was better than colonial monopoly. It was urged that the alienation of Cuba would not be a forfeiture of Spain's national honor, as the Cortes seemed to think. She had ceded territory several times before and she still had her honor. Marcy stated that the policy of the American Union was entirely pacific, that all its wars had been defensive ones, and that we disdained any other means than honorable ones to increase our territory. It had been, and was still, the policy of the Government to repress unlawful enterprises in which individuals attempted to usurp the powers of Congress. As a cure for the evils which existed it was desired that Spain should co-operate to secure peace. The most perfect assurance, it was suggested, would be to make the proposed change of

the sovereignty of Cuba. Next to that, it was proposed that several modifications might be made in the administration of Cuban affairs: (1) The existing siege and blockade of Cuba should cease and the deportment of the local authorities toward American citizens be changed. (2) A commission or consul-general of the United States should have direct communication with the captain-general, who should have power to dispose of controversies. (3) A discussion and settlement of pending questions. (4) A better policy as to the political and social relations of the inhabitants of Cuba. (5) A commercial treaty advantageous to the United States and Cuba. Dodge was asked to exert himself earnestly, and was informed that when the interests and honor of the United States demanded war the fact would be frankly announced.

During the remainder of Pierce's administration there were renewed complaints as to Cuban affairs. John H. Felix, an American citizen in Cuba, was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and sent to Spain. His friends thought him innocent and the United States endeavored to secure his release. Spain was asked to treat his case with leniency in order that the irritating effect of his imprisonment might be avoided. Other pardons were asked for in 1856. The duty on flour in Cuba and Porto Rico practically amounted to a prohibition and in September, 1856, Marcy was encouraged to hope that the dearth of breadstuffs in Spain might induce her to reduce her restrictive tariff in Cuba, but he was disappointed. American citizens who had claims for the losses arising out of the repeal of the Cuban decree of October, 1844, were much dissatisfied on account of delays in investigating the subject. Marcy complained just before Congress met in 1856, that he had not been able to ascertain the disposition of Spain in regard to making some treaty arrangements on the subjects upon which Dodge had been instructed.

Relations with England became ruffled in 1855; the President complained of British interference with affairs in the American continent; the British West India force had been increased and the London newspapers said that the purpose of the increase was to supply the ability, which the American Government seemed to lack, of enforcing its own laws against filibustering by the South. There was also irritation over British enlistments in the United States, and over the controversy as to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and Central America. Marcy said that it looked as though England did not care to preserve cordial relations. He saw nothing to justify her in "holding her head so high," and he said "the prospect, to my prevision, looks a little cloudy, but * * * nous verrons." The leading Whig paper in New York said that the enlistment dispute with England was an attempt to influence the approaching election. During this dispute the rumor that there were designs on Ireland attracted the attention of the British Government. A London paper referring to the rumor was convinced that there were no chances of filibustering in that direction—not even if the rebellious spirit had been still alive there—and stated that the real difficulty between England and the United States was in regard to Cuba, which it claimed was an American question with which England should not meddle. "What do we owe the Spanish Government," it said, "that we should play the Quixote for them in behalf of their worst governed possession?" A writer in the *Westminster Review* saw that American and English interests jostled each other, but that there was a feeling of race which caused kinsmen to aid each other in case of imminent peril to their interests. He said that some in the United States looked forward to the annexation of all North America, and some let their imagination wander to Cape Horn, but that England need not complain for America could say to her: "You have encircled the earth." The writer suggested, that having failed in securing a tripartite arrangement

guaranteeing Cuba to Spain, England should encourage moderation, should not interfere further than to advise emancipation, and that she should approve American annexation where it was peaceable and free. Some of the London ministerial papers, in assigning causes for sending an English fleet across the Atlantic, stated the ridiculous apprehension that Ireland was exposed to an invasion by an expedition from the United States. Marcy was irritated at these newspaper articles, and saw that the real reason for sending the fleet was connected with Cuba. While contemplating this subject on November 12, 1855, he wrote to Buchanan: "There is now and has been for several months less cause to suspect any design to get up an expedition against Cuba than there has been in any other period during several years. I do not understand that any such movement is talked of or thought of at this time in any quarter of the Union." Dallas at London made a prompt demand for explanation, and the British minister disavowed the hostile intentions of the West Indian fleet.

The attitude of the United States to the Walker government was a source of apprehension to both England and Spain. Walker, who had failed in a filibustering attempt against lower California in 1853-4, in 1855 had sailed from New Orleans to conquer Central America. His object was to build up a confederacy of slave states in the south. He soon became the real ruler in Nicaragua. Marcy, whose conduct was governed by what his party said, and who believed that "to the victors belong the spoils," recognized the diplomatic agent which the Nicaraguan Government sent to Washington. Spain feared that Nicaragua was intended as a base against Cuba "by those vagabond invaders who receive applause in the United States." In April, 1856, Alfonso de Escalante had several conferences with Marcy in which he denounced the connivance existing between the Cuban conspirators in the United States and the usurping government of Walker, by which Nicaragua

was to be made a basis of operations against Cuba. He claimed that the details of the scheme had become notoriously known through the newspapers, and that the zeal of the United States Government to prevent their departure had been ridiculed. He strenuously protested and hoped that the United States Government would take the subject under serious consideration, and prevent the departure of people who were armed with unlawful intentions. In April and May Mr. Escalante was still apprehensive of the condition of affairs. The newspapers had reported expeditions preparing in New Orleans. Marcy saw no reason for apprehension and advised Escalante not to pay too much attention to newspaper report. The Government had not countenanced any expeditions, and he stated that the departure of individuals unassociated was not an infringement of our neutrality laws.

There was a general belief at this time that a change in Cuba was impending. The London *Examiner* suggested that Spain should take into consideration a complete revision of her colonial system in Cuba in order to meet the higher grade of general intelligence that was developing there, and that was preparing the way for constitutional government. Many of the planters were citizens of the United States who had settled there and desired annexation to the United States in order to preserve slavery in Cuba. They had considerable influence over the Creoles. A writer in the London *Quarterly Review* advocated English interference in the name of justice, humanity and religion; he admitted the tyranny of Spain, but doubted whether the Creoles would fare any better under the stronger government of the "energetic and unscrupulous Americans." Mr. J. S. Thrasher, in the preliminary chapter of Baron Humboldt's "Island of Cuba," said that the English policy was to strike at the advance of our republicanism in order to advance her own interests—as in all her previous movements. Referring to the British Cabinet as being back of

the Cuban policy and as offering us assurances that Spain would do right in regard to the slavery and other questions, he said, "and when the evil is done, when the work of hate is consummated, when Cuba has perished before the sirocco breath of European philanthropy, and the seeds of dissension and disunion are sown broadcast throughout the length and breadth of this vast confederacy, then may England's statesmen weep crocodile tears over our misfortunes, and be sad in mockery of our fate." To him it seemed that in the course of events Cuba might become the Crimea, and Havana the Sebastopol of the New World.

The importance of Cuba to the United States from a military point of view to protect the commerce of the Mississippi was not so great as formerly. After 1846-7 the greater part of the increasing commerce of the West had been diverted to the East by the lakes and canals. The deflection was further aided by east and west railway lines. Cuba was still important, however, from a military point of view—especially in connection with the control of a route across Central America by which to facilitate communication with distant California. Annexationists emphasized the increasing value of its geographical position. The Panama railway benefited all commercial nations in some degree in a pecuniary sense, but it was urged that it had brought an increase of national power only to the Spanish Government in Cuba, along whose portals the increased tide of national wealth had to pass. Baron Humboldt in his "Island of Cuba" said: "Every waning year increasing the industrial power of the mighty West adds a new value to the strength that attends the geographical position of the island of Cuba."

In spite of all the pleas of the annexationists there was a growing belief that the incorporation of Cuba was full of difficulties for the Union, even if there was a shadow of a chance to purchase it. Fillmore had said that its annexation would be a measure fraught with peril; others thought

that the greatness of a country does not consist in its size, and that it was doubtful whether the United States would gain by lavishing her embraces upon Cuba. An intelligent American in "Pictures from Cuba" said that in spite of "manifest destiny," and "orators of the human race," he could not regard the annexation of Cuba as a probable event. It could benefit neither creole, white, nor negro in Cuba; violent annexation would be ruinous, and America could gain nothing financially by purchase. He urged that any Cuban, reflecting upon the elements of disorder which quivered in Cuba's heart, could not fail to see the ruinous consequences which would follow a sudden and violent disruption of the bond with Spain—be it ever so hateful. As to America, he held that the acquisition would be only a first step in military extravagance—that it would necessitate a large standing army—and that the hostility of the Cuban negroes would cause us more trouble than ever did the Seminoles in the Everglades of Florida. "Should the flame of revolt spread far and wide," said he, "we might as well throw money into the burning crater of a volcano as to waste it upon an attempt to subjugate the island." He said that Southern politicians in their greed for more slave territory, laughing at general laws, failed to see the explosive forces sleeping in the bosom of the island. "To pursue the annexation of Cuba in the interest of Cuba," said he, "is to pursue the doom of the republic"—for we could embark in no worse policy than that of robbery and lucky gambling in "green fields and pastures new."

While the slavery-extensionists sat on the warhorse of democracy, and rode with whip and spur in order to control the course of legislation at Washington, and while the lurid tableau of "popular sovereignty" burned in bleeding Kansas, the sons of toil in many mills and on many farms were gradually forging the resolution that there should be no more extension of slave territory, and that Cuba should not be annexed even under the pretense of cleaning the western seas of Spanish inconveniences.

CHAPTER X.

EXPANSIVE DEMANDS OF A DEFIANT MINORITY.

“Expansion is in future the policy of our country and only cowards fear and oppose it.”

The Cuban enterprise at Ostend gave Buchanan the presidency in 1856, and Douglas felt it slip. Douglas also favored Cuban annexation, but the Ostend manifesto placed Buchanan prominently before the South at the Cincinnati convention. The split in the Democratic party, which was finally to result in defeat, was beginning to be visible; but Buchanan, receiving the nomination, was triumphantly elected. A few days after his inauguration as President, the Supreme Court announced the Dred Scott decision which startled the North and renewed its determination to wrest Kansas from the slave power. The “irrepressible conflict” was approaching. “Whom the gods would destroy they first make mad.” The slavery-expansionists vainly contrived to secure Kansas and Nebraska. They saw that if they lost here their only hope was the acquisition of Cuba, the annexation of Mexico, or secession and organization of a new government.

Buchanan said that the relations with Spain were in a very unsatisfactory condition at his accession. Injuries had been inflicted upon persons and property of American citizens by Spanish officials acting under the control of the Captain-General of Cuba; and for years our ministers had urged claims and been baffled. The Spanish rule in Cuba became even more immoderate in 1857. After 1858 the rule was more moderate and the country was more quiet;

but the restriction on commerce, the tax on agricultural products, and the restraint on white emigration hampered the development of the island, produced irritations in the United States, and gave an opportunity for Cuban annexationists to urge their policy. Buchanan sat in his chair and favored the wishes of the annexationists from the beginning of his administration to the close thereof. Cass, Buchanan's Secretary of State, had long ago placed himself on record as favoring the slavery-extensionists. When he took the portfolio of State, foreign affairs were more peaceful than they had been for several years. Peace existed with all nations, the canvas of our mariners whitened every sea, and the plough of the husbandman was developing the bloodless conquest of the West.

The relations between Spain and Mexico, however, were a source of some anxiety to Secretary Cass. It was seen that a war between them would affect the southern coast of the United States, imperil our relations, and probably lead to violations of neutrality. In asking Dodge for the origin and probable issue of the dispute Cass hoped that the controversy might be adjusted by the Mexican minister. The condition in Mexico was very discouraging. On April 20, 1858, Houston offered a resolution in Congress for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the expediency of making it a protectorate of the United States—under a proper extension of the Monroe doctrine. Such a scheme ultimately would have resulted in possession by the United States. Houston may have intended to divert attention from sectional quarrels, but there was no nostrum or panacea which could quiet the awakening conscience against slavery extension. In October, 1858, Cass learned that a naval and military armament was about to leave Spain to attack Mexico—possibly to acquire political ascendancy there. He immediately, in a confidential letter, informed Dodge that the United States would not permit the subjugation of any of the independent states of the American

continent nor allow the European powers to exercise a protectorate over them or to use any direct influence to control their policy or institutions. There was no concern as to the causes of the war between Spain and Mexico, but it was our policy to prevent permanent subjugation. Dodge was instructed to incidentally inform Spain of this fact. Tassara, the Spanish minister at Washington, called at the State Department to inform Cass that a Spanish naval force had been ordered to Mexico to protect the persons and property of Spanish subjects, and to compel the Mexican Government to do justice to Spain for injuries committed. Shortly afterward President Juarez, of Mexico, in a proclamation, stated that the object of Spain was to re-subjugate a part or all of Mexico. Cass hardly expected Spain to undertake such a large contract, but he thought the United States should be kept informed, and that Spain should be informally reminded of our own views as to interference.

The differences between the American and English cabinets on account of the settlements of England in Honduras, and the desire of the United States to annex Cuba, were happily adjusted by the beginning of Buchanan's administration. J. M. Phillippo, in a book on the "United States and Cuba," in 1857, thought there would be no British feeling against American annexation in case slavery should be abolished, and he said that war between the United States and England would be such a calamity as to "make angels weep." In case America should abolish slavery he suggested the possibility of an Anglo-Saxon alliance. "Then," said he, "the British Lion shall roar for defense around the tents of Judah, while the Eagle of America will rise and flutter over her and spread abroad her wings."

But England still deemed it expedient to keep an eye on American movements around the Gulf. In December, 1857, William Walker, who had been arrested in Nicaragua by Captain Paulding, was brought to the State Department in custody, but Cass and the President would

not recognize him as a prisoner. On January 4, 1858, a resolution of the House of Representatives asked whether Nicaragua had complained of Walker's arrest. In reply, Buchanan thought it proper to make a few observations. Paulding had exceeded his instructions by intercepting Walker after he had reached Nicaraguan soil. Buchanan's disapproval of the conduct of Paulding did not indicate that Nicaragua had sustained any injury; she had rather been benefited. Buchanan said that his own determination to execute the neutrality laws in the United States was as strong as ever. He disapproved such military expeditions as Walker's; he said that it would be better for the Government itself to get up such expeditions than to permit them to be carried on by adventurers; and he stated that in addition to motives of duty, the interests of future American progress should prevent lawless enterprises which could have no other tendency than to cause our neighbors to regard us with suspicion. He preferred to remove the jealousies of our Central American friends. "It is beyond question, the destiny of our race," said he, "to spread itself over the continent of North America, and this at no distant day, should events be permitted to take their natural course. The tide of emigrants will flow to the South, and nothing can eventually arrest its progress. If permitted to go there peacefully, Central America will soon contain an American population which will confer blessings as well upon the natives as upon their respective governments."

Mr. Clingman, who was looking forward to the seizure of Cuba, had, early in the session, offered resolutions that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty should be abrogated, and that Central America, which he urged as now having a relation to the United States similar to that of Louisiana before 1803, should be subject to no foreign power. He also proposed that Congress should authorize the President to employ the land and naval forces to protect the transit route across the Isthmus. Many feared that there was an inten-

tion to occupy the Isthmus. Clingman complained that the failure of the United States to send troops to keep the Nicaragua transit line open had been the cause of Walker's overthrow. He urged that the capture of Walker was unfortunate; that it was calculated to aid the British in Central America, and that it had been "properly appreciated in England and Havana." Clingman said that England in times past had acquired much by filibustering and that she should not now be allowed to become censor of our conscience. He favored the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty as a step toward the ultimate occupation of Central America. Bliss and Giddings felt that Clingman was merely seeking to prepare the way for a seizure of Cuba and Central America. Clingman denied this, but admitted that he was looking forward to it. He said that he wanted to see Cuba annexed and that he would favor seizure, if the difficulties with Spain were not settled.

It appears from a book recently written by J. H. Bloomfield, of London, that there was a filibustering expedition against Cuba in 1858, though it does not seem to have been a subject of correspondence between the governments. Bloomfield says that 285 men, most of whom were young sailors out of employment and desirous of seeing the world, embarked on a vessel at New York and sailed for Cuba; the officers were Captain Ryan and Colonel Ridley, both of whom had served in the Mexican War. After a three weeks' sail, Bloomfield says, their vessel neared the coast of Cuba, and watched for signals from the Creoles, but, seeing a Spanish war steamer, went to Central America. The expedition returned to Cuba later, joined the Creoles, and, according to Bloomfield, had several brushes with the Spanish troops. These belated filibusters soon had enough of it. They sat in wet ditches at night amidst thunder, lightning and rain; they had to forage in the woods for food; and, though they repulsed the enemy, they were finally pursued through swamps and had to swim for their

lives. Bloomfield says that only seven of the expedition escaped and they were saved by boarding the *Ida Kimball*, of Boston, after they had made a midnight swim from the shore amidst sharks. They were doubtless not sorry to escape. It was urged that the building of the Pacific railroad would tend to prevent the spirit of filibustering, but Senator Thompson, of Kentucky, doubted whether these wild spirits could be coaxed to take part in public improvement. "They toil not, neither do they spin," said he, "but they all desire to be officers."

England in the spring of 1858, sent several small cruisers to Cuban waters with orders to board merchantmen suspected of being in the African slave trade. On April 10, Cass complained to Lord Napier of the British pretension, but received no reply. Serious difficulties soon arose. The forcible entry of several American vessels in a port of Cuba by a British armed steamer was reported. Other violations excited deep feeling in the United States and attracted the attention of both Houses of Congress. Over forty vessels flying the American flag were stopped and searched. President Buchanan remonstrated at the pretensions of England to search our vessels on the ocean and on the Gulf of Mexico, and a naval force was ordered to the Cuban waters with directions "to protect all vessels of the United States on the high seas from search or detention by the vessels of war of any other nation." Documents were laid before Congress in answer to resolutions for information. In June there was news of a Spanish vessel of war boarding an American vessel off the coast of Cuba. But this was hardly in accordance with the Spanish policy. The Spanish minister at Washington said that the conduct of the British cruisers had caused much dissatisfaction in Cuba and that the governor-general had given orders to protect merchant vessels from detention and search within the jurisdiction of Spain. The collisions in the West Indies were a subject

of discussion in the British Parliament. In reply to Bright's request for information, Fitzgerald said that the British officers had probably been in error in boarding the American vessels. Mr. Roebuck objected to the language used in the American Congress, but the Chancellor of Exchequer was not displeased that the American vessels had been sent to Cuban waters, and said that England watched the expansion of the United States with no jealousy. Fortunately no collision occurred. The British Government promptly avowed its recognition of the American position as laid down by the Secretary of State at Washington. Lord Palmerston made a satisfactory explanation and disclaimed all right to search or visit vessels against the wishes of the United States Government. He also proposed some mutual arrangement for verifying the nationality of vessels. But he suggested no method by which it could be done. It was evident that the slave traders were using the United States flag to protect their traffic, and the Government offered no suggestion of a means by which it was to be prevented. In November Mr. Cass made complaint against British vessels of war going to San Juan in Central America—on the ground that under existing circumstances it would have an unfavorable influence upon public feeling in the United States. He hoped that no vessels would be sent.

There was to be no political calm. After the election of 1858 secession became the prospective plank of the slavery wing of the Democratic party. The Republican party was getting too close upon the heels of the Democratic machine to make its managers feel comfortable. Douglas in his speeches in the South had endeavored to appease the anger of the slavery-extensionists. In Memphis, on November 29, he said that the United States must get more of Mexico, and would be compelled to take Cuba even if she did not want her. Soon after Congress met in December, President Buchanan said in a speech at the White House: "Expansion is in the future the policy of our country, and

only cowards fear and oppose it." In his message he again stirred up the quieting waters with his divining rod and asked for extensive powers against neighboring nations, and for money to use in getting Cuba. In Mexico, he intimated that interference might be necessary to stop the internal strife. His kindest wishes were for Mexico, but he realized that it was his duty to protect her from foreign powers. Revolutions, constitutions, and governments had followed each other in rapid succession until anarchy and debts seemed to be the chief inheritance of the people. While the antagonistic parties were warring against each other the Americans were caused much trouble on the frontier by the depredations of Indians and wandering Mexicans from Sonora and Chihuahua. Life and property were insecure and our stage and postal connection with the Pacific were threatened. Buchanan said that the laws were dead in that section, and that it would be for the best interest of all parties for the United States to establish a protectorate and military posts in Sonora and Chihuahua. In his message he had much to say about Central America where, he said, it was absolutely necessary that the world should have a highway. The transit route had been closed since 1856, and he recommended that the Government be authorized to act with land and naval forces in order to open it.

Relations with Spain were still unsatisfactory. The American envoy at Madrid had asked for his recall, a year before, and on account of causes not enumerated no new minister had been selected to take his place and to secure adjustment of pending questions; but Buchanan announced in his message that William Preston, of Kentucky, would go to Madrid without delay to make a final attempt to obtain justice. Of all the numerous claims which had been discussed for several years there had been no redress except in two cases. The frequent changes in the Spanish ministry had kept us waiting for novices to investigate our com-

plaints. Some claims which had existed since 1844 were recognized by the Spanish Government; but later it offered to settle by paying only one-third, and without interest. It was said that Spain should arrange so that we could apply directly at Havana for redress, for she always referred back to Havana anyhow. Buchanan felt that Cuba was constantly a source of annoyance—that it was the only place where the African slave trade was still tolerated; that it had been the cause of getting us into several controversies with England; and that it necessitated the keeping of an American squadron on the African coast. He advocated purchase of Cuba in order to end the slave trade and stop the tribal war in benighted Africa. He preferred to get it by a fair purchase, but intimated that self-preservation might compel us to grab it with a strong hand. In order to exert a favorable influence on negotiations with Spain he recommended an appropriation to pay the *Amistad* claim which had so long been refused.

Buchanan was accused of being a tool of the slavery Democrats. All knew that he omitted to mention the principal reason why they desired Cuba. They intended to extend the power of slavery. An editorial in the *Charleston Messenger* said that if Cuba were free the administration would give \$100,000,000 rather than take it. Buchanan asked for money to use in clinching the bargain if Spain should be induced to sell. He desired to arrange for a secret and prompt bargain by making part payment cash in hand. Ready money would probably help the Spanish minister to act. Some thought there had been a dozen times when Cuba could have been thus purchased. Doolittle referred to the advance money as "secret service money." Collamer said it would be looked upon as bribe money for the Spanish officials.

Buchanan wanted Cuba, the message said, to stop the African slave trade, but that was not why the Southern Democrats wanted it. They were opposed to statutes against

the slave trade. In 1845-6 several expeditions to bring slaves from Africa were fitted out at New York and other American ports. English officials complained of it, and Southern papers admitted it. In 1856-8 commercial conventions and meetings, newspapers, writers and politicians favored a repeal of laws and treaties which restricted the slave trade. The representative journals of the South defended slavery as a positive good and said that Southern thought and Southern example must rule the world. Slavery was not only defended as an economical institution, but also as a political and educational institution. De Bow's *Review* stated that slavery as a moral, educational institution, was "worth more than ten times all the common schools in the North." It was claimed that the South was leading opinion in proposing a renewal of the slave trade—and that she must also originate a new political science based upon the principle that "the world is too little governed." The principles of Jefferson had been obscured—eclipsed by material interests.

On January 3, Preston was given his instructions as minister at Madrid. He was furnished with full power to negotiate for the purchase of Cuba, and was asked to urge the necessity of a convention for the settlement of vexed questions. He was also asked to inform Spain that we wished full pay for our just claims. It was desired that Spain should also disavow the arrest of an American steamer on the high seas by the Spanish war vessel *Ferrolana*. On January 18, the Senate asked the President for any unpublished correspondence which had passed as to the purchase of Cuba. Buchanan replied that there was no correspondence, but that the previous consent of Congress was important in order to secure the success of such a project.

Reuben Davis, on December 22, had asked for the unanimous consent of the House to introduce a resolution that the committee on foreign affairs be instructed to report a bill authorizing and requiring the President to take and

retain possession of Cuba unless within six months the sum of \$128,635.54—acknowledged in 1854 by the Spanish Government as justly due American citizens for duties unjustly exacted at different custom-houses at Cuba after 1834—be paid, and satisfaction be given to the President for the insults offered to our flag and for the injuries inflicted upon the persons of our American citizens. Mr. Morgan, of New York, objected. The next day Davis made a second attempt, but Ritchie objected. On January 21, Davis, while considering the President's message, made a speech on Cuba, in which he tried to justify his resolution and show the right of making reprisals on Spanish property for debts due. He confessed Spain might make it a cause of war, but in case she did, he said that she would be answerable for the consequences. He stated that Spain had delayed long enough and that he favored war as a necessary evil—to preserve our national honor.

The message of Buchanan called forth considerable foreign comment. *La Patrie*, of Paris, said that to protect Cuba against the "covetous Americans" Spain ought to count on England who owned Jamaica, and that the most infallible means of securing to Spain the possessions of Cuba was to abolish slavery there. Marshal O'Donnell, in the Chamber of Deputies, when asked if the Spanish Government intended to reply to Buchanan's message, said: "Never will it [Spain] abandon the smallest portion of its territory; and the proposition having that tendency will always be considered by the government as an insult to the Spanish people." The Cortes agreed with much applause. Time had consecrated Cuba and associated it with the traditions of Spanish history. Spain felt it did not desire annexation to the United States.

Dark horizon clouds in Italy indicated trouble in Europe. The angry passion of European people was seen flashing along the surface like lurid lightning. Might it not be the dawn of a revolution that would drench Europe in blood?

One match might fire the magazine and make a thunder that would quake all the country from the Urals to the Pyrenees, sundering alliances and keeping the powers busy at home with their war harness on. The condition of affairs in Europe together with the periodic freaks of the Spanish Government it was thought might give an opportunity for action as to Cuba. No one expected Spain to say "yes" at that time, but some hoped that the Spanish Ship of State might soon change its crew, according to its past custom, and open the way for easy purchase. It was said that no European power would so long have left so tempting a prize untouched. England was sweeping on to the East and South; France was organizing the Arabs of North Africa, the granary of the Roman world; Russia was piercing Asia at every vulnerable point, with her lances; Spain had joined France in her designs on China. Why should not the United States pick up a sinking gem from the Caribbean. There was a revival in Congress of talk in favor of manifest destiny. Men looked southward and said that timid counsels should not prevail. We had acquired, but we were now only counting time. It was useless to fight against the inexorable law of our destiny, for it would work on in spite of us. It was said that we "could not stay the path of man's conquest over the material world." We had extended our bonds; in 1783 Spain had exclusive dominion of the Gulf of Mexico, but she had lost it; why should she control the commerce and defense of the Southern states? What were the wild waves saying, and what were the winds whispering, when they complicated matters by driving our vessels upon Cuban shores? Were they not urging us to go and possess? Webster, it was held, would never have said we had enough territory. Contentment seeks more. There is no rest for the active. Nations must advance or recede. The eastern boys were going to the West. The plough of the husbandman was marching on to the bloodless conquest of a continent. With Mexico crumbling to pieces

and wasting her blood in internal struggles, with Central America as a stumbling-stone in our path, and with Cuba misgoverned and compelled to pay exorbitant prices for bread and pork, so long was the territorial progress of America to be the law of our existence. Acquisition would bring new problems, but after existing dangers were averted—the Americans would set the republican machine going and pour into Cuba as they had poured into Louisiana. The United States had sprung up as suddenly as the goat of Daniel's dreams—Talleyrand saw it a young giant without bones or nerve, but it had now become a great power—and Clingman said that the Gulf should become an American lake. "We have become a colossus on this continent," said Cox, "with a strength and stride which must be heeded." We were content for the French to make the Mediterranean a French lake—carrying a world's history on its bosom—if she would only keep her navies from the Gulf of Mexico; England might subsidize the riches of Asia, and fight over Suez, the focus where the nations of old converged, if she would only stop her designs in America; France might divorce Asia from Africa by marrying the Red Sea to the Mediterranean; we would look on with indifference—while we were advancing our standards nearer home. America desired to be let alone to open the Isthmus of Darien and to control the commercial centres of the western hemisphere.

Toombs had once expressed the wish to see tropical America annexed to the United States, and he was still ready to subscribe to it; if his wishes had been horses it would not have been delayed; he said that our institutions were broad enough for a whole continent. Reuben Davis, of Mississippi, desired to revivify the fallen, prostrate republics of the south. He said that expansion was our mission. He wanted to break from the thralldom of the "enervated North" with her cities; and to let the pioneer people uncorrupted by towns "advance our eagles until the tread of our

columns shall be heard upon the whole continent and the shadow of our wings shall be seen in all its parts." Senator Thompson, of Kentucky, struck a discordant note when he said the people had been spoiled like children, and whined because their stomach was not as big as their eye for sweetmeats. They desired Cuba because her resources were abundant—because she was a land flowing with sugar and molasses. They desired Mexico because her resources were so small that she was unable to pay her debts or to take care of herself. It was with a two-pronged fork they were armed. They looked upon Mexico "helpless, bleeding, dying"—unable to resist even the Spanish fleet, and they were ready to vote for a reprisal or occupation. "Wherever the carcasses are there will the vultures be gathered together." Intervention was proposed as the method by which to begin to administer relief. If Mexico could not have an orderly government it was plain that no power but ours should guard its weakness. We should intervene to save her from other nations and from herself. The Central American states were the football of European diplomacy, and it was seen to be a necessity to start a policy that would secure all the isthmian highways as an aid to our development and power.

Buchanan was floundering in a sea of troubles. The sectional strife in Kansas was declining, but it had left rancor and ill feeling. The Eagle had recently been sent on a flight of three thousand miles to pluck a few feathers from a petty chief of Paraguay; but from the Fiji Islands to the Spanish throne there were still demands to urge. The half-rebellious advocates of slavery interests were becoming defiant. The Democratic party was going to pieces on a turbulent sea; the helmsman had lost control and the pilot could not see his way. Some one said the treasury had become so empty that even the workmen about the capitol could not be paid regularly, and that it seemed that we should have to sell some territory to obtain money, instead

of buying Cuba to get cheap molasses. Mice had been playing in the public granary. Uncle Sam was a loving father, but he could not meet the cost of all the philanthropy and glory that was desired. He could hardly pay for all the whims to buy up the Cuban garden as a winter resort.

Notwithstanding that the confidence in the administration was low, and that the Government had borrowed money for daily expenses, and that the Washington money-chest gave back a hollow sound when Congress knocked on it, it was proposed to continue the higgling for Cuba—even if the chances for getting it were very slim. Slidell agreed that if a proposition would offend Spanish pride it would not be worth while to prepare to make an offer. A few days later the Spanish Cortes *did* take offense at Buchanan's message. Seward notified Slidell of the attitude of the Cortes, but Slidell said that it was a matter of no importance. Kennedy, of Maryland, said that all negotiations were meaningless, unless we desired to excite Spanish anger and to force a solution by lead and steel instead of by gold. Seward said that there was no hope of getting Cuba, and that Buchanan merely wished to draw the eyes of Congress away from the failures of his domestic policy. Spain held Cuba tenaciously and with a firmer grasp than fifty years before. She had safely passed through periods of convulsions, and now, it was said, that contentment existed. Under these circumstances Seward saw that it was unnecessary to debate whether Cuba was desirable. Nothing was to be obtained by insulting Spain, said he—not even could the President thereby retrieve the sinking fortunes of a disappointed administration. Sickles, of New York, said in the House that if the United States had been represented by a first-class consul-general in Cuba—one whose ability and accomplishments would command a high political and social position—the acquisition of Cuba would have been much nearer possible than it was under the circumstances.

The leaders saw that the Democratic party must have something better in its platform than the Dred Scott decision. The Washington correspondent of the *Charleston Mercury* said that Mr. Buchanan had evidently reserved the Cuban question for political capital, and that he intended to "make it the lever by which to raise the Democratic party out of the slough of despondency" into which the abolitionists had thrust it. The *Mercury* said that it was a subject which had peculiar attractions to those democrats at the North who were devoted to "free sugar" and would favor the annexation of Cuba without slavery. It stated that according to the existing complexion of affairs the Cuban cry was the only thing likely to secure the election of the Democratic president in 1860. Hale said that the bill for the acquisition of Cuba was intended primarily for the acquisition of the country in the next presidential election. He stated that the Democratic party had only lived by the aid of tonics and stimulants since 1840; the annexation of Texas had been deemed salutary; they had run out of patent nostrums and a strong dose of Cuba was now recommended as the only means by which the party could survive. Senator Crittenden, of Kentucky, called Buchanan's policy a "mere piece of fanfaronade—a sort of political fireworks set off * * to amuse and entertain the people with undefined and exaggerated prospects." The Democratic party was very badly damaged at this time, and it would have taken more than the Cuban plank to save it from annihilation.

Slidell's bill for an appropriation of \$30,000,000 to facilitate the acquisition of Cuba was reported from the committee on foreign relations on January 24, 1859. It extensively quoted the wisdom of the sages from Jefferson to Marcy; it traversed the entire gamut of argument which had for years been deposited upon the pages of the *Congressional Globe* and had been disturbing the sleep of the employees of the government printing office. It is not neces-

sary to enumerate these arguments in full at this point. Mason, who was a member of the committee, did not agree with the report in the statement that it was the policy of the United States to enlarge its bounds by successive acquisitions of territory. He did not favor the annexation of Cuba merely as an acquisition; neither was he certain that there was any immediate political necessity; but he concurred in the presentation of the bill. Seward, of New York, dissented from the report and the bill to facilitate the acquisition. He substituted a bill requesting the President to communicate to the Senate at the beginning of the next session, the condition of Spanish relations, the negotiations as to Cuba, and the condition of the treasury, army and navy. He objected that the Slidell bill was executive in origin, and placed too much power in the hands of the President. He saw also serious political difficulties; he wanted to see the treaty before he put up the cash—to see what *status* Cuba was to have. He thought that the rocks and sands of Cuba were drifting back toward the Florida coast, but he did not favor premature action.

Toombs desired Cuba for its wealth and as a stepping stone across the Caribbean. He was ready to pursue “manifest destiny” both by land and by sea. He saw no objection to the acquisition of territory by treaty or by war.

He said that voting \$30,000,000 to facilitate the acquisition did not commit the government to confirm the treaty afterwards. He was willing that all the people of the United States should fix the status of the people in Cuba and he was ready to accept Canada as well as Central America and part of Mexico. He was convinced that it required 20,000 men to keep Cuba from throwing herself into our arms, and that it was only by means of political machinery that Central America was kept from coming under our protection. In regard to acquisition of territory, he said: “The only question of foreign policy which is worthy of consideration by American statesmen is the tropical empire lying at our

feet; and it ought to be declared to be our settled policy * * * to unite as fast as it can be fairly and honestly done, all the tropics under our flag. * * * Cuba has fine ports, and with her acquisition we can make, first the Gulf of Mexico, and then the Caribbean Sea, a *mare clausum*. Probably younger men than you or I shall live to see the day when no flag shall float there except by the permission of the United States of America. That is my policy." Reuben Davis, of Mississippi, favored the Slidell bill as a step toward the preservation of the Union, the prevention of quarrels, and to stop any interference by Europe in the affairs of America. He thought that there was danger of Spain allowing France and England to use Cuba as a naval and military depot. He favored the acquisition of Cuba by *force*, rather than by *purchase*, for which there was no hope. It seemed to him that the Cuban fruit was ripe, and that we should not let it decay upon the stem while we waited and hoped for it to fall into our laps without a struggle. "I propose," said he, "we shall take it now—take it in its perfection, redolent with the rich odors of its budding flowers and tropical fruits and productions, girt with her spreading waters, and covered with her genial clime."

Senator Pugh desired Cuba in order to prevent foreign interference. He said that the impunity of England in Central America emboldened her to seize upon Mexico—to blockade Vera Cruz and Tampico in order to compel a reduction of the tariff—and that Cuba could not remain exempt from the British schemes. Taylor, of Louisiana, desired it in order to increase the slavery influence in Congress, and he plainly said so. He favored immediate action in the attempt to purchase, and he offered a substitute for the committee bill authorizing the President to pay \$120,000,000 to issue bonds for the amount and to provide for erecting Cuba into a new state.

Benjamin, of Louisiana, claimed that Cuba was panting for liberty. He desired to give freedom to her, to prevent

British influence in America, and to make the Gulf a *mare clausum*. He said that Spain had already bartered away her sovereignty in Cuba, and that she should be willing to sell it. Spanish dignity had not been insulted by England's offer to pay her £400,000 for giving up the slave trade, nor by the mixed commission which sat in Cuba to judge whether negroes had been recently brought from Africa. Why should she feel insulted by our offer to pay for Cuba. Benjamin proposed purchase; if that failed, he proposed to pay for Cuba's independence; if that failed, his policy was to tell Spain that we were ready to aid Cuba as England had aided South America. "Tell her," said he, "that when the Cubans shall have conquered their independence, theirs shall be the right of remaining a separate republic if they so prefer; that we will cherish, aid and protect them from all foreign interference; that they may unite with us as a state, and, when the Union shall have been accomplished, the sword of the nation shall smite down any rude hand that shall attempt to sunder those whom the god of freedom has united." Doolittle, of Wisconsin, adhered to our traditional policy as to Cuba, but he did not accept what Benjamin had declared in the rapture of his expression as to making the Gulf of Mexico a *mare clausum*. He said that the highways of the world should not be closed to the commerce of the world. Judging the future by the past, he held that we would take possession of the continent; that it was a mere matter of arithmetic and time. He desired to provide for the peaceful emigration of all negroes to Central or South America, where they would be free. He expected the tropics to become a kind of safety valve where slavery could escape into the air of freedom.

Polk, of Missouri, talked to the extent of two columns in the *Congressional Globe* to show that we should have Cuba because it was valuable and ripe for gathering. Mr. Walker had once favored the annexation as necessary to defend New Orleans and to preserve the Union—to prevent

the formation of a Southern confederacy. The same cry now came again, and Senator Crittenden, of Kentucky, took exception to it. He said that though Cuba might come to us in the course of earth revolutions we could patiently "do without it." "Tell me," said he, "that Cuba is necessary, absolutely necessary, to the preservation of this Union! Why, sir, my pride as an American revolts at the idea; tell me that the want of the island will destroy and dismember this Union! No such thing. I will allow no such ideas to possess my mind."

Several from the South thought that we might have a chance to get the island free by waiting for some insult by Cuban authorities. Mallory favored advertising to the world that we must have it, peaceably, if possible, forcibly, if necessary; he was willing to do either, and urged that the Slidell bill was nothing more than an advertisement of this policy. In case Spain should reject all reasonable terms to sell it he said we should look directly at the contingency of taking it and talking about it afterwards, as Frederick the Great did when he marched into Silesia.

The opposition to the President's message and Slidell's bill was very strong. Collamer, of Vermont, called the message a new edition of the Ostend manifesto. In reply to Mallory, he said, that to "subdue the earth" did not mean to filibuster against our neighbors—conquest and standing armies was not the American policy. He stated that the bill was based on a notion that our people had a voracity for getting land. The Indians had the same idea when, after St. Clair's defeat, they stuffed the mouths of the dead full of earth. The administration seemed to believe that this desire was so uncontrollable, that the situation of the land was no obstacle—that the people would swallow almost any proposition without examination as sharks following in the wake of a ship would swallow hot stones, tubs, barrels and other knick-knacks which were thrown overboard to appease their appetites. Collamer was of the opinion that the administration was mistaken—that the people would

examine whether Cuba was digestible or applicable to their wants, as in the case of Louisiana, Florida and Texas.

Many objections were made to the Slidell bill. (1) Some feared that the acquisition of Cuba would lead to other and wider tropical fields; that the appetite for ripe fruit would increase. Collamer said that according to the report we must also take Jamaica and all the tropics with their naked people. Senator Crittenden hoped we would not take possession of Chihuahua. He was not in favor of universal expansion. (2) Both sides appealed to the opinion of past statesmen. John Quincy Adams was quoted as saying that there were "objections to territorial dominions beyond the sea." Clay and Everett had both been willing to let Spain keep Cuba. Everett said that it was "our duty to leave her (Spain) in possession of this little remnant of her mighty trans-Atlantic empire." (3) It was stated that \$30,000,000 was a large sum to appropriate when the receipts had fallen off \$50,000,000, and there was a deficit of \$30,000,000. (4) It was a common objection that the Slidell bill gave too much authority. It was estimated that the offer would be in the neighborhood of \$120,000,000, but there was nothing to prevent Buchanan from paying any price. In case the Senate should afterwards refuse to accept the treaty, \$30,000,000 would have been thrown away. It was seen that it might cost too much. Spain might ask much more than Cuba was worth. Senator Thompson, of Kentucky, thought that a man should look at a horse before buying, and that we had better investigate before being in a hurry to take Cuba into the family. In addition to the power in regard to purchase the bill gave the President the power to determine the terms by which Cuba should be admitted. Seward stated that Buchanan certainly was supplied with enough simplicity—or perhaps he thought that others had enough of this article. (5) Many were inclined to doubt that Cuba would have any great value to the United States. Thompson, of Kentucky, thought that it might ruin New

Orleans as the railroads had ruined Lexington in his own state, where he said the jimson weeds now grew in the streets, while the women took their meals in Cincinnati and Louisville. He said there was plenty of room for vessels to pass between Florida reefs and Cuba. Chandler stated that Cuba did not command the commerce of the Mississippi, and he opposed annexing its mosquitoes, scorpions, lizards and worms. Hale said that the times had changed since the days of Jefferson, and that Cuba could not be defended without a navy. (6) In case of the disruption of the Union which some of the Southerners openly mentioned as a possibility, Cuba would have fallen to the Southern Confederacy after having been paid for by Federal funds. In fact, the purchase of Cuba might have hastened secession. It might have become an apple of discord. On April 19, 1858, Francis Lieber, who had lived in South Carolina, wrote that the South would declare itself independent as soon as the North had paid for Cuba. (7) There was no good reason to believe that the slave trade would have been ended by the purchase of Cuba, though both Buchanan and Slidell believed that it would. In the speeches on the bill, many spoke against the United States interfering with the slave trade. Feeling in the South was against the restriction. Collamer said that it was a delusion to hope that the acquisition of Cuba would end the slave trade. Mr. Pottle, of New York, noticed that Southern people did not seem to accept the President's message on the slave trade, and he said that "after all the smooth talk, it requires no skill to see that 'this is the voice of Jacob but the hand of Esau.'" (8) It was denied that Cuba was "panting for liberty." There were three classes in Cuba; the Spaniards and foreigners were as a rule not advocating any changes; the Creoles desired something approximating self-government, but there was no general desire for independence. Some favored annexation to the United States.

R. H. Dana, who visited Cuba in 1859, tells us something concerning the conditions there. There was nothing like a jury; there was no right of suffrage; the captain-general

could banish any one at his own will; no Cuban could hold any office of honor, trust or emolument; no man could entertain a stranger at his house overnight without previous notice to the magistrate; bribery was the rule. Senator Chandler said that a person could not get the dead body of a friend without bribing the priest, the captain-general, the judge, and the customs officers. Cuba was paying the expense of its own government and at the same time sending an annual remittance to Spain. Still it may have been possible that the Cubans had as good a government as they deserved. There was no widespread dissatisfaction; conditions were better than in many of the Spanish-American republics. It was evident that Cuba would have a long road to self-government. It was entirely different from what Massachusetts had been in 1776. The thirteen American colonies had had experience in self-government—they were ships fully armed and equipped with a long sea experience, but in Cuba the ship was not built nor the keel laid nor the timber grown from which the keel was to be cut. Dana thought that the natural process for Cuban progress was to secure an amelioration of her institutions under Spanish auspices. It was evident that if the connection with Spain was dissolved it would be necessary for Cuba to have the protection of some other power.

Concerning the "beautiful apple" argument in regard to Cuba, Senator Hale said that school boys often used a club "to hasten this process of nature and knocked the apple off before it got ripe. But," said he, "the committee say the apple is fully ripe. Now, I am not certain this judgment may not have been formed a little by the hankering appetite of the committee for ripe apples instead of a precise knowledge of what the fruit is." Senator Crittenden said it was an unpropitious time to purchase Cuba—that we had better wait and let it fall into our lap a little later. He feared that it would give the United States trouble, and he preferred its independence. He said: "I think we shall sooner or later find it our duty to make Cuba an independent state under

our protection, and bound to us by certain liberal ties of commercial intercourse and alliance which are to be irrevocable. This course would free ourselves from their government and leave them with the expense of their own government."

The last debate on the Slidell bill was on February 25. The Homestead bill had passed the House and the Republicans were anxious to have it considered in the Senate before the close of the session. Seward urged that the Cuban bill should be laid aside for the Homestead bill—for, he said, the latter was a "question of homes, of lands for the landless freemen," while the Cuban bill was a question of "slaves for slaveholders." Toombs complained that certain men who shivered in the wind were always ready to bring up the local question of "land for the landless" in order to antagonize the Cuban question, which he claimed was one of national policy, appealing to the patriotism of all the American people. Wade, of Ohio, springing to his feet, said that he was glad that the land question had antagonized with the "nigger" question, and declared that his opponents might have occasion to shiver on that question before they were through with it. He was ready to appeal to the country upon the question of whether our policy should be to "give niggers to the niggerless or land to the landless." He was opposed to "fishing for negroes throughout the whole world," and said that the designs on Cuba were not for the benefit of the landless. "Are you going to buy Cuba for the landless?" said he. "What is there? You will find three-quarters of a million of negroes, but you will not find any land—not one foot, not an inch."

The session of February 25 did not close until the next day. The Potomac rolled past the unfinished monument to Washington while a sleepy audience sat in the new Senate chamber which had been occupied only since January 4. Slidell himself at last moved to adjourn. He seemed to believe that a majority favored the bill, but a few hours later

he said that it would be laid over until the next session in order to give time for the appropriation bill. Many even of the Democratic papers declared that Buchanan did not desire to have the bill passed, but simply wished to hold the party together until after the election.

After the discussion closed in Congress it was taken up in the magazines. The irresistible *Democratic Review* undertook to offer consolation and sympathy for Spain in order to prepare her for the much-wished-for inevitable. She was informed that the United States entertained no ill-will toward the nation which was once the most flourishing and refined in Europe, but which was now being rapidly absorbed by England and France. "We could not save it [Cuba] to her if we would," said the *Review*, "for she has been losing ground everywhere for the last three centuries, and no human power can avert her final extinction as an independent nation." A Republican committee had opposed the annexation of territory, but the *Democratic Review* said: "The ark of the Democratic covenant is moving onward, and if they place their puny hands upon it they will wither; if they raise their voices against it their tongues will cling to the roof of their mouths * * * activity and progress is the law of Heaven and earth." *Harper's Magazine* for March said that the plan of seizing Cuba was laid aside for the present, but that there was no doubt that its acquisition might become a question of force. An article in *Hunt's Merchant's Magazine* said that while there was a unanimity of sentiment as to the ultimate acquisition of Cuba, filibustering would not be countenanced. It agreed, however, that justification might exist for the "peaceable, if practical, otherwise forcible, acquisition of Cuba"—as stated in the Ostend manifesto. Mr. E. H. Derby, of Massachusetts, in reply, favored due deliberation. "Let us pause for reflection," said he, "before we undertake by conquest and vast expenditures, to absorb and assimilate a million and a half of foreigners, by no means homogeneous,

speaking different languages, and trained under monarchical institutions in Cuba."

Three Southern speeches published in the summer of 1859 bear upon the Cuban question. Rhett, of South Carolina, was ready for secession. A. H. Stevens, of Georgia, desired to repeal the act of Congress which made the slave trade a piracy, and he favored external expansion to Central America, Mexico and Cuba. He did not favor paying any large price for Cuba, but if Cuba desired to come into the Union he was not opposed to a repeal of our neutrality laws so that our citizens could assist her. On July 6, Jefferson Davis said, in the Mississippi Democratic State Convention, that the laws against the slave trade should be repealed and that Cuba should be acquired—especially on account of the importance which it would have to the Southern states in case they should be formed into a separate confederacy. He said that the acquisition of Cuba would benefit the whole Union if the Union continued, and that it would be of still greater advantage to the South in case of a new confederacy. He seemed determined to urge the acquisition of more territory, even if the increased length of the Union should hasten it to break like the recent submarine telegraph.

In August, 1859, the Knights of the Golden Circle were organized at the South with the prime object of extending slavery's area by conquering Spanish America.

Buchanan, in his annual message of December, 1859, still advocated the need of Cuba by fair purchase, and he thought that Congress should recognize this policy in order to help negotiations. Even if Preston had found an opportunity to treat for Cuba, it did not appear sure that Congress would approve his action. He found it necessary to limit his duties at Madrid to the consideration of other questions. Perry, the secretary of legation, said that during the latter portion of his term he endeavored to prejudice the Spanish Government in favor of the faction which was preparing for

secession. In the latter part of 1859 Buchanan decided that the most eligible course for the adjustment of the remaining claims against Spain was by joint commission like that under the convention of 1833 with England. He remonstrated against the Spanish proposal to pay only one-third of the claims for illegal exactions growing out of the decree of 1844. On March 5, 1860, a convention was concluded at Madrid establishing a joint commission for the final adjudication and payment of *all* claims. This convention was sent to the Senate May 3, 1860, but on June 27, the Senate, greatly to the surprise of the President and disappointment of the claimants, determined that they would "not advise and consent to its ratification." The refusal of the Senate to ratify was due to the fact that the *Amistad* case, though the validity of the claimants had not been recognized by the convention, was allowed to be considered. In March, 1860, Cass complained that Leono, an American citizen in Cuba, had been summoned for military duty. The captain-general said that he would recommend his exemption to Spain, but Cass instructed Preston that precautionary measures should be taken to prevent a similar occurrence. During the summer of 1860, Spain had ordered a squadron to Vera Cruz, with demands against the Juarez government in Mexico. Cass felt that the United States had important interests there for protection in case of danger, and he interviewed Tassara as to the necessity of an increase of the American force in the Gulf of Mexico. It was not the American policy to resist Spain if she resorted only to war measures, but there was a determination to allow no plans for subjugation. Cass wrote Preston that the threatened warfare should be averted, and, at least that Spain should give orders to prevent offense to other powers. From the unsettled state of affairs in Mexico, collisions could have been prevented only by great discretion. Cass believed that the Juarez government would consent to the arbitration of some friendly power; but he afterwards informed Preston that he had

no idea of hinting that the United States would act as referee, and he instructed him not to leave that impression with Spain.

In 1860 there was considerable correspondence concerning questions arising under the suppression of the slave trade. England wanted the United States to interfere more actively. On February 6, Lord Russell, in his instructions to Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, proposed that the diplomatic representatives of the United States and other powers should meet at London to consider measures for checking the slavers. In reply, Cass said that it was against the United States' policy to participate in such councils. He said that Spain could stop the traffic by preventing the introduction of slaves into Cuba; and that Great Britain must determine for herself how to enforce her treaty with Spain. Since 1858, when the United States had objected to the right of visitation, England had ceased to station cruisers on the coast of Cuba, and, it was said, that 30,000 slaves had been imported to Cuba since that time. In 1860 the English Government thought of again stationing some cruisers in Cuban waters, and on April 28 Russell asked Lyons to ascertain to what extent the United States would co-operate. Cass consulted the Secretary of the Navy, and in May he told Lyons that he was considering a plan for joint cruising against the slavers; but on June 16, Acting Secretary Trescott stated that the Cabinet had discovered difficulties to prevent a joint arrangement. On August 10, Trescott informed Mr. Irvine, of the British legation, that the Government, in the absence of a treaty with Spain similar to that which the English Government had, could not interfere with the slave trade to Cuba.

In the Democratic Convention at Charleston, both the majority and minority reports concerning a platform recommended the early acquisition of Cuba—the majority report adding, however, that it should be “honorable to ourselves and just to Spain.” A large number no longer pretended

that the acquisition would stop the slave trade. Mr. Gaulden, of Georgia, in a speech at the convention, which met the approval of the Southern members, characterized slavery as a positive good and the greatest moral, social and political factor in our civilization; and he demanded that the ruthless restrictions which cut off the supply of slaves from foreign lands should be abolished from the statute-books. Northern Democrats refused to subscribe to the new and extreme demands of slavery, and the party with a past was split in twain. The Republican party, without a past, met in a city without a past—Chicago, which had sprung up from the bosom of breezy Western wilds, the product of free institutions—and nominated for the presidency Lincoln, the observing, sympathetic student of national life. After his election, the slavery-extensionists urged the preparation for secession. The political metaphysics of Buchanan, with his ideas tumbling over each other in the dark, allowed states to secede under his nose; but while they were making preparations to disturb the political health, he despairingly prescribed a dose of Cuba and a slice of Mexico. In his message in 1860, he said that our relations with Spain were of a “more complicated though less dangerous character” than they had been for many years. With his Scotch characteristic of holding on, he again repeated his recommendation for the acquisition of Cuba. He believed that its transfer could not justly tarnish the national honor of the proud Spanish monarchy, and said that it would contribute to the well-being and prosperity of both countries. The hope was vain. Douglas, who had in the past gone far to conciliate the demands of slavery, referring to Buchanan’s recommendations, said that we could buy Cuba for \$300,000,000, admit it as a state, see it secede the next day, and have it offered the day after by Spain for a new sum only to have it say “good-bye” again when it saw fit.

Corwin, of Ohio, in the House, January 21, 1861, while discussing the state of the Union, said to the Southern members: "You say that you must acquire more territory, and you gravely sit down here in the halls of legislation, in the only successful republic that has ever appeared, in our form, on the face of the earth, and distribute among yourselves the dominions of neighboring states while you are about to break in pieces your own government because you cannot agree as to the occupation of your present domain. You are looking to Mexico, Nicaragua and Brazil to determine what you will do with all their territory when you get it, while you are not sure you will have a government to which these could be ceded." When peaceable secession was first agitated the leaders pointed to the opportunity which the Confederacy would have of making new conquests in the direction of the tropics. Mr. Hutton, of Tennessee, was not ready to secede and surrender to the free states the public domain "purchased by the blood of all," as invited by the "leaders of secession who assumed exclusive custody of Southern rights," with only the promised privilege of extension into territory where, owing to British influence and policy, he considered it childish fatuity to dream of obtaining possession.

Several plans were proposed to conciliate the slavery-extensionists and to prevent secession. It was seen that the Western territories would be free—Nature, not Congress, had decreed it. Senator Crittenden proposed a compromise favoring the right of future acquisition of territory which might extend slavery. This was strongly opposed. Wilson, of Indiana, in the House, said that it was strange that while the Union was in the throes of dissolution the American Congress was gravely deliberating as to the future condition of territory which was not our own. He saw that acquisition had already been the source of our disquiet, and that the Crittenden proposal would mean the dismemberment of Mexico, the annexation of Cuba and Central

America and an empire of slavery such as the world had never before witnessed. On February 27, the Peace Convention met at Washington in order to attempt to pour oil on the troubled waters. It proposed as an amendment to the Constitution in order to prevent disunion: (1) That there should be no slavery north of $36^{\circ} 30'$, and no laws by congressional or territorial legislation against slavery south of that line. (2) That no territory should be acquired by the United States, except by discovery, and for naval and commercial depots and transit routes, unless by a concurrent majority of the Senators from the slave states and also from the free states. President Lincoln favored no compromise which would allow the extension of slavery in territory not ours, or which the South might seek to acquire. He saw that the compromise of $36^{\circ} 30'$ would still leave slavery propagandism to ferment in Cuba, Mexico and Central America. It was too late to alleviate by compromise the disease which lay at the root of the republic. Slavery-extensionists were as determined to secede as they had been to get Cuba, and to preserve the Union of the states required the uprising of a mighty people whose homes stretched from ocean to ocean. If Cuba had fallen into the arms of the United States as a slave state, it would have strengthened state sovereignty, and might have rendered it far more difficult to prevent the slave confederacy from ploughing deep furrows across the territory of the republic.

CHAPTER XI.

AMERICAN-SPANISH RELATIONS DURING THE PERIOD OF AMERICAN DISUNION AND REUNION.

Shortly before the first gun of the Civil War was fired at Fort Sumter, it was reported that Spain was increasing her fleet in the West Indies and attempting to introduce Spanish authority in the territory of San Domingo. In March, 1860, she had defeated the Moors and gotten 400,000,000 reals; she now hoped to regain some of her lost influence in America. San Domingo had achieved its independence in 1844 under L'Ouverture. At the beginning of 1861 the revolutionists under Pedro Santana overthrew the existing government, announced himself dictator, and asked Spain to resume its former authority over the island. On April 2, Seward, Secretary of State, informed Tassara that this might be the first step in a policy of armed intervention in the American countries which were once Spanish—Hayti, Mexico, the seven states on the former Spanish main, and even those states of the United States which were once Spanish. Seward said: "For more than half a century it has been a fixed and settled policy of the United States to respect the title and possessions of Spain in the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico and not only not to permit the conquest or purchase of them by any other power, but to even forbear to acquire them as additions to our own territory, although it is well known that they are on many accounts very attractive to the American people." The Executive was ready to

abide by the former policy in regard to Cuba, but the Spanish minister was notified that it would be considered unfriendly for Spain to interfere in San Domingo, and that the United States would resist it.

On April 27, Carl Schurz received his first instructions as United States minister at Madrid. Report had just reached Washington that Spain had overthrown San Domingo by her troops sent from Cuba. Seward asked Schurz to urge an explanation, and stated that any attempt to hold San Domingo would claim the attention of the United States. He again referred to the traditional American policy as to our near neighbors, Cuba and Porto Rico. He mentioned the recent hope "to acquire them lawfully," but said it was to the "present and ulterior safety of the United States for Spain to possess them." There had at times been a tendency to deviate from our policy, but he said the President adhered to it. He significantly added, however, that our forbearance had been due to the non-aggressiveness of Spain. The Spanish Government postponed an answer in regard to San Domingo, stating that they had no details as to troops sent to Cuba. Seward told Schurz to ask whether Spain under any circumstances would accept San Domingo, and on May 21 he asked Perry, temporarily in charge of the legation at Madrid, to get information and protest.

Spain decided to hold San Domingo. England declined to protest, for Marshal O'Donnell declared that slavery should not be established in the new territory. On July 1, Tassara confidentially delivered to Seward the royal decree pronouncing the annexation of San Domingo to Spain. The policy of the United States was determined by circumstances which existed at home. People of San Domingo asked the American Government for aid and protection, but Seward said that other subjects prevented him from giving attention to the island at that time. Spain expressed a disposition to ameliorate the long-existing regulations of com-

merce with the West Indies, and Seward decided that it was best to meet the advances as to a commercial treaty.

Spain took offense at the attitude of the United States as to San Domingo, and complained to Perry at Madrid; but in November Seward told Perry that he could not see that any explanation was needed concerning what had been said. The stormy present was piled high with difficulty, but Seward looked to the future with an optimistic eye. He was evidently determined to settle with Spain as to San Domingo after the Southern insurrection had been quelled, provided San Domingo still wanted our interference. He desired to settle complications instead of unnecessarily developing new ones. While he did not persist in adopting a defiant tone towards Spain, he was firm in upholding the interests and rights of the nation. In August he informed Schurz that the *Amistad* case was not considered valid and should be excepted in case of an arrangement for a claims convention. On November 5, in a letter to Perry, he stated that he could not admit the *Amistad* claim, but that we were ready to effect a measure for the adjustment of mutual commercial claims.

When the American domestic crisis began to merge into a civil war, Secretary Seward's first object in the diplomacy with the Spanish Government was to prevent its sympathy from being enlisted in favor of the proposed Southern Confederacy, whose agents had been sent to Europe for aid. He neither feared the enmity nor asked the protection of Europe, stating that whenever the United States should need the protection of any other nation it would have become "unable and unworthy to exist." But he desired Spain to see that there had been no oppression of the states that favored secession and the repudiation of debts; that the arguments of disunion were self-refuting, and that the moderate policy of the United States towards Spanish America had been "due to our federation." In his instructions to Schurz, Seward stated that the interest which was raising

the flag of disunion had directed the Government since the first murmur of discontent; that the United States had engaged in no foreign war nor extended its dominion except at the instigation of the same party, and that for forty years the Government had especially accommodated the interests of slavery. He urged that the Confederacy could offer Spain no better commercial advantages than those of the United States—sugar could not be exchanged for sugar, nor cotton for cotton.

In the instructions to Schurz, Seward referred to those which had been given Mr. Preston as being still in force so far as they remained applicable or unexecuted, but he distinctly stated in regard to Cuba that the Government adhered to its traditional policy and preferred to see it in the hands of Spain.

Perry said that the sympathies of the Spanish Government from the beginning of the Civil War were with the faction which seemed to offer some hope of dividing the republic or diminishing its power in the western hemisphere. He stated that Preston during the latter part of his term at Madrid endeavored to aid the cause of secession by leading the governing classes to believe that the aristocratic and chivalrous people dwelt in the South, while the underbred and "*sans culotte*" democracy dwelt at the North. Perry endeavored to dissipate the impression which Preston had made. He showed that the conservative classes were at the North. In a despatch to Seward he said: "I showed the Government of Spain, by speeches pronounced in South Carolina, Georgia and Louisiana at the outbreak of the rebellion, that its leaders, leaping beyond the eventualities of the war against the Federal Government, were holding up to the population of the South the plan of immediately annexing Cuba, Santo Domingo and Mexico as one of the grand results to be attained by severing connection with the North, and I urged the conclusion that the continued union of the South with the North of the United States was

the best guarantee to Spain of her own peace with North America." In interviews with influential persons and in a talk with Calderon in June, Perry endeavored to show that Davis and other Southern leaders had in 1854-5 endeavored to provoke a war with Spain for the conquest of Cuba. He showed Calderon that the former filibustering against Cuba, like the existing rebellion, had its origin with the political ambition of the slave-owners, who, still reckless of danger, were ready to embark for the fever lakes of Central America or the sugar fields of Cuba. He assured Calderon that the revolt would cost blood, but that it would be put down. Calderon assured him that the commissioners of the Confederacy would not be seen or recognized by Spain.

Spain followed the course of England in announcing a neutral policy. This practically recognized the Confederates as belligerents, a thing which the United States had hoped to prevent. In July, 1861, the Spanish Government issued a proclamation against the fitting out of privateers, but the South, especially after the battle of Bull Run, expected Spanish sympathy, and hoped that Havana would become an *entrepot* where the munitions of war could be obtained and where Confederate vessels could find shelter. Schurz complained of the inimical publications at Madrid. In September, 1861, Seward wrote him that forbearance was necessary and that the United States could indulge no passions or prejudices in its relations with other powers. He stated that if there should be a collision with Spain the United States would be in the right. New causes of complaint arose. On July 15, Seward informed Tassara that the port of Cienfuegos, Cuba, had given shelter to a piratical armed steamer, the *Sumter*, with seven captured United States vessels, and that the piratical vessel had been supplied with coal and water. The governor-general released the prizes; later the *Sumter* was dismissed from the Spanish port. Spain admitted Confederate trading vessels without regular papers into her ports, but she protested that this did

not mean that she recognized the Confederates. She said it was the business of the United States to see that her blockade prevented such vessels from sailing. At the beginning of September there was danger of collision between the American consul and the local authorities in Cuba concerning vessels which had cleared from the ports of the insurgents. Seward instructed Schurz that such vessels should be treated as American vessels and as subject to the consular authority of the United States, not as vessels independent of the laws of the United States. The *London Times* of October 16 contained a statement that several vessels were loading ammunition at Havana for the Confederacy. The mind of Schurz was rendered uneasy and he mentioned the matter in an interview with Calderon. The latter assured him that it could not be true—that General Serrano would not permit it. Schurz informed him that the Government of the United States could not look on quietly if the ports of Cuba were to be used as war depots for the insurgents.

European statesmen were prophesying that the republic of the United States was "shooting the Niagara" *chutes*. The American minister at Madrid, hearing the apprehensions of American dissolution, wrote Seward that we should gain victories faster. But the latter had confidence in the inevitable law of reaction which would inhere and operate as the Government gathered its forces together. Seward said that we might get more foreign sympathy by avowing it to be our purpose to extirpate slavery, but that foreign sympathy was not necessary to maintain a state. The Confederates were giving it out that the United States had designs of conquest, but Schurz promptly denied it and assured Spain that we sought no quarrel with her. A commercial treaty was desired, but both nations were too busy to give it attention at that time. The United States Government was jealous of its rights, but watchful of the designs of the Confederates. It was anxious to maintain

the integrity of the American Union, which Seward said was "the guarantee of peace to the world." It sought to extend its influence by commerce, not by the sword. It practically guaranteed Cuba to Spain and had no design against any of her possessions. "But," said Seward, "it will not look with favor upon any policy that shall make that island the fulcrum of a lever for overthrowing either the Union or the institutions of human freedom and self-government which are identified with its existence."

The close blockade of Southern ports was severe upon the South. Cotton fell to 8 cents in South Carolina and rose to 50 cents in England. After the battle of Bull Run the South hoped to get recognition and aid from Europe by which to reduce the blockade. She especially hoped for the friendship of Spain, whose ports in the West Indies might be used by Confederate cruisers, and she saw that it would be wise to disclaim designs of annexing her Cuban neighbor. In January, 1861, *De Bow's Review* had ventured to suggest that the South should guarantee Cuba to Spain--that she could well afford to do this in the interests of peace, and because there were so many free negroes and coolies in Cuba. On July 22, 1861, Jefferson Davis sent Mr. C. J. Helm as special agent to the West Indies with a letter of introduction to the Captain-General of Cuba. Helm's instructions informed him that the Southern states no longer desired Cuba, and had so informed Spain; and he was instructed, in case apprehension should exist as to Confederate designs to acquire Cuba, to "leave no effort untried to remove it," and to urge reasons for friendly relations between that island and the Confederacy. Helm was to forward despatches and look after commercial interests.

In March, President Davis had appointed Yancey, Rost and Mann as Confederate commissioners to Europe. On August 24, R. M. T. Hunter, acting as Confederate Secretary of State, instructed them to hurry to Madrid and say that they represented the sovereign states which had

"seceded according to compact." They were to ask recognition but not aid. They were informed that Spain being the only European nation interested in the same social system which pervaded the Confederate States, it was especially desirable to establish friendly relations with her. The close proximity of the Spanish colonies to the Southern states, and the mutual dependence of social and commercial interests were mentioned as seeming to "invite a close and intimate alliance between the two countries." "The Confederate States, therefore," said Hunter, "can never find any cause for jealousy or regret in the steady growth of the power and resources of Spain. If a party was found in these States during their connection with the former Union which desired the acquisition of Cuba, it was for the purpose of establishing something like a balance of power in a government in whose dominant majority they feared oppression and injury." Hunter stated that there was no longer any such fear and that there could no longer be inducements to acquire Cuba. He urged that the Confederacy desired to see the growth of a state bound to her like Spain by the tie of slavery—and armed with the means to protect it. He said, however, that the case would be different if the slave states should be forced back into the Union, for that the non-slaveholding states, feeling their strength, would feel it to their interest to annex the Spanish colonies and would become troublesome neighbors to them. Considering all these things, Hunter urged that Spain was the most interested of all nations in the speedy recognition and permanent maintenance of the Confederacy, whose climate and soil would soon make it a great empire; and, with it "so organized socially and physically as to promise friendship and sympathy with Spain for a long time," he thought that it was worthy of consideration whether Spain would not be "justified even in running some risk to consummate an event which would probably prove so advantageous to itself." He insisted that it was better for Spain to assist

in building up a great friendly power than to indirectly favor the establishment of a rival who would become formidable to her in the future. Mr. Rost went to Madrid as instructed by the Confederate Government, but he accomplished nothing. Spain was not ready to take the initiative in Europe for the recognition of the Confederacy. Calderon so informed Mr. Rost in March, 1862. Feeling his inability to accomplish anything, Rost, the following September, decided to resign. He was convinced that Spain would act as she did with Italy, and would probably be the last power of any consequence to agree to recognition. In October, with his health broken down, he left Madrid.

Notwithstanding the attitude of the Spanish Government, the Confederate agents counted upon making a convenience of Cuba. In October, 1851, Mason and Slidell were sent as commissioners to England and France. They ran the blockade and reached Havana, where they boarded the British steamer *Trent*, bound for England. On November 8, Captain Wilkes, of the United States vessel *San Jacinto*, stopped the *Trent* in Bermuda channel and captured the two commissioners with their secretaries, but the United States Government, adhering to her policy against the right of search, released them and allowed them to go on their mission. While at Havana, Slidell wrote a private note to Benjamin, who had become Secretary of State for the Confederacy, telling him of the almost universal sympathy for the Confederate cause among the people of the island. He had an interview with the captain-general which seems to have elated him in regard to the attitude of Cuba. On February 11, 1862, in his first official letter from Paris, Mr. Slidell indicated that a large number of vessels were running between the ports of Cuba and the blockaded ports of the Confederate states. About the beginning of 1862, Henry Hotze, who seems to have been on his way to Europe to buy up London and French papers in favor of the Confederacy,

wrote to Mr. Hunter from Havana that there appeared to be good proof that in case of a prolonged continuance of the blockade, the Confederacy might confidently rely on Havana as an *entrepot* for the exchange of commodities. While in Havana he endeavored to get information with a view to directing English enterprise in that direction, so that the Confederacy would have "an easy and safe communication with Europe."

Seward thought that it seemed unnatural for Spain to tolerate the Confederate "pirates." He said that the United States suffered, although she had once refused to sanction the attempts of those who were now insurgents to divest Spain of her West India possessions. In case the insurrection should prevail, he doubted whether Cuba would long be safe against the rapacity which the Northern people had "rebuked at the cost of attempted revolution." "Why should not Spain * * * retrace the steps of last June," said he, "and close her ports to those who are exasperated against their own government because it will not lend itself to their own evil, aggressive designs against Spain and their war against human nature?" In March, 1862, Perry, at Madrid, again showed Calderon the policy of the Southern leaders against the foreign states on the southern border and drew his attention to the way in which the Northern people had rebuked this policy. He stated that the United States did not acquiesce in the decision of Spain to treat the Confederates as belligerents, but that she did not make this a cause of breaking ancient friendly relations. Perry believed that Spain was able to see how the American people in former years had opposed and defeated the schemes which were intended to provoke war between the United States and Spain in order to separate the Spanish colonies from the mother country; that she could understand how the prevention of the filibustering schemes for conquest and the extension of slavery had resulted in secession; and that she would carefully consider the utterances of insurgent orators,

who, at the time the rebellion was inaugurated, spoke of the immediate annexation of the Spanish West India islands and portions of Mexico, in order to form a large slaveholding empire. He felt that there should be a recognition of an identity of interests existing between Spain and the United States. He informed Calderon that the President was conscious that the interests of both countries were singularly harmonious, both politically and commercially, and that he reposed complete confidence in the friendship of Spain.

The condition of Mexico became a source of correspondence between the United States and Spain. There had always been warfare between the clerical (conservative) party and the liberal (progressive) party in Mexico. In thirty-three years there had been thirty-six rulers. In 1861, President Juarez began reforms to lessen the influence of the priesthood. About the same time England, Spain and France presented large claims for damages caused to their citizens by the revolutions. The condition in Mexico was such that Juarez refused to pay. A joint convention at London decided to take possession of the Mexican custom-houses. The United States was naturally interested in the moves of the powers against Mexico. In October, 1861, Seward, in a letter to Schurz referring to the threatened coalition of the three powers, said that they had a right to levy war against Mexico, but that in case of war the American Government would find it necessary to keep a naval force near the scene of conflict in order to protect American citizens. Seward was anxious that Spain should endeavor to avert conflict, and he was ready to incur some sacrifice in order to preserve peace. He had offered to pay the interest on the Mexican bonds held by England and France in order to stop the controversy. The United States was asked to join a convention with Spain, England and France to secure redress of grievances against Mexico. Seward informed the Spanish minister that it had been the policy

of the Father of the Country not to make alliances with foreign nations. He stated that the United States had sentiments of good-will towards Mexico and was willing to help her in the settlement of her claim, and that she had offered to do so. He informed the minister that in case of a conflict between the three powers and Mexico, an American force in the Gulf would look after the interests of American citizens. A few days later (January, 1862,) British, Spanish and French troops landed at Vera Cruz ready to enforce their claims. Mexico soon arranged with Spain and England to settle their claims by diplomatic negotiations and they withdrew their forces. Napoleon refused to accept the terms offered him, and by invitation of the clerical party declared war against Juarez. He probably expected the Confederates to be successful, and thought that it was an opportune time to establish an empire in Mexico. French journals pretended that the intervention of Napoleon was made necessary by the ambitious views of the United States in regard to territorial extension.

Before the Civil War there were newspaper reports of plans to extend French influence in America. *De Bow's Review* for January, 1861, stated that the mouth of the Chesapeake was about to be united in commerce with the mouth of the Mediterranean. A French company was to connect the Chesapeake with the Ohio by a canal, and it was said that the French Government endorsed the scheme. About the beginning of 1863, Benjamin seemed to think that Napoleon might have secret designs on the Southern states and Cuba, as a part of his plan in America. He informed Slidell that a professor in the University of Virginia in 1860 had an hour's conversation with the French Emperor, who was specially eager to question him in affairs pertaining to Mexico. The professor stated that he had just returned from Cuba and had informed himself concerning things there and in the Gulf, but that Napoleon was apparently much better informed than himself, even knowing the number of guns of

Morro Castle and the cost of Florida fortifications. In regard to the feeling in the Southern states, especially Texas and Louisiana, he seemed to think that it would be favorable to his schemes. He said "La Louisiane n'est-ce pas qu'elle est Française au fond?" * * * "Eh bien, il faut reconstruire l'Empire là bas." Benjamin's informant saw that Napoleon seemed to seek in Mexico a compensation for the colonies which France had lost in the West Indies and which Napoleon did not think could be peaceably recovered. The Emperor also said that it would soon be necessary for France to have a *pied a terre* on the Florida coast to protect her Gulf commerce. He said: "Nous ne voulons pas d'un autre Gibraltar de ce côté-là." He also seemed to revolve in his mind the possibility of getting a foothold in Louisiana.

On May 23, 1862, Perry had an interview with Calderon on the subject of France and Spain in Mexico. Considering the high pretensions of France, he thought that it was time for Spain to terminate her participation in the affair. Calderon had repeatedly declared to him that Spain was opposed to the project of placing Maximilian on the throne; but he appeared to be undecided as to what might be the course of the Spanish Government. Perry showed him how France might build up a large merchant navy between Mexico and France; and he suggested that the geographical and strategical position of the Spanish colonies in the West Indies should make Spain careful as to the consequences which might follow the interference in the internal affairs of Mexico by France. On July 4, he had another talk with Calderon. The latter had heard it rumored that Mexico was to pledge territory to the United States for a loan. This report was prejudicial to the rising influence of the American Government at Madrid, and Perry endeavored to dissipate the impression which the report had created. He said that Confederate statesmen had favored the annexation of Mexico and Cuba, but that the people of the North

had opposed it, and that the United States Government had no other wish than that Mexico should maintain her sovereignty and independence. On August 26, he informed Seward of a conversation with the Duke of Tetuan at San Ildefonso on the same subject. He endeavored to inform Tetuan of the past history of the slavocracy and to show him that the North was actually fighting battles for the benefit of Spain and all other foreign states having territory contiguous to the southern frontiers.

The designs of the French grew bolder, but Seward said that the United States was prepared for their unfriendliness. On December 29, he wrote that Butler had arrived at New Orleans, and that this fact might reassure European opinion. In January, he wrote that "Whatever else may happen here, the idea of building up an European interest on this continent is chimerical." When Napoleon proposed to force an emperor upon the people of Mexico the United States sent a protest, but it did not avail. The "Congress of Notables" at Mexico in 1863 proclaimed a monarchy, and the crown was bestowed upon Maximilian of Austria, who arrived in the early part of 1864. Spain, probably seeing that the Mexican empire might later include the Southern states, hastened to send envoys to recognize the new empire, even before it was organized. She appeared to have no fear that Napoleon had designs on Cuba. About this time a monograph on the foreign policy of the Southern Confederacy, published at Mobile, Ala., declared in favor of rushing headlong into "entangling alliances" and political combinations with France, in order to secure a gigantic increase of power and dominion. It advocated a Franco-Confederate alliance which would make the Gulf a Franco-Confederate lake, with Cuba and the French islands as the central key, and would give them control of all the isthmus routes, so that "Yankee" crafts would be compelled to breast the storms of Cape Horn to secure the precious tenure of the Pacific possessions." "This is no fancy dream," said the writer. "It is a

reality which France has long contemplated and panted for." The Confederate States, learning that Almonte seemed anxious for the Confederacy to send a commissioner to Mexico, sent William Preston to Havana in January, 1864, to be ready to go to Mexico as soon as the Emperor should arrive; but the Mexican Government would take no initiative in receiving him, and he was instructed to return. At the close of the Civil War the United States demanded immediate withdrawal of the French troops from Mexico, and on April 5, 1866, the French Emperor complied with the demand.

At the beginning of the Civil War, Perry had informed the Spanish liberals that the rebellion in the United States was the work of a few, and the Government at Madrid had shown no disposition to embarrass the American Government, though there had been some friction in Cuban waters. In July, 1862, Tassara complained that the cruisers of the United States navy had not respected the maritime jurisdiction in Cuba, which he claimed should extend six miles from the shore. In August, 1862, the attitude of the Spanish Government towards the insurgents had given no cause of serious complaint, and there was no apprehension that it would be changed. It was thought expedient, however, that the claims against Spain should be allowed to rest in abeyance for the time. The South had been gaining influence by victories and had begun to appear united and strong to Europe. In September, Perry felt that the only argument remaining to influence the people of Europe was one in opposition to African slavery. In June, President Lincoln had hoped that the maritime powers would recede from their policy toward the insurgents, but temporary reverses had prevented it.

Several incidents in the vicinity of Cuba soon became the subjects of correspondence with the Spanish Government. The Confederate steamer *General Rusk* had been used to get Confederate supplies. At Havana the vessel was supplied with British papers and its name changed to *Blanche*.

After one successful voyage the vessel was returning to Havana with a second cargo of cotton in the latter part of 1862, and was destroyed on the coast of Cuba in the neutral jurisdiction of Spain by a Federal steamer. The United States Government paid Spain an indemnity of \$200,000. Early in the next year the Confederate Government asked Spain to turn all this money over to it, on the ground that the *General Rusk* had been temporarily loaned to the individuals who had charge of the cargo. Benjamin informed Slidell that if Spain asked delay it was not politic to press the claim, and it was never pressed. Spain had recently revoked the privilege which she had previously allowed to American vessels of war to hold communication with the shore at Havana. Seward thought that the liberal action of the United States in the case of the *Blanche* should induce Spain to restore this privilege. He said "while Spain had been wisely loyal that there was a local sentiment at Havana which favored the insurgents." He stated that the United States could bear with it, but hoped that Spain would do what she safely could to secure some manifestation of cordiality in Cuba as in Spain. In January, 1863, Seward complained of the capture and burning of the American brig *Estelle*, laden with sugar, by the Confederate piratical vessel *Florida*. He complained that the *Florida* had been admitted into the port of Havana; that the admission of the United States war vessels was refused, and that a Spanish vessel had fired upon the United States despatch boat. In February, 1863, Spain announced that the American war ships would be allowed to enter at Havana.

In February, 1863, news reached Washington that a ministerial crisis was imminent in Spain. Schurz had returned to the United States to take a part in the Civil War. Koerner, who had replaced him at Madrid, saw the necessity of instructing the new Cabinet in regard to recent United States history. In a long conversation with the Marquis of Miraflores, the Minister of State, he stated the nature of

the questions which led to the rebellion and spoke of the schemes of the slaveholders to wrest Cuba from Spain.

In March, 1863, Mr. Benjamin appointed Mr. Slidell, who was at Paris, to go to Madrid as a special commissioner to impress upon Spain the vast difference between the relations that would connect the Confederacy with Spain and of those which had previously existed between Spain and the United States. It was deemed expedient to inform Spain that the Southern states had no designs upon Cuba. The repulses of the United States Army at Vicksburg, Charleston and Rappahannock gave the Confederate Government hope for European recognition, and Benjamin thought that Spain might be induced to review her former decision. In a letter to Slidell, on May 9, he stated that the Spanish Government need have no fears that the Confederacy was desirous of obtaining Cuba. "Desirous ourselves of no extension of our boundaries," said he, "seeking our safety and happiness solely in the peaceful development of our ample resources, having learned from the experiences of this war the perils to which we will be exposed by the excessive eagerness of the United States to extend its territorial possessions, we cannot fail to foresee attempts on the part of that government to seek elsewhere for acquisitions which it has failed to wrest from us. * * * The aggressive policy of which that government now furnishes so conspicuous an example will make it for us the most dangerous of all neighbors on our southern coast, while the traditional respect which Spain has ever evinced by the obligations imposed by public law would inspire a feeling of security in our relations, both to the mother country and her colonies, eminently conducive to the peace which we seek. The policy, therefore, that dictated the refusal on the part of the United States to join in the engagements imposed by the tripartite treaty is the reverse of that by which this government is inspired, and it would not be difficult at the present moment for the Spanish Government to secure as an addi-

tional guarantee for the permanent possession of its valuable colonies the alliance of the people whose proximity to those colonies would render practicable the promptest assistance in a sudden emergency, while its ability to render such assistance has been amply shown during the impending struggle." Slidell was authorized to enter into any kind of engagement guaranteeing Cuba to Spain if the success of his mission depended upon it.

Slidell had been encouraged to hope that the Confederacy might be able to secure favors during the administration of General Serrano, who had charge of foreign affairs, but Serrano soon went out with the O'Donnell cabinet, and Slidell's hopes declined. In May, however, he had a conference with Isturiz, the Spanish ambassador at Paris, in which he availed himself of the opportunity to urge the arguments in favor of intimate relations between Spain and the Southern Confederacy. Isturiz declared unreservedly that the sympathy of Spain and himself "were warmly and decidedly with the Confederate States;" that he considered that the interests of the two countries were largely identical, but that Spain was not prepared to act except conjointly with France and England. He said that she "could not risk the hazard of a war with the Federal Government, and the possible destruction of her richest colony by taking the initiative of recognition." Slidell suggested that Spain might unite with France in such a step without fear of more serious consequences than "some characteristic ebullitions from Mr. Seward." Isturiz did not commit himself, but he seemed to admit that Spain would be disposed to act with France and other powers without the co-operation of England. In June, Isturiz wrote to Miraflores that Slidell would go to Madrid as soon as he had any intimation that his presence would be acceptable. Slidell at this time was endeavoring to induce Napoleon III. of France to decide in favor of recognition. The Emperor feared the large navy of the United States. Slidell replied that Spain had a navy, and told

the Emperor that the Confederacy was ready to adhere to the tripartite proposal guaranteeing Cuba to Spain, and he thought such a policy, if France should concur in it, would lead Spain to take the initiative. The Emperor was willing that Slidell should inform Isturiz that he concurred in the plan. A month passed and still no word arrived from Madrid. But Lord Howden encouraged Slidell by saying that when he was at Madrid he never received replies in less than three or four weeks. August came, and with it the news of Vicksburg and Gettysburg. Isturiz informed Slidell that he could expect to effect nothing at Madrid at that time, and Mr. Benjamin could no longer hope for a treaty.

By August, 1863, after the fall of Vicksburg, and the repulse of the gallant Lee by three days of stubborn contest and slaughter at Gettysburg, the tide of war had clearly turned in favor of the Union cause, and against the determined spirits who had endeavored to plough a deep furrow across the bosom of the republic. It became evident that the Mississippi would not flow through two nations—and that what nature and invention had bound together could not be separated by the storms of a single generation. Generations would come and go, but the land and the commercial outlets would remain the property of one people. It became apparent that the strife due to a passing generation would end, and Seward, who desired peace with Spain, thought it was an auspicious time to speak to her in no uncertain tone concerning the irritations on the Gulf. Koerner having been granted leave of absence, Perry was asked on August 10, to say to Spain, "that the United States have hitherto been content with Spanish sovereignty of Cuba and that after the war shall have ended, they are likely, owing to domestic considerations, to be even more just and friendly than they have hitherto been;" but he stated that "no one could foretell the future relations of the two countries if they allowed the cross currents of an insurrection to drift them into a naval conflict." The question of Spanish

jurisdiction around Cuba was being discussed at Washington at this time. The Spanish minister claimed six miles from the shore. At Madrid there was some discussion of recognition of the Confederates. Seward was anxious that Spanish statesmen should understand the relative policies in regard to the Spanish possession of Cuba. On September 3, in a letter to Perry, he stated that Spain could easily determine whether she would be more likely to hold Cuba by recognizing the insurgents than by a policy of cordial friendship to the United States, who had for sixty years insisted upon respecting Spanish occupation in that island. Seward said: "The United States does not want any more territory, certainly it does not want any more slaveholding territories. The United States is not a forcible propagandist of emancipation, even at home, although it does not hesitate to strike slavery down when it is used in resistance to the Government. Much less is the United States an armed propagandist of emancipation or any other policy in foreign countries. But it certainly could not, if assailed by a foreign slaveholding power, show any greater forbearance towards the slavery maintained by a foreign army, than it shows to domestic slavery when employed against the Government by the insurgents." Mr. Perry was allowed to use his discretion as to informally presenting these views to Miraflores.

In the months of the war which followed, the recognition of the Confederates by Spain became less and less probable and the relations of Cuba as connected with that question almost ceased to be a matter of consideration.

The condition of affairs in San Domingo was the source of a further expression of the American policy in the West Indies. In August, 1863, a rebellion broke out in that island to oust Spanish authority. In October the Spanish Government complained, through Tassara, that American merchant ships were carrying arms for the insurgents, and that United States naval vessels showed no disposition to

interfere. It was reported that the United States Government was participating in the San Domingo trouble. Seward promptly denied it. On November 23, he said: "The United States neither contrive, nor aid, nor encourage, nor mix themselves up in civil or international wars of other nations." In February, 1864, he informed Tassara that the President was determined to observe a strict neutrality in regard to the conflict in San Domingo. He suggested, however, that there was a difference between that rebellion and the Southern rebellion; the San Domingo rebellion did not aim at the life of Spain, but only at the dismemberment of a province recently acquired by her, and, as the insurgents claimed, without the consent of the people. Seward doubted whether one vessel, one soldier, one seaman, one cannon, one musket, or one pound of gunpowder had ever been received by the insurgents from the United States. Revolutions and wars might come in the future as they had in the past, but the United States was resolved upon a policy of neutrality which neither checked human progress nor encouraged factious revolutions. Seward said: "The United States leaves the government and people of every foreign state the exclusive settlement of their own affairs, and the exclusive enjoyment of their own institutions * * * Nations are equal in their independence and sovereignty, and each individual state is bound to do unto all other states just what is reasonably expected those states should do unto itself." But Seward had his eye toward the future and in May, 1864, he said that he would not be surprised if all the attempts to secure European dominion in America should end in disappointment. Mr. Roumain, the minister of Hayti, thought that his Government might be useful in settling the troubles between Spain and San Domingo in case it could get the co-operation of England, France and the United States. Seward did not see how American principles would permit the Government to unite with any European power as an ally. Rou-

main suggested that the Spanish motive in San Domingo was caused by the apprehension that the United States had intentions of seizing the Bay of Samana. Seward stated that the parties connected with the Government in the past had favored the purchase of the bay, but that the United States no longer had designs for more territory. Perry was instructed to bring these views informally to the attention of the Spanish Government. Seward did not attempt to speak for the indefinite future of the tropical regions which former statesmen had desired; it was wiser to leave distant contingent questions for future statesmen, but the United States had no immediate need for additional territory. Seward would have preferred, however, to see the establishment of free and independent governments on the continents and islands of America.

In December, 1864, the war still continued in the Spanish part of San Domingo, but soon afterwards the Spanish Government decided to withdraw. In January the subject of the occupation of the island was discussed in the Spanish Senate and the opposition claimed that its occupation was the only way to prevent its annexation to the United States and the consequent ruin of Spanish interests in the West Indies. General Concha, who defended the policy of abandonment, said that the United States had long ago refused annexation. He stated that if there was anything to be feared from the United States it would be better for Spain to concentrate her resources in Cuba where they might be needed.

Before abandoning San Domingo, Spain contemplated a convention of the powers guaranteeing its independence. The United States would have been glad to see the European powers favor its independence, but, while the American Government was determined not to interfere to disturb the peace of the African race in Hayti or elsewhere, it was against its policy to enter into any entangling alliances. The San Domingo trouble was finally settled by a decree

of May 5, 1865, relinquishing the island by the subsequent withdrawal of the Spanish army.

In 1864, Spain forcibly seized the Chinca Islands near Peru, to indemnify Spanish residents in Peru for losses during the revolution there. The act was the source of much correspondence with the American Government. In May Peru asked the good offices of the United States in settling the difficulties. Some of the South American states said that Spain was seeking to reduce her old colonies to dependence. The United States desired to remain as neutral as possible, but "not to surrender her integrity of proper position" on the American continent. War soon broke out. American citizens in Peru held a meeting and passed indignant resolutions in favor of the enforcement of the Monroe doctrine by the United States, but the latter did not intervene. In August, the United States Government, seeing that war was brewing, contemplated whether Spain should be allowed to cross the isthmus, whose neutrality had been guaranteed by treaty in 1848. Colombia held that Spanish troops could not be allowed to cross it. While the United States was hoping that the Spanish Peruvian difficulty might be settled, Spain became irritated at Chili, and, on March 20, 1865, Seward asked Perry to endeavor to avert the misunderstanding between them. The following August, Seward suggested arbitration, and said, that, in the opinion of the American Government "the interests of European States as well as those of this continent would be promoted by assuaging and, if possible, of removing all existing controversies among the American States, and all controversies between them and those situated on the European continent."

In April, 1865, Seward informed Perry that it was his earnest desire that Spain might be the first power to retire from her erring policy of June, 1861, and stated that "This proceeding, in connection with the restoration of peace in Peru, and the retirement of Spain from San Domingo,

will probably open harmonious and friendly relations with Spain and the United States for a period as long as statesmen are accustomed to foresee events."

In the following August, Seward complained that the Captain-General of Cuba refused to give up to our consul-general the *Harriet Lane* and the *Pelican* and other property belonging to the defunct insurgent Government, and the terms used in conveying the refusal were not quite courteous. Nothing further occurred to irritate friendly relations, and the liberal people of Spain came to regard the United States as a natural friend.

By the beginning of 1866, Seward offered the good offices of the United States Government to settle the controversies with Chili and the new ones with Peru. These offers were appreciated by Bermudez de Castro, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs. The South American states thought the Spanish designs were hostile to their independence. Spain assured the United States otherwise. The Government at Washington rested satisfied, but suggested in a friendly way that the frequent Spanish demands upon our neutrality, on account of war between herself and the states with which we sympathized, were inconvenient. Ecuador, Bolivia and Chili had become united in a treaty of offense and defense against Spain. On March 31, 1866, Spain bombarded Valparaiso. The United States remonstrated and offered mediation. A year later, Seward instructed Hale, the United States minister at Madrid, that the war should cease by a formal armistice and that the plenipotentiaries of the nations concerned should then meet at Washington to bring about a definite peace. Hostilities were soon afterwards suspended. A peace conference which met at Washington was presided over by Secretary Hamilton Fish. A permanent armistice resulted, requiring the necessity of a three years' notice through the United States in order to break it.

Before the American Civil War the Cuban insurrectionists were allies of the slavery party in the United States;

and the most powerful weapon which Spain possessed was a proclamation of emancipation, which was said to be always ready for signature in the portfolio of the captain-general—to be used in the case of an insurrection too great to be resisted by force of arms. If Cuba ceased to be Spanish it was said that it would be African. After 1865 all this was changed. The threat of emancipation lost its horrors. Discontented Cubans became abolitionists; they yielded to the inevitable force of circumstances in the United States and accepted abolition of slavery as an indispensable condition for annexation. Cuba had a full monopoly of slave labor, and the advantages of slavery in the production of sugar led to a strong slave party called the *Peninsulares*. The Cuban or Creole party was called the *Insurrectos*, and it sedulously tried to have it understood that the liberation of Cuba meant the abolition of slavery. Liberal sentiment of Cubans had been strengthened by emancipation in the United States, and Spain showed a disposition to meet the requests for representation in the Cortes. In 1865, Marshal Serrano assured them that they would soon be represented, and in November of that year a royal commission was formed to inaugurate Cuban reform. The Cuban delegates had shown that the island was depopulated, and might support 16,000,000 inhabitants; that scarcely a tenth of the land was cultivated; that there were very few roads; that the judicial and administrative authorities were corrupt; that there was an absence of all freedom; that the enormous taxation levied was expended in Spanish expeditions to San Domingo and in lavish official salaries. The reactionaries and slave-owners in Cuba sent emissaries to Madrid to prevent any reform, and their efforts prevented any further steps than the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry which sat with closed doors at Madrid. The opponents of reform had a majority on the commission and the proposals for reform failed.

The fact that slavery existed in Cuba was in some cases a source of inconvenience to the United States. England

had, in the early part of 1864, urged Spain to fulfill her treaty in regard to stopping the slave trade. In 1842, the United States, in a treaty with Great Britain, had agreed to unite in remonstrating against the trade. The United States laws considered the trade as piracy, and Seward now notified Spain that it would give the United States satisfaction if the obstacles to the suppression of the trade in Cuba be removed. Shortly after the Civil War closed, it became evident that there might be an attempt to supply Cuba with slaves from the United States. In May, 1866, official information reached Washington that a steamer was fitting out at New Orleans to take a cargo of negroes from near Pensacola. It was reported that other vessels were to follow. The information was forwarded to the Captain-General of Cuba, who promptly replied that he would not omit any measure to suppress the traffic. The discrimination against negroes going to Cuba on United States vessels became a subject of complaint. A bond had been required in order to prevent them from going ashore during the stay of the vessel. It was thought that there should be a relaxation in regard to this regulation. The United States had no thought of intervention in the domestic concerns of Cuba, but after emancipation had been secured in the Southern states public attention everywhere began to be directed to the anomalous toleration of slavery in Spanish dependencies which were so closely connected with the commercial and social intercourse with the United States. There was a growing opinion that slavery would be abolished in both Cuba and Porto Rico, but Spain was too busy in suppressing insurrections and keeping order at home to risk an attempt at such reforms in her colonies. In June, 1866, there was a fearful insurrection at Madrid which left many pools of blood in the streets. Random shots struck the corner of the house occupied by the American legation. Sixty persons were executed before the rebellion was finally overthrown.

General Prim was sent into exile for fomenting disturbances against the O'Donnell government at Madrid, but this did not crush the spirit of disaffection. The Infante of Spain, the brother of the Queen, in the autumn of 1866, claimed to be intriguing for revolution, and said that it was nearly ready to break out—money alone being needed. On October 1, at Biarritz, in a long talk with John Bigelow, who was temporarily in charge of the American legation at Paris, the Infante seemed anxious to be recognized as the leader of the revolutionary party and he “proposed darkly to make Cuba the price [to the United States] of such assistance as the United States might render to the Spanish emigrè to overthrow the government.” Bigelow asked him if he had mentioned the matter to Mr. Hale, the American minister at Madrid; the Infante replied that Mrs. Perry, the wife of the secretary of the legation, was a Spanish woman, having long served as a spy of the Spanish Government, and that it was unsafe, for this reason, to speak to Mr. Hale upon the subject. During the succeeding winter the Infante had several conversations with Bigelow upon the veiled proposal, or intimation, just mentioned. Similar intimations came from another source. A person, who had three years before befriended the United States by giving information of Confederate vessels being built in French ports, wrote Bigelow on October 25 that Prim was then negotiating a secret agreement with a European power, by which he would receive \$3,500,000 and some war supplies to continue the insurrection in Spain, and would agree to abandon the Spanish Antilles as soon as he succeeded. This person had written on October 4, concerning the same subject, but Bigelow had made no reply—doubtless because he felt his government was not disposed to occupy itself with the matter. Bigelow believed Prim to be behind the curtains proposing the abandonment of Cuba in order to get money to enable him to control the Spanish Government; but he also believed that the acquisition of the

Spanish Antilles by the United States would be a great calamity, and he was careful not to get mixed up in a correspondence as to the Spanish insurrection. He briefly replied that he had no instructions from his government which would authorize him to negotiate for the dismemberment of the territory of a friendly power.

The prodigious development of physical strength in the United States during the civil conflict was to some foreign powers a source of fear that the young republic would be led into an offensive foreign policy. The Confederates kept this feeling alive by fanning it. At the beginning of 1864, when Preston was sent to endeavor to obtain admission as minister to the new Mexican Government, Benjamin instructed him to impress them with the idea that the United States army would aim at both Canada and Mexico. At other times they endeavored to excite the fear of Spain in regard to the safety of her possessions. This feeling was increased when the American Government growled, and showed its teeth to the French in Mexico. The reunited nation stood upon its feet, with a confidence and character strengthened by recent experience, ready to meet the problems of the future. It had felt its way hesitatingly along untried paths, while communication had been growing swifter and more intimate, and the necessity for union had grown stronger. The experience of centuries had been crowded into a few generations. A strong nation with wide bounds had been built and had suffered for only four years from civil dissension. The people had increased fifteen-fold in the century; and still the throngs of emigrants were coming to the land of fruitful soils, genial climes and liberal institutions where they could own their own homes and enjoy free labor, prosperity, and an atmosphere of toleration. Friendly relations existed with almost all the South American states; telegraphic communications between America and Europe had been begun by the Atlantic route and by Behring's Sea and Siberia; the difficulties which

for a while had excited political apprehensions and caused a closing of the inter-oceanic transit route, had been peacefully adjusted, and there was a prospect that the route would soon reopen. We had been making history very fast, and the contemplation of our past was enough to inspire extravagant dreams of manifest destiny—but we had learned self-control. Vast armies were disbanded, and the screams of some excited warriors and haranguing demagogues did not set the nation mad with a passion for territorial aggrandizement, nor turn it aside from binding up the wounds of the past. "The Yankee" was not so grasping as he had been painted; there were opportunities for conquest, but the nation held its own pulse and kept local fever under control. Maximilian went to sleep with his fathers, and Mexico quarrelled again, but there was no interference from abroad and none from the United States. There was no desire to embark into a policy of getting rid of our neighbors by annexing them. The operations of blockade-running fleets, which were harbored and fitted out in the West Indies during the unpleasant strife, showed the advantage which Cuba would have as a military and naval outpost in time of war, and a small party expressed the desire to acquire it with the view of ending slavery there; but manifest destiny did not aim at Cuba as before the war. After slavery had been abolished, the Southern states had no further object for meddling with southern neighbors. There was no need to extend the area of abolished slavery, and Cuba was left to contend for her own independence.

During the war the United States Government felt the need of a harbor of refuge and a source of naval supplies in the West Indies. Naval experts said that with such a station the war would have ended much sooner. As early as January, 1865, Seward took steps to procure such a station. In an informal note he intimated to the Danish minister at Washington that the United States would consider a proposition to purchase possessions of Denmark in

America. This would have included the Island of St. Thomas, a central point east of Porto Rico commanding the West Indies and possessing an excellent harbor. The subject was widely discussed, and informal protests were sent to the Danish Government by England, France, Germany and other foreign powers. The proposition was temporarily abandoned, but negotiations were resumed in 1866. Seward himself, while in the West Indies, investigated the advantages of St. Thomas and made a report to the President. Later, while negotiations for the purchase of Alaska were pending the United States agreed to pay Denmark \$7,500,000 for St. Thomas and one other small island. Denmark accepted on the condition that the inhabitants should vote in favor of it. On January 9, 1867, the two islands almost unanimously voted in favor of annexation, and the treaty was sent to the United States Senate the following December; but the Senate was too busy with President Johnson to consider the subject, and by some unexplained neglect no action was ever taken upon it—though Denmark twice extended the time for the exchange of ratification. In 1867, the government probably considered the possibility of a cession of Culebra and Culebrita Islands by Spain to the United States. These islands lie a few miles east of Porto Rico. In his message of December, 1867, President Johnson, in referring to the European colonies in America, stated that the West Indies had been held "chiefly for purposes of military and naval strategy in carrying out the European policy and designs in regard to this continent." He stated that they had been used to our disadvantage in the Revolution and in the War of 1812, and he added: "In our recent war the rebels and their piratical and blockade-breaking allies found facilities in the same port which they too successfully accomplished of injuring and devastating the commerce (of the United States)." He stated that vessels employed by the insurgents had found friendly shelter and supplies in the West Indian port, while the American

naval operations were necessarily carried on from the American shores. He recommended a naval station which would prevent us from apprehending injury or offense from any trans-Atlantic powers. He said that St. Thomas and St. Johns would offer the advantages immediately desirable. He agreed with the early statesmen that the other islands naturally gravitated towards us and the other continental states, but he also agreed that it was wise to leave the question of their absorption to the natural processes of the future.

During the hot weather of July, 1868, several members of Congress, while discussing the purchase of Alaska, the cool land of short rations and long twilights, incidentally wandered from talk on the Aurora Borealis to the lurid pyrotechnics of manifest destiny in warmer climes. On June 30, N. P. Banks, of Massachusetts, while favoring the purchase of Alaska on account of its fish, forests, berries and minerals, suggested the advantage which it would give in controlling events in Pacific waters and in carrying our civilization to other people. He said that the Sandwich Islands must also be ours. Erratic Ignatius Donnelly, of Minnesota, on July 1, did not stop with the Sandwich Islands. He voted for the Alaska bill as one of the necessary steps in the expansion of American institutions and nationality over the entire domain of the North American continent. He saw the territories and people both north and south gravitating towards us and he saw no reason why our institutions should not extend themselves "to the extremest limits of human habitation under the frozen constellations of the north as well as amid the heat of the tropics." With the United States on the south and Alaska resting on the northwest of British Columbia, he said that the latter would disappear between these upper and nether millstones—that the jaws of the nation would swallow it up. Looking to the future, he foresaw the time when the traces of rebellion should be gone and "our

nationality shall have expanded until it fades out beneath the fire of the tropics on the one hand, or disappears along the margin of eternal snows on the other;" and he said that we could then present to the world the aspect of a nation, that, by the mere force of its moral influence, should be able to "compel justice and destroy injustice" in all the lands of the earth. He stated that in the destiny of the United States was involved the destiny of mankind, and that the broad and wide foundation of such a nation should "abut only on the everlasting seas." Shellabarger did not agree with Donnelly that we were a land-appropriating people by nature, and he did not think that our future glory depended upon our diameter, nor upon owning all the continents and the islands between. He favored a compact country rather than one that was so large that we could love only half of it at a time. He would hesitate before embarking on a system of colonial possessions. Hiram Price, of Iowa, also said that we should not seek to stretch our arms like seas to embrace the universe, but that we should preserve and develop what we already had. Mr. Spalding, of Ohio, was not so particular about staying at home. He said that if the Russian possessions were made up of icebergs covered with walruses, he still wanted them, and he also wanted more. He denied that any territory on the American continent was to be deemed foreign to the Government of the United States in case it should seek to extend its limits, for, that in due season the American flag would wave over both the continent and the contiguous islands. B. F. Butler was filled with wonder and consternation at the "spread-eagleism, filibusterism, and manifest destinyism" of this son of the western soil who wanted everything—even including Patagonia. Butler did not favor the annexation of any territory that was not contiguous to us.

In his message of December, 1868, President Johnson said: "A comprehensive, national policy would seem to sanction the acquisition and incorporation into the Federal

Union of the several adjacent, continental, and insular communities as speedily as it can be done peacefully, lawfully, and without any violation of national justice, faith or honor." To his mind, the necessity of repressing unlawful movements against the colonies of European powers, in this country, was evidence that it was our duty to adapt legislative action to suit the decline of European monarchical power and the increase of American republican ideas. "It cannot be long," said he, "before it will be necessary for this government to lend some effective aid to the solution of the political and social problems which are continually kept before the world by the two republics of the Island of San Domingo, and which are now disclosing themselves more distinctly than heretofore in the Island of Cuba." He thought that the annexation of the two republics of San Domingo would be satisfactory to foreign nations as well as to the people interested. He spoke of the attitude of the United States towards the Hawaiian Islands as being similar to that toward the West Indies. Being a near neighbor to all of these islands, the United States could not allow them to pass under foreign control.

President Grant, seeing the danger of a conflict between races, at the close of the Civil War, and looking for a settlement of this question, was led to urge the annexation of San Domingo. After many sanguinary struggles this government was now a republic. Soon after Grant came to the presidency, the President of San Domingo sent him a proposition to annex that republic to the United States. Being weak in numbers and poor in purse, and needing protection, the people felt that if the United States did not accept their proposition they might be compelled to seek protection elsewhere. Grant desired to maintain the Monroe doctrine, and after sending his private secretary upon a secret mission to investigate the conditions and the sentiment of the people, a treaty of annexation was negotiated between the Secretary of State and the Dominican agent.

Grant sent the treaty to the Senate and recommended its ratification. But many Republican leaders were strong in their opposition to it, and it was rejected, partially on the ground that it had been initiated by private and corrupt interests more than for the general welfare. Grant was surprised, but not discouraged. He recommended that a commission be appointed to negotiate a new treaty. Congress authorized the commission, but did not commit itself to the annexation policy. In January, 1871, the commission went to San Domingo, and in April it reported to Congress sustaining the statement of President Grant in favor of annexation. The influence of Sumner and others in the Senate was sufficient to defeat the adoption of the recommendation of the report, and Grant decided to press the matter no farther, though the project became a political issue in the campaign of 1872.

The speeches in Congress on Alaska, and the proposition to annex San Domingo, led to accusations that the United States was ambitious for the annexation of territory. The United States fortifications at Key West and the American influence at Samana Bay together with the attitude of the American Government towards slavery caused Cuban slaveholders to fear that their northern neighbor desired to occupy Havana. These apprehensions were certainly groundless. It was said the United States desired the prosperity of Cuba—that she did not desire to kill the goose which was laying golden eggs, and that she did not desire to lift a single finger to annex an island disturbed by factions. It was not the American policy to take by armies; but rather by pioneers who improved the territories in which they settled, and made them assimilable. It was the American policy to leave the parties in Cuba to settle their own differences, reserving the right to interfere only in case it should be made necessary by the designs of foreign powers. If conquest had been its policy, the United States Government could have seized Cuba, but only the immediate necessity

of sustaining the Monroe doctrine could have induced such a measure. There was no desire to hasten the crisis, but there was equally no intention to be afraid of one in case it should come. The right of Spain to hold was recognized, so long as she could hold, or so long as the Cubans should submit to her rule; and the government did not contemplate plundering Spain because she was old and effete. The United States desired a more liberal government and unrestricted commerce; she complained sometimes of the stern manner in which Cuban customs officials insisted upon applying penalties to American traders where there were merely accidental errors in manifests; but there was no desire to hasten any relation with Cuba except that of reciprocity and friendship. It was hoped that causes of complaints might be removed as far as possible, and that, in case they should arise, investigation might not be delayed. The ocean telegraph was completed to Madrid by 1867, and made it possible to secure more prompt settlement of difficulties. On September 10, 1867, Seward cabled to Madrid the congratulations of the President upon the completion of the telegraph between the United States and Cuba.

CHAPTER XII.

THE TEN YEARS' CUBAN WAR AND THE AMERICAN POLICY OF MEDIATION.

THE MISSION OF GENERAL SICKLES.

In his "History of Civilization," Buckle characterized Spain as a nation which regarded antiquity "with too wistful eye," and which opposed improvement as a "dangerous innovation." While Europe and America had been energetic in extending the scope of human progress, Spain, at the forward edge of the eastern continent, remained proud of the antiquity of her opinion, her orthodoxy, and her credulity; she encouraged the notion that all important truth was already known, and repressed aspiration. "Spain sleeps on," said Buckle, "untroubled, unheeding, impassive, receiving no impression from the rest of the world, and making no impression upon it." As the procession moved from age to age, Spanish ministries had changed rapidly enough, but the Spanish habits had not been changed. There had been little alteration of public opinion. A generation had sometimes threatened to change its costume only to settle back into the mantle of its grandfathers with whose wisdom it was satisfied. But the seeds of liberalism were germinating in many Spanish minds. The revolution of 1868 was an attempt to plant the signs of national progress.

Isabella, the Spanish queen, had repelled all liberal elements by her policy of military despotism and clerical absolutism; and her shameless amours deprived her of all claims to respect. In the pendulum swings of administrations from absolutism to constitutionalism, and back again to absolutism, her life was a story of personal intrigue and passion.

Insurrections arose, but were put down by the most extreme measures by Marshal Narvaez. After the death of the latter in April, 1868, a great military insurrection was planned to crush the French and Jesuit influences. A revolution which began at Cadiz on September 17, was consummated at Madrid on September 29, when the queen was deposed. Serrano, Prim, and Topete were the leaders, and became the chief officers of the new provisional government after Isabella escaped to Paris—Serrano as minister-president, Prim as minister of war, and Topete of the navy. On February 11, 1869, a newly-elected Cortes assembled and the new constitution was adopted. It was a monarchical constitution without a monarch. On May 21, the Cortes voted in favor of a monarchy. Serrano was named regent until a suitable person could be found for the throne. Prim organized a new ministry in June. The Spanish throne went a-begging for some one to sit upon it. A strong party was opposed to the establishment of a monarchy, and the condition of the country was such that no one was anxious to accept the crown. Prim tried many able persons, and endeavored to persuade them to sacrifice their personal interests in order that Spain might have a ruler. But all in turn refused until in July, 1870, when Prince Leopold, of Hohenzollern, showed a disposition to accept. Finally on November 16, 1870, the Cortes elected Amadeo Duke of Aosta, who became king in January, 1871, but the king-maker Prim had already perished from the wounds made by assassins on December 27, 1870. Possibly if he had not been assassinated Spain might have been saved from the misery of a later insurrection, but, after all, the misfortunes of Spain and Cuba alike were but conditions of the national character as manifested in all countries where the Spanish element prevails. Amadeo's government, with Serrano as minister-president, was a continued scramble of monarchists for office, and of insurrections by Carlists and republicans. Ministries changed swiftly; powerful nobles hated the king, and, constitutionally honest as he was, his

ministers betrayed him, and finally fifteen assassins on July 18, 1872, fired upon himself and wife in one of the most frequented and brilliantly lighted streets in Madrid. On February 11, 1873, the king abdicated and returned to his home in Italy. Men said that he left Spain because he was the only man there who was scrupulously faithful to his oath, and obstinately adhesive to the constitution of the country.

On the abdication of Amadeo the two chambers combined as the Sovereign Cortes of Spain, and by a vote of 126 to 32 decided upon a republic. Figueras became president of the new ministry, and Castelar became minister of foreign affairs. They favored a federal republic, self-government of individual states, no centralization, abolition of the standing army, separation of church and state, and a democratic constitution. The Cortes was disbanded and on June 8, 1873, a constitutional Cortes declared for a federative republic. But the extreme red republicans were not satisfied; they seceded and raised the red flag. Ministries and presidents passed in rapid succession. In September, Castelar was chosen president of the executive with full power to adopt whatever military and political measures he should think necessary. He became virtually dictator. The discussion of the proposed constitution was postponed. For the present, the strong hand of a dictator was more convenient than a constitution. The Carlists and others were putting centrifugal forces into motion, and insubordination existed in the army. Castelar found it necessary promptly to use powder and lead. When the Cortes met in January, 1874, it voted a lack of confidence. Castelar resigned, but on January 3, Pavia, the Captain-General of Madrid, dispersed the Cortes and set up a military dictatorship under Marshal Serrano. New Carlist insurrections broke out here and there, but they were put down as they arose. Serrano's government was soon recognized by all the European powers except Russia.

On the expulsion of Queen Isabella by the spasmodic revolution of September, 1868, there was a feeling of joy in the United States at the prospect of republicanism in Spain, and on October 13, the American Congress passed resolutions of encouragement to the provisional government. It was believed that fair and fertile Cuba, whose direct taxes had been recently increased, might now hope for a better government. Spain, after squandering a continent, had still clung tenaciously to Cuba; and the changing governments which had been born only to be strangled held her with a taxing hand. While England had allowed her colonies to rule themselves, Spain had persisted in keeping Cuba in the same state of tutelage that existed when she was the greatest power in the world and when the idea of colonial rights had not developed. The island had been dependent on the will of transitory governments in Spain which changed every few months at the command of a *pronunciamento* or popular revolution. The London *Times* in one of its moral paragraphs said that Cuba had been used as a place of honorable banishment for unruly soldiers, who, having been sent there in order to keep them out of mischief, had given vent to the temper which they had found perilous at home, and had often displayed a domineering spirit and cruelty like that which once added dark chapters to the history of Spanish conquest.

The Cubans had furnished money to secure Isabella's expulsion, and they received the news of the September revolution with enthusiasm. On October 11, at Yara, a small town in the eastern part of the island, the "Junta of Laborers" began a revolution against the remnant of Isabella's authority in Cuba. Cespedes, a lawyer, began the revolt by giving liberty to his slaves. Many planters gradually followed his example, and in a few months ten thousand undisciplined men had risen to engage in guerilla warfare against the Spaniards. They had few arms, but they expected to get war material from the United States through

the Cuban Junta at New York. They expected sympathy from the hardy pioneers of democracy across the Florida straits. The leaders were Maximo Gomez, Marmol and Figuerdo. Aid was not wanting from without. In December, 1868, General Quesada landed with the first expedition from Nassau, bringing the first consignment of arms and munitions of war. The revolutionists' cause prospered, and April 10, 1869, a new government was constituted and a legislative body provided for. Cespedes was president of the provisional government, and Quesada was commander-in-chief of the forces. In the long strife which ensued Cuba fought like a giant. Blood from the veins of her soldiers reddened the soil of many Cuban hillsides. Spain lost many thousand men. Some districts of Cuba were left almost entirely without male population. Spain strained every nerve to put down the revolution. Public wealth disappeared rapidly; \$700,000,000 were spent to feed the conflagration which tested Cuban nerve, but which could not touch the heart of Spain to stop the struggle against the bleeding country that she could not subdue, and that had ceased to have strength to prolong the struggle.

Calderon y Collantes, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, in 1876, said that the leaders of the rebellion had doubtless made preparations before the revolution occurred in Spain, and that they simply took advantage of circumstances to defeat the small number of Spanish troops which was on the island at the beginning of the war. According to his account the "flag of the independence of the island was not raised at the outset, much less that of annexation to any other state." The people cried "Hurrah for Prim!" and "Hurrah for the revolution!" Calderon said that many who joined in the insurrection loved Spain, but desired a political change which they thought would result from the revolution; and that they subsequently repented when they became aware that the leaders of the revolution were seeking independence. Many who at the outbreak of the revolu-

tion had favored it, finally took up arms against it. But the character of opposition to Spain had become very serious. Calderon said that many of the white population, especially the unsuspecting and rash youth who imagined that it was possible to establish a republic in a country populated largely by the African race, had been carried away by enthusiasm which had no experience to balance it. The policy of the liberal party that had assumed control of the Spanish government was professedly in favor of autonomy in Cuba. There was no desire to continue the previous policy of exploitation. Silvela, the new Minister of State, afterwards said that the liberal party of Spain was forced into seeming sympathy with the reactionary party of Cuba. He said that the insurrection broke out just at the time when it was possible to give Cuba all the rights that she desired; that the Spanish liberals wished to make provision for the self-government of the island, and that they favored the freedom of all men, but that the Cuban situation, unfortunately for both countries, had made it necessary for them to oppose self-government and emancipation.

The cruel character of the war was evident from the first. In October, 1868, Mr. La Reintrie, who performed the duties of United States consul at Havana, in speaking of the preparations for the outbreak, said that the Spaniards were searching all persons suspected of republican proclivities. He recommended that a United States squadron should be placed in the vicinity for the protection of American citizens. In January following, the Spanish volunteer system caused much dissatisfaction around Havana. The volunteers roamed about the city uttering threats against the Cubans; several murders were committed; in one case the volunteers surrounded a theatre and fired on the assembled audience. This conduct seems to have been condemned by the captain-general.¹ Phillips, the

¹General Dulce was sent to Cuba to represent the Liberal ideas of the Spanish Revolution. His policy was too lenient to please the

American consul at Santiago, informed the government that there had been assassinations of many peaceful citizens in that vicinity. The Cubans could not agree upon the question of slavery—some desired immediate abolition, some gradual, and some neither. After the revolt had gathered strength in the eastern and central parts of the island, however, the provisional government decided to declare the abolition of slavery in Cuba. This was done on March 11, 1869, and resulted in the freedom of 100,000 negroes. Prim, immediately after the revolution, had prepared a proclamation for the abolition of slavery in the colonies, but it was delayed for political reasons, and the new captain-general opposed the policy. In reply to the Cuban proclamation of emancipation the captain-general issued a decree that in the disturbed districts every man over fifteen years of age, who was found absent from home should be shot; that houses unoccupied and without a flag would be burned; and that women not living at home or with a relative might be carried forcibly to Jiguani or Bayama. The American Government protested against this policy, and soon had cause for protest on account of other proclamations. In April, a decree was issued prohibiting the alienation of property in Cuba except with the assent of the Spanish authorities. Mr. Fish, the Secretary of State, requested that it might be modified so that it might not be applicable to American citizens. According to a consular letter from Mr. Hall at Havana the American-born citizens were treated well by Spanish authorities and many of them did not favor the insurrection, but others complained of cruelties.

In the United States there was much sympathy for the struggling Cubans. In New York a large citizens' meeting, presided over by Mayor Hall, resolved that the United

Spanish party in Cuba represented by the "Volunteers," and he was soon superseded by others who represented the reactionary party, and who were more aggressive in the conduct of the war, and less inclined to conciliate the Cubans.

States should give sympathy and assistance to the insurgents. The Spanish minister complained of false and exaggerated statements which were uttered at these meetings and had found their way into the newspapers. The Cuban agitators in Congress had forgotten what the Government had said in 1861, when Confederate agents asked Lord Russell to recognize the Southern Confederacy.¹ A Cuban envoy arrived at Washington on March 24. The President would not give him official recognition, but Secretary Fish gave him audience in his private apartments, and it seems that he also appeared before the committee on foreign affairs. General Banks, in the House, and Sherman, in the Senate, proposed to authorize the President to recognize Cuba as a belligerent; but others compared the Cuban movement with the Fenian movement. The *New York Tribune* said that it was too soon to pronounce the insurrection a success, at least until the effect of the yellow fever upon the Spaniards should be ascertained.

In order to prevent aid from reaching the insurgents, the captain-general, in March, had issued a decree authorizing the capture on the high seas of any vessels that might be found carrying men, arms, or munitions of war to the insurgents, and had directed that persons captured on such vessels should be executed as pirates. Mr. Fish protested to Mr. Roberts, the Spanish minister at Washington, informing him that war had not been declared, and that the United States citizens had a right to carry articles destined for the enemies of Spain, subject to the seizure of such as might be contraband of war, or to capture for a violation of a lawfully established blockade. He stated that a persistence in the decree would endanger friendly relations, and Spain was induced to alter it, but the *Colonel Lloyd Aspinwall* and other vessels were captured.

¹Others remembered that Spain had recognized the Confederates as belligerents in June, 1861.

Mr. Roberts stated to Mr. Fish that the United States Government should issue a proclamation similar to that which was issued by President Fillmore against the filibusters in April, 1851. Mr. Fish replied that the circumstances of the two cases were entirely different—that peace prevailed in Cuba when Fillmore's proclamation was issued, and that armed invasion threatened to leave the United States; but that a portion of the people of Cuba were now in insurrection to redress alleged wrongs, and no expeditions were leaving the United States. Mr. Roberts had admitted that the Government had been active in preventing violations of the law, but he was afraid that the condition of the struggle in Cuba might become such that the American Government would be induced to concede belligerent rights. Secretary Fish informed him that while the sympathy of the United States was in favor of people who were striving for self-government, and was in harmony with all efforts to free the American continent from trans-Atlantic control, yet there was a desire to maintain friendly relations with governments still claiming control over neighboring possessions, and that the United States would not depart from her traditional policy. Roberts had intimated that free discussion in the United States should be limited, but Fish notified him that the American Government would limit its interference to unlawful acts in the infraction of obligations to foreign powers.

Notwithstanding the care taken by the American Government, the shipment of supplies for the Cubans threatened to endanger the friendly relations with Spain. There had been secret enlistment by an ex-officer of the Union army, who was working in favor of the Cubans. The *New York Tribune* of April 6, stated that the Cuban committee in New York furnished transports to all who desired to enlist. The *New York Times* stated that various vessels cleared that port for Nassau, and then sailed under English colors to Cuba. The *Mary Lowell* was seized in April by the Spanish

authorities, and the American Government prepared to send war vessels to demand restitution. The London *Times* suggested that the United States was about to seize Cuba, and doubted whether England would any longer offer objections. Writers in America stated that Grant had run wild on the subject of Cuba, and that the people were being prepared for a step looking toward annexation. A writer to the London *Times* said: "I forewarn you there is a heavy storm brewing ahead."

The sympathy of the United States did not extend to designs against Cuba. There was no desire to disturb the relations with Spain. It was hoped that all misunderstandings might be adjusted in a way to prevent irritation. Secretary Fish proposed that the Spanish Government should authorize Mr. Roberts to adjust matters growing out of the intercourse with Cuba, instead of referring them to Madrid. In order to facilitate a peaceful settlement of cases, which were liable to arise in regard to questions growing from circumstances through which Cuba was passing, Spain concluded to acquiesce in the proposal of Mr. Fish. Roberts was authorized to settle such cases by agreement with the captain-general without consulting the Spanish Government.

In June, 1869, the violence of the volunteers in Cuba became the subject of consular letters to Mr. Fish. It was also stated that the Spanish residents in Cuba were dissatisfied with the conduct of the war and wished it to end. They had deposed General Dulce on account of his conciliatory disposition. The fierceness of the Cuban conflict, the excesses on both sides, the desolation of the island, the infringements on commerce, the position of Cuba, and the interests of American citizens there, led the United States to hope that Spain might be willing to listen to offers of mediation to end the contest. If the majority of the people of Cuba desired to terminate their colonial relations the President felt that they were only following the general course of events in America since 1783; but notwithstanding

the American sympathy for people whom they thought were striving for self-government, the United States had discharged its duty in restraining American citizens whose tendencies had been warmed into life by the appeals of Cubans in the United States. Some orators, newspapers and printers apologized for the enforcement of the neutrality laws, and left the impression that Grant prevented the violation of these laws from duty rather than from any desire. The *Nation* (New York) was inclined to think, however, that the supposed sympathy with Cuba existed principally with the wire-pullers and manufacturers of issues. In reply to those who had favored annexation, it was stated that since 1860 our annexation fever had declined, and that we were no longer going up and down the earth seeking to spread ourselves. In June it was reported in Washington that negotiations were in progress with the Spanish Government for the surrender of Cuba, but a denial was subsequently given. The United States Government felt that the Cubans might be conquered, but that they would never again be contented, faithful subjects of Spain; that there was a growing sentiment in favor of breaking the tie which had bound them so long with a country three thousand miles away. England had anticipated events by granting self-government for Canada, Russia had given up her American possessions, and it was thought that Spain, without losing her dignity and honor, could reasonably adopt a similar course with reference to Cuba. Spain had already voluntarily ceded distant colonial possessions in the early part of the century, and she could no longer urge the objection of national dignity. It was thought that she could afford to stop the war in the name of humanity, even if Cuba should be lost to her forever. Had it not been for her traditional pride the American Government might have been willing to appeal to her considerations of *interest*, in order "to induce her to surrender her rights to Cuba on receiving equivalent for her property and her rights of domain." It seems that in the spring a proposal had already been made to General Prim for the

purchase of Cuba, but it was made by private parties and was not intended to lead to the immediate advantage of the United States. The intention was to buy "Cuba for the Cubans" by money to be advanced by a company of speculators who expected to get their pay later from the Cuban customs. It appears that about \$75,000,000 were offered.

Grant at first was inclined to accord the insurgents the rights of belligerents; and at one time in the summer of 1869 Secretary Fish at his direction had prepared and signed a proclamation to that effect, but owing to the firm objections of Fish the document was never issued. Afterwards, when the President changed his mind, he thanked Fish for having restrained him. Notwithstanding that the conditions at one time appeared to favor the recognition of belligerent rights, after a careful survey it was decided that before adopting a policy of recognition it was the duty of the United States to all parties to use its influence with Spain, and, if possible, to end the strife by mediation. The American Government was interested in the new national organization in Spain and did not wish to embarrass it at that time. It knew the Spanish pride, but hoped to suggest a plan that would settle the Cuban trouble in the interest of humanity and for the benefit of all parties concerned. The embarrassment which it was seen might result to nations, on account of the strong sympathy in the United States, made it advisable for Spain to look at the question from a practical point of view and to act promptly. In June, 1869, Paul S. Forbes, of the United States, who seems already to have had a confidential interview with Prim and other influential persons at Madrid, was, on account of his personal relation with these individuals, appointed a special and confidential agent of the American Government to confer with the Spanish authorities, but with only advisory powers. He was asked to inform the Spanish authorities that the American Government offered to mediate to end the Cuban struggle on the following basis: (1) The acknowl-

edgment of Cuban independence by Spain. (2) Cuba to pay Spain for the relinquishment of her right of sovereignty and for her property. In case she could not pay all in cash she was to give a pledge of export and import customs. (3) The abolition of slavery in Cuba. (4) An armistice pending the negotiation. On June 29, General Daniel E. Sickles, who had been appointed minister to Madrid, received full instructions, which also embodied the above plan of mediation. In case the good offices of the United States should be accepted, he was also authorized to propose a conference of American, Spanish and Cuban delegates at Washington. In case Spain refused to accept the proposition of the United States, it was suggested that the "early recognition of belligerent rights" would be the logical deduction, and that such a course would probably be necessary unless a change in the conditions of the parties should occur. Secretary Fish suggested that Spain might wish to make it a *sine qua non* that the United States should guarantee the payment by Cuba. Though it was desired to avoid such complications, he said it might be that President Grant could be induced to make such a recommendation to Congress. It was also intimated that Spain might suggest a desire to sever her political relations with Porto Rico, but Sickles was instructed not to obtrude this subject. Sickles was asked to confer with Mr. Forbes who had already gone to Madrid.

Before Sickles reached Madrid new causes of complaint had arisen. On July 7, the Captain-General of Cuba issued a decree closing several ports, declaring voyages of vessels with arms, ammunition or crew for the insurgents illegal, and directing Spanish cruisers on the high seas to bring such vessels into port, as provided by the treaty of 1875. Secretary Fish immediately complained to Mr. Roberts, and stated that the decree assumed power over the United States that could be permitted only in time of war. The treaty of 1795 gave Spain no rights over the vessels of the United States in time of peace, and Mr. Fish declared that the Government would not permit American vessels to be interfered

with on the high seas except in time of war. He stated that a continuance of the decree or an attempt to enforce it would be regarded as a recognition by Spain that a state of war was existing with Cuba. A few days later Mr. Plumb, the American consul at Havana, informed Secretary Fish that the decree of the captain-general had been modified.

Forbes reached Spain before Sickles, and gave the purport of his propositions to General Prim. The latter did not receive them favorably, so he decided not to present his letter to Mr. Silvela, the Minister of State. General Sickles arrived at Madrid on July 21, called with Hale to see Mr. Silvela, and on the 29th was presented to the regent, with whom he dined. On the same day Secretary Fish cabled him that an early decision on the proposition on mediation was important, and requested him to hasten it. On July 31, Sickles mentioned the American good offices to the Minister of State, who gave him the promise to consult the Cabinet. On August 1, he presented the subject to Prim, who wanted to know how much Cuba and Porto Rico would give for their independence. Sickles had no instructions on this point, but he suggested about \$125,000,000. Prim informed him that Spain might arrange the preliminaries with the United States, and concede autonomy of Cuba and Porto Rico for a satisfactory equivalent as soon as hostilities ceased. He promised to consult the Cabinet.¹ When Sickles was sent to Madrid it had been reported that he had instructions to ask Spain to surrender Cuba. On August 3, the London *Times* stated that the preliminaries of such an agreement had been fully arranged, and that the terms provided that Spain should recognize the independence of Cuba and receive from the new government \$100,-

¹ General Sickles states that the haste of Secretary Fish in pressing the Spanish Cabinet for an early decision, defeated the policy of mediation. The formal tender of mediation was not made by Sickles until he was urged by Fish. Prim desired time to prepare his colleagues and public opinion. Becerra disclosed the offer, which greatly inflamed Spanish opinion.

ooo,ooo in bonds, to be secured by the revenues of the island and guaranteed by the United States. Though this was not strictly accurate, it will be seen that there was a leak somewhere in diplomatic circles.

The sudden sickness of the Prime Minister, on August 6, caused a delay in the Madrid negotiation. In the meantime several new questions had been under consideration at Washington. Speakman and Wyeth were captured with an insurrectionary force to Cuba. They surrendered, claiming that they had embarked by mistake, and they were both murdered after a mere form of a Cuban trial. The American consul immediately notified the State Department, and suggested the need of a man-of-war at Santiago to protect American citizens. In July, a vessel of war was sent to investigate the execution of the two American citizens. On August 10, Secretary Fish instructed Sickles to demand compensation for the families of Speakman and Wyeth, and to protest in the name of the President against the continuation of the war in such a barbarous manner. On the same day Sickles, according to his instructions, made a solemn protest.

After this date, he had several conferences with both Silvela and Prim on the subject of mediation, and neither of them became excited at the suggestion that Spain should recognize the independence of Cuba. Silvela acknowledged the sincere manner in which the United States had fulfilled her international duties, and he assured General Sickles that since proslavery days the liberal people of Spain had come to regard the United States as a natural friend. Both he and Prim seemed to favor a friendly intervention which would secure a simultaneous disarmament and amnesty in Cuba, but they could not agree to accept Mr. Fish's plan. They were both opposed to a conference in which Spain, the United States and Cuba should be represented; they said that Spain was willing to treat with the United States, but that Cuba could only be heard through deputies in the Cortes. It was evident that they felt that

the Spanish people would refuse to grant any concessions so long as the Cubans were in rebellion—so long as they had arms in their hands. Mr. Silvela, on August 14, informed Sickles that article 108 of the Spanish constitution would prevent the government from making any arrangement concerning Cuba until the Cuban representatives were seated in the Cortes; but after that should occur he said that the government could make any arrangement which seemed expedient—that they could grant a liberal constitution, complete autonomy, or independence. General Sickles suggested that under the circumstances something should be done at once. Silvela concurred as to the danger of new complications which might result from delay, but he said that the temper of the Spanish people at that time did not allow haste, and that the Government would not set an example of an infraction of the constitution. Prim warmly protested that Spain could not entertain the suggestion of an armistice, nor consider a plan for the independence of Cuba while the insurgents were still in arms, but that she would grant full amnesty as soon as they laid down their arms. Concerning the subject of emancipation, he thought the Cubans themselves could best settle that, and said: "That is your glory in America, the reward of your philanthropy." In a second conference with Sickles, Prim showed that his own ground was in advance of his colleagues. He appeared to be ready to deal with the Cuban question as a successful revolutionary leader wielding much power. He stated that some of his colleagues did not realize as he did the difficulty of carrying on a war across the Atlantic, and that they were also greatly influenced by popular opinion. Prim was ready to say to the Cubans: "Go, if you will; make good the treasure you have cost us, and let me bring home our army and fleet and consolidate the liberties and resources of Spain." Silvela, who was a lawyer and a parliamentary leader, inclined towards a purely legal and legislative solution of the Cuban trouble. He dealt with it as a jurist and a par-

liamentarian. Both admitted that no human power could obtain a concession from the Spanish people while the rebellion was in existence.

On August 13, General Sickles cabled Secretary Fish that Prim had agreed to accept the good offices of the United States, but that he had modified the plan which had been offered. Prim's plan embodied four cardinal propositions: (1) The insurgents to lay down their arms. (2) Spain to grant simultaneously a full and complete amnesty. (3) The people of Cuba to vote by universal suffrage upon the question of their independence. (4) A majority having declared for independence, Spain to grant it, the Cortes consenting; Cuba to pay a satisfactory equivalent, guaranteed by the United States. On August 16, Fish objected to the first proposition as unattainable, and said that the third was impracticable. He instructed Sickles to negotiate only on the basis of the propositions submitted by the United States. On August 20, Sickles, in an interview with Prim, stated the objections of Mr. Fish, and again urged the first proposal. This Prim could not accept, but he said: "Let the United States be assured of the good faith and good disposition of Spain, and especially of the frankness and sincerity with which the President of the Council has promised to treat with the Cabinet at Washington, on the basis of the independence of Cuba, as soon as it is possible to do so consistently with the dignity and honor of Spain." Prim still hoped that the United States would induce Cuba to accept a basis of settlement which should comprise a cessation of hostilities, amnesty, election of deputies, a project of law to be submitted by the Government to the Cortes settling the future of Cuba, and a plebiscite or independence. As a reason for his argument that the insurgents were not in a condition to negotiate, he urged that they were merely roving bands with no government. Though he could not agree to treat with them at that time, nor to precede negotiations by an armistice or the abolition of slavery, he said that by following his program they could "have their liberty without

firing another shot." "It is only necessary for the Cubans," said he, "to accept the assurances of the United States, given on the faith of Spain, that they may have their independence by laying down arms, electing their deputies, and declaring their wish to be free." Prim did not doubt that the Cuban would eventually be free; he recognized the manifest tendency of events in America and the inevitable termination of all colonial relations as soon as those colonies should be prepared for autonomy; but he stated that Spain could not be reconciled to make concession for the independence of a district with no ports nor ships nor army, while such district should remain in hostility to the Government.

General Sickles was impressed with the tone of the Spanish Cabinet and stated that it was so manifestly conciliatory, and "so apparently earnest for complete accord with the United States," that he saw no occasion for intimating that the recognition of belligerent rights would logically follow in case Spain refused to accept the proposition of his government. He did not desire to excite any just susceptibilities of the government or the people.

Considerable newspaper discussion followed the negotiations at Madrid. The London *Times* discovered that the reports that Sickles had made overtures for the sale of Cuba were "up to a recent date unfounded." It stated that there were obvious reasons why the American Government might not desire to annex Cuba at that time, but would prefer to see it in a transition state of independence. The neutrality of Cuba guaranteed by England, France and the United States was suggested in some of the journals, but it was seen that such a proposition was not likely to materialize. A French diplomat was reported to have said that times had much changed since the days when the mere mention of the acquisition of Cuba by the United States would have convulsed Downing Street and the *Affaires Etrangères*. Neither England nor France seemed disposed to stir a finger to prevent the transfer. Russia seemed to desire the settlement

of the Cuban question agreeably to the United States. The French minister to Spain hoped that the Cubans would receive qualified autonomy like Canada, and he was inclined to think that the time was not far distant when they would become independent. He hoped the United States would interfere to stop the war. Articles in *La Patrie* and *La France*, semi-ministerial papers, considered that the insurrection in Cuba was likely to be successful. *La France* said: "It is no use to delude ourselves, for Cuba is lost to Spain;" and it suggested that Spain should yield the independence of the island for an equivalent to be paid by the assumption of a portion of the public debt of Spain, the independence to be guaranteed by the great powers, including the United States. In Spain, while some of the monarchical organs were apparently making efforts to provoke a misunderstanding with the United States, republican organs were generally friendly and deprecated any interruption of amicable relations. Several Spanish papers went so far as to speak decidedly in favor of a cession of Cuba to the United States for a fair equivalent, mentioning the usual reservation that the insurrection should first be terminated. It began to appear that Spanish opinion might be conciliated in favor of independence in case some reciprocal commercial advantage could be obtained. There appeared to be less susceptibility to the idea of transfer than to the concession of independence. There was a general impression that the persons and property of Spaniards would not be safe under Cuban control. The newspaper discussion in favor of cession may possibly have been stimulated by the agents of American parties who had undertaken to secure the purchase of Cuba from Spain as a private enterprise.

Spain still repelled the idea of giving up Cuba, especially so long as it remained in rebellion. She did not forget her past glory and she had lost none of her self-esteem based on former exploits. Her honor was more than religion; it was superstition. She would have grieved more at shame than from any pecuniary loss by the transfer of Cuba. A

Spanish writer in Paris, while admitting that Cuba had long been a milch-cow for needy Spanish governments, while the honest Cuban laborer had toiled under the hot Cuban sun, was yet not willing to see Cuba given up. He said that its loss would be the utter ruin of Spain, causing her to sink into a fourth-rate power.

Spain would not accept the good offices of the United States on a basis which the latter believed would be accepted by Cuba. The conditions which the Spanish Government offered were considered incompatible with any practical negotiation. The United States could not ask Cuba to lay down her arms unless the Spanish volunteers should be compelled to do the same. Mr. Sickles informed Silvela, on September 3, that the people of the United States could not be indifferent to the fate of Cuba, and that the Spanish ministry, seeing the growth of self-government in America, would do well to anticipate events. France had once replenished her treasury by the sale of Louisiana, and relieved herself of the burden of distant possessions; and England had granted self-government to Canada; why should Spain not adopt a similar course of wise foresight regarding Cuba? There were extravagant rumors after September 3, indicating that it was the purpose of the United States to grant belligerency if her offices were not accepted. There was an immediate fall in Spanish funds. Becerra, Minister of State, *ad interim*, held firmly to the policy which had been previously outlined, though he agreed with the views of General Prim. He said that slavery was purely a domestic question and not one for mediation; that the committee of the Cortes had voted that the independence of Cuba was inadmissible as the basis of negotiation, and that no Spanish territory could be constitutionally alienated except by consent of the Cortes.

Mr. Fish especially objected that the plebiscite was impracticable—that the popular vote could not, at that time, be an indication of the popular will. At the same time there were rumors that Spain was about to send more troops to Cuba.

New causes of irritation had also arisen. On August 21, Plumb informed Fish of the murder of twenty prominent citizens in Santiago. On the 27th he gave information that the insurgents had resolved upon a general destruction of the property, and especially of the sugar estates. By this, it was seen that much loss would be entailed on the American citizens. In August there had also been a decree by Cuban authorities, authorizing the seizure of the estates of suspected sympathizers with the rebellion. Much American property was confiscated. Sickles protested, and the estates were released by Spanish decree, but the Cuban authorities did not act promptly. About the beginning of September, the American Government, at the request of Peru, had detained gunboats which were being built in New York for Spain to use against Cuba. The boats were seized on the pretext that they were intended for use against Peru, but Spain denied that she was any longer at war with Peru, and said that Peru knew that not another shot would be fired. Hostilities had ceased, but Spain refused to sign a treaty. Mr. Becerra, in remonstrating against the detention of the gunboats, referred to the long friendship which had existed between Spain and the United States since 1778; and he informed Sickles that he desired President Grant to influence the Cuban refugees to secure a less savage character to the war, but that the gunboats were intended to act neither against Peru nor Cuba. He said that they were intended to defend the coast against the aggressions of filibusters and pirates. The *New York Times* stated that it was the duty of the American Government either to forbid the Spanish vessels to leave the harbor, or to declare the contending parties belligerents—that it was not seemly for our republic to hold the hands of a struggling people while a trans-Atlantic power was beating them with weapons supplied by our artisans. The Government did not immediately release the vessels, but the subject was under consideration until Spain was induced to sign a treaty of peace with Peru.

The purport of the negotiations at Madrid had leaked out.¹ It seemed that the offer of mediation had at least been made known to the French Government. About the middle of September the reception given by the Emperor at Paris to Prim and Silvela, and to the British secretary of foreign affairs, caused many comments. It was stated that the Cuban question and the action of the United States were the topics of consideration. But Becerra declared that the rumor concerning the negotiation with other powers in regard to the American proposition was false. He stated that Spain would not negotiate with any power as to her internal policy. On September 16, Becerra formally notified Sickles that the committee of the Cortes had decided to oppose treating with any power concerning Cuba, but he stated that the Cubans could have peace if they would ask for it. He asked Mr. Sickles to get authority to withdraw his note, in order that Spain might be enabled to act freely in her policy of moderation, without accusations of yielding to foreign pressure. Two days later, according to the *London Times*, a telegram from Paris advised Prim to accede to the representations of the United States, follow the French example in Mexico, and "relinquish Cuba when they can and before they must." But if such a telegram was ever sent, it was evident that the revolutionary government of Spain was afraid to act upon it.

Sickles was instructed to withdraw the tender of the United States, in case Spain did not accept it, and he was informed that the recognition of Cuban belligerency would only occur in case of necessity. The offer of good offices was at once withdrawn, but not without the assurance of Spain that they "might still avail for the object to which they had been addressed." The greatest obstacle to the success of the

¹ General Sickles states that the purport of the negotiations were disclosed by Becerra who was hostile to the American policy of mediation. Becerra was temporarily acting as Minister of State during the absence of Silvela with Prim who was taking the Vichy waters in France.

negotiation had not been the independency of Cuba so much as the preliminaries. Many years afterwards, Señor Castelar said that Sickles proposed to buy Cuba. Sickles denied the statement. The latter thought, however, that if President Grant had not been in such a hurry, Prim would have agreed to Cuban independence.

Roberts believed that the President had resolved, early in September, to recognize the insurgents as belligerents. As the negotiations at Madrid drew to a close he concluded to sound the Government at Washington. In a note to Fish on September 18 he described the condition of the insurgents and quoted both Sumner and Dana to show that they were not entitled to recognition. Referring to the policy of Spain in 1861, he said it was necessitated by geographical conditions. He complained of the malcontent Cubans in the United States who were enlisting men without interference, and of Cuban emissaries who had boasted of private official information. Owing to the absence of Secretary Fish no reply was sent to Roberts until October 13, when he was informed that no intention to grant belligerent rights had been reached. Fish took occasion to say that it was rather early for Spain to concede belligerency to the Confederacy sixty-six days after the bloodless assault upon Sumter in 1861, but he recognized the weight of Roberts' argument as to geographical position. He quoted Riquelme to prove that foreign intervention in Cuba might be made in the interest of humanity. He stated that the existing character of the war could not be indefinitely prolonged; the United States had acted according to her long-established policy, but she reserved the right to guide her future course according to future exigencies. Spain had hastened to recognize the Maximilian government in Mexico, and Mexico in return had promptly recognized Cuba. Peru and other South American states had also recognized Cuban belligerency, and the Cubans were urging the United States to follow their example. An American writer who saw that the fate of

Cuba rested with the United States, estimated that nine-tenths of the people favored her recognition; he urged that the exclusion of Spain from that island, with its commanding position in the West Indies, should be the determined policy of the American Government, and he insisted that there never was a case which appealed more earnestly for the application of the Monroe doctrine; he said that its independence or annexation should be secured before it should become utterly desolated. Charles Sumner, in a speech before the Republican State Convention at Worcester, Mass., on September 22, stated that the true rule for America was non-intervention—except in the way of good offices; he said that we could not recognize the Cubans by international law, and that we could never recognize them anyhow so long as they continued to hold human beings in slavery. But he saw that the island where Columbus slept was fast becoming a desert; and he felt that the historic monarchy whose empire had once encircled the globe could not close her eyes to the lessons of history as stated by Turgot—that “colonies are like ripe fruits which hold to the tree only until their majority.” “In the interest of both parties * * and in the interest of humanity, the contest should be closed,” said Sumner. “Cuba must be saved from its bloody delirium, or little will be left for the final conquerors * * Spanish power on this island is an anachronism. The day of European colonies has passed—at least in this hemisphere.” The *Nation* stated that much of the talk about American sympathy was exaggerated—that it had never been the policy of this Government to be in a hurry to recognize the independence of the insurgents. It was plain that a few men could not get to the mountains and make a nation. The *New York Journal of Commerce* said that except for the damage which would result to the American position on the Alabama question the American Government would accord belligerent rights to the Cubans without waiting to follow other nations with far-off steps; but the American policy was determined by

the principles of international law, and not by the Alabama cloud.

After the refusal to accept mediation, the Spanish Government gave assurance that orders would be issued to prevent a repetition of the barbarities which had occurred under the generals in Cuba. Prim, however, in a note of September 25, stated that it was necessary to move cautiously. It was agreed that the volunteers would be disbanded as soon as hostilities should cease; that scandalous executions would be stopped; that slavery would be abolished; and that liberal reforms would be granted without waiting for the termination of the war. Information from Cuba did not agree with the information from Madrid. Plumb did not think that it was practicable to secure a disarmament of the volunteers, whom the government feared to displease. He said that the rulers in Cuba wished well to the island, and desired to stop the effusion of blood, but that there was a general opinion that "abolition" should be gradual. In October, a decree of the governor-general concerning passenger vessels met the remonstrance of Mr. Plumb, who was successful in securing a modification. The condition of the insurgents had not improved, and by their policy of inciting the negroes to burn the estates and cane-fields they soon lessened their chances of getting recognition. On November 3, the *London Times* stated that Cuba had given up hope of recognition. A recognition by the United States would, perhaps, have led to a declaration of war by Spain, and to many Spanish depredations on American commerce in the vicinity of Cuba. It was reported that the Spanish minister at Berlin had suggested to Bismarck that the Spanish Cabinet would entertain a proposition for the cession of Cuba, but this was probably only an attempt to gain time by overtures. It is not likely that even Prim would have entered into negotiations while the fight was undecided; even he did not dare to adopt any other plan except that of inducing the insurgents to lay down their arms and trust to the ultimate success of negotia-

tions for their independence. Prim continued favorable to Cuban independence, but when Roberts informed him Grant had resolved upon a recognition of the insurgents in September, he said that the United States had precipitated the question of independence before Spain was prepared for it. Claiming that Spain was able to do nothing, he said: "Let us wait and see what Congress will do."

In the meantime it was deemed wise to assure General Sickles that the future program of the Spanish Government would be to make haste as fast as possible. At a Sunday dinner, in November, Rivero, President of the Cortes, Martos, the Secretary of the Colonies, and Becerra all assured him of this policy, and of the friendly feeling toward the United States. Rivero said that he had favored the Union cause in America, and that he wanted to see Spain and the United States become allies. He stated that the Cuban question would be settled on the basis of self-government and commercial reciprocity as soon as the war was ended; and that the United States would be of assistance by advising Cuba to confide in the Spanish Government. Martos referred to the common interests of Spain and the United States in Cuba, and said that it was the policy of the government to extend free institutions to the island. He stated that when the existing government made its *debut*, it sent General Dulce to Cuba with instructions to make the largest concessions; but he said it soon became evident that Cuba did not want liberty, but independence, and that Spain could not yield that to force. He declared that the Cubans had been granted liberty of the press, and that they had used it against the government; that their right to hold public meetings had been recognized, and that they had employed it to despoil Spain of her territory. Becerra admitted that the Cubans were better prepared for free institutions than was the average population of Spain, and, like Martos, he favored the largest liberties for Cuba under the constitution. He assured Mr. Sickles that Spain was no longer controlled by the reactionary and antiquated

ideas of the Bourbons. In November, it was announced that no reforms for Cuba would be brought forward until the hostile bands had been dispersed, but the government, program for Porto Rico was to include local government, free press, impartial suffrage, the abolition of slavery, and equal civil and political rights without distinction of color. It was proposed to extend these to Cuba whenever hostilities should cease. When Congress met in December, Grant, in his message, stated that the conditions in Cuba did not justify a recognition of belligerency—the contest was not yet a war in the sense of international law. He recognized that the people sympathized with those who were struggling for self-government; but he advocated that it was not honorable to force our views upon unwilling nations, or to take an interested part in foreign quarrels without invitation. The United States had opened her doors to the oppressed of all nations, but she proposed to deal with the question of neutrality and belligerency according to strict justice and law. She had executed her neutrality laws according to this policy. Grant said: "The United States has no disposition to interfere with the existing relations of Spain to her colonial possessions in this continent. They believe that in due time Spain and other European powers will find their interest in terminating those relations, and establishing their present dependencies as independent powers—members of the family of nations. These dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one European power to another."

For several weeks after Congress met the attitude of the Government remained in doubt, amidst the shifting of the scenes and the play of alternating forces and opinions. But the eye of the pilot was discerning and the hand at the helm was ready. On December 16, the Attorney-General decided that it was not proper to cause a libel to be filed against the Spanish gunboats on the ground that they were fitted out with intent to commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens or property of a colony, district or people

claiming to be the Republic of Cuba. The Government acted upon the advice and decided to release the vessels. It was intimated even on the floor of the Senate that the action of Secretary Fish in regard to the vessels was influenced by the fact that his son-in-law, Sidney Webster, had been engaged as an attorney for the Spanish Government, though the Senator who made the intimation afterwards retracted it. Carpenter, in the Senate, offered a resolution that the thirty gunboats should not be allowed to leave till the Cuban trouble was over; but they were released, and were a great help to Spain in guarding the Cuban coasts. The bonds of the Cuban republic soon sank to a level with those of the Fenians and the defunct Confederacy. The *London Times'* correspondent stated that Spain had reason to be satisfied with the course of the American Government on the Cuban question. The vigilance of law officers had paralyzed the efforts of the Junta to send aid from American ports. It was said that Sumner inspired this policy. There had been many petitions presented to Congress in favor of granting belligerent rights, but in a debate in the Senate on a resolution offered by Carpenter, Sumner made a strong speech in opposition, and the attempt to secure recognition failed. The House asked for a copy of the Sickles correspondence, but the State Department decided not to furnish it at that time. On December 20, however, the President gave the Senate 118 pages of information as to the progress of the revolution in Cuba. There was an impression at Madrid a few days before the close of the year that Grant was on the eve of recognizing the insurgents. *La Poltica*, the organ of the Union liberals, stated that a note had been sent to the Spanish Government announcing this policy. The *Imparcial* and the *Epoca* denied the authenticity of the report. Much anxiety was felt as to the effect in the United States of a failure of the Spanish campaign in Cuba. Despondency was visible in business circles in Madrid, but the employment by the Cuban Junta of persons to go in armed bands, which was

a flagrant violation of the law of the United States, led to a diminution of sympathy in the executive department of the American Government, and for a time caused public interest in the Cuban struggle to decrease.

The United States still held herself free to act, but decided for the present to urge the question of the abolition of slavery and of reforms in Cuba. It became more apparent every day that this was necessary to end the strife. It appears that such measures might have tended to throw Cuba and Porto Rico into the hands of the United States, but Great Britain heartily co-operated in favoring them. It was not long before Mr. Layard, the British minister at Madrid, at the instance of Mr. Moret, undertook negotiations for the pacification of Cuba. When Layard proposed co-operation to Sickles, the latter avoided any expression which might indicate a disposition of the United States to accept the co-operation with England in questions concerning Cuba. These negotiations were continued in concert with the United States at Washington on the basis of emancipation and reform.

In March, the Spanish journals opened a general discussion of the Cuban question. This was probably due to the belief that Prim desired a full and frank discussion of it in order that he might feel the public pulse. The minority of the journals advocated a new policy. One ministerial paper and several republican papers favored cession to the United States for commercial advantages and an equivalent in money. It was reported that the Minister of State expressed himself favorable to a cession directly to the United States. Prim still professed to hold his former views, but intimated that if immediate independence be commended to the government by the opposition, it would be seriously considered. On March 12, Vildosola, in the Cortes, called the attention of the President of the Council to a reported conversation of Senator Sumner with the correspondent of a New York paper, in which the Senator had said that a proposition from General Prim for the sale of Cuba had been lying in his

desk since the previous May. Vildosola asked whether this proposition was in any way connected with the new point of view taken by some of the Spanish papers. Prim denied that he had ever proposed sale, and that the Government had no ministerial papers, and pronounced the report to be an invention. On March 17, Navarro y Rodrigo, a Union liberal, in the Cortes, denounced the discussion of a cession of Cuba by some of the Spanish papers, and said that the Cortes should announce to the world that, "While there are Spaniards in Spain the banner of Castile shall not be struck or furled on the battlements of Morro." Becerra, Minister of the Colonies, asked the Cortes to adopt the proposition that if Spain could not triumph in Cuba she could act so that her descendants could be able to say: "Here Spain was vanquished, but her honor was never tarnished." He said: "All who feel Spanish blood in their veins are agreed upon preserving the integrity of the country, bearing, at the same time, to the provinces beyond the sea, the reforms which civilization demands." He suggested, however, that under the existing liberal government, newspapers should be allowed to talk, even if they uttered extravagant opinions. Even strong reforms did not frighten him as they did "those tortoises that never move." The principal arguments of the journals which thought it an opportune moment to open negotiations with the United States upon the settlement of the Cuban question by cession, were as follows: (1) Spain was satisfied that the power of the insurrection was nearly broken. (2) The Cortes and Congress were both in session, and whatever advantages might accrue to Spain could be realized without delay. (3) The American Government had a large surplus in the treasury, and Spain with a treasury which could not meet needed expenditures could advantageously use the American surplus in the development of internal industry. (4) Spain would be relieved from the embarrassing questions of colonial reform. If Spain held Cuba it would be impossible to fix the limits which might arise from the agitation of reforms; the *Penin-*

sulares were liable to oppose any measures which were broad enough to reconcile the Creoles. (5) It was doubtful whether the American Congress would depart from her traditional policy against the acquisition of colonies or the annexation of insular states; she could desire no acquisition more than Cuba; she had often refused the Sandwich Islands, and treaties for the annexation of San Domingo and the purchase of St. Thomas were still pending; considering the growing indifference of the United States to obtaining foreign territory, it was likely that if the decision of the Senate should be against the pending treaties, it would defeat any subsequent offer to cede Cuba.

In the latter part of March, 1870, there was a rupture in the Spanish coalition ministry on the question of selling the bonds deposited to the credit of those who had lent money to the Government. The Union liberals in the Cabinet resigned, and a radical administration was formed. General Prim still retained his influence. After the ministry had performed its usual gyrations, it was thought that there might be a slight chance of colonial reform. Spain had made some gains in the Cuban struggle, but she now came around to the opinion advanced by Fish the previous August, that the offer of a *plebiscitum* was impracticable. Soon after the new ministry was organized, advice from Cuba was not very favorable. More troops were asked for, and Prim said that Spain could not endure the drain of blood. It was reported that the peninsular party in Cuba was disaffected toward the revolutionary *regime* in Spain. It was hard to enlist troops for the army by conscription in Spain. Demonstrations all over the country opposed "This lottery of servitude and death." The expediency of opening negotiations with the United States regarding Cuba became a subject of conversation in the ante-room of the Cortes. The American Government was anxious to see Cuba pacified, and the slaves free, but, of course, since the rejection of its good offices, could not again initiate such a movement. No new offer was made by Spain.

The critical state of affairs in Spain, together with the attitude of the Cuban authorities, caused delays in the transaction of business by the Spanish Cabinet. The *Colonel Lloyd Aspinwall*, an American vessel, had been captured by the Cuban authorities and detained for nearly four months. The United States Government asked its release, on the ground that it was going on an errand with official despatches. On April 9, Sagasta, who had become minister of state, sent orders to the captain-general to have the vessel released. The local authorities in Cuba had already placed the matter before the courts, and decided not to take it from their hands. After considerable delay and discussion over the case, Sickles, who had become tired of procrastination and promises, urged immediate action. The pressure of the United States and the resistance of the Cuban authorities left the Spanish Government between two fires, but by May 5 the *Aspinwall* was finally released.¹

The condition of the insurgents had not improved, and the insurrection showed no signs of advance. Bands of poorly armed men, with no concentration, roamed through the woods and sparsely-populated districts, attacking from ambush, and burning the property of those who did not agree with them. But Spain had been unable to suppress them; and climate, disease and an occasional bullet were destroying her soldiers while they were enduring the privations of a guerilla warfare. Both Spaniards and Cubans showed a disregard for human life and the rules of civilized

¹ The *Lloyd Aspinwall* case came near involving the recognition of the Cuban insurgents. The vessel was taken on the high seas and turned over to a Prize Court, so called, in Havana, by which she was condemned as a lawful prize. The United States denied the jurisdiction of the Prize Court, which could only sit in time of war, and decide between belligerents. Spain not having recognized the insurrection as a war, stultified herself by such action, practically recognizing the insurgents as belligerents. Sickles pointed out this dilemma to General Prim and he promptly released the vessel, paying damages for her seizure and detention.

warfare. Both parties devastated with the torch, and dealt in revengeful decrees. Both parties aroused the indignation of the world by executions of prisoners without proper trial. No civilized people could sympathize with a conflict characterized by so many barbarities and outrages. The American Government was kept busy remonstrating. Many Cubans congregated in the United States, at a safe distance from the Spanish bullets, and endeavored to embroil the American Government in complications with Spain, while they were seeking for recognition of the belligerents. Cuban bonds were issued in large amounts, and their payment made dependent upon the recognition by the United States of Cuban independence. The American Government recognized the policy of the early fathers as to neutrality, and insisted that agents of foreign governments, recognized or unrecognized, could not be permitted to abuse American hospitality, nor organize filibustering expeditions from American territory. As to a policy of recognition, Grant adhered to the rule of Monroe, who said that it depended upon a condition that showed success to be probable. In his message of June 13, after reviewing the conditions, Grant said that he was unable to see that the contest had the elements which were necessary to constitute a war, in the international sense. The revolutionists held the centre of the island and the mountains, but were unable to obtain any standing in the seaports, where their flag was not recognized by any great foreign power. They had no town or city, no established seat of government, and the existence of their legislature was veiled in uncertainty. They had no commerce and no manufactures. Fighting, though fierce and protracted, was not enough to constitute war. It was seen that belligerency might be granted as a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion, but such a policy was not yet considered to be necessary. There were serious complications arising from the seizure of American vessels, and the confiscation of property and the execution of American citizens. But the question of belligerency could not

be decided upon these grounds. It could not be decided by the sympathies or prejudices of either party, but only upon definite principles and ascertained facts.

There was considerable opposition to the President's message. In Congress, some, who were hoping for the success of the Cuban revolution, intimated that the message had been written by Caleb Cushing, who had recently been an attorney for the Spanish Government, and who had also been accused of writing the letters of the Spanish minister to the American Government. No evidence appears to sustain these charges. They were simply safety-valve ebullitions of republican democracy. Banks, of Massachusetts, and others attacked the message and favored a policy of recognition. But Grant's policy was strongly defended. Orth, of Indiana, while defending it in the House, against the arguments of the opposition, who appeared to be yearning for annexation, stated that recognition would retard the inevitable gravitation of Cuba toward the United States. He did not favor prematurely hastening the fall of the fruit; neither did he desire to commit an act which might cause us to blush for shame in the future. Concerning the destiny of American territory, he said: "To my mind the future relations of this government of the North American continent and the adjacent islands of the ocean are as clear as the sunbeams dancing * * on the dome of this beautiful Capitol. European governments, European policy, and European power will soon cease to exist in all the vast domain that stretches from the North Pole to the Equator; and throughout all that entire region yonder flag shall float, and under it, all human beings shall enjoy the blessings of free government." John A. Logan favored recognition. He said that some gentleman who opposed it did so because New York parties had sent an agent to Madrid to endeavor to make a bargain with Prim for the purchase of Cuba in order to make large sums of money and increase the power and influence of a few individuals. He said the Cubans did

not desire annexation, but that they wanted to be and ought to be free; and he appealed to the House not to allow the scheme of the New York individuals to be carried out.

The condition of Cuba was the subject of inquiry in the British Parliament. On May 9, Gilpin, in the Commons, asked whether it was not well for England to seek co-operation with the United States to stop the horrors on the island. Otway, the Under-Secretary of State, replied that the attention of the Government had been called to the condition of affairs, but that Spain had claimed to be able to end the insurrection. He stated that intervention by the English Government would be difficult, but that it would be agreeable to co-operate with the United States in such work in case the occasion should arrive. The discussion in the British Commons became the subject of inquiry in the Spanish Cortes on May 21. Soler asked one of the ministers whether it was true that England had come to some understanding with the United States to prevent the horrors in Cuba. The minister replied that he had no official notification, but he stated that a remark in the American Congress as to the Spanish atrocities in Cuba had recently caused the captain-general to send a note to the American Government inviting American commissioners to accompany the Spanish columns in order that they might see how Spain made war. On June 16, a resolution, by Mr. Bingham, looking toward co-operative intervention, to secure observance of recognized laws of war, passed the House of Representatives. On July 25, in the British Commons, M'Laren asked the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs whether in accord with the American resolution any communication had taken place between the United States and Great Britain as to co-operation in ending Cuban barbarities. Otway replied in the negative.

It became more and more apparent every day to the United States Government that the Cuban contest could

not be ended without the abolition of slavery. The Spanish Cabinet claimed to favor emancipation. On September 14, 1869, Becerra had assured Sickles that Spain would devise a scheme for entire abolition, and the American Government considered the Spanish Cabinet as committed to that policy. But Spain had many difficulties to meet. The slaveholders of Cuba used all their influence against even partial emancipation. Exiles in favor of emancipation and in sympathy with the insurgents, and the desire of others for annexation to the United States, had an influence in inducing Spain to narrow the scheme for emancipation. The Spanish Government, by committing itself to the policy of abolition, associated itself with its enemies in Cuba, and gave offense to its trusted partisans. It was seen that emancipation could not be accomplished by Spain without large political concessions to the white and free colored population of Cuba. The Moret law of June, 1870, was a compromise. It provided for partial and gradual emancipation, and was a disappointment to the United States Government. It was only an entering wedge, but it was "the beginning of the end." It postponed total emancipation for many years, but the American Government felt it was better than nothing.

In April, 1869, the Spanish Government had authorized Mr. Roberts, at Washington, to settle questions arising out of the condition of Cuba by agreement with the captain-general, instead of by consultation with the authorities at Madrid. In June, Secretary Fish asked Roberts whether his powers were sufficient to authorize him to interfere in cases where American property had been seized and American citizens arrested. Roberts replied that the situation in Cuba had been considered favorable enough to discontinue the powers which had been previously granted to him. Fish immediately instructed Sickles to bring the subjects of the seizure of property, and of arrests, before the Spanish Government; and on July 1, he said that if there was no

longer a necessity to continue the powers once given to Roberts, he hoped the arrests and embargoes would also not occur. The Senate was kept supplied with reading matter. On July 9, he handed that body 246 pages of correspondence relating to the seizure of American vessels and injuries to American citizens in Cuba.

The novelty of the war in Cuba wore away and the "resolutions" of public meetings in the United States decreased. The Government continued to maintain its neutrality and to protect the rights of the American people, but for two years the relations with Spain were more quiet. Representations in reference to the revolution were on several occasions made to the Spanish Government, and it was understood they were not pressed simply because of the Spanish difficulties at home. On February 12, 1871, a mixed commission met at Washington to decide upon the settlement of claims. A cable despatch from New York to the *London Times*, on March 15, said that the Washington correspondents of several of the New York journals stated positively that General Sickles had communicated an offer to Spain to sell Cuba and Porto Rico to the United States for \$100,000,000, but a week later the newspaper report was authoritatively announced to be without foundation. When the Cubans heard the report of the offer they hastened to declare that they would not submit to any such sale. They wished for independence alone. The *Scotsman*, the leading organ of public opinion in Scotland, in November, stated that it was believed that an attempt had been recently made to bring about a joint representation, on the subject of the Cuban revolution, by Great Britain and the United States. The *Scotsman* believed that it was desirable that something of that kind should be done and stated that there was reason to think that if public opinion in Spain were informed of the true merits of the case, "there would soon be a pacification of the island and that Cuba would be for the Cubans." On the other hand, a writer in *El Emigrado* said that Cuba

could not become independent for about fifty years. He thought that the United States looked upon the island as a coveted prize, and that independence with the protection of the United States would be nothing more than a means of bleeding both Spain and Cuba. "Let Cuba be independent to-morrow," said he, "and in a short time the fable of the wolf and the lamb would, at our expense, be re-enacted, for our beloved island would be found disturbing the waters of the Gulf which bathes the feet of the American Union. In order to be Cuba, Cuba cannot be independent." The attitude of the American Government did not substantiate all that this writer said. Grant, in his message of 1871, hoped that all pending questions growing out of Cuban affairs would be adjusted in a spirit of peace. He regretted that the disturbed condition of Cuba was still giving annoyance, and stated that the American people abstained from interference with other powers, though they desired every country to enjoy liberty and peace. A naval force was sent to the vicinity of Cuba to protect the property of *bona fide* residents.

New atrocities in Cuba and the failure of Spain to make reforms, attracted the attention of both the American Congress and the English Parliament. At Havana, in December, 1871, there was a terrible murder of medical students, who, it was charged, had injured the tomb of a volunteer officer and scattered doggerel verses over it. At the request of the Cuban volunteers the captain-general had forty-four students arrested, of whom eight were shot and thirty placed in a chain gang. The captain-general justified his act of allowing eight to be shot by the statement that the volunteers would otherwise have butchered the whole forty-four. On February 13, 1872, the President furnished the Senate with documents relating to questions with Spain concerning affairs in Cuba. S. S. Cox, of Ohio, offered a resolution in the House for the recognition of Cuban belligerency. Fearing that his resolutions were quietly sleeping in the

snug quarters of the committee on foreign relations, he took occasion to express his feelings in regard to Cuban matters. "Loving the island of Cuba as a rare and wonderful portion of our star, knowing the vicissitudes of its history, feeling indignation against the horrible massacres of American citizens and Cuban students by the nation whose flag is a river of blood between banks of gold," he urged a policy that would free the struggling people from the bonds which had held them to the bosom of their antique mother across the sea. He stated that Spain had virtually admitted that the Cubans were waging war, in that she had confessed to the loss of 30,000 men; and he said that Spain, by overhauling our merchant vessels at sea, had virtually admitted our right to declare belligerency.

On April 19, 1872, Mr. Hughes, in the British House of Commons, said that Spain should be urged to cease her procrastination in regard to treaty obligations concerning slavery in Cuba. He thought it was the time to press claims and to compel fulfillment of treaties. Thirty thousand troops were about to be sent to Cuba; 59,000 were already there, besides 60,000 volunteers. Did that indicate that there was any intention of ending the great loss of life? Spain had recently established a system of cooley servitude in Cuba, and Hughes urged that the British consul should act as a commissioner of these Chinese, and should protest against the Spanish policy of the war as the United States had done. Major Arbuthnot had been to Cuba, and he stated that the Spanish faction there wished neither independence nor annexation, but that the Cuban party sought complete independence. He believed that no state of war existed; he said there should be no interference in the internal affairs of other countries. He thought that Cuba had not given Spain an opportunity to carry out her reforms, and stated that it would be best to make no protests until the rebellion was ended. Serjeant Simon spoke from personal experience concerning the hospitable character of the

Cubans, all of whom detested the Spanish Government; and he favored giving a solemn warning to Spain to observe her treaties. Viscount Enfield said that England had no treaty right to interfere as to the status of slavery, and that she must make some allowance for the difficulty under which the Spanish Government had recently labored.

Secretary Fish, in his instructions to Sickles on October 29, stated that unless Spain should become more successful in the Cuban war the United States Government might consider whether it was its duty to change its line of action. If Spain allowed a few persons to set at naught the law which was for the benefit of all, it seemed like an acknowledgment that Spain was unable to control affairs. The system by which the grasping sugar planters were reducing coolies to slavery was considered atrocious. The Spanish people seemed to sanction the assurances of reform which had been made by the Spanish Cabinet, but Spain was tardy in her promised co-operation with the United States, and was not carrying into effect the provisions (of June, 1870) for the gradual emancipation of slaves. The United States was warmly interested in commerce and peace, and was tired of the strain which was placed upon her by the necessity of watching to prevent adventurers from committing acts against our traditional policy. Mr. Fish regarded peace as the best means by which Spain could retain her possessions. He thought a humane policy towards Cuba would have a good effect, and that the prompt settlement of American claims would tend to prevent a change of popular feeling in the United States.

The turmoil in Spain continued to weaken the Spanish arms. On February 11, 1873, the king abdicated on account of the continual struggles of factions. On the same day, the two chambers combined as a sovereign Cortes and voted a republic, 126 being in favor of it and 32 against it. When the republic was proclaimed, European nations stopped diplomatic relations, but it was promptly recognized by Gen-

eral Sickles. It was naturally expected that the new government might relax the severity of the previous Spanish policy. On March 22, Secretary Fish instructed Mr. Bancroft, at Berlin, to get the German Government to ask Spain, simultaneously with the request of the United States, to change certain oppressive tariff laws in Cuba, so that the goods and not the vessels might be subject to fine.¹ Hostilities were suspended in Cuba at the time of the establishment of the republic, but much fighting was reported by the following June. The New York *Herald* continued to announce victories for the insurgents. Spain continued to say the rebellion was "*almost at an end,*" and that "*even if Spain should perish, Cuba must not be lost.*" Swarms of Cuban fugitives told the stories of the broad, bare patches of Cuban land, and of turkey-buzzards swarming on the island, protected by law and fattening on the unburied carcasses of human beings. It soon became evident that the new *regime* in Spain would grant no reforms in Cuba so long as the insurgents refused to lay down their arms. Secretary Fish, on August 27, wrote Sickles that he hoped, in the interests of *all*, that such was not the determination of Spain and he asked that the Spanish ministry be urged to disavow any such inconsistent policy, and to impress the importance of action, rather than promise, in the reforms which Spain had recognized as proper and necessary. Gallenga, in a book on Cuba, published at London, stated that there were in the island two white races united in blood but divided in heart, and that society was treading upon such a thin crust while slavery existed that there would always be conflict. He said that the Spanish rulers knew full well that they were

¹ England and Germany joined the United States in demanding relief from the abuses of the revenue system in Spain and Cuba, and the corrupt manner in which it was executed. All three governments united in adopting Sickles' note to the Spanish Government on this subject.

unable to abolish Cuban slavery or to put an end to the Cuban war. There were 15,000 Cuban slaveholders, of whom 150 overawed, not only the people, but also the Government. Out of the 1250 poorer slaveholders, he thought that many were insurgents at heart. He believed that independence must go hand in hand with the abolition of slavery by the purchase of slaves—that Cuba could be best freed from the disturbance in this manner. He stated that the majority of people in England had been disposed to endorse the conclusions of English travellers, that "American annexation of Cuba is an event as desirable as it is unavoidable." He recognized, however, that Grant was perfectly willing for Spain to keep Cuba, and that he was grieved only at the continual disturbance in that quarter.

Castelar, the Spanish "Patrick Henry," was elected President of the Cortes on August 26, 1873, and in less than a month he had become the head of the ministry and virtually dictator. In a speech in the Chamber of Deputies in 1872, he stated that, as to trade relations, Cuba was moving away from the American continent and drawing nearer to the European. Before he came into power he announced a line of policy as to Cuba, which was similar to that of the United States. He said: "Let us reduce to formulas our policy: (1) Immediate abolition of slavery in Cuba and Porto Rico. (2) Autonomy of Cuba and Porto Rico, which shall have a parliamentary assembly of their own, their own administration (like Canada) * * * a federal tie to unite them to Spain in order that we may found the liberty of those states and at the same time preserve the national integrity. I desire Cuba and Porto Rico to be sisters, and I do not desire that they shall be trans-Atlantic Polands." At another time he said: "There will be room for a free Cuba." But, though Castelar knew how to break away from monarchy, he did not know how to establish a republic, and did not have an opportunity to carry out the reforms which he had advocated. His career as a torch-bearer of

the Spanish republic was very brief, but if it had been longer perhaps Cuba would have fared no better.¹

One of the gravest crises in the relations of the United States with Spain occurred during Castelar's administration. It arose over the *Virginus* tragedy, which was the culmination of a catalogue of inconveniences and wrongs growing out of the condition of Cuba under Spanish rule. Both Spain and the United States recognized that the insurgents in Cuba were not belligerents; they therefore could not fit out vessels of their own, but were forced to use the flag of some neutral nation—usually that of the United States. Their hostile naval expeditions and their efforts to send arms to the insurgents were disguised under the pretension of commercial adventures. The *Virginus* was originally an American vessel engaged in commerce; but she was bought by Cuban insurgents or their sympathizers, and was used to convey warlike supplies. In October, 1873, having secured supplies and a full crew at Kingston, Jamaica, she hoisted the United States flag, sailed to Port-au-Prince,

¹General Sickles, in a recent letter, says: "Castelar was a brilliant orator and writer, but failed as an executive. I helped him and his colleagues establish the Spanish Republic, but the leaders were not men of affairs. In one year there were four presidents. Figueras, Pi y Margall and Salmeron were all parliamentarians, but not rulers. Castelar advocated the separation of church and state, but he appointed more bishops than the Bourbons. He advocated emancipation, but he didn't liberate a single slave, even when he had absolute power as a dictator. I appealed to him to follow the example of Lincoln, whose statuette, representing him breaking the chains of the slave, stood on Castelar's mantelpiece. He promised to do this, but did nothing. He drafted a constitution for a federal republic in Spain and presented it to the Cortes, but never called it up for action. He professed horror at the act of Burriel, who shot the prisoners captured on the *Virginus*, and promised to punish him, but, in place of punishment, Burriel was promoted. Castelar was a man of fine sentiments but a weak character, easily baffled by opposition. He was amiable to a fault, influenced by flattery, easily persuaded by personal friends—whom he found in all parties—and lacking in firmness to overcome adversaries."

Hayti, where she took on board contraband of war, and started for Cuba. When near the island she was seen by the Spanish gunboat *Tornado*, and turned toward Jamaica. The *Tornado* pursued and captured her on October 30, either on the high seas or in Jamaica waters. She offered no resistance. Any arms that may have been upon board were thrown into the sea. The *Tornado* towed the captured vessel into Santiago de Cuba, notwithstanding the fact that she was flying the Stars and Stripes, and was probably captured in British waters. Captain Fry, the commander of the *Virginius*, and fifty-one companions were shot in the public square of Santiago—some having been allowed a trial of only ten minutes. There was no United States cruiser within reach of Santiago, and but for the arrival and bold interference of Sir Lambton Lorraine, commander of the British man-of-war *Niobe*, the other ninety-three men from the *Virginius* might not have been saved. Lorraine acted with quickness and determination. "Shoot another Englishman or American," he said, "and the *Niobe* will bombard the city." There was an indication of certainty in his tone, and look, which caused the slaughter to cease. A resolution of thanks to Sir Lambton in the American Congress was tabled, but the Nevada miners sent him a fourteen-pound silver brick to show their appreciation of his grit. Both England and the United States immediately protested against the executions at Santiago, and sent men-of-war to protect the rest of the prisoners. The American air was heavy for awhile with warlike talk, and not without reason. Even if Spain should have been justified in seizing the vessel, she was surely not justified in putting the prisoners to death by drumhead court-martial. Indignation meetings were held in the United States. Grant promptly convoked the Cabinet to deliberate upon grave matters of State. The navy-yards were set working day and night. On November 4, Fish telegraphed Sickles: "In case of refusal of satisfactory reparation within twelve days from this date, you

will, at the expiration of that time, close your legation, and will, together with your secretary, leave Madrid." Sickles protested; he asked Spain to punish the iniquities of her Cuban servants, to pay an indemnity, and properly to salute the United States flag. At first the Spanish minister showed a disposition to receive the suggestions of Sickles, and to take action to show disapproval of the Santiago affair. But he fell from grace. Perhaps he had an intimation that the American Government was not so sure that the *Virginus* had a right to sail under American papers; possibly there was a "leak" in the telegraph owned by Spain, at least, when Sickles renewed his protest on November 14, Carvajal's reply was in a defiant tone. He could not recognize General Sickles' competence to make the protest, and he objected to the severity of his style and to the "excited and improper words" which he used. On the next day, Fish heard that fifty-seven more men had been hanged, and he cabled Sickles: "If Spain cannot redress these outrages, the United States will." Carvajal grew obstinate during the next few days, and endeavored to escape responsibility by a maze of contentions. There was an outburst of popular feeling in the Spanish press. The Government was urged to send passports to Sickles, as it had done to Bulwer in 1848. General Sickles' person was menaced in public places and his residence was threatened by a mob until the authorities interposed and placed guards. The *Imparcial* refuted the idea that the United States could make any claim on Spain in the case of the *Virginus*. It said that the majority of the American people desired the consolidation of the Spanish republic, and that the American executive could not run counter to this feeling by bringing Spain into an international complication at a time when the Government needed all its strength to vanquish its internal difficulties. The American newspapers were sensational enough. The telegraph spread the news that excitement was raging at the railway stations and newspaper offices

west of the Ohio river. A Baltimore mass meeting demanded reparation of Spain, or occupation of Cuba. The *London Times* stated that it looked as though America contemplated annexation. Naval preparation continued in the West Indies. The forts on the Gulf coast were being strengthened and garrisoned.

A calm followed at Madrid and also in the United States. The *Nation* of November 20 stated that the nation needed to keep a cool head in taking any steps to meddle in Cuban affairs. It said the *Virginus* was not a *bona fide* American vessel. The *New York Tribune* said that the Cubans had not been recognized as belligerents and that Spain could only seize the warlike vessels of rebels when they were found in Cuban waters. But the *Nation* held that, so far as rebel vessels were concerned, Spain need not be limited to Cuban waters—that she could take the insurgents in their own vessels at any place on the high seas. Hostile feeling was decidedly moderated. The report of the fifty-seven additional executions was found to be untrue. It was now believed in official circles at Washington that war would be averted. Senators Sumner and Cameron, through the newspapers, called upon the American people to show sympathy towards struggling republican Spain. Spanish papers expressed great pleasure that Grant would reserve questions arising out of the *Virginus* affair for settlement by Congress.

The *Discussion* of November 20 stated that Spain would reply to the United States and England that she would postpone an answer as to the *Virginus* until she could get the facts. This plan did not suit the American Government. On November 25, Fish telegraphed Sickles: "If no accommodation is reached by close of to-morrow, leave." That night Mr. Rivero initiated a renewal of an attempt to adjust affairs by negotiation. He promised that a note from Mr. Carvajal would be sent by noon the next day. Its delay caused Sickles to contemplate calling for his passports, but

it finally arrived in the afternoon of the 26th. The Spanish minister had desired to consider the *Virginus* as a pirate, but it was agreed that a formal declaration of the nationality of the vessel, by Sickles, would be accepted as a basis for immediate compliance with the American demands. Early on November 28, Sickles sent Mr. Adee to deliver a note in which he made the required formal declaration. The reply of the Spanish minister was expected at once. When it did not arrive, Sickles gave intimation to the Government that he would renew the request for passports if no adjustment was reached by three o'clock in the afternoon. All morning rumors of war floated through excited Madrid, but at noon Carvajal notified Sickles that a proposition from Fish had just arrived by cable, and had been accepted by Spain as a settlement of the question.¹

The American Government did not intend to disapprove the conduct of General Sickles, but at the same time the President decided that it was better not to make extreme demands at the moment when Spain under Castelar was

¹General Sickles, in a letter to the author, under date of June 5, 1899, says: "In the *Virginus* affair our Government vibrated between extreme demands at the outset and large concessions to Spain in the end. I was directed to insist upon complete reparation in Madrid, while Mr. Fish, in Washington, made a settlement at a small price per head, for the victims of the cruelty he had denounced as barbarous and inhuman. All Europe was horrified at the outrage, and stood ready to sanction our intervention in Cuba, in the name of civilization. We had collected a powerful fleet at Pensacola, to seize Havana. Suddenly our policy changed and Spain was released from responsibility, except the payment of a paltry indemnity. No explanation is known. The Spaniards promised to return the ship, but she was sunk. I have no doubt that our vacillating and timid policy in the *Virginus* affair gave Spain the impression that we were afraid of her, resulting in her defiance of our subsequent remonstrances touching her conduct in Cuba, ending in the Spanish War of 1898. Firmness on the part of General Grant in the *Virginus* question would have settled the Cuban question then and there. Why he hesitated and lost his opportunity remains a mystery."

struggling to establish republican institutions. There was no desire to rush into war, and it was not certain that the flag, in this case, had not been used by law-breaking adventurers to shelter themselves. An agreement was reached through the Spanish envoy whereby the *Virginius* together with its surviving passengers and crew should be surrendered to an American naval vessel; and, in case it should be proven that the vessel had a right to sail under American papers the flag was to be duly saluted by Spain. Spain was also expected to grant indemnity for the men executed, and to punish the authors of the executions. Castelar's Government found complications enough at home, and considered it wise to make whatever reparation was required. The Government disclaimed any intention of indignity to the flag of the United States. The Attorney-General at Washington decided that the *Virginius* was not entitled to sail under the American flag, and the Spanish salute was not required. After a year of pressure Spain paid \$80,000 to the American Government for the heirs of those executed at Santiago; she also promised a thorough investigation of the conduct of General Burriel, who ordered the execution, but he was never punished. No steps were taken to guarantee the United States against future abuses by the Cuban authorities.

The attitude of England in the settlement of the affair was favorable to the United States. Layard informed Castelar that Lord Grenville considered the American claims just and moderate. He held in reserve British reclamations incident to the same matter. Aside from general consideration, England might have desired for obvious reasons to prevent a rupture that might have given an opportunity for increasing American power in the Gulf of Mexico.

The catalogue of irritating affairs in relation to Cuba, of which the *Virginius* was only the culmination, might have been urged as sufficient to justify a policy of intervention to stop the stubborn war of extermination which

had been tolerated by peaceful neighbors for five years. Some would have been ready to advocate intervention as a duty. The relations of Cuba to the United States, the Spanish commercial restrictions which placed Cuba at the mercy of the Spanish monopolists, and the character of Spanish rule, pointed to the conclusion that if Spain should not voluntarily grant reforms and guarantee pacification of the island, the United States might be compelled, especially for future security, temporarily to occupy it and assist in the organization of a liberal government based upon modern views. Such action might have led to annexation, but not necessarily; it might have led to a restoration of Spanish possession under restrictions as to the character of Spanish rule, and as to the size of the Spanish army and naval force in the vicinity; more likely it would have resulted in the independence of Cuba under American protection.

Castelar expected to present a bill to the Cortes in January, 1874, providing for abolition of slavery in Cuba. He believed that this institution lay at the bottom of most of the abuses in the island. But he had waited too long; his popularity was declining at home, and it was not likely that the volunteers in Cuba would observe the regulations for emancipation. His speech at the reassembling of the Cortes on January 2 indicated a desire to carry out reforms, obeying the "dual movement of conservatism and progress," beginning with the pedagogues in Spain and ending with the institutions of Cuba. He stated that the reforms which were most urgently needed were (1) the establishment of a system of obligatory and free primary instruction, to be paid by the national treasury, in order to prevent the misery of the schoolmasters who had, as a rule, been poorly paid by the town board; (2) separation of church and state so that the rights of conscience might be guaranteed; (3) abolition of vassalage of every form "so that there be none save free men within the bosom of our republic, both at

home and beyond the seas." In referring to the settlement of the *Virginius*, he said: "By reason of this occurrence we have received new proofs of the friendship of many governments, and have once more convinced ourselves, by imposing upon our greater Antilla a convention which was repugnant to her natural susceptibility, that the name of Spain is as solid and as lasting there as the very soil of the island itself." His speech was made on the eve of his fall. The Cortes voted a lack of confidence, and he resigned the next morning before breakfast. The Cortes proceeded to elect a successor, but was dispersed by troops. Serrano soon assumed absolute power as chief executive under a *regime* of martial law. Spain had performed another of her well-known political changes. Sickles, leaving the indefatigable worker, Mr. Adey, in charge of the legation, returned to the United States with little hope that Cuba would become pacified.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE TEN YEARS' WAR AND AMERICAN STEPS TOWARD INTERVENTION.

MISSION OF JUDGE CUSHING.

Spain still suffered from the delirium tremens of disorder and revolution. For sixty years the pendulum had swung between anarchy and despotism. It appeared that the nearest approach to tranquillity had been during the temporary usurpation of great generals who administered law at the end of the sword. The Spaniards, though they had a fund of generosity and honor, seemed to have no capacity to manage republican institutions. They were among the worst of rebels when they decided to oppose the Government; they drew no line between political opposition and rebellious conspiracy; they did not estimate the morality of methods used to gratify feverish thirst for office, and they did not calculate the dynamic relations of the means to a desired end. Spain, like Cuba, had her rebellions, guerilla warfare, incendiarism, pillage of towns, military executions, deportations, embargoes of property, banishments, suspension of suffrage, and arbitrary domination of captains-general. Since the dethronement of Queen Isabella insurrection had succeeded insurrection, and provisional and experimental governments had passed in rapid succession. All had been maintained by irresponsible dictatorships except that of King Amadeo. In 1873, the sovereign had abdicated on account of the continual struggle between factions and parties, and the Cortes voted in favor of the republic. The following September Castelar

had become virtually dictator as the head of the ministry. But at daybreak on January 3, 1874, he had found it necessary to resign his power. While the Cortes were selecting a successor they were dispersed by troops. Martial law was proclaimed, and 10,000 soldiers occupied the streets of Madrid. Marshal Serrano named himself President of the executive of the republic; he soon assumed absolute power, and the triumphant reaction finally resulted in the restoration of the monarchy. On December 29, 1874, General Martinez Campos, who sympathized with the Bourbons, proclaimed as king Isabella's son, Alfonso XII., who had received his early instruction from the wife of Calderon de la Barca. The army favored Alfonso; Sagasta's ministry resigned, and Serrano gave up the chief command. On January 14, at the age of eighteen, Alfonso went to Madrid, and he remained king until his death in 1885. He found many difficulties to meet. Spain was bankrupt and the treasury was empty. There was not revenue enough to pay the interest on the public debt. There were sixteen million people, and it was said that there were sixteen million and one political parties.

But Alfonso received the loyalty of his people—though there were attempts to assassinate him in October, 1878, and December, 1879. His mother, Isabella, caused him very little trouble. In July, 1876, the king received her and she declared that her share in public affairs was at an end. In December, 1877, she disapproved the king's proposed marriage to his cousin, and began to associate with Don Carlos in Paris, but she was forbidden to return to Spain and her pension was stopped. The Carlist revolt in the northern provinces was finally suppressed in February, 1876, and the government won in its assertion of political unity. Under Canovas there was a retrogressive action as to liberty of conscience, but with the restoration of Canovas' ministry in 1881 and the liberal victory in the August elections, which placed Sagasta's party in power, the *regime* of

liberality ended. At the beginning of Alfonso's reign, heavy taxes were laid, and a loan of 100,000,000 francs was obtained from a syndicate of Spanish bankers, at ten per cent. interest, the Cuban customs being pledged for the payment. The insurrection in Cuba had become a nuisance to the United States, and Spain soon resolved upon energetic measures in order to prevent the threatened intervention.

When President Castelar felt the Cuban war had been in existence for almost five years, and during the diplomatic discussions of that time the neutral policy of the United States had been substantially the same. The well-intended offer of Mr. Fish to secure the independence of Cuba had been refused by Spain. Cubans still continued the war with angry fierceness, and Spain still failed to suppress them by the oppression which more and more alienated their affections. It was generally agreed that the character of the war was a scandal to the age, and Secretary Fish felt that it was the one great cause of perpetual solicitude in the foreign relations of the United States. It became more and more unsupportable to the American government. The captain-general, who could inflict injury, had no power to give redress, and might refuse to listen to the American consul. American property had been embargoed and promises to release were evaded. In July, 1873, the Government of Spain recommended the removal of these embargoes. The Cuban authorities at first disregarded the recommendation, and afterwards only partially executed it, in some cases obstructing delivery by the allegation of leases. On February 6, 1874, in his instructions to Caleb Cushing, the new minister to Spain, Secretary Fish stated that the policy of the United States was one of expectancy, but that there were convictions of duty in case of emergency. He was determined to watch for signs prejudicial to American interests. In the instructions he reviewed the conditions in Cuba as they affected the United States, and gave reasons why Cuba

should be independent. President Castelar had favored the abolition of slavery and autonomy in Cuba and in Porto Rico. This policy was not objected to by Fish, but he preferred independence. While slavery was believed to be the basis of all the trouble, it was feared that abolition would not prove a complete panacea. While the President did not contemplate annexation, yet it was hardly believed that Cuba would accept anything less than independence. Notwithstanding the promises of Spain, there was little cause to believe that Spanish exploitation would cease as long as the previous connection continued. The President regarded "independence and the emancipation of slaves as the only certain, and even the necessary, solution of the question of Cuba," and, to his mind, all other questions were incidental and insubordinate. It was stated that no part of America large enough for a self-sustaining state could be held in forced colonial subjection to Europe, but that it might be continued in attachment to that country by friendly bonds of commercial intercourse. Political separation was one of the inevitable conclusions which grew from the inexorable logic of events. The United States did not deem it wise and just to recognize even Cuban belligerency, but Cushing was informed that, apart from the general question of the unsatisfactory condition of affairs in Cuba, several prominent questions which remained unadjusted must necessarily be settled before satisfactory relations with Spain could be maintained. The most prominent of these related to the embargo and confiscation of estates, the trial of American citizens, the violation of treaty obligations, the *Virginius* claims and the punishment of General Burriel.

The right of intervention in matters connected with the external relations of Cuba had been asserted since the days of Jefferson. Interference, rather than the recognition of the Cubans, began to appear as the proper way to end the deplorable strife with all of its inconveniences. Spain after six years had gained no superiority. Her unhappy intestine

dissensions gave her little hope for the future, and the American Government was tired of delays and protracted negotiations. In his message of December, 1874, Grant said that steps by other powers might become a real necessity. This possibility had been suggested as early as June, 1870, when the House passed a resolution authorizing the President to remonstrate against the barbarous manner in which the war in Cuba had been conducted, and, if expedient, "to solicit the co-operation of the other governments" in such measures as might be necessary to secure the observance of the recognized laws of war. In the summer of 1875 there were reports of contemplated intervention by the United States, Great Britain and Germany to cause Spain to abandon the Antilles. There were probably no official steps to this effect. Germany would hardly have interfered without Russia. By November, 1875, the American Government, seeing no prospect of an end to the war or of any change in the methods of conducting it, felt that the time was at hand when it might be "the duty of other governments to intervene solely with the view of bringing to an end a disastrous and destructive conflict, and of restoring peace in the interest of all." After the failure of other expedients that had been attempted and with no other apparent course to pursue, the Government reluctantly and regretfully concluded that it might be necessary to recommend to the consideration of Congress a plan of intervention.

For nearly two years Cushing had been at Madrid, and most of the questions upon which he had received instructions had not been settled. After delays, Spain had paid the indemnity for the execution of the Americans taken on the *Virginian*, but the story of the other questions which the United States desired to adjust was an unending one of promises and delays, in which every chapter was "To be continued." During all this time, notwithstanding aggravating circumstances, the Government had scrupulously performed its obligations towards Spain, sympathizing with

the embarrassments of the Spanish Government, and doing more than was required by international law, at a time when Spain claimed that no state of war existed. After seven years of strain in fulfilling exacting demands, it was natural that the United States should desire to be relieved from this burden. Spain had refused to accept practical measures looking toward reconciliation, and it was a question whether a point had not been reached "where longer endurance ceases to be possible." If the Spanish Government, appreciating American forbearance, could not spontaneously and satisfactorily adopt measures for adjusting depending questions by comprehensive and firm measures, which would be respected, instead of by empty decrees which had no effect in Cuba, intervention seemed to be the only remedy. In a long letter of November 5, notifying Cushing of this decision, and asking him to communicate it to the Spanish Government, Secretary Fish carefully reviewed the recent relations with Spain. The letter, while not weighted with bold and defiant menaces, was nevertheless full of properly clothed intimations that Spanish misdoings could be stopped. While it gave notice of a necessity which might be forced upon the President, it stated that he hoped to avoid it, and desired Spain to help him in escaping it. Spain was arraigned on almost as many charges as were solemnly paraded against George III. in the Declaration of Independence, and they were urged with a diplomatic vigor which showed that there was a sound basis of justice and moderation in Mr. Fish's argument. Briefly stated, the note to Cushing considered the long-continued correspondence in regard to the questions arising from the strife in Cuba: The embargo and confiscation of the estates, the use of the revenues by the Cuban authorities, and the failure to comply with the provisions of 1795; the delays for nearly seven years to remedy this admitted injustice; the trial of Americans by courts-martial, and their summary punishment; the failure to punish General Burriel; the desolating

and inhuman nature of the war in Cuba, involving so much injury to American interests and so much watchfulness by the American Government; the utter hopelessness of Spain being able to succeed in the war; the friendly feeling of the United States to Spain, and at the same time her sympathy in a contest of freedom against slavery, in which a people were striving to cut the ties which held them from the self-control that natural rights and the spirit of the age seemed to favor. It was stated that our relations with Spain were so critical that another seizure like the *Virginius*, or another execution of American citizens, or, possibly, other wrongs of a less objectionable character, might produce a feeling of excitement which would force events that there was an anxious desire to avoid.

Cushing was asked to inform the Spanish Government of the probability that steps would be taken looking toward intervention. In doing this he was authorized to read his instructions to the Spanish minister, or to state the substance and purport in case he thought best. Although it was not to be ignored that war might eventually result from the condition into which Spain was allowing her relations with the United States to drift, there was no expectation that war was imminent, and there was no desire by the American Government that it should be necessary. Secretary Fish said: "In making the communication it is the earnest desire of the President to impress upon the authorities of Spain the continued friendly disposition of this Government, and that it has no ulterior or selfish motives in view, and no desire to become a party in the conflict, but is moved solely by the imperative necessities of a proper regard to its own protection and its own interests and in the interests of humanity, and, as we firmly believe, in the ultimate interests of Spain itself."

A copy of the instructions, showing the position which the United States had at last been forced to assume, was transmitted to the capitals of six European powers, with the sug-

gestion that it would be satisfactory to the United States if they should urge Spain to stop the hopeless contest. It was especially desired to ascertain the attitude of England, and Schenck was asked to read a copy to Lord Derby in confidence. Cushing before proceeding was requested to await further instructions, which were to be given as soon as the disposition of England should be ascertained. The part of Cushing's instructions which related to Cuba was supposed to be of interest to Great Britain, and it was expected that it would be regarded as just and necessary. It was thought that the English Government of its own accord might think proper to co-operate with the United States to arrest the war of devastation, and it was hoped that she would at least be able to support the American position by expressing her approval to Spain, thus tending to assure a speedy adjustment. Schenck seems to have been in doubt as to the exact intention of the American Government. On November 27, Fish cabled him that intervention was only intended as a contingent necessity in case the contest should continue, and that peace with Spain on a permanent basis of friendship was desirable.

It was a bold step to invite the co-operation of England; it opened a wide perspective; it looked like breaking the last barrier of distrust between two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race. After the lapse of a century of jealousies, mutual confidence seemed to be clearing away long-standing frets. To some it might have appeared that America was abandoning the Monroe doctrine, which had endeavored to exclude European influence on the American continent. It was evident that the multiplying bands of commerce were making it impossible for America to be isolated from Europe.

On November 15, before Cushing received the note of Mr. Fish, Spain became more friendly. On that date she sent a note to Cushing containing proposals for the adjustment of particular differences, and Cushing thought that if they

should be faithfully carried out, they would go far toward satisfying the particular claims of the United States. When he received Mr. Fish's note of November 5, he was somewhat excited, and he telegraphed in reply that in case Great Britain should co-operate, Spain would probably succumb in sullen despair, but in case England should hold aloof, he thought that Spain would venture upon the chances of a desperate war, unless she could be convinced that the true object of the United States would be to prevent war. Cushing was ready to obey orders, but he was anxious to avoid rupture. He believed that many thoughtful persons in Spain desired a foreign war as a remedy for domestic dissensions. With the close of the Carlist War over 200,000 soldiers would be left to be disposed of in some way, for the public good. Especially at such a time many in Spain would have been glad to rush into a foreign war. Cushing's telegram of November 16, concerning the Spanish note of the previous day, caused Fish to instruct Schenck to delay presenting the copy of Cushing's instructions at London. On November 26 Cushing asked whether he might give a copy of his instructions instead of giving only their substance orally. On November 27, Fish informed him that he might make the communication and present the copy, without waiting for its presentation in London. Three days later, in a friendly interview with Calderon y Collantes, Cushing presented a copy of the instructions with verbal explanations. Calderon took the whole matter very coolly, and listened attentively to the reading. In taking the copy for further consideration before another interview, he pleasantly stated that Spain was in no hurry to go to war with the United States. On the same day, December 30, Schenck communicated the copy to Derby, and on December 2, Layard, the British minister at Madrid, called upon Cushing to say that he had instructions by telegraph that the British Ministry was considering the subject of Cuba, and that Lord Derby had instructed him to confer with Mr. Cushing.

Layard expressed a readiness to support the views of the United States, saying that England also had abundant cause to intervene in Cuba on account of the slave trade. Further interview with him was delayed for three days until Cushing could see the Spanish minister again. Calderon in the interview with Cushing on December 4, said that he had accepted his office principally with the hope that he might co-operate with Cushing, who was an old friend, in healing all differences between the two countries. He concurred that the United States had good reason to complain of both unjustifiable acts and delays. He was opposed to the sequestration of the property of foreigners in Cuba, and was ready to promptly take up all the particular cases with a view to settling them and removing all causes of complaint. He hoped that the Spanish note of November 15 would prove acceptable as a basis for settlement. But, while it furnished some hope for adjustment, it did not suggest any alterations in the President's message of December 7 as to the policy concerning Cuba. Fish, some time later, in a note to Cushing said that the interview on December 4 appeared to have been confined to particular griefs, and that no allusion had been made to the general question of the condition of Cuba. But Cushing did not so understand it; he stated that every word uttered by himself had been upon the "general question" and the consequent complications; he said that he had not mentioned private griefs, but that Calderon had introduced that point, evidently with the purpose of eluding the general question, and that it did not seem wise to push the question of intervention upon him; he supposed, anyhow, that he was to undertake no pressure in that direction till the attitude of the other powers should have been ascertained. On December 5, Cushing conferred with Layard, who was prepared to co-operate to keep the peace in Cuba, but Cushing felt confident that Spain would do her duty and that the friendly interposition of Layard would probably not be needed. Derby's observation to Schenck

left the impression with Cushing that England would aid in a mediatory form, rather than by co-operation in a forcible pressure upon Spain. In speaking of it some weeks later, Cushing said that Derby began by suggesting postponement of action, that he proceeded to repel the idea of any pressure, and that he concluded with a vague expression of "good offices."

Grant's message of December 7, as usual, reviewed the desolation and ruin in Cuba and referred to the injuries which the United States and its citizens sustained from the long-continued struggle, which had no prospect of termination. It condemned the recognition of belligerency in strong terms. The contest was older, but not larger, and recognition was considered inexpedient, premature, unwise and indefensible. It would have given Spain, by the treaty of 1795, a supervision of American commerce which might have led to perilous collisions. It could have given the Cubans but a delusive hope and could not have removed their evils. Mediation and intervention by other powers was referred to as a contingent possibility or ultimate necessity if the contest should be contracted, but immediate intervention was not recommended. The readiness to mediate if Spain desired was mentioned, and it was suggested that Spain should not call upon any other power except as a last expedient. The message referred to the pending proposals, which had been submitted to Mr. Cushing on November 15, with the hope that they would lead to a satisfactory settlement and removal of the causes of grief. In case the proposals, after examination, should not prove satisfactory, it was stated that recommendation would be made to Congress as to the course to be pursued. The President's message perplexed Spain as to the precise form of intervention intended, for it stated that the insurgents were unfit for independence, and disavowed the purpose of the United States to acquire Cuba.

When the replies from the powers reached Washington they appeared somewhat indefinite. Germany desired peace,

and thought the United States was justified in her complaint, but the foreign secretary desired to consult the Emperor and Bismarck before giving a reply. Decazes, of France, desired to consult England. Italy agreed to instruct her minister to urge upon Spain the expediency of fulfilling her duties to the United States, and of pacifying Cuba. The minister at Rome had heard it alleged that the motive back of the United States' policy was the annexation of Cuba, but Minister Marsh informed him that the editorial tone of many journals in the United States, which gave that impression, was prompted by fraudulently naturalized Cubans and others desiring to bring about a rupture with Spain. Austria deferred her reply, but it was evident that it would be unfavorable. Owing to a long diplomatic rupture, Russia doubted her influence at Madrid, but the foreign minister promised, in case the Emperor should consent, to make representations to Spain to effect an equitable adjustment of difficulties. He was surprised at the forbearance of the United States, commended the reluctance which she seemed to feel in proceeding to serious measures, and stated that the display of candor and magnanimity in laying the question before the Great Powers must "forever set at rest the report that the United States had views of territorial extension in the direction of Cuba. In commenting upon the possible results of a rupture between Spain and the United States, Prince Gortchakoff observed that the inevitable loss of Cuba, which would result from hostilities, should be an important consideration for Spain. Portugal feared to make representations to Spain in regard to pacification, for that Spain would overrun Portugal in case Cuba should become independent.

On December 19, the Spanish Government heard from Austria that a note had been addressed to the powers suggesting intervention in Cuba. Cushing, when questioned about the subject, stated, according to instructions from Fish, that the intervention of foreign powers was neither

asked nor suggested; but that the expression of their views, to impress Spain with the necessity of ending the contest, had been requested, with the view of avoiding the necessity of intervention. In Madrid there was a dispute as to whether the Spanish Government had taken any action. It was believed that the Spanish Minister of State was preparing a counter-communication in behalf of Spain. There was much speculation as to what the United States would do in case she failed to secure co-operation with the other powers, also as to whether intervention by force was contemplated, and, if so, whether it would be in alliance with Spain or with the insurgents. The London *Telegraph* of January 5 contained a despatch from Vienna, stating that Spain had instructed its representatives at the European courts to explain that the Cuban question was one of European as well as of American interest. The Spanish minister, however, informed Cushing that he was postponing his note to the powers until the United States should hear from them. Spain might have used to advantage a circular issued by Seward on February 18, 1862, opposing foreign intervention in the United States between the Union and the Confederacy. Probably the Spanish ministers had no knowledge of this document, for, amidst the tragedy of oft-recurring rebellions, the comedy of transitory quarrels, the reign of political anarchy and the shifting of procrastinating ministers, it was likely such a document would have been crowded out of sight and memory.

In the early part of January the European newspapers announced that the American note had not been favorably received by any European power. On January 11, Fish confidently expected a satisfactory termination of all the pending questions with Spain and the end of the conflict with Cuba, and he was anxious that all the foreign representatives should urge Spain as simultaneously as possible. He was anxious that no erroneous impression should be created by his note of November 5. The despatch of Mr.

Boker, of St. Petersburg, contained certain expressions which suggested a possible misapprehension as to the purpose of communicating with foreign powers. The Russian chancellor had offered, with the consent of the Emperor, "to employ the good offices and friendly advice of the Russian Government with that of Spain with the intention of effecting an equitable adjustment of the difficulties," and he also had referred to the candor of the United States in bringing the question before the Great Powers. Mr. Fish, on January 13, informed Mr. Boker that it was intended that Spain should be informed of the unbiased and disinterested views of Russia concerning the necessity of ending the Cuban conquest, but that "It was not the intention of this Government to go further, nor was it expected that the Russian Government should take any steps toward effecting an adjustment of the individual griefs of the United States, nor that it should lend any material assistance under any circumstances." Mr. Boker felt sure that Prince Gortchakoff understood the communication as Mr. Fish intended it. He said that he understood that the United States considered that the only remedy for disposing of the difficulties and grievances growing out of the war was the speedy pacification of Cuba. The particular questions had been mentioned only to illustrate the general conditions, and Boker said that Gortchakoff could not have inferred that intervention between the United States and Spain was suggested, or that the United States did not consider itself able to settle its affairs with Spain without foreign assistance. In a note of January 20 to Davis at Berlin, Fish explained that the United States sought no physical force, but only the moral influence of the concurrence of opinion, which was not inconsistent with the United States' traditions.

In January, Congress was busy discussing the financial question, polygamy, the Pacific Railway, and the Centennial Exposition, but the subject of Cuba came in for occasional

consideration. On January 10, Senator Conover offered a resolution requesting the President, in order that the good understanding between Spain and the United States should not be changed by the grave events in Cuba, to declare and maintain a strict neutrality between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba. He proposed that the same provisions which were enacted by Spain on June 17, 1861, at the time of the insurrection of the Southern states, should be re-enacted by Congress. His resolution appears to have attracted little attention.

The European and American papers, in December and January, were full of articles concerning the purport of the note of November 5. They attracted the attention of Congress. On January 17, the House of Representatives asked for the correspondence between the United States and Spain concerning Cuba. On January 21, Fish sent 81 pages, 60 of which related to the conditions of Cuba, and the remainder consisted of extracts of the correspondence with Cushing, Schenck and Washburn. This correspondence shows that Fish had hoped for the co-operation of other governments, by their approval and influence, in helping to render intervention unnecessary. According to a newspaper report of an interview, Secretary Fish frankly admitted two days before submitting the correspondence, that he had invited the European governments to consider the Cuban condition with a view to aiding the United States "in our appeals to Spain on purely right grounds, without any prejudice in our favor whatsoever." The House read the newspaper reports and thought that Fish had probably proposed more than the co-operation which had been indicated in the correspondence submitted. On January 22, Mr. Waddell, by the unanimous consent of the House, asked for the correspondence of the European powers besides Spain, during the previous year, as to Cuba. Fish replied that the note of November 5 had been communicated to the foreign governments orally, in whole or in substance, but that no cor-

respondence had taken place. Fish probably expected a call for all the correspondence with Spain, for on January 4, he had asked Cushing whether any inconvenience would result from the publication of the note of November 5 and the attending correspondence. Cushing replied in the negative. The committee of foreign affairs desired to see how far Fish had invited the foreign powers to join the United States in intervention, in order to see whether he had violated the established policy of keeping aloof from foreign alliances. Fish appeared before the committee to explain the instructions upon the subject. He stated that the foreign powers had been invited to use only their moral influence in settling the Cuban troubles. He said that his request had been kindly received, and that all the powers had promised moral support except Austria. He declared that Spain replied without any offense, though the newspaper reports indicated otherwise.

From the editorials of London newspapers and from other sources came the announcement that Secretary Fish had apparently abandoned the Monroe doctrine—for, that the spirit of Monroe's message would have excluded the interference in Cuba of any other European power except Spain, she being the only power that had an existing possessory interest. Fish, however, stated that the Monroe doctrine did not mean complete isolation from Europe; and he declared that the invitation addressed to the European powers fell outside the scope of the doctrine, because Cuba was still technically a colony of Spain. As a precedent for his action, he stated that "the very next year after President Monroe advanced that doctrine the United States asked Russia to mediate with Spain to stop the war between Spain and the South American governments whose independence the United States had acknowledged." The *London Times* was surprised that the American Government had invited the co-operation of the European powers, thus apparently recognizing their right to interfere in the poli-

tics of the American continent. But it entirely agreed as to the right of the United States to adopt a policy of intervention. The purists of international law might say that the American Government had no right to dictate the way in which Spain should govern Cuba—that American citizens who had gone there at their own risk must bear the inevitable penalties of war. But the *Times* stated that these arguments were only fit for lecture-rooms; that while general rules of international usage applied to ordinary cases of warfare, a nation was justified in defending itself by exceptional measures in exceptional cases. Spain had set the ordinary rules of civilized society at defiance, and the duty of the United States was no longer determined by the letter of the law, but by general considerations of policy. The promises of justice by the Spanish minister had only resulted in delay, and it was incumbent upon Spain to set Cuba free or make it orderly. The London *Standard* stated that General Grant might be trifling with the world, but that he was demanding a just thing of the Spanish Government, and that Spain could not afford to ignore it. It said that the Americans might suffer at first, but that they had confidence that “within six months every spare ironclad in the world, including, perhaps, half the Turkish fleet, would be in their hands; that Cuba would be full of Western soldiers, and that the Spaniards would be vainly endeavoring to defend their own harbors from attacks.” The London *Post*, on the other hand, said that the Americans were probably not in earnest either as to their assurance of friendship or their threat to intervene. It stated that the wolf luckily had no teeth; that America had neither an army or navy worth mentioning, and that she could not even manage her red Indians, who afforded her an opportunity of practicing the “humanity” that she had been preaching. As to whether the United States had a selfish motive, the *Post* said: “Qui s’excuse s’accuse.” *La Política*, of Madrid, was inclined to think that Mr. Fish’s note

was merely a "pilot balloon" to get the drift of European sentiment. It declared that the people who clamored before Europe for the rights of humanity and lamented the ravages of the fire that had been kindled in Cuba, had for years sympathized with the accumulation of the combustibles which fed the fire. It stated that the pretended intention to intervene had "for its basis no other thing than the eternal tendency, which, from the beginning of the century and from one motive or another, has been ever manifested by the partisans of the Monroe doctrine—a policy which served to rend from Mexico the greater part of her territory; a policy which has ever sought to deprive Spain of the brightest jewel of her crown, of the jewel which symbolizes a world of memories for the nation which discovered America." It referred to the notes of Henry Clay urging Spain to conclude the wars with Mexico and Colombia, the instructions of Mr. Buchanan looking towards purchase, the mission of Mr. Soule, the Ostend conference, and the refusal of the United States to join the tripartite arrangement,—and it said that these were the key "to explain the stroke of humanity with which the United States present themselves before Europe, soliciting its moral co-operation to end the war in Cuba."

Cushing had received no instructions concerning the basis of adjusting differences as proposed in the Spanish note of November 15. Calderon stated that under the impression that Fish might have concluded not to act until he had heard from the European governments, he (Calderon) having no desire to offend, had resolved to defer his contemplated responsive circular to those governments until he should hear from the American Government. On January 15, Cushing called upon Calderon at his request to relieve his solicitude as to the non-arrival of a reply to the note of November 15. At the interview, most of the conversation was upon the general question of Cuba, and at its close Cushing felt that if the United States contem-

plated intervention by land and naval force to prevent Spain from subduing the insurrection, the latter would fight, no matter what the cost or ultimate loss; but in case the United States should desire to act "by mediation in behalf of the insurgents, to induce them to lay down their arms, to make acceptable terms for them, to secure the execution of these terms, to provide for the introduction of good government and the abolition of slavery, in officious concert or in formal treaty with Spain," he believed that Spain was "ready to meet the United States half way in such action, to receive, and even invite, their interposition in the affairs of Cuba." In the interview, Calderon wished that Secretary Fish might be seated by his side, and hear him say that the United States could desire nothing in regard to the peace or liberty of Cuba which the Spanish Government did not also desire; he admitted the political expediency and necessity of abandoning the old colonial system; and he said that the predatory bands of incendiaries were the only obstacle to the introduction of radical reforms. He thought that the United States surely could not desire to assist these incendiary bands against the determined efforts of Spain to restore order. He was willing to ask Fish as a friend, or statesman, for advice as to the precise thing which he might wish Spain to do "under the mediation of the United States," and he declared that if the thing proposed should be just and practicable, as he had no doubt it would be, Spain would gladly do it in the interests of both people.

The character of the Cuban emigrants, for whom Cushing had no use, and the experience of South America in self-government gave him little desire to pursue a policy of intervention in behalf of independence. He believed the United States would have an immense task on her hands if she undertook the pacification of Cuba by force without the co-operation of other powers. He stated that it would be necessary to have not only an army and fleet

for operation, but also for occupation. If such a policy should be adopted to establish peace in Cuba he rather inclined to the view that it should be in co-operation with Spain.

Fish continued to urge the co-operation of foreign powers. The correspondence upon the subject is voluminous, but the probability of success became more and more doubtful. Germany, Russia and Italy at first intimated that their representatives at Madrid would be instructed to urge upon Spain the wisdom of establishing peace in Cuba. There was no assurance of co-operation beyond this. Decazes desired to consult Great Britain as to what course to adopt. There was apparently more hope from England than from any other power, and she had not yet sent instructions supporting the views of the United States as to the necessity of ending the contest. Her failure may have been partly due to a misunderstanding as to the result of the Cushing-Calderon interview of December 4, which Cushing told Layard was so satisfactory that there seemed no immediate occasion for friendly interposition by the latter. On January 11, Fish was hoping that England would not delay to send instructions supporting the American views as expressed in the note of November 5. But England was not ready to go so far as that note seemed to expect. The *London Times* of January 24 did not think that it was incumbent on England to interfere. It declared that in case there was a desire to take the risks and responsibilities, there would be justification in intervening for the sake of humanity, but that it was not the business of England "to play the knight-errant among nations." In regard to the catalogue of offenses enumerated by Mr. Fish, it stated that some were admitted by the Spanish Government; that others were keenly questioned in the United States; and that still others, though they were to be deplored, could hardly be repressed by foreign intervention, unless there was an undoubted menace of danger to the

intervening nation. The *Times* thought that the aggrieved and offending powers should be allowed to patch up their own differences, and that America should be left to decide for herself whether she had been injured and insulted beyond the possibility of endurance.

On January 25, Derby, in an interview with Schenck, said that England would be unwilling to co-operate unless Spain should be willing. He did not consider it proper to make any attempt unless there should be a prospect of success, and he deemed the time premature and ill-chosen. His memorandum stated: "The questions with which the United States Government were dealing—the redress of the grievances of American citizens and the proposal to put an end to war by mediation—seemed to him to stand on an entirely different footing. In regard to the first, the United States Government had put forth claims which, assuming them to be just in substance, they were entitled to press as a matter of right. In regard to mediation, though every one could understand the inconvenience and damage to American interests produced by the continuance of the war, yet, strictly speaking, it was not easy to see how any foreign power could claim a right of interference with them. They could give friendly advice, but it would rest with the Government of Spain whether to take it or reject it." Lord Derby, in the interest of humanity, was ready to offer the good offices of England to bring about a reconciliation between Spain and Cuba; but he was not ready to use pressure in case Spain rejected the overture, and, therefore, he desired to take no steps unless there was a reasonable probability of success. Layard thought that owing to the extreme pride and sensitiveness of Spain no foreign mediation would be accepted by the Spanish Government. The Carlist War was still in progress, but in case it should soon be finished Derby saw some hope of Spain being able to crush the Cuban insurrection.

The Cuban insurrection was as long lived as the Carlist revolt, and it had cost the country much more blood and treasure. Reinforcements had been sent periodically from Cadiz, and very few had returned to Spain again. Captain-general had succeeded captain-general like clockwork, but the war never ended—though it was always going to end. The insurgents were reported to be beaten about twice a month, but they turned up later with good health, and ready for another defeat. They had no towns, and sometimes Spain said she could not find them; but they were able to live in jungles and deserts, from which they sallied forth like birds of prey to fall upon the estates and property of those who did not agree with them. They lived upon wild fruits and wild hogs, while the Spaniards were dying of dysentery instead of wounds, and while the Spanish civil officers were getting rich speculating upon food and war supplies. It was difficult to ascertain the true condition of Cuba, but it was certain that Spain had been unable to get the Cubans into her fingers, and it was equally certain that the war could not end so long as Don Carlos was parading through the provinces of Spain. If the Carlist War continued much longer, Spaniards, though they argued in public that Spain could not part with Cuba, were willing to state in private conversation that she would be unable to hold it. Spain still had confidence in her abilities to pacify the island and to reform its organization and administration. In memoranda of February 3, which Calderon sent to the representatives of Spain in other countries, he endeavored to show the inconveniences and objections to intervention, and he indicated that the revolution would soon be brought to an end. A copy of these memoranda was handed to Secretary Fish. It stated that the Spanish originators of the revolution were no longer living, and that the leaders who had succeeded them were foreign adventurers without antecedents and with no interest in the island; that not over 800 white natives of Cuba were still to be found in the insur-

gents' ranks; that what could at first have been considered a struggle for independence had become a ferocious war of races and devastation; that the Spanish troops defended Cuba as a possession of the mother country and in the interest of order, but that the negroes and adventurers, in case they should secure the ascendancy, could not establish a firm government. He said that the Cuban emigrants in the United States, who had kept out of harm's way, and sent only their good wishes to Cuba, could not constitute a government, and that "Those among them who were brave enough to face death on the battlefield have almost all either fallen or surrendered." The memoranda urged that it was in the interest of all Europe and America not to encourage the insurrection, that the triumph of Spain would be the triumph of law and civilization, and the only effective solution of the question. It was argued that even if Spain, without compromising her dignity, could enter into any kind of arrangement with the insurgents, she would have no one to treat with except negroes and mulattoes, Chinese, Dominicans, deserters and adventurers.

As Calderon and Cushing approached the conclusion of the various special questions at issue between the governments, Cushing stated that it might be his duty to communicate soon concerning "the larger and purely political question of the general state of Cuba." Calderon thought that there was no difficulty on the subject of reforms as to Cuba—that Spain had resolved to introduce practical reforms either with or without friendly suggestion of the United States, but he said that the rebels obstinately repelled the idea of autonomic institutions, thus leaving Spain no remedy except force. He concluded that this was sufficient to indicate that pressure should be applied to the rebels and their sympathizers, instead of to Spain, in case it was desired to end the conflict. He compared the attitude of the United States in regard to Cuba to that of the powers in regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina. He stated that the powers suggested to Turkey the need of reforms in her

provinces; they also admitted the duty of exerting their influence to induce the rebels to cease the rebellion, while the United States appeared to stop at assuming "a menacing attitude towards Spain." The concentration of the American fleet at Port Royal impressed Calderon as a menace. He said Spain had done nothing to call for defensive preparations by the United States, and that the naval display created an impression that there was an evident intention to invade Cuba and to aid the insurgents. Cushing found that these suspicions hindered friendly diplomatic negotiations. He told Calderon that he might rest assured that the American Government had been sincere in repelling the suggestions of hostile purpose, and that it was only anxious to terminate the desolation and bloodshed in a neighboring territory that was socially and commercially related to the United States.

At the opening of the Cortes on February 15, the King, in a speech which had been prepared by Canovas del Castillo, stated that negotiations to settle the differences with the United States remained amicable; that 32,000 troops had recently been sent to Cuba, and that Spain, in spite of the insurgents, had given liberty to 76,000 slaves. In regard to these facts, the King said that it was evident "to what extent our resolve is unshakable to maintain the integrity of our territory and how strong is our purpose that civilization and justice shall rule throughout." The reply to the King's discourse a few days later said: "The impious insurrection which, taking advantage of the sufferings of the country, sought to pluck from its bosom a precious portion of its territory situated on the other side of the Atlantic, is in a notorious decadence, and it is to be presumed that the pacification of the peninsula will dispel the last hope of the sustainers of that war, so long ago degenerated into mere devastation and robbery. * * * The nation has known how to vindicate its honor and maintain its rights in the Antilles." In regard to reforms, it was

stated that the nation "which bore to America the torch of Christian civilization cannot deny any of its advancements to its provinces beyond the seas." In regard to negotiations with the American Government, the reply said: "The deputies of the nation congratulate themselves that the differences of the United States are to receive a satisfactory solution dictated by the spirit of justice and mutual consideration which befits two peoples destined to unite the Old World and the New in the path of progress and liberty."

Notwithstanding the sweet words of the reply to the King's speech, there were expressions in Madrid indicating fear as to the probable course of the American Government. Cushing felt uneasy concerning the purpose of the American fleet at Port Royal, and of the effect which its location caused to the Spanish mind. He said that Spain was told every day by leading American newspapers that the object of the naval preparations was to force the hand of Congress and of the people of the United States by producing some *casus belli*. While he agreed that "nobody believes what newspapers say," he saw that "they nevertheless were able to propagate mischievous irritations and dangerous suspicions." Cushing found himself in an atmosphere of misconception and suspicion in which he had to work incessantly, observing much and talking little. It was the current opinion at Madrid that the Cuban insurrection could have been suppressed long before except for Spanish traitors in the United States; that most of the American grievances originated from the acts of Americans or disloyal Spaniards who assumed to be citizens of the United States; that the American reclamations had been settled, in principle, if not in fact, while the note of November 5 was crossing the ocean; that the Cuban rebellion was beneficial instead of injurious to American commerce; that while the American Government professed peaceful purposes it was making naval preparations which implied the

contrary, and at a time when Spain was sending her treasures of art and industry to the Centennial Exposition; that the destruction of property in Cuba was prompted by the New York Junta, and would cease if the United States applied the same pressure to them as it was doing to Spain. The Spanish papers were full of comments in regard to Secretary Fish's note of November 5. In addition to the arguments which have already been indicated in regard to the rebellion in Cuba it was stated that the violence of Spain on the island had been forced upon her by the still worse acts of the rebels and foreign adventurers. It was declared that the pretended New York directors of the rebellion were mainly occupied by criminal intrigues against the United States. In regard to reclamations, it was complained that the United States, whose legislative body had refused to pay the *Amistad* claims, and whose citizens owned no slaves in their own country, was nevertheless urging claims for the loss of slaves in Cuba. It was also charged that many claims at Madrid were of an invidious character, the claimants being bogus American citizens. It was stated that many of the claimants had homes in Cuba and exercised the rights of Spaniards while there, and that they could base their claim to citizenship in the United States only upon some transitory summer visit, or upon a few months' enrollment in an American school.

In regard to the Port Royal fleet, which had alarmed the Spaniards, and had been considered as a menace, Secretary Fish explained to Cushing that while Port Royal had been selected, in the first instance, as a good place for wintering the fleet, and as a harbor both commodious and convenient, the possibility of a protraction of the Spanish negotiation, as well as other possible events which the President had desired to prevent, had been considered. He stated that the inducements which caused the Government to select Port Royal harbor were precautionary and not menacing. He thought it had probably exerted good influence "in has-

tening some of the conclusions which seem to be happily in progress of attainment," and that it had contributed in inducing Spain to appreciate the "sincere earnestness of the President." He suggested that it was time that Spain "should recognize the sincerity and long endurance of this Government under unfulfilled promises and repeated assaults on the rights of our citizens." He informed Cushing that in case the President had "contemplated or apprehended a hostile movement towards Spain, he would not have left it to vague speculation," but that Cushing would have been promptly advised of it.

The American claims were being satisfactorily settled by Cushing and Calderon. By February 8, Cushing was confident that there would be no controversy in settling the remaining questions, and he began to think that peace, emancipation and good government could be obtained in Cuba by mediation of the United States without the aid of other powers, in case the United States could answer for the desperate character of the Cuban Junta. Calderon stated that war should not be caused by any breach of Spanish engagements, or any failure to satisfy just reclamations. It seems that General Burriel's promotion had been obtained by the solicitation of a woman named Virginia, but Calderon said that the Burriel trial would take place in accordance with the obligation of the protocol of November, 1873, that he and Castillo had both advised Castelar to agree to the protocol, and that they would not try to escape it. On February 20 it appeared that the Carlist War was at an end, and Spain would thus have a better opportunity to quiet Cuba.

Cushing saw no hope for intervention. He did not feel so sanguine as Fish concerning the foreign powers, for not one of them spoke through their representatives at Madrid in a manner which could encourage hope. Those who appeared willing to co-operate said that the time was not favorable. There was a feeling that Don Alfonso's

government was doing its best to end the Cuban struggle. General Campos was to be sent as soon as possible with reinforcements, with the intention of pursuing an active policy. The Government was also showing a disposition to satisfy all the reclamations of the United States that were considered to be just. The three emperors, all of whom probably believed that the note of November 5 implied an intention by the United States to use force against Spain, showed no disposition to co-operate with the American Government. Austria remembered the American attitude toward Kossuth, Koszta and Maximilian. Germany had plans which interested her in southern Europe, and would probably lead her to favor Spain. Russia was America's rival in the production of wheat for Europe, and Cushing thought she was becoming sorry that she had made a cession of the islands near Alaska. The constant companion of the wife of Alfonso was a Russian lady of rank. Layard was the only foreign minister at Madrid who spoke in a helpful spirit as to intervention or mediation, but the equivocal and vague nature of the treaties between Spain and England produced a long list of questions, which, in addition to other problems for discussion, rendered it improbable that England would find it convenient to co-operate. Some Spaniards suggested that British sympathies were liable to be with Spain on account of the magnitude of British dependencies in America. Although there were no personal impediments to a perfect understanding between Cushing and the foreign legations at Madrid, Cushing declared: "No foreign minister here is prepared to back us in saying to Spain: You must close up the war immediately, or we will intervene to force a conclusion in our own way."

As the days went by, Cushing became more confirmed in his conviction as to the indifference of Europe on the subject of intervention. He was much amused by the statements, "fencings" and "evasive generalities" which were

offered in discussing the subject of co-operation. In a despatch to Secretary Fish in March he said: "I stand behind the players and see the cards they are playing. It is not our game. We can do much with Spain, but it will have to be done on our own ground. We have no cause, in my belief, to expect aid from the European powers, not even from Great Britain. The problem rather is to work out our own policy in such a way as to avoid obstructions on the part of those powers." With the identical interests of Spain and the United States in Cuba, he was confident of the success of a policy of mediation, the essential premises of which were reciprocal confidence, good-will and mutual interests. He thought that there were mutual interests, and that Spain was willing to confide in us if we would let her. Nevertheless she was anxious and suspicious with regard to the knots of "bad Spaniards," who, "having a holy horror of the smell of gunpowder," had fled to "snug harbor" in New York and other American cities, and had been dedicating themselves by speeches, trading in bogus bonds, the presentation of exaggerated claims for injuries, and by violations of the law, to the task of manufacturing a war between Spain and the United States. Cushing thought that these emigrant rebels were the authors of all our sorrows and our troubles with Spain, and urged that by depending upon ourselves, by abstaining from hostile demonstrations, and by pushing the opportunities for pure mediation or friendly intercession in order to secure pacification, emancipation and reformation, we might reach desired results without war. The refusal of the President to recognize the Cuban Junta had prepared the way for Spanish confidence. The paid agitators of the press, and excited members in Congress were considered to be the main stumbling blocks.

On March 15, Sagasta, the parliamentary leader of the Constitutional party, in a speech before the Spanish Cortes, in which he "hoped that the United States, instead of taunt-

ing," would try to show her good-will in stopping the savage brigandage in Cuba, significantly touched upon the question of intervention. He favored a policy of strict neutrality for Spain—neither to interfere in the affairs of other nations nor to permit them to interfere in Spanish affairs—"without, however, thereby ceasing to strive for recuperation of her ancient splendor not by means of force, but in common accord with other nations interested in the subject." He hoped that by this policy the differences with the United States would soon be settled. He said that the United States, who had the advantage of not having to cross the sea to quell her rebellion of 1861-5 would understand how difficult it was to subject a fratricidal strife to determine rules. The recent intervention of Russia and Austria in the affairs of Turkey attracted attention at Madrid. These powers had recognized their duty of applying pressure to the rebels in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as to the Sublime Porte. The Porte had said to the powers: "You advise us in the interest of peace to introduce certain specified reforms of administration in our discontented provinces. We had already determined to do not only so much, but even much more; we cheerfully take your advice, therefore, but we do so in the express understanding that you * * * are to cease to allow your subjects or *protéges* to aid our rebels; * * * that you are to use all your moral authority at least to induce those rebels to lay down their arms and accept the measures of reform graciously granted by the Sultan." In such a plan of "practical friendly intervention" between Spain and the Cuban insurgents by means of mediation and moral influence, Cushing thought that the great powers would be willing to co-operate; but in a plan to force Spain to abandon Cuba, which would mean hostilities, if not war, he said that the powers would at least exert their moral authority in favor of Spain.

The expressions of Calderon to Cushing, on January 15, seemed to be in perfect accord with the views of the United States. His friendly intimation that he desired to listen to the advice of Secretary Fish, as to the precise thing which the United States would desire to do, was the occasion of a long instruction from Fish to Cushing on March 1, in which Spain was assured that the United States had no desire to annex Cuba, but that she wanted Spain to observe treaty obligations, restore order, establish good government, emancipate the slaves, and improve the facilities of commerce. Mr. Fish said that there was no desire to disturb the Spanish possessions, and that there should be no cause for mistrust between the two peoples whose interests were identical. Concerning the admission of Calderon, as to the necessity of abandoning the old colonial system, he suggested that Spain should see her duty to inaugurate a new plan without delay. He stated that whatever desires for annexation to the United States had been shown in the past, "there are at this time no considerations, moral, social, political or financial, which are regarded by the President as making the acquisition of Cuba by the United States either desirable or convenient." The United States desired peace with Spain, and if the latter had asked for the good offices of the American Government, Mr. Fish was ready to use every effort to restore peace. As to desired changes, the following suggestions were given: (1) Mutual and reciprocal observance of treaty obligations and a liberal and just interpretation in case of doubt. (2) Peace, order and good government in Cuba. It was time to stop the antiquated system of exactions and corruption. A liberal and impartial government was more suited to the age. It was impossible to conquer a peace by force of arms. Experience in America had shown that it was impossible by mere force to subdue any serious uprising where grave causes of injury exist. The olive branch would be "more potent than the sword." It was believed that "abuses

and wrongs which would not be tolerated in the peninsula had been allowed and perpetuated in this island." Spain could hardly desire to continue the oppressive and arbitrary exactions by way of taxes, the public officials who had no interest in the welfare of Cuba, nor the unjust fines upon vessels. (3) The gradual emancipation of slaves in accordance with the spirit of the age. It might be found that the conditions would make it necessary to proceed carefully. (4) The improvement of commercial facilities and the removal of the obstructions to trade and commerce. Such a policy was for the welfare of Cuba as well as for the trade of the United States.

By March 20 the insurrection in the northern provinces of Spain had been concluded. The King arrived at Madrid amidst great rejoicing, the waving of handkerchiefs, and showers of floral crowns and even money. There were plenty of fireworks and festivities. Spain was now free to devote her energies to the termination of the trans-Atlantic nuisance. On March 29, Cushing informed Calderon that in reply to the latter's remarks of January 15, Secretary Fish had in his instructions of March 1 replied at considerable length. Calderon consented to receive a copy of the reply, and, on April 12, he invited Cushing to an interview upon the subject. He agreed upon all four of the main points mentioned by Secretary Fish. He desired to see "in the Spanish Senate and in the Congress of Deputies the representatives of the island of Cuba," according to the plan recently inaugurated for Porto Rico. It was desired to retain the good-will of the Cubans, and to "join them to the common fatherland by the gentle yet strong ties of gratitude and affection." Calderon thought, however, that the American Government would doubtless admit that all the proposed reforms could not be immediately realized; there could be no elections until the island was pacified, though amnesty might be granted and property restored at once. It was suggested, however, that though the Gov-

ernment might grant amnesty, it would be difficult to enforce it upon negro incendiaries. It was stated that there could be no emancipation while the insurrection was in existence, for the reason that the negroes and mulattoes constituted a large part of the insurgent body. Calderon said that but for the insurrection there would have been no slavery in Cuba at that moment. He invited a further opinion regarding the solution of the difficult questions which presented themselves concerning reforms, and he declared that it was his "earnest wish to go on in perfect accord with the Government of the Great Republic in a matter wherein, when examined with true elevation and without prejudice, there is a common and legitimate interest; that is to say, the peace of Cuba and a government prudent, generous, and liberal in all its proceedings."

The efforts of the Department of State for mediation were unsuccessful on account of the indisposition of both Cuba and Spain to accept any arbitrament except force. The refusal of Spain to make reforms before the suppression of the rebellion, tended to prevent suppression. When America complained to Spain, the answer always was that the insurrection was about to be overpowered, and that reforms would follow. Thus the reforms have always been kept in the distance, and the insurrection continued without hope for peace and prosperity in Cuba.

By the summer of 1876 most of the perplexing subjects aside from the general question of the Cuban insurrection had been settled between the two judicial friends, Cushing and Calderon, at Madrid. The subject of private claims was the main source of controversy, as well as of much arduous labor. Calderon often had occasion to refer to the dishonest character of the citizenship of many of the claimants. He said that many persons claiming to be American citizens were really citizens of Cuba, and exercised the right of Spaniards there, having lived in the United States only during transitory summer visits or while in school.

Many of the claims were doubtless bogus, but there were also many other cases in which true American citizens had actually suffered from the oppressive wrongs of the Cuban authorities. These citizens might have been of more benefit to their country by living in it, but America was a free country, which allowed emigration as well as immigration, and it was necessary for her to protect *bona fide* citizens from illegal confiscations and exactions. There was no objection to legal taxation, but there were often exactions under cover of law by the "bad Spaniards" who had gone to Cuba in order to fill their pockets—some of whom had desired to prolong the insurrection in order to use it as a cover for illegal exactions at the custom houses and in the judiciary. It was evidently not right to compel a man to build a fort or a telegraph line on his plantation at his own expense. It was quite probable, though some cases were fabricated, that there were plenty of good causes for well-founded complaint. Even if only a few of the complaints were just, it was equally true that the Government should be vigilant to protect the few. A few righteous men would have saved Sodom. If goats were found among the sheep, it was nevertheless necessary to protect the sheep. It is evident, however, that great care should have been taken to separate the goats from the sheep.

While Prim, Serrano and others had been scrambling for power at Madrid, they could not pay the proper attention to Cuba. While the Carlist rebellion hung like a dark cloud in the northern provinces, Spain could not send her best soldiers to Cuba, and there was no definite plan of operations nor sanitary precautions in the island. At the end of the Carlist War, in 1876, an active policy was adopted. In October, General Martinez Campos was appointed governor with plenary powers, and took command of military operations in Cuba. Twenty-five thousand reinforcements were sent. By the summer of 1877 the struggle was declining in activity. The insurgents for a

while had a faint hope of making a treaty with Spain for independence of Cuba, by the payment of an indemnity which they desired the United States should guarantee. In September, they made their last attempt to induce the United States to recognize them as belligerents. In October several of the Cuban leaders surrendered to Spanish authorities and undertook to induce the others to abandon the insurrection, but the contest had not yet closed in December, when Hayes said in his message: "We suffer, but abstain from intervention." On February 21, 1878, however, the revolt was ended by the submission of the central committee of the insurgents. The terms of pacification provided for representation in the Spanish Cortes, and the freedom of the slaves of the insurgents. On May 14, information concerning the terms and conditions of the surrender, and the future policy of Spain in the government of Cuba, were sent to the American Senate. It has been said that General Campos, in order to avoid the difficulty of seeking for bands of acclimatized men in a tropical bush and an intricate mountain country, patched up a peace partly by bribery, but that there were men in the bushes who were ready to initiate a new edition of the insurrection as soon as the signs were favorable. Perhaps the treaty concessions were not liberal enough to maintain order. At least order was not maintained for some time. An insurrection broke out in 1879, and was not defeated till the following December. General Calixto Garcia headed another revolt in 1880. He had been captured once before but had made his escape to the United States, where he formulated plans for the new insurrection. He and José Martí landed in Cuba and held their ground in the woods for six months, but they found that the country was not ripe for another revolt. Garcia was captured and sent to Spain. By September, 1880, tranquillity existed. From this time dates the autonomists' party, which maintained that experience would not justify further attempts to gain freedom by force of arms, and held that the island's only hope lay in

peaceful measures. Small and ill-advised attempts at insurrection followed, but they amounted to nothing. Campos went back to Spain to favor a policy of reform for Cuba. He proposed to abolish slavery, to remove the oppressive commercial restrictions, and to place Cuba on a footing with the Spanish provinces at home. Two hundred million francs were needed for this program, and Canovas resigned, because he was not willing to demand that amount from the Cortes. In March, 1879, Campos formed a new ministry, but before his plan of reform was carried out he was again replaced by Canovas, whose policy had been one of extermination, and who would not submit to the Cortes the program of Campos. In the vicissitudes of Spanish affairs, Campos was soon enabled to again form a ministry, which adopted his policy. In January, 1881, a bill passed the Cortes for the gradual abolition of slavery in the Antilles, and it was abolished absolutely in 1886. The essential feature of Campos' program was sufficiently carried out that the majority of the inhabitants of Cuba were contented with their condition, and were loyal to Spain, though there were many who desired to secure autonomy or home rule.

After the summer of 1876, most of the special claims against Spain, growing out of affairs in Cuba, had been settled. Causes for complaint decreased. On the subject of judicial procedure, Calderon, on January 12, 1877, made a satisfactory statement as to his interpretation of treaties with the United States. He agreed that there should be no military trials, except in cases of persons captured with arms in hand, and that the persons accused should have access to attorneys, be confronted with the causes of arrest, be allowed to compel witnesses to appear or send depositions, and be permitted to make their own defense. The Spanish commercial policy, besides the war, was the greatest source of irritation. Some had advocated the annexation of San Domingo on the ground that it would bring an end to the Spanish commercial restrictions. Grant, in his message of December, 1876, in attempting to vindicate his previous

recommendation for the annexation of San Domingo, with its sugar, coffee, tobacco, fruits and other tropical products, referred to the legislation in Cuba as being unfavorable to a mutual exchange of products, and said that if we had owned San Domingo, with free commerce, the effect upon Cuban commerce would have settled the vexed question long ago in favor of "free Cuba." Seventy-five per cent. of Cuba's exports were consumed in the United States, and were paid for in coin instead of by American products. Flour from the Mississippi river could pass Havana, go to Spain, pay a duty there for articles re-exported, be transferred to a Spanish vessel, and brought back to Havana and pay a second duty there, and still leave a profit over what would have been received by direct shipment to Havana. Such an illiberal commercial policy had made Cuba farther off than the Sandwich Islands. The tax was not only felt by the people of the Mississippi Valley, but was also oppressive to the Cubans. Besides the duty on flour there were heavy duties on butter, lard, boots, calicoes, etc., etc. The Americans also suffered by the irregular manner in which the duties were collected. The United States consul-general, in a letter to the State Department in November, 1877, spoke of the gross injustice to the United States in the assessment of tonnage duty. Secretary Evarts, on November 13, 1877, instructed the American minister at Madrid that the burden of these exactions was becoming "well-nigh unbearable" to American shippers. Heavy penalties were often imposed for mere verbal inaccuracies, or for trivial or technical informalities. Such fines were a source of income for the Spanish revenue officers.

Several other incidents were made a subject of complaint. In 1877, three whaling vessels, under the American flag, were captured by Spanish guard-boats twenty miles or more distant from Cuba. They were detained for several days, on the ground that there "were so many scamps in the world" ready to carry material to the insurgents, that it was hard to know whom to trust. The Spaniards knew very well,

however, that the Americans had enforced the neutrality laws, and the Secretary of State, in a protest of November 13, stated that the United States was not hunting for a quarrel in regard to Cuba. After an investigation, the American Government asked \$19,500 indemnity, but accepted \$10,000. In 1880, several vessels were fired upon outside the jurisdiction of Cuba. In 1877, under the regulations of the United States, arms were allowed to be sold to either party in Cuba, but vessels had to take their own risk. The Spanish minister contended that Americans should not sell even a pistol if they suspected that it would be used in a conspiracy.

He also complained of the probable hostile intention of the steamer *Estella*, which had been fitted out under the auspices of the Cuban Junta in New York. Secretary Evarts promptly detained the vessel. The Spanish minister evidently desired some restriction upon the freedom of the American press. He recognized the right of the press in America to freely criticise Spain, but he suggested that "domestic liberty is not a warrant for international license."

According to extracts from the newspapers of Cuba in the spring of 1882, it seems that annexation was under serious consideration by the people at that time, but there is no evidence to show that the feeling for annexation was to any extent general in the United States. No one would have thought of taking Cuba by force, and it was certain that Spain would not have favored any plan of releasing her hold. The sympathy of foreign nations would have been with Spain in case of war as to Cuba, unless provocation on the part of Spain should have been great. A writer, in 1879, said that it would require at least 150,000 men to conquer Cuba, and that it would cost over \$200,000,000. Even if Cuba and Porto Rico could have been *purchased* for that amount of money, the interest on the amount would probably have been more than the gain in commerce by free trade. There would have been serious social objections to the incorporation of Cuba into the Union. Its population consisted of 130,000 Spaniards, 600,000

Cubans, 240,000 free colored, 360,000 slaves, and 34,000 Asiatics. What Cuba probably needed more than annexation was a firm government in the hands of the middle class.

Some nations evidently expected the United States to adopt a policy according to that which had been indicated in speeches just after the close of the war, and at the time of the purchase of Alaska. Some even measured the American température by referring to the dead speeches of *ante bellum* days. Mexico feared a railroad connection with the United States. A member of the Mexican Congress said that "nations of the north usually invade nations of the south." The United States at this time was probably anxious to suppress marauding across the Mexican frontier, but she did not want any more of Mexican territory. It seems, in fact, that the American Government was opposed to the annexation of territory in any direction. Grant had recommended the acquisition of San Domingo in 1870, but the treaty had failed to pass the Senate. During the Cuban war, Secretary Fish had frequently stated that the United States did not desire Cuba. Secretary Blaine, in December, 1881, while speaking of the proposed annexation of Hawaii, said that the history of foreign relations for fifty years showed that it was the policy of the United States to guard the control of the coast from foreign interference, but that she had not extended her territory beyond the mainland. He said the material possession of Hawaii was no more desired than was Cuba, but that the United States could not allow them to be cut adrift from the American continent by a transfer to some other nation. Secretary Frelinghuysen, in April, 1883, stated that the American policy had tended toward the avoidance of possessions disconnected with the main continent. Again in February, 1884, he declared that the American policy was against any territorial aggrandizement that would require a large naval force—even if the territory was intended only for a coaling station.

CHAPTER XIV.

RENEWED CUBAN INSURRECTION AND AMERICAN INTERVENTION.

ESPANO-AMERICAN WAR AND THE SPANISH WITHDRAWAL FROM CUBA LIBRE.

After the close of the ten years' struggle, Cuban affairs fell into the old way again. The captain-general was absolute; and the exploitations, and the impediments to trade went on. The debt incurred by Spain during the war was saddled upon Cuba. The painful lesson of the long struggle was entirely lost upon the Spanish Government. Instead of endeavoring to heal the wounds of the late unpleasantness, and to quench the thirst of the people for justice and freedom, the Government persisted in continuing its old system. Every native Cuban was excluded from any office that could give him any effective influence in public affairs. The colonists were exploited for the benefit of Spanish monopoly and bureaucracy. Thus affairs continued with few exceptions until the Cubans were again driven to a renewal of the insurrection, which finally resulted in American intervention.

There was less controversy between Spain and the United States from 1879 to 1894 than at any other previous period. During this time, however, there was some correspondence concerning estates that had not been returned to American citizens. The Spanish commercial policy also continued to be a source of irritation. Notwithstanding the restrictions to trade, the United States commerce jumped from \$76,000,000 in 1880 to \$105,000,000 in 1894. In 1881, an American cattle vessel, which would ordinarily have been

taxed about \$14.90 was taxed \$387.40, because she had some lumber on board. In 1882, the United States began a long correspondence on the subject of overcharges and exactions of Spanish officials. In December, 1883, King Alfonso revoked a royal decree of March, 1867, which had ordered merchandise proceeding from the United States under the Spanish flag to pay on importation into Cuba the same duties as if under a foreign flag. But this still left the conditions existing before 1867, and Mr. Foster, the American minister, insisted upon an entire abolition of the differential flag system. After Foster had become impatient under Spanish assurances of an intention to consider the subject, an agreement was finally made in February, 1884, by which the discriminating duties on goods imported into Cuba and Porto Rico from the United States, and from those islands into the United States, were abolished. It was thus expected that the war of discriminating and retaliatory duties would be ended. It was said that Spain outwitted the United States in this treaty. The retaliatory duties were more prejudicial to Spain than to American interests, since the amount of exports from Cuba far exceeded those of imports from the United States. Spain was playing a double game. She wanted to save her commercial marine from destruction, and at the same time appear to be favoring the United States. Notwithstanding the apparent advantage of the treaty to Spain, the Cuban authorities evaded it by means of the Spanish translation. In 1886, President Cleveland issued a proclamation threatening to reimpose the retaliatory duties on Spanish bottoms if American ships were not accorded their full privileges under the agreement of 1884. The menace drew forth public opinion in Cuba, alarmed the Spanish ship-owners, and caused the Government at Madrid to accede, in October, 1886, to an agreement for reciprocity and complete suspension of all discriminating duties of tonnage and impost on trade between Cuba and Porto Rico and the United States. Nevertheless, the Cuban officials continued to violate the princi-

ples of equality of flags which was the basis of the agreement. They continued to harass American interests by fines for trivial clerical errors and shortages of cargo when there was no intent to defraud. The customs officials had their living to make, and they took advantage of every technical irregularity by which they could increase their perquisites.

While the American tariff bill of 1890 was under discussion, Spain, in expectation of increased American duties on tobacco, decreed an increase of 20 per cent. on imports to Cuba and Porto Rico from all ports except those of Spain. The reciprocity amendment of the McKinley bill directly affected Cuba's future toward economic emancipation from Spain. The co-operation of the United States, by means of the reciprocity provision, gave Cuba a fulcrum by which she could lift from herself the Spanish commercial system that had so long half paralyzed her by its serpentine embrace. This system, once uprooted, she might expect a more just treatment. The argument of nature was in favor of close commercial relations between the United States and Cuba. The latter saw the necessity of commercial union with the United States, and argued that it would strengthen the bond of union with Spain. Very few planters opposed reciprocity, and such as did were usually in favor of annexation to the United States in order to breathe more life into Cuba. In January, 1891, Cuba had a delegation at Madrid urging reciprocity with the United States, and some favored revolution if a treaty was not negotiated. Spain doubtless saw that if she refused to enter into a commercial treaty for reciprocity, the impulse to annexation would be increased, and that Spain would lose the support of the influential classes; so she took a safe course. In June, 1891, the reciprocity schedules were negotiated by which Spain consented to relax her former system. Many things were allowed to enter Cuba free of duty, and many others were admitted at a lower rate. From 1876 to 1891 the people of the United States purchased from Cuba raw products to the amount of

\$923,888,357, and sold to her merchandise only to the amount of \$188,699,845, leaving a balance of trade of \$735,-192,512 against us for the sixteen years. The United States exports for 1891 showed an increase of \$431,398 over the average for previous years. The English West Indies in recent years had been fairly embarrassed by the warm and friendly attitude of Canada, who desired to obtain a commercial union independent of the United States. Canada had assured them that millions of fur traders and Esquimaux were hungry for Jamaica rum, and for sugar and oranges to eat with their ice-cream. When the news reached Jamaica of a reciprocity treaty between Spain and the United States, securing a free market for Cuban sugar, the Canadian advances ceased. The British West Indies also had to accept the American offer. The news of the treaty was received with joy in Cuba, but its execution was obstructed by the authorities. It was prophesied that if the treaty failed to release the planters from their financial embarrassment, the force of economic gravitation to the United States would become irresistible, and that annexation would be the last resource. The Americans were confident that they did not desire the annexation of Cuba; but they felt that if she urged it would be hard to keep her out.

The economic conditions of Cuba—her industrial and financial burdens—had been the source of much agitation hostile to Spain, and had also led to the discussion of the question of annexation. The spirit of rebellion had not been crushed. In 1884, there were preparations for a revolution, and the Spanish ministers in the United States complained that Cuban filibusters were storing munitions of war at Key West and other Gulf ports. The life of the Spanish consul had been threatened, and the United States Government took means to protect him. The Spanish minister recognized the active friendship of the United States; but he complained that dynamite had been manufactured for Cuba, and he thought that the unfriendly public expression

and newspaper articles should be prevented. Secretary Frelinghuysen informed him that manifestations against Spain would be promptly checked if they were breaches of the peace. The United States officers were instructed to prevent hostile infractions against the neutrality laws at Key West and other places near Cuba. The Government was vigilant in performing its duties, but, in some cases, filibusters seem to have eluded the local authorities. A Key West paper of September, 1887, deplored the periodical expeditions to Cuba, and said that they could only delay the independence of the island, and might induce some Spanish commander to bombard Key West in order to capture the revolutionary chieftains who made that city their asylum. In May, 1888, the Spanish minister gave notice of an expedition that was ready to leave Key West under General Ruz. Secretary Blaine immediately gave instructions to prevent the enterprise.

In the spring of 1887, John Sherman visited Cuba and gave his impressions of the deplorable condition there. He said the revolt had only been ill-suppressed, and that the natives, beginning to realize that they were incapable of self-government, were nearly to a man in favor of annexation to the United States. Cuba was paying the salaries of all the Spanish horde which was fastened upon her. The official positions, from the captain-general down to the tide-water at the docks, were held by Spaniards. Under such conditions annexation sentiment was natural. But Sherman said: "I don't think we want Cuba as an appendage of the United States; I would not favor annexation." Mr. Sherman favored a reciprocity treaty with Spain which would prevent the Cubans from being forced to trade with England and other European countries. He said that we could benefit the island more by reciprocal trade than by annexation; and, that, while we would probably object to a transfer of the island, Spain was welcome to hold it if she would only give the United States better commercial terms than the Cubans could get elsewhere. Froude, who

visited the West Indies in 1887, spent some time in Cuba. He was told that the Americans had refused to take the part of the Cubans in the ten years' struggle because they saw no way of admitting the island into the Union, but he said: "The opinion in Cuba was and is that America is the residuary legatee of all the islands, Spanish and English equally, and that she will be forced to take charge of them in the end, whether she likes or not. Spain governs unjustly and corruptly; the Cubans will not rest till they are free from her, and, if once independent, they will throw themselves on American protection." Again, recalling Mr. Motley's words, "To be taken into the American Union is to be adopted into a partnership." He said: "If I were a West Indian, I should feel that under the Stars and Stripes I should be safer than I was at present from political experimenting. America would restore me to hope and life." The home-rulers had been trying to obtain what concessions they could from Spain, but their policy did not prosper, and in 1888 they became more restless. The small concessions came to be regarded as sops distributed by Spain to maintain peace—like confectionery given to crying children to stop their noise. The Cubans complained that in return for benefits, Spain had imposed new taxes which more than counterbalanced her good deeds. The Cuban revolutionary party began to regain strength. It asserted that peaceful measures had failed, and that Cuba's salvation could be accomplished only by driving the Spanish soldiers into the sea.

Senator Morgan, in the Senate, on January 24, 1898, said that Cleveland, during his first administration, favored the annexation both of Hawaii and Cuba. However strongly Cuba may have favored it, when overtures suggesting the sale of the island by Spain were renewed in 1889, Sagasta said there was not enough gold in the world to buy it. An article in the *Forum* of July, 1891, urged the necessity of transferring Cuba to the hands of the United States. The

writer said: "The United States has great and varied interests in all that concerns the future development of Cuba's natural resources. These interests make it an essential complement to our industrial, agricultural, commercial and military systems, and, logically, should lead our people to desire its early acquisition." He said that we should be just and generous to Spain, but that we should tolerate no sinister diplomacy by foreign governments. At the beginning of 1890, there was reason to believe that the Cuban debt of \$124,000,000 was wholly in the hands of German bankers and subject to the control of the German Government. It was feared in some quarters that in case Spain or Cuba should not be able to meet the debt at the proper time, Germany would thus have a chance to interfere in affairs on this side of the Atlantic; it was also seen that Germany would thus be interested in the perpetuation of the Spanish sovereignty over the island. In January, 1890, Senator Call, in a resolution of inquiry, stated that this was opposed to the policy and interests of the United States as well as the interests of Cuba, and proposed that the Senate should pass resolutions to discountenance it.

Possibly the policy of the United States at this time was expressed in August, 1890, in a public speech of Secretary Blaine: "We are not seeking annexation of territory. Certainly we do not desire it, unless it should come by the volition of the people who might ask the priceless boon of a place under the flag of the Union. I feel sure that for a long time to come the people of the United States will be wisely content with our present area, and not launch upon any scheme of annexation."

As Athens was the school of Greece, so has the United States been the school of the western continent; it has been a shining light of self-government for the Spanish provinces that have desired to imitate its example. Cuba often looked across the Florida straits and dreamed of the days when she might cast aside the burdens of a proud, undutiful and

unfortunate mother—when she might follow the principles of the American Declaration of Independence, which declared the right of revolution against oppression. Promises of autonomy had failed to materialize. The Maura bill of 1893 had failed because it was too genuinely in earnest. The modified reform bill of Maura, in 1894, was approved by the Cortes in February, 1895, but it did not satisfy the autonomists, and the separatists regarded it as useless. Active preparations for insurrection had already begun in 1894. About the end of the year, Cubans from the United States, under Marti, chartered three American vessels, and sailed with men and war material, but the vessels were captured at Fernandina, Fla. February 24, 1895, was set for the opening of the revolutionary demonstration, but when the time came, Spain looked upon it as only a small riot. The insurrection gained ground, however, though Spain continued to send new troops. A Spanish officer, on reaching Cuba, said that he did not like the prospect of chasing goats over the mountain.

The Cuban insurrection endangered the relations between Spain and the United States from the beginning. On March, 1895, the American steamer *Allianca*, while in the Windward passage, about four miles from Cuba, was signalled to "heave to" by the Spanish gunboat *Conde de Venadito*. The captain of the *Allianca* quickened speed. The Spaniards gave chase for twenty-five miles and then fired upon her, but the shot fell short. The captain of the *Allianca* informed the American Government that his vessel did not transfer munitions of war to fishing vessels, as claimed by the Spaniards, but that she was taking them to Colombia. On March 14, Secretary Gresham cabled the American minister at Madrid to demand prompt disavowal and regret, and to ask the Spanish Government to give orders to prevent future interference with American vessels in the Windward passage. The Spanish minister gave assurance that the matter would be satisfactorily adjusted; he relieved the Spanish commander, and, after some delay,

made apology. Many in the United States complained that President Cleveland was too dilatory in demanding reparation. On June 12, Spain, having complained that the customs collectors failed to enforce neutrality, Cleveland issued a proclamation admonishing all citizens to abstain from taking part in Cuban disturbances in any way that might be adverse to the established government there. United States officers were enjoined to use diligence in preventing violations of the laws.

Spain now showed a disposition to settle some of the American claims that had been the subject of controversy for years. These claims grew out of the seizure of property in Cuba. Spain had urged that the claimants for damages had not become American citizens until after they had given aid to the Cuban insurrection during which the property was seized. The Maximo Mora claim was the most important one. Mora's estates had been confiscated in 1870. In 1873, Spain had admitted his claim as just, and a decree for restitution was confirmed by the Spanish Government in 1876, but Cuban authorities delayed execution until the estate was in ruins. Spain finally offered an indemnity which was accepted in 1876, but the Cortes made no appropriation, and, in 1888, the Spanish minister tried to make the condition that certain Spanish claims should be settled at the same time. Secretary Bayard objected and urged Spain to fulfil her promises. On June 12, 1895, Secretary Olney instructed Hannis Taylor to ask Spain to give assurance that she would pay within two months. Congress had recently urged the pressure of the claim. Spain agreed to pay the principal, and the claimants accepted. On September 14, Spain paid \$1,449,000 to Mora's heirs.

The neutrality laws of the United States were now such that the filibusters did not care to strain them. In September an expedition was fitted out from Canada by Cespedes y Quesada, of Venezuela, son of the Cuban leader who died at Yara, 1873.

The strength of the insurrection was growing. It was said that the Cuban Government controlled one-half of the island, and in some quarters there was a feeling that recognition should be granted. On November 1, a mass-meeting at Washington, while it discountenanced filibustering and violation of international law, resolved that it would gladly hail the day when the authorities could see their way to grant belligerent rights. On the other hand, it was said that the Cubans were not oppressed, and that Cuban independence was not wanted; that it would not be advantageous to the United States, and that annexation was out of the question. The New York *Tribune* stated that the United States Government was not in the market for the purchase of Cuba, but it believed that annexation was the manifest destiny of the island. It favored a policy by which the Cubans could gain their independence without American military aid, and should, after a failure to govern themselves, be allowed to come into the Union as Texas had done. "A Cuban annexationist" stated that taking history as a guiding star, it was evident that the Cubans could not overcome the law of heredity and establish an enduring republic, but that they would ultimately petition the United States for annexation. He said that in case their petition should be rejected, England would open her arms to receive Cuba for the use it would be to her in case the Panama canal should be opened. The following December it was rumored that Great Britain, in return for the cession of Cuba, would turn Gibraltar over to Spain, assume the Cuban debt, and acquiesce in the Spanish plans in Morocco. Prime Minister Canovas del Castillo was said to be favorable to the idea of ceding Cuba to England only as a last resource. Officials in the foreign office at London, when questioned concerning the rumor, declared they knew nothing of it except from the newspaper reports.

The constituent assembly of the Cuban republic accredited T. Estrada Palma as diplomatic agent to the United States, where he was informally received to present the

Cuban side of the case of the insurrection. On December 7, in a note to the Secretary of State, he stated the condition of Cuba and the causes of the revolution for "independence or extermination." He described the preliminary organization of the revolt, its subsequent growth, the battles and campaigns, the defeats of General Campos, the civil and military organization of the Cubans, the treatment of prisoners, the non-negro character of the government, and the attitude toward the property and persons of American citizens. He stated that the causes of the revolution were substantially the same as those of 1869, and that they were far more grave than those of the American Revolution of 1775. Spain in Cuba was only a parasite exploiting through her fiscal, commercial and bureaucratic *regimes*. The representation which was given to the Cubans was proven to be only a farce. The laws had been framed so that natives were substantially deprived of the right of suffrage, the high poll tax of twenty-five dollars restricting the suffrage to 53,000 inhabitants. In disputed cases the courts declared in favor of the Government. Thus the Spaniards got the advantage, and the Cubans usually had only three deputies in a Cortes of 430 members. The qualifications for the Senate were so high that it was almost impossible for Cubans to secure the place. Taxes were levied on every thing conceivable, and were almost entirely devoted to the support of the army and navy, to the payment of the interest on the debt that Spain had saddled upon the island, and the salaries of a vast number of office holders. Only a small proportion had been devoted to public improvements. The Cuban debt hung as a continual burden upon Cuban prosperity. All the industries of the island were hampered by excessive imposts, and the commerce was crippled in every possible manner. The native Cubans had been left with no public duties to perform except the payment of taxes and exactions. There was no security of person or property. The judiciary was the instrument of the military authori-

ties. There was no freedom of the press, or speech, or religion. Liberties were written in the constitution, but they were not practiced. The Cubans could discuss political affairs theoretically, but they were not allowed to mention particular abuses or to make personal application of them. They could hold public meetings, but it was necessary to give notice, so that a functionary could be present, and this functionary had power to suspend the meeting. Personal safety was a myth. The civil guard (armed police) was a terror, and not a guardian, of the Cuban peasants whom it beat upon trifling pretexts. Bankruptcy and ruin existed upon every hand despite the vast sugar and tobacco industries. The money which was derived from large exportations remained abroad to pay the interest on the debt, to cover the remittances of the Spanish officers, and to pay the pensioners and political patrons who lived in Spain. Such was the case as presented by the Cuban delegate to the United States, and he declared that Cuba had appealed to arms, "not in anger but in despair," in order to defend its rights. The colonial office at Madrid refuted the "calumnies" which were hurled at Spain, and endeavored to show that Cuba was decently governed. But the Cuban delegation in the United States replied in a pamphlet in which it designated the Spanish statement as a tissue of falsehoods.

When Canovas replaced Sagasta at Madrid in 1895, he looked out upon a sea of difficulties, but the brave old man did not falter. He got rid of those who had different opinions from himself, and proceeded to inaugurate a policy of "thorough" to replace the policy of conciliation which had been advocated by Sagasta and General Campos. His policy was "The last dollar and the last man." He was able, subtle and high-thoughted, but at heart he was a Spaniard of the past. He studied upon the Cuban question day and night, endeavoring in some way to solve the problem. He decided to be swift as lightning and at the same time to

preserve peace with the United States. He recognized that the right of visit and search of American vessels could not be practiced either within or without Cuban waters, nor even in cases of the transportation of arms. He said that the rights of commerce could not be interfered with, for that Spain had not consented to a declaration of war, and belligerency was not recognized. He proposed, however, to keep a close outlook for Cuban filibusters and to require vessels to come to anchor only in ports of entry. General Campos had proposed administrative reforms at the same time he was endeavoring to end rebellion by military forces. Canovas's policy was to end the rebellion and talk about reforms afterwards.

By the beginning of 1896, more than half of Cuba was in the hands of insurgents, or in turmoil. The night skies were illumined by the fires of devastation. Gomez, burning cane-fields and destroying railway trains, claimed everything, and the Spaniards put themselves on the defensive. Many new troops now flocked to the apparently victorious Cuban cause. The rural pacificos were believed to be in coalition with the Cubans, and many Spanish soldiers asked for their punishment, but Campos refused to make war upon them. Conservatives called for more vigorous warfare to check the insurgents, and demanded the recall of Campos. Spain's greatest soldier went home, and Canovas had a free hand to carry out his own policy. Weyler, an energetic officer of the medieval type, who had been in many hard campaigns of blood, fire and desolation, was sent to Cuba to carry out the policy of Canovas. This man of "blood and iron" soon began the carnival of death, which, notwithstanding the indignation of the United States, swept like a simoon over the garden of the Gulf until near the close of 1896. The cruel policy of concentration was initiated on February 16, and the productive districts under the control of the Spaniards were soon depopulated. The inhabitants were herded in the garrison towns, and the lands laid waste, and the dwellings destroyed.

American sympathy for the Cubans was strong. Some favored belligerency, some independence, and some annexation without asking the Cubans. On December 28, 1895, the House asked for the correspondence relating to Cuba since the previous February. On February 11, President Cleveland responded with a document of 212 pages dealing with the neutral policy, the right of the consul-general to present remonstrances, the progress of the insurrection, the destruction of the American property, and the arrests and trials of American citizens. Spirited debates followed. On May 16, the Senate also asked for information as to the rights of United States citizens in case of arrest and trial in Cuba. On May 23, the President replied with a copy of the original text of the Cushing-Collantes protocol of January 12, 1877. Congress favored intervention on the basis of Cuban independence. It passed a concurrent resolution that a condition of public war existed justifying a state of belligerency. The Senate made the previous attempt at intervention, in the Ten Years' War, the basis of a resolution requesting the President once more to "interpose his friendly offices with the Spanish Government for the recognition of the independence of Cuba." On March 24, the Senate had asked for the correspondence following November 5, 1875, upon the subject of mediation and intervention. Cleveland responded on April 25, with 137 pages.

In the meantime the President had decided that it was time to tell Spain to put her house in order, and to endeavor to bring about an honorable adjustment of the contest by the mediation of the United States on the basis of some effective scheme of self-government for Cuba under the sovereignty and flag of Spain. Spain had appeared to favor reforms *after* the Cubans should lay down their arms. The President realized the suspicions and precautions of the Cubans in regard to the promises of Spain, and he intimated to the Spanish Government that if a satisfactory measure of home rule should be tendered to the Cubans and accepted

by them on the guarantee of its execution, the United States would endeavor to find a way not objectionable to Spain of furnishing such guarantee. On April 4, Secretary Olney, in a note to Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish minister at Washington, alluding to the character of the war, and the interests of the American people in it, stated that it had led many honest persons to insist upon intervention. He said, however, that it was not his purpose to consider at that time when intervention would be justified, but he declared that the United States could not contemplate with complacency another ten years' struggle. It was not his purpose to even pave the way for intervention, but rather to prevent it by offers of mediation. Spain had thus far faced the insurrection with sword in hand. Secretary Olney inquired whether it would not be wise to modify that policy. He gave assurance that the United States had no designs on Cuba, and none against the sovereignty of Spain—neither was she meddlesome—but she only desired to end the strife. Instructions were also sent to the United States minister at Madrid on April 9, tendering the good offices of the American Government to secure a cessation of the rebellion on the basis of reforms promised by the Spanish Government in 1870—viz: Equitable levy of taxes, no discrimination against native Cubans in office-holding, security of persons and property, separation of the judiciary from military authorities, and the granting of greater liberty of religion, speech and the press. Olney suggested that if the Spanish Cortes would frame a measure of home rule satisfactory to the Cuban tax-payers, it would be an important step toward peace. As a justification for this friendly advice, he mentioned the damages to the estates and commerce of American citizens. Olney told Dupuy de Lome that if the reforms were inaugurated the Cubans and their friends in the United States would probably withdraw their aid. The Spanish Government made no direct reply to Secretary Olney; but on June 4, De Lome wrote him that the importance of the

subject had led the Government to examine it with care, and to postpone an answer until the Spanish views could be made public. He suggested, however, that Cuba having been Spanish since its discovery could not be benefited except through Spain, and that reforms would come in time. He stated that the Cubans, on a supposition that the United States "wishes to get possession of the island one of these days," had repelled the idea that the United States could intervene by advice or otherwise, and, therefore, that there could be no success from mediation, even if Spain should condescend to treat with the rebellious subjects as one power with another. He suggested that the United States could, nevertheless, contribute to the pacification by continuing to prevent expeditions and by publicly declaring that she considered Spain to be in the right.

Spain discussed a plan of autonomy, but she adhered to her policy to grant no reforms until after the insurgents had laid down their arms. It was evident that the rebels desired independence and not local autonomy—and Spain said that independence of Cuba meant a step backward in its civilization. She refused to consider any plan of mediation or settlement except on such terms as she herself might grant at the end of the war. So the war continued unabated, and fresh levies of Spanish troops were sent to meet the undiminished resistance of the insurgents. The horrors of the strife were increased. "If Spain held Havana and the seaports, the insurgents still roamed at will over two-thirds of the inland country." If Spanish determination was stronger, so was the insurrection. If Spain had not yet established her authority neither could the insurgents be considered an independent state. The Spanish army had the difficulty of facing a foe that shunned general engagements and fought only from ambushes. Such devastating hostilities might have been prolonged forever or until the industrial value of Cuba was ruined. With the people of the United States the spectacle of ruining Cuba

had become almost unbearable. Many Cubans lived in American cities, and many Americans sympathized with the insurgents; and the Government was constantly called upon by her citizens to claim damages, to do police duty, and to ask explanations and apologies of Spain for acts against unoffending American citizens.

The inevitable entanglements, the American interests, and the considerations of humanity, all pointed to the necessity of curing the Cuban difficulty. It had been proposed that belligerent rights should be accorded to the insurgents; but this was considered untimely, and perilous to American interests. It was then proposed that the independence of the insurgents should be recognized, but it was doubtful whether they had a government. By the latter part of 1896, it was suggested that the United States should buy the island, but there was no evidence that Spain was willing to entertain a proposal in that direction. Intervention was offered as the only practical method of ending the strife. The advocates of intervention contemplated the possibility of a war with Spain, but it was confidently prophesied that such a war could not be large in its proportions nor doubtful in its issue. President Cleveland still hoped that the American proposition for mediation, the United States guaranteeing the acceptance of some form of home rule by Cuba, might be inaugurated and pushed to an immediate and successful issue. In his message of December, 1896, the President reviewed the conditions in Cuba, and the various cures that had been proposed for the Cuban disease, and urged mediation as the best method of stopping the conflict and, at the same time, keeping intact the possessions of Spain without touching her honor, and without severing the ancient and natural ties which bound Cuba to the mother country. He believed that, under the circumstances, for Spain "to withhold the proffer of needed reforms until the parties demanding them put themselves at her mercy by throwing down their arms, had the appearance of neglect-

ing the gravest of perils and inviting suspicion as to the sincerity of any professed willingness to grant reforms." As to the American conduct, he believed that it should be guided by right and not by might. The United States desired peace, and her attitude towards Spain had clearly indicated that she had no dreams of conquest, nor covetous eyes upon her neighbor's dominions. The American people did not forget the Spanish relation to the discovery of the Western Hemisphere, nor fail to recognize the patriotism of the Spanish people and their devotion to national honor. "Whatever circumstances may arise," said the President, "our policy and our interest would constrain us to object to the acquisition of the island, or interference with its control by any other power." He added, however, that it could not be reasonably assumed that the American Government would continue indefinitely to maintain an expectant attitude; the relations of the United States were such that events might bring a limit to the patience with which she had been waiting for Spain to end the contest. He said: "When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its re-establishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge." Contemplating the emergencies that might arise, he realized the necessity of trying to avoid their creation. As to the methods of facing future contingencies he was willing to leave a discussion of them until the contingencies should arise.

In December, 1896, and at the beginning of 1897, the Senate asked information as to the treatment of American

citizens in Cuba and as to claims arising out of the insurrection; and, in the closing weeks of President Cleveland's term of office, he sent several communications upon these subjects. Congress was still inclined to believe that the time had come to resume intervention with Spain for the recognition of the independence of Cuba. Congress was already pledged, in fact, to friendly intervention, and the only question to be decided was the nature of the next step to be taken with a proper regard to international customs and usages. On December 21, 1896, the committee of foreign affairs submitted a report to the Senate, in which it gave a careful examination of all the instances in the nineteenth century of people claiming independence by right of revolt. It showed that Europe had asserted and practiced the right to interfere, collectively and separately, amicably and forcibly, in almost every case where European people had resorted to insurrection to obtain independence. The right had been based upon the desire to remove impediments to commerce or other evils, to stop effusion of blood and disorder, to secure the repose of Europe or political equilibrium, to maintain the political influence of the intervening power, and for the sake of humanity. The cases of intervention in the western continent were also cited. In October, 1818, Castlereagh had proposed that the five great powers should "intervene in the war between Spain and her colonies by addressing offers of mediation to the two belligerents." Russia had energetically opposed and rejected the proposition—because it savored of mediation instead of intervention, and she did not desire to recognize the rights of the insurgents. In April, 1818, Monroe had already indicated that the only intervention which the United States would permit would be for independence. On March 8, 1822, he recommended to Congress the recognition of the Spanish colonies in revolt; and in December, 1823, he created an American law of intervention, placing outside of the European system the new American republics

which had expressed a desire to be American—declaring that, “We could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any manner their destiny by any European power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.” The committee of foreign affairs, in view of the fact that Congress had favored intervention the previous session on the basis of independence, and that Cleveland, though ready to extend his patient delay, saw that our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain might be superseded by higher obligations, recommended a joint resolution as follows: (1) “That the independence of the republic of Cuba be and the same is hereby acknowledged by the United States of America. (2) That the United States will use its friendly offices with the Government of Spain to bring to a close the war between Spain and the republic of Cuba.”

There were cries of indignation in the United States against the Spanish policy in Cuba, but Canovas went on until near the close of 1896, when the death of Maceo, the son of Gomez, caused a great public meeting in New York. On January 1, 1897, reported proposed reforms for Porto Rico were published in the *Madrid Gazette*; and, soon after, there was a rumor that Canovas was busy in his closet drafting Cuban reforms. On February 4, these reforms were proclaimed by royal decree, but the people in the United States saw that they were not satisfactory. They were put forth under pressure “as a mere coup de theatre” to divert the American people until Weyler could reduce Cuba. While Weyler kept on, there was agitation in Spain against Canovas. It was rumored that Sagasta would replace him, but the Queen resolved to keep him, and he still clung to Weyler and his nerve of blood and iron. The policy of devastation and concentration went on. The raising and movement of provisions of all kinds were interdicted. The policy of desolation and destruction was justified by Spain

as a measure of war, but it utterly failed in its purpose to crush the insurgents.

President McKinley at the beginning of his administration continued the protests of his predecessor against the Spanish policy of extermination. He also demanded the release or speedy trial of American citizens who were imprisoned. Congress by executive recommendation, in the spring of 1897, made an appropriation to aid American citizens in Cuba. In the summer of 1897, when Woodford was sent as minister to Spain, it was surmised that some other method than violent repression would soon become necessary in Cuba, and that Spain, in order to prevent intervention by the United States, would have to accept the good offices of the American Government and treat with the insurgents on the basis of Cuban independence or sell Cuba. Woodford's instructions directed him to impress upon Spain the sincere wish of the United States to lend its aid to end the war in a way just and honorable to both Spain and the Cuban people. The character of the war and its resulting losses, burdens, restraints, and disturbances were carefully reviewed, and it was suggested that the time was ripe for Spain to end the struggle. It was urged that the American Government could be required to wait only a reasonable length of time. No solution was offered that could in any way humiliate Spain. While General Woodford was on his way across the Atlantic, Canovas fell by the hand of an assassin (August 8), and soon after the proposals of the American Government were delivered to the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, the old Cabinet resigned (September 29). In October, Sagasta formed a new and more liberal ministry which had been committed in advance to a policy of reform involving the widest principle of home rule for Cuba and Porto Rico. While the instructions of Minister Woodford were not in the nature of an ultimatum they were possibly of such a character as to have some influence in producing the change of ministry. It was not apprehended that any war would arise upon the subject. Senator Davis,

chairman of the committee on foreign affairs of the American Senate, looked for the collapse of the Spanish power in Cuba before the close of the dry season. He doubted whether a policy of autonomy would be favored by the Spanish people or accepted by Cuba unless through the influence of the American Government, and said there was no desire on the part of the American Government for an aggressive policy that would secure immediate annexation of Cuba.

The new ministry appeared sincere in its desire to inaugurate a new policy. Weyler, who had shocked the world by his career of destruction, starvation and bloodshed, was recalled. Blanco was sent to replace him and to grant reforms. The Spanish reply to the American note was received on October 23. It appreciated the friendly purposes of the American Government, admitted the inconveniences to the United States, and declared the purpose of the Spanish Government to adopt a policy that would satisfy the United States and secure an early pacification of Cuba. The political reforms previously advocated by Sagasta were to be put into effect. Military operations were to continue but were to be humane, and accompanied by political steps toward Cuban autonomy. The island was to be governed by an executive and the local council, reserving to Spain the control of foreign relations, the army and navy, and the judicial administration. Instead of accepting the American overtures looking to an immediate and effective amelioration of the condition of Cuba, Spain suggested that the United States leave the new ministry free to conduct military operations and grant political reforms, the United States meanwhile enforcing its neutral obligations. It was claimed that the western provinces were well-nigh reclaimed and complete pacification could be hoped for soon. Hannis Taylor, who had just returned from Spain, had little confidence in the promises of the new ministry. He said Spain had not demonstrated her ability to conciliate Cuba or to conquer her, and that her sovereignty over the

island had thus become extinct. He favored intervention to prevent the fierce bird of prey from longer whetting its beak upon the vitals of Cuba. He thought that Sagasta would only follow meekly in the footsteps of Canovas, for, that the Spaniards did not know the meaning of "autonomous colonial government."

In suggesting that the United States could best exercise its good offices by stopping filibustering, Spain showed an apparent disposition to intimate that the American Government had not observed its international duties. This implication was without any basis of fact. The constant efforts to prevent violations of neutrality had been made at a cost of millions of dollars. Senator Davis said: "The United States through the last administration and the present has pursued a course so forbearing that Spain has no just reason to complain. The belligerency of the Cubans in my opinion should have been recognized long ago. This Government has refrained from doing so, and has enforced our neutrality laws against her own citizens with the greatest vigilance and stringency. Spain has had every opportunity, as far as this Government is concerned, to win back Cuba by coercion or negotiations, and has failed to do so. The moderation which the United States has displayed has been recognized and wondered at by many of the leading journals of England and continental Europe." Gage, Secretary of the Treasury, submitted a report showing the unceasing vigilance of the Treasury Department in patrolling the coast. Out of 13,585 available American vessels, only six had succeeded in reaching Cuba. Seven vessels had been captured, two expeditions had been broken up and thirteen vessels had been held on suspicion. Secretary Gage said: "If the Spanish patrol of 2200 miles of Cuban coast had frustrated one-half the number of expeditions which were frustrated by the United States authorities along a coast line of 5470 miles, not one man nor one cartridge would have been illicitly landed in Cuba from the United States.

Out of sixty alleged expeditions only two have been broken up by Spain."

A scheme of autonomy was soon proclaimed by decree of the Spanish King. It was to become effective by ratification of the Cortes. It created a Cuban parliament which with the insular executive could consider and vote upon all subjects affecting local order and interests. Besides its local power, the parliament could regulate the electoral registration and qualifications, organize courts of justice, frame the insular budget, initiate or take part in the Spanish negotiations for commercial treaties, accept or reject such treaties, and frame the colonial tariff. Conflicts between Cuban authorities as to jurisdiction were to be submitted to the courts. Blanco, who was sent to replace Weyler, announced his policy to grant reforms as outlined by the new minister. He found everything in Cuba in a deplorable state. There were hungry pacificos and unpaid soldiers. By orders of the new minister he modified the concentration plan—stating that he only intended to fight the enemy, and not women and children. He gave \$100,000 for the relief of the helpless and for those who desired to resume the cultivation of the fields, assuring them that they would be protected in their lawful occupations. He asked Cuban emigrants to return, and abolished many harsh decrees and regulations. Prisoners captured upon the filibuster *Competitor* during Cleveland's administration were released. These prisoners had been the subject of repeated diplomatic correspondence. They had at one time been condemned to death by court-martial; but Consul-General Williams, threatening to close the American consulate if the men were shot, demanded a civil trial, which was allowed by the authorities. By the latter part of November, 1897, not a single American citizen was in arrest or confinement in Cuba.

President McKinley in his message of December carefully reviewed the situation and narrated the steps taken with a view to relieving its acuteness and opening the way to some

form of honorable settlement. The message was moderate in tone, and governed by the same principles that had influenced Grant and Cleveland. It advocated the duty of awaiting the result of the changed policy of Sagasta, and the milder methods of Blanco; but it stated that the American Government had never in any way abrogated its reserved rights to determine its policy according to future exigencies. Recognition of the insurgents, or of independence, was considered impracticable and unwise. Forcible annexation was discountenanced as being opposed to the American code of morality. Even intervention upon humanitarian grounds was considered improper in the face of the new Spanish offers of reform. At the same time, the President intended to watch the progress of events and take whatever steps might appear to be necessary in view of "our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and to humanity." While not desiring to embarrass the new Spanish minister, the President said: "If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations * * * to interfere with force, it shall be without fault on our part, and only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the support and the approval of the civilized world." If that time should come, the United States was ready to meet the exigency without misgiving or hesitancy, and moved neither by passion nor selfishness. Weyler protested against McKinley's message, but the Spanish Government prosecuted his Madrid paper and summoned him before the Supreme Court and later to the Captain-General of Madrid.

The Christmas season was prefaced with war talk on both sides of the world. Europe looked to Cuba and West Africa as two possible centres of belligerent action. There was an impression that the United States was about to crowd Spain to abandon Cuba, and that Spain was anxious to make a *casus belli* by which she could surrender Cuba to the United States instead of to the Cuban insurgents. The London *Spectator*, and other papers, contemplated the future with nervous seriousness. They feared a rise in the

price of wheat, and a fall in the quotation of Spanish bonds, as well as a prospect of an outbreak of anarchist violence in Spain and then in Europe. There was no desire to see Europe suffer from a sympathetic attack of the revolutionary spirit. Besides, it seemed possible that if the cannon-ball was set to rolling at America's front-door it might also be set to rolling in Europe. Some journals in America thought that in the existing state of Europe, where statesmen were at their wits' ends to preserve peace, it was inadvisable to force Spain into a ruinous contest that might endanger the European powder-house and could be of no profit to the prosperity of the millions who pay the taxes.

On December 25, Minister Woodford, in reply to the Spanish note of October, delivered to the Spanish foreign office an argumentative statement of the American position outlined in the President's message. He also made a forcible statement in regard to the remarkable success of American authorities in stopping filibustering expeditions, and contrasted it with the feeble efforts of the Spanish authorities to maintain a patrol around Cuba. The Spanish press took up the question and showed much feeling. The Spanish Government announced that the press attached too much importance to the note, and that it still considered the American attitude as correct.

The situation in Cuba had not improved as expected. In the early part of December there was a report of a dangerous conspiracy at Matanzas against the Americans, but Consul-General Lee thought that danger might be avoided in case Blanco could manage the Spanish volunteers as he said he could. The assurances of the Spanish officials at first prevented General Lee from making application for American warships to be sent to Havana; but he was inclined to think that two vessels should be kept at Key West prepared to move at short notice, and that a coaling station should be established at Dry Tortugas. The majority against autonomy was very great. Very few persons in Havana favored it. The insurgents, the non-combatants

and the great mass of Spaniards opposed it. The Spaniards preferred annexation to the United States to autonomy, and there was little prospect that it could be put into operation. About the middle of December, Mr. Hyatt, the consul at Santiago, wrote that Spain would have to fight harder if she desired to win. He believed that reconcentration being practically wiped out, the insurgents could get needed supplies from the towns. He had little hope that agricultural pursuits would be resumed, for the reconcentrados had no spur to work, and very little interest in the problem of human life. Many of them could hardly expect to live until a crop should mature. As Mr. Hyatt wrote, men were dying in the street at his front door. The destitution in Cuba had been a serious subject of consideration in the United States. In May, money had been appropriated for the relief of American citizens, and later it was decided to endeavor to extend aid to Cuban sufferers. On December 1, Secretary Sherman asked Dupuy de Lome whether Spain would remit the duty on relief supplies. This Spain agreed to do, only making the condition that supplies should go through the relief committee at Havana. It was later decided that they should be sent through the American consul. On December 24, the President requested Sherman to make an appeal to the American people for contributions to the Cuban sufferers. There was a liberal response. A Cuban relief committee, with headquarters in New York City, was organized. Arrangements were made to secure free transportation to Cuba. Contributions were sent to General Lee and admitted free of duty. Spain had expressed a willingness to co-operate in order that there might be an effective distribution of the collected supplies. By April, 1898, \$200,000 in money and supplies had reached the sufferers in nearly all the towns, and thousands of lives were saved. The American consulates were besieged by starving, struggling masses whose cry was "Bread, or I perish!" Men, women and children, homeless and almost naked, roamed the streets begging, and slept under no roof

except the blue sky. Out of the 400,000 country people who had been driven from their homes, 210,000 had perished of starvation. At that rate not a soul would have been left in Cuba in five years. Notwithstanding the severe measures taken by Spain there were many thousand square miles in Cuba where the foot of the Spanish soldier had never trod. After three years of warfare, and the use of 225,000 troops, Spain had in fact lost control of every foot of Cuba outside of the actual intrenchments and fortified picket lines which were under the protection of the Spanish warships. The revolutionists were in absolute and almost peaceable possession of the eastern half of the island, and in the four so-called Spanish provinces there was neither cultivation nor railway operation except under strong military protection. That Spain could ever expect, under these circumstances, to re-establish her sovereignty over the blue mountains and naked hills of the interior was visionary. Chaos, devastation, and depopulation had taken the place of war. Spanish soldiers were dying in the hospitals, and not upon the battle-field, and the army was in a poorer condition than ever before.

In January, owing to the riots which were occurring at Havana, it was thought advisable to have American war vessels at Havana. On January 24, General Lee was notified that the *Maine* would in a few days make a friendly visit at the Havana port. There was much excitement in the city at that time, and Lee advised a postponement of the visit. The Spanish authorities professed to think that the United States had an ulterior purpose in sending the ship. They declared it would obstruct autonomy, produce excitement and perhaps a demonstration. They desired to wait for instructions from Madrid. But the vessel arrived the next day, and exchanged friendly visits with the Spanish officials. On February 4, General Lee was informed that it was imprudent, for sanitary reasons, to keep the *Maine* longer in Havana, but General Lee thought there would be no danger to the vessel's crew before May. He said: "We

should not relinquish position of peaceful control of situation, or conditions would be worse than if the vessel had never been sent. Americans would depart * * in haste * * * If another riot occurs, it would be against governor-general and autonomy, but might include anti-American demonstration also. First-class battleship should replace present one if relieved, as object-lesson and to counteract Spanish opinion of our navy. * * ”

A few days later, on February 15, the tragic destruction of the *Maine*, in which two officers and 264 of the crew lost their lives, excited the compassion and resentment of the American people. But great self-restraint was shown until an official examination could be made as to the cause. On the morning of February 16, the telegram announcing the blowing up of the *Maine* was received at the State Department, and during the next few days the country was kept well informed of the occurrences at Havana. After the divers, under Captain Sigsbee, had made a cursory examination of the wreck, the Spanish Government proposed a joint investigation of the bottom of the ship in order to ascertain the probable cause of its destruction. The American investigation continued independently, but the Spanish authorities were notified that they would be afforded every facility for whatever investigation they would desire to make upon their part. Within a week it became apparent from the evidence that the *Maine* explosion had been due to an external cause. This pointed to the probable connivance of Spanish officials in the affair.

The Cuban problem pressed for solution. Members in Congress were pressing for belligerency, and still others for peaceful or armed intervention to protect commercial interests and stop the flow of blood. Americans owned property in Cuba to the extent of \$50,000,000, and had a trade of \$85,000,000 a year. Some declared that this would justify the United States to end the war by standing security for Cuba's payment of a quit claim to Spain. While waiting for the report of the board of inquiry as to the *Maine*

tragedy, the spirit for war grew in Congress. But Secretary Sherman was negotiating to adjust affairs without the necessity of opening the gates of Janus. There were rumors that President McKinley was proposing to purchase Cuba. *El Nacional* and other Madrid papers considered that this would be the best solution of the Cuban problem. *El Nacional* said: "Will nobody preach and proclaim the annexation of Cuba by agreement with Spain, on condition that the United States redeem us from the insular debt, favoring us during a certain period by a tariff concession and guaranteeing under a powerful authority and a respected flag the lives and property of Spaniards resident in Cuba? Behold the solution of the problem which would win popular sympathy, procuring the best termination of any foreseen or present heart-burnings of a nation." It was urged that American intervention already existed in the succor which American warships were conveying to the pacificos, and that the pacific intermeddlings of the United States would soon become armed intervention. It was declared that either independence or radical autonomy would produce anarchy in the colony, lead to the extermination of everything Spanish, and result in the ruin of the Spanish exchequer. The article in *El Nacional* produced much comment. The country was anxiously awaiting the report of the cause of the *Maine* disaster. Many believed that President McKinley would be willing to waive questions of responsibility and money indemnity if Spain would consent to American friendly mediation or intervention to stop the struggle between Cuba and her Spanish parent. Thus it was thought the island might obtain real autonomy, and that the United States might at the same time be placed before the world in a more unselfish attitude than if she should demand damages and then come back to the plan of intervention. The property-owning classes appeared to dread a democratic government in Cuba as much as they condemned the idea of Spanish supremacy. This led to the hope that a safe middle ground might be taken, in which

the United States would stand as friendly sponsor for the good faith of both Spain and the Cubans.

The President had evidently not fully decided upon the plan which he would present to Congress. The idea of guaranteeing \$100,000,000 purchase-fund, raised on the bonds of the Cuban republic, although it met considerable favor, did not have any assurance of meeting the approbation of the American Senate, where there were indications that the Populists and Democrats would object to purchase so long as there was a chance to secure Cuba's freedom by a threat of war. A careful poll of both Houses showed that the Senators and Representatives of both parties would hesitate to pledge the Government to the payment of Cuban bonds for the purchase of independence. But among those who endorsed the proposal for purchase there were several administration leaders. On March 27, the Secretary of State, through the United States minister at Madrid, after considerable correspondence, submitted propositions to Sagasta looking toward an armistice until October, during which time it was proposed that peace should be negotiated by the good offices of the President; and an immediate revocation of the concentration decree was asked so that the people could return to their homes. The Spanish Government was informed that complete and absolute independence of Cuba was the only measure that would satisfy the American people. It had already been suggested that the easiest way to bring this about was for Spain to relinquish her control, accept a money indemnity, and withdraw her troops immediately. It was now given out at Washington that the amount of indemnity would be about \$200,000,000. A member of the Cabinet at Washington, March 31, stated that negotiations were in progress, and he believed that Spain would accept the indemnity offered, but that if she did not accept it within forty-eight hours the President would cease negotiations and refer everything to Congress.

At this time the Cuban situation overshadowed the Chinese question in the London newspapers. Sympathy with President McKinley was very strong. The *Westminster Gazette* suggested that the European powers should advise Spain by an expression of opinion so unanimously and decisively that it would force her to yield. The *Daily News* believed that if Congress would let the President alone for a few days, he would obtain a peaceful severance of Cuba from Spain. The *Chronicle* considered the Washington demand as inexorable and just, and said that Spain should bend to the inevitable and logical result of her failure—the liberation of Cuba.

On March 31, the reply of the Spanish Cabinet was received. It offered to bring about peace in Cuba by a plan to be prepared by the insular parliament which would meet on May 4. In the meantime it agreed to suspend hostilities in case the commander of the insurgents should make the request. On March 26, the Spanish minister had given assurance that Spain would do all that honor and justice required in the case of the *Maine*. On the 31st she expressed a readiness to arbitrate all differences arising out of this question. The Spanish reply was received with disappointment, and it was felt that the Executive had reached the end of his efforts. President McKinley in a message to Congress on March 28, had submitted the report of the court of inquiry as to the *Maine* case. The conclusion was unanimous that the vessel was destroyed by an external explosion due to a submarine mine. The responsibility was left to be fixed later, but it was evident that the affair was a proof of an intolerable state of things. The report drew forth a shower of resolutions looking towards the termination of the unnatural conflict. Some favored recognition with independence, some favored both recognition and intervention, and others urged intervention and war by the United States in order to establish a republican government in Cuba.

It is not necessary to enter into all the factors that cause men to favor war. Motives are complex, and oftentimes contain a considerable mixture of personal or revengeful ingredients. The good of humanity was not behind all of the resolutions. Nevertheless there was plenty of cause for intervention, and no one could say the United States had not been long-suffering. If Cuba had been as near England as she was to the United States, the island doubtless would have been seized long before. Wars are bad, but they are sometimes necessary when it is not expedient to avoid them. The United States only desired peace. She had a right to ask Spain to vindicate her authority or confess her inability to do so. From the European standpoint she had good grounds for annexing the island long ago. It lay at her front door but she had held back her hand. Sagasta, the Spanish cavalier, like his predecessors, played upon the guitar of Spanish diplomacy, but every note was delay and every string played the same note. The feeling in the United States was strong that it was time to remove medievalism from our front doors, so that our ships could safely enter Havana, the "city of smells and noises." Cutting off Spain from Cuba appeared to be a necessary act of duty for the health of civilization. If Cuba had been in other hands the *Maine* might have been safe, and the blood of American citizens might not have caused the foul waters of Havana harbor to blush with shame. Spain had long misgoverned Cuba, but the sun was nearing the meridian, and the time for the hours to strike was at hand—and when they should strike, the desolating pitiless story in Cuba would end. Spain would parade no more as a colonizer in front of the portals of the progressive civilization in the valley of the father of Waters. Under the recent pressure, Spain was allowing the reconcentrados to return to their homes, was endeavoring to give them employment, and had appropriated \$600,000 for their relief; but she had too long procrastinated, and the American Congress had lost confidence in the political measures of Spain.

President McKinley was neither bellicose nor pusillanimous. As captain of the Ship of State, he stood on the bridge trying to sail the ship into port through rocks and breakers, with mines and torpedoes on every hand, while some of the crew were shouting and quarrelling and calling the captain names. But he kept the vessel in a safe channel—at the same time trying to induce Spain to clear away obstructions for intercourse, and to preserve order on her ship. Finally, in a peace-loving but not war-fearing message, he proclaimed to the world that he had exhausted every effort to restore peace in Cuba, and that the only remaining remedy was intervention. In his message to Congress on April 11, he stated this conclusion. He gave the history of the revolutions that had convulsed the island, dwelt upon the horrible character of the war practiced, described the condition of the reconcentrados, and the efforts of the United States to induce Spain to end the contest. He argued that the wreck of the *Maine* showed the inability of Spain to guarantee security to foreign vessels. Of all the various measures which had been proposed to bring peace in Cuba, he favored intervention in order that a government might be established which could be recognized. He said that forcible annexation could not be thought of, but that intervention, which, in fact, had already commenced by the feeding of the Spanish subjects, was justifiable in the interests of humanity, by the duty which the American Government owed to its citizens, by the necessity of preventing injury to commerce and property, and in order to remove the irritating entanglements that were a constant menace to American peace. The President declared that fires of insurrection could not be extinguished by existing Spanish methods, and that the only hope of pacification lay in the action of the American Government. He asked Congress for authority to end hostilities and to establish a stable government.

The President's message was considered by the Senate in connection with various resolutions upon the same sub-

ject. On April 13, the committee made a lengthy report. The destruction of the *Maine* was considered as only a single incident in the relations between Spain and the United States during three years of momentous history. It was declared that the *Maine* was destroyed by the participation or negligence of the Spanish authorities, some of whom had expressed resentment at her presence. Considering all the relations with Spain for three years, it was believed that the United States ought at once to recognize the independence of the people of Cuba, and to intervene to end the war and hasten the establishment of an independent government by the free action of the people. It was stated that recognition alone might have ended the war in the spring of 1896, but that it had now become necessary for the United States to be drawn into the quarrel. Attention was drawn to the fact that the cause of Spain had continually grown weaker, and that of the insurgents stronger. Eight-ninths of the population was said to favor the insurgents, and assurance had been given that the native Cubans were better able than the Spaniards to administer the government. The Spanish Government had violated the laws of civilized warfare and depleted its treasure in a desultory struggle which had recently deteriorated into an apparent policy of depopulating the island in order to repeople it with the natives of Spain. The report of the committee said: "We cannot consent upon any conditions that the depopulated portions of Cuba shall be recolonized by Spain any more than she should be allowed to found a new colony in any part of this hemisphere or island thereof. Either act is regarded by the United States as dangerous to our peace and safety." By recognizing the independence of Cuba the report said that the United States would be entitled to insist that war should be conducted by humane laws instead of by the Spanish domestic code against riots, and that the American Government would no longer be compelled to aid Spain by the energetic execution of the neutrality laws. It had already cost the United States \$2,000,000 to police the seas in favor

of Spain. Intervention was favored on grounds of necessity and policy as advocated by the Monroe doctrine, rather than by international law. It was justified by the interests of peace and humanity. Spain had been warned that American forbearance might cease, and that intervention might become necessary in case the new plan of autonomy should prove illusory. That the time for interposition was now at hand was justified by the following reasons: (1) The Cuban situation had become a menace to the world and especially to the peace of the United States. (2) The danger that conditions might make European intervention possible. (3) Relations with Spain were daily more irritating. (4) Spain had failed to fulfil treaty obligations. (5) The Spanish barbaric military operations, the extermination of non-combatants and the destruction of American property and commerce had become intolerable. In a resolution declaring that the people of Cuba were and of a right ought to be free and independent, Congress proposed that the United States demand Spain to relinquish her authority and withdraw her forces from Cuban waters. The President was empowered and directed to use American forces to carry this resolution into effect. As to the future American policy in Cuba the resolution declared: "That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people." The above resolution was agreed to on April 19, and approved by the President the next day.

The emphatic proceedings in Congress indicated that we were no longer drifting towards war—we were rushing towards it under a full head of steam. There was practical unanimity in the American halls of legislation, and the wheels of law-making turned unchecked. Unless the proud and brave Spaniards should surrender at the first summons without firing a shot, interference in Cuba would be con-

strued by the Spanish Government as war. Spain was weak and bankrupt, and could have no hope of winning in a contest against the United States. But her statesmen were determined, and her people still had some of the martial instinct of their grandsires. Poor, betrayed, destitute of ammunition, and with her navy a wreck, and her regular army in not much better condition than her fleet, she had once faced the great and swift Napoleon in the strength of her people, who fought with bludgeons and knives when they could find no better weapons. With the nature of her people fired by the incentive which would come from the feeling that they were resisting foreign interference in the affairs of what they still considered their country, it was likely that they would resist America even if their success had no ray of hope. We were face to face with a momentous crisis; and, notwithstanding the irreconcilable views of Congress and many Spanish statesmen as to the conditions in Cuba, there were still some who were willing to make concessions for the sake of peace. Secretary Sherman was one of these. He believed that if Congress had not delivered its proclamation to Spain, the whole Cuban difficulty would have been satisfactorily adjusted without a war. He afterwards said: "We had progressed to that stage that I could have arranged a treaty by which Spain would have retired peacefully from Cuba." He considered that the responsibility of the war rested upon the shoulders of Congress. The Duke of Tetuan, who had been minister of foreign affairs under the late Premier Canovas del Castillo, also believed that the war could have been avoided; and he said that Canovas, if he had lived, would never have accepted a war, for, that its inevitable result would be the ruin of Spain. He said the liberals could have averted a war by accepting the proffered good offices of the United States minister, General Woodford, and "by treating with the insurgents on the basis of Cuban independence or by selling Cuba." Tetuan declared that Sagasta was responsible for the American war and its consequent disaster.

On April 20, the American Executive addressed an ultimatum to Spain, as provided in the resolution of Congress. The Spanish minister at Washington at once asked for his passports and withdrew before night. The Spanish Government notified General Woodford that diplomatic relations had terminated, and the latter withdrew from Madrid. The demands of the United States having been denied, and having resulted in a rupture of intercourse, the United States immediately put on her war harness, declared a blockade of Cuban ports and ordered Sampson to advance from Key West with his fleet. A proclamation calling for troops was issued; and, on April 25, a bill declaring that war already existed was passed by Congress. The naval game of "hide and seek," which was to result in a Spanish defeat in the Gulf, had begun. It was at daylight on May 1, at far-off Manila, however, that the thrilling drama opened in earnest. The United States squadron, under Commodore Dewey, having made a daring entrance of the mined bay under cover of the night, destroyed the Spanish fleet of ten vessels and the land battery of Cavite, thus placing Manila at his mercy. The well-trained men followed the command, "Keep cool and obey orders!" and before the Spanish bull-fight had begun on that May Sunday, America's belching guns had thundered the knell of declining Spain. The difficulties of the Spanish Government were increased by apprehended riots at home. Spain hoped to obtain assistance from some of the European powers, but her plans in this direction were rendered futile by the friendly attitude of Great Britain toward the United States. During the first week of April, New York City and other places had been elated over the rumor of a possible Anglo-American alliance which was said to have been suggested by the English foreign office. The suggestion had also been welcomed by the London papers and people. Chamberlain attracted all Europe by his famous Birmingham speech of May 13, in which he strongly favored an Anglo-Saxon alliance. Spain, while straining every nerve to influ-

ence European opinion in her favor, sent a Spanish fleet from the Cape Verde islands, and on May 19 it reached Cuba. It successfully entered the spacious and sheltered harbor of Santiago de Cuba, situated beneath giant cliffs and antique frowning battlements, its entrance guarded by narrow granite gates, and surrounded by a magnificent furniture of nature. This recent arrival caused a modification of American plans to land troops in western Cuba, and for weeks the American fleet now paced up and down in front of Santiago harbor watching for a chance to engage the Spaniards. On May 24, the battleship *Oregon*, after a journey of 13,000 miles, arrived from San Francisco and joined the American squadron. After Hobson's daring attempt to "cork" the narrow mouth of the bottle-shaped Santiago harbor, and Sampson's bombardment of the Spanish shore batteries, the invasion of Cuba was finally begun by the landing of 600 marines at Guantanamo, where the enemy's forts were silenced. On June 22, General Shafter's army landed at Baiquiri, a few miles west of Santiago harbor, and from that point, inspired by the advance of the "Rough Riders," went on toward Santiago as fast as it could enquire the way. On June 27, President McKinley increased the extent of the Cuban blockade and also applied it to San Juan, Porto Rico. It was also announced that Commodore Watson would be sent with a squadron against the coast of Spain. On July 1, the general assault on Santiago was begun by an all-day battle, in which the Americans secured the Spanish outer lines of defenses. On July 2, the Spanish forces were driven into the city with heavy losses on both sides. On the next day, Sunday, Shafter asked his government for reinforcements, but at the same time demanded the Spanish commander to surrender the city. On July 4, he was re-encouraged by the welcome news that the Spanish fleet had met its fate. On July 3, Admiral Cervera, by order of his Government, had made a dash to escape from Santiago with his four armed cruisers and two torpedo destroyers, but the American ships intercepted him outside of the har-

bor. Men down in the grimy depths of the ponderous fighting machines, where the temperature was almost unendurable, unmindful of the roar of battle overhead, stood by their post of active duty, and not a Spanish vessel escaped. Eighteen hundred prisoners, including Cervera, were captured while they were leaving their burning and sinking ships. The only fleet that Spain now had was at Suez on its way to the Philippines. The Spanish Government, fearing an attack at home by Watson, at once ordered Admiral Camara to return with the Suez fleet. It saw that the end was nigh. General Toral asked General Shafter for three days' grace and for cable operators to notify Madrid of his desire to surrender. All of this was granted. While negotiations were in progress General Miles left Washington to assume command of further operations in Cuba and Porto Rico. On July 13, yellow fever having broken out among the American troops, General Toral was allowed to parley no further in regard to the surrender, and he submitted the next day. Santiago and the country east of a line drawn through Acerraderos, Palma and Sagua, together with the troops and munitions of war in the district, were surrendered, the United States agreeing to transport the troops back to Spain. Santiago was formally surrendered to General Shafter on July 17, and the American flag was hoisted over the palace. The Spanish troops marched out and gave up their arms. As the American troops entered the city, the better class of Spaniards remained indoors and made their observations from behind drawn blinds. Here and there were shouts for free Cuba, but, as a rule, only low mutterings were heard. The bones of dead horses were bleaching in the streets, and buzzards, as tame as sparrows, hopped aside to let the Americans pass. The hospitals were crowded with invalids who dragged themselves to the windows to see the harbinger of better things. In one of the squares was the old relic of a "merry-go-round" which told of happier days, but on every hand was the evidence of starvation. By the terms of the surrender, the Spanish were conveyed

to distant Spain at American expense. The contract was awarded to the Spanish Transatlantic Company. President McKinley issued a proclamation providing for the government of Santiago, and immediate preparations were made for an expedition against Porto Rico.

The Senate had solemnly disclaimed any intention to wage a war of conquest in Cuba, but it was apparent that the war would end in territorial expansion in other directions. Porto Rico was regarded as "a more desirable possession than Cuba, and there was a growing impression that it would be a permanent possession of the United States. Some began to fear that statesmen with an incurable taste for territory would not be disposed to stop at Porto Rico. Senator Davis, chairman of the Senate committee on foreign relations, said: "We are entering upon a new era. The flag will not be lowered from Hawaii, and the fate of the Philippines is linked with the destiny of the Republic. This nation in the future is to become a leading factor in international politics. We cannot retreat to our former policy of isolation. In the domains of the Pacific ours is henceforth the paramount power and we cannot escape the responsibility. The future of an unborn empire of the West, the furthestest West that borders on the East again, lies in our hands." Senator Davis was a man of recognized ability, and understood to be in close touch with the administration; but it was suggested that if the empire, of which he talked, should never be born, it would be fortunate for the United States, and some expressed the hope that Senator Davis's desire for "imperial mud-pie" did not represent the views of the controlling influences of his party.

While the Porto Rican expedition, under General Miles was landing at Guanica, Spain decided that it was time to bring an end to the war. On July 26, she began negotiations for peace, through M. Cambon, the French ambassador, at Washington. She admitted that she had been worsted in the contest of arms, and believed that the time had arrived when she could properly ask the co-operation

of the United States in terminating the war. She desired to know the terms upon which the United States would be willing to make peace. By July 30, the American Cabinet agreed on the following points: (1) Cuba to be free. (2) Porto Rico to be ceded to the United States. (3) One of the Ladrone Islands to be ceded to the United States as a coaling station. (4) All the Spanish military forces in the West Indies to be withdrawn, with the formal relinquishment by Spain of her sovereignty over any possessions among these islands. (5) Manila bay with the city and surrounding territory to be retained in possession of the United States at least as long as it should be necessary to devise and put in operation some plan for the future government of the entire group. The American reply was received at Madrid on July 31. It represented the President's decision and ultimatum, and Spain knew that the country was back of the President. The terms were liberal to Spain and just to the Americans. Not a dollar of war indemnity was asked, but this was probably because the United States knew that Spain had no money. Instead of a money indemnity it was preferred to secure terms by which Spain would no longer disturb the waters of the Gulf by her presence in the West Indies. The recent annexation of Hawaii had also made the United States less afraid to change her territorial policy. So she was willing to take land instead of money, even though that land was not contiguous territory. The reply of the Spanish Government was received at Washington on August 8. Several new points with regard to the terms of peace were raised; but they were soon settled, and the protocol was signed on August 12. It practically agreed with the terms previously offered by the United States. All the West India Islands except Cuba were to be ceded to the United States; Spanish authority was to be relinquished in Cuba; one of the Ladrone Islands was to be ceded to the American Government; and a peace commission was to consider all questions concerning the Philippines, except that of a coaling and naval

station, for which purpose the United States was to hold Manila. Spain had endeavored to secure greater concessions, but was unsuccessful in her effort.

Spain's loss of her West India possessions had a political and commercial significance for the other West India Islands. In Jamaica there was considerable annexation discussion. There was soon to be a sugar conference of the British West Indies, at Barbados, to agree upon a request to Parliament for action that would effectually assist the sugar interests. European bounties on beet sugar had worked to the disadvantage of the British planters in the West Indies. It was desired that these bounties should cease or that England should bear a tariff equal to the amount of bounty paid by other countries to producers. Porto Rico produced a great deal of sugar; and, since its incorporation into the United States, the position of the Jamaican planters was more insecure than ever—if Cuban sugar as well as Porto Rican sugar was to enter the United States free of duty there would be very little demand for Jamaican sugar. It was suggested that by annexation to the United States the industrial depression might be avoided. Annexation was especially opposed by the colored population of the island, and when S. C. Burke, the Jamaica member of the Barbados conference, started on his mission he was not authorized to propose annexation in case the demands of England were not granted. The conference published a resolution demanding aid to prevent an industrial crisis; they also demanded the adoption of measures either for the exclusion of bounty-fed sugar from the English market or the enforcement of countervailing duties. No ultimatum looking toward American annexation was adopted, although the question was incidentally discussed as a possible future contingency, in case Great Britain should refuse relief.

Public opinion in Cuba is divided as to the best future policy for the island. There has been much discussion in favor of annexation to the United States. Many property

owners, who had been able to cling to their homes during the violent reign of Spanish oppression, ardently desired speedy annexation and the absolute domination of equitable Anglo-Saxon-American principles to take the place of unstable, oscillating Latin impulsiveness which had been disastrously exemplified in the Spanish-American republics. Opposition to annexation arose from the devotion of many Cubans to a long-cherished dream for independence, rather than from any distaste for American institutions. Many who opposed annexation would probably welcome a union with the United States in which Cuba would have a genuine autonomy similar to that of Canada or the Australian colonies. The dangers from racial impulsiveness are fully recognized. Marti himself doubted the capacity of Cubans for self-government, though he did not believe that they could do any worse than Spain had done. The military leaders, including Gomez, look forward to an independent government. Annexation had been contemplated only as a secondary recourse. A Santiago newspaper says: "We reject annexation because it is against our feeling. It is impossible for us to live in a strange atmosphere of domination, even although American. Our customs and ideas have battled thirty years for liberty. Blood has been shed in rivers to preserve our individuality. None now shall take it from us. There is no room here for any save our own people, and no history or tradition save our own. Annexation, if realizable, would kill our people as a nation." It was stated that the resident Spaniards cried for annexation, but that they only aimed at the salvation of their own property. It is no easy problem that confronts the United States in the pacification of Cuba.

The ultimate political destiny of Cuba must be left to the prophet and the statesman, and to a kind and progressive future. There are many things to indicate that she cannot practice self-government so easily as Massachusetts did after the fires of 1776 were lighted. Bolivar, in 1815, while an exile in Jamaica, wrote a prophetic letter in which he

said that South America had been kept in a state of infancy so long, that it could "not keep the scale at just equilibrium" when called upon suddenly, without preparation and knowledge, to act the part of legislators, judges, diplomats and executives—that it was "liable, like a new Icarus, to see its wings melted and fall into the abyss." What Bolivar said in regard to South America may also possibly be true in regard to Cuba. Whether she shall become independent under a stable government, or whether she will cast her star with the American stars and wear the American colors, will depend upon the future exigencies and the changes in sentiment or policy. It is a question which cannot be decided by merely looking to precedents or past opinions. But when the Spanish soldiers sailed back to Spain during the peace negotiations of 1898, Cuba was free from Spanish rule.

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